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The cassation respondent had an iron sand transportation business and, in order to improve efficiency, had successfully applied for a credit facility (murabahah) from the cassation applicant to purchase a container truck. The agreement stated that, in the event of any dispute, the first course of action would be to resolve that dispute in a deliberative manner between the two parties, but if deliberations were to fail, both parties agree to resolve the dispute before the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional).

The cassation respondent had acquired a credit facility from the cassation applicant for IDR 1.476 billion, with a down payment of IDR 265,100,000. The cassation respondent subsequently experienced many financial ups and downs, impeding his ability to make repayments to the cassation applicant. The cassation respondent, however, if late to make his repayment, would also pay the late fee associated therein.

On 3 August 2013 at 8:30pm, the cassation respondent repossessed the container truck, subject of the agreement. It did so after the cassation respondent was 17 days late to make a repayment. The parties had agreed that the cassation respondent would pay a late fee of 0.002 per cent of the nominal repayment per day, and after 30 days in default, the cassation applicant would be entitled to repossess the vehicle. Pursuant to art 1365 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), the cassation respondent had sought damages.

The South Jakarta Religious Court (lower court) had ordered the cassation applicant to return to the cassation respondent the vehicle subject of the credit facility agreement, as well as to pay to the cassation respondent damages of IDR 167,355,000. At the same time, the lower court ordered the cassation respondent to pay to the cassation applicant arrears of IDR 167,355,000, and a fine of IDR 209,193,750. The Jakarta High Religious Court then upheld this decision on appeal.

The cassation applicant sought to challenge the decision on the grounds that the lower courts both erred in their application of the law. Specifically, that the Jakarta High Religious Court had failed to provide reasons or clarity for its decision to uphold the decision of the South Jakarta Religious Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the appeal, concurring with the cassation applicant that the lower courts had failed to apply the law correctly. The court found that the parties had entered into a murabahah agreement on 17 December 2010, the subject of which (the vehicle) had been repossessed by the cassation applicant. The court believed that such conduct was a breach of the agreement rather than illegal conduct. Moreover, the right to take legal action must be based on one party's failure to fulfil an contractual obligation, meaning that the cassation respondent needed to explain which section of the agreement it believed the cassation applicant had contravened. Finally, the court reasoned, the vehicle was not seized by the cassation applicant. For those reasons, the court found in favour of the cassation applicant.

The plaintiff submitted that, on 24 June 2011, he and the defendant had entered into a murabahah financing agreement for a 2011 Daihatsu vehicle. Pursuant to the agreement, the plaintiff was to pay to the defendant IDR 198,060,000. This figure comprised the price of the vehicle, insurance, as well as other incidental costs. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would pay this sum in 52 monthly payments of IDR 3,301,000, which, for the first seven months, the plaintiff did. On the eighth month, however, a person borrowing the vehicle from the plaintiff did not return it, causing the plaintiff to report the vehicle stolen to the police. The plaintiff requested that the defendant grant him a grace period vis-à-vis repayments while the police conducted its investigation into the vehicle’s whereabouts. The defendant, however, reported the plaintiff to the police for dealing with the vehicle inappropriately by transferring it to a third party. (The defendant had perceived the vehicle to be a fiduciary security guarantee.) The plaintiff cited art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking, claiming that the defendant should have instead sought to resolve the issue pursuant to shari’a principles, via deliberation (musyawarah), banking mediation, through the National Shari’a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional – BASYARNAS), or, if necessary, the religious courts. Moreover, that the grounds invoked by the defendant in his police report repudiated the fiduciary principles of the agreement, and were contradictory to the principles of shari’a. In principle, the plaintiff argued, a murabahah agreement is a financing facility designed to benefit both parties. It is instigated by a capital holder (shahib al-mal) with another party in need via a sale-purchase transaction, clear that the sale price includes a profit for the capital holder and is to be repaid in cash or instalments (art 20(6) of Supreme Court Regulation No. 2 of 2008 on the Compilation of Shari’a Economy Laws). By repudiating the plaintiff’s request for a grace period, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had, in fact, turned the agreement into a fiduciary security guarantee agreement. For pain and suffering, the plaintiff sought IDR 300 million.

Citing art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), as well as the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda (agreements must be kept), the defendant lodged an objection to the perceived absolute authority of the court to adjudicate the case. The defendant stated that both he and the plaintiff had agreed (in art 8(2) of their agreement) to resolve any disputes arising from the agreement before the Yogyakarta State Court (Pengadilan Negeri Yogyakarta), if initial deliberation proved unsuccessful. In other words, the parties had agreed to preclude the court from having jurisdiction over the case. To strengthen his claim regarding a civil court adjudicating a shari’a banking dispute, the defendant cited art 55(2) of Law No. 21 of 2008, including the Elucidation of art 55(2).

The defendant lodged three other objections:

1. that while the plaintiff had incorrectly filed his complaint against a Maman Suryanto, rather than the defendant, he still should have filed his complaint against the company represented by the defendant, rather than the defendant personally;
2. that the damages for pain and suffering sought by the plaintiff were not supported by sufficiently clear particulars and authentic evidence; and
3. that the plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant had transformed the agreement into a fiduciary guarantee agreement was premature in that it was contingent upon the police investigation into whether or not the plaintiff’s conduct constituted a criminal transfer of a fiduciary security guarantee (the vehicle), contrary to art 372 of the Indonesian Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana) and art 36 of Law No. 42 of 1999 on Fiduciary Guarantees.

As part of his counterclaim, the defendant sought to have the court find that the plaintiff had defaulted on his repayments. The defendant claimed he had reminded the plaintiff several times, verbally and in writing, to make the eighth repayment, but the plaintiff had still defaulted. The defendant sought IDR 674,953,000 in material and immaterial loss, requested that the court guarantee this sum against the plaintiff’s current and future assets, as well as the Daihatsu vehicle, and sought an additional IDR 1 million for every day the plaintiff was late in making repayments.

First, the court noted that the defendant’s claim regarding the court’s judicial authority (or lack thereof) had been dismissed in an interlocutory decision on 17 June 2014. It assented to the defendant’s first objection, however, dismissing the case on the grounds that the defendant lacked the necessary legal standing, and that, therefore, the plaintiff should have submitted its claim against the company of the defendant, rather than against the defendant himself.

On 30 July 2008, the first plaintiff and his wife, the second plaintiff, entered into a cooperative agreement with the second defendant, the agent of which was the third defendant. Pursuant to the agreement, the term of which was 36 months, the plaintiffs leveraged the deed of title to their property. The parties also agreed that the second defendant would provide monthly income portions from the agreement of IDR 1,616,800 to the plaintiffs. The second defendant agreed to:

1. ensure the security of the plaintiffs' property;
2. not allow the deed of title (original or photocopy) to change hands;
3. not use the deed of title, except for purposes relating to the provision of income portions; and
4. return to the plaintiffs the deed of title if the agreement came to an end.

The plaintiffs agreed to:

1. accept a portion of the profits, as agreed to by both sides;
2. be provided with a security guarantee for the deed of title provided to the second defendant; and
3. have the deed of title returned if the agreement came to an end.

The plaintiffs submitted that the second defendant had fulfilled its obligations to the plaintiffs by providing them with IDR 1,616,800 per month until April 2010, when the second defendant defaulted on this part of the agreement. The plaintiffs then filed a civil claim against the second, third and fourth defendants (as first, second and third defendants), and first defendant (as fourth defendant) with the Sleman State Court on 28 January 2011, with the decision being handed down on 16 August 2011.

Initially, the security guarantee over the second plaintiff's property had been with the first defendant pursuant to a Mudharabah agreement between the second defendant as debtor and the first defendant as creditor (dated: 27 December 2007), with an arrears of IDR 1.5 billion, with security in the form of several other deeds of title. The plaintiffs submitted that, as a result of subterfuge on the part of the first and second defendants, the security over the deed of title of a property belonging to a Prof. Dr Kuswandi was removed by the second defendant, working together with the first defendant, and replaced by the deed of title belonging to the property of the second plaintiff. Moreover, that the first and second defendants then coerced the plaintiffs into assenting to the inclusion of an addendum to the initial agreement, the contents of which were the inclusion of the second plaintiff's property, by threatening that the plaintiffs would not receive any dividends. In actual fact, the plaintiffs never received any dividends, regardless.

On 20 September 2010, the first defendant wrote to the second defendant instructing the second defendant to pay to the first defendant arrears owed pursuant to their original agreement. Failure to make payment would result in the auctioning of the property. The first defendant made an application to auction the property, but a lack of interest from prospective bidders prevented the property from being auctioned. Regardless, the plaintiffs submitted that such conduct on the part of the first plaintiff was illegal.

The Sleman State Court had, on 16 August 2011, ordered the second, third and fourth defendants to pay to the plaintiffs IDR 450 million in damages. The plaintiffs, however, filed an application with the Bantul Religious Court for, what it perceived to be, breaches of shari'a law (muamalat law) on the part of the defendants. The plaintiffs sought orders from the court that:

1. the defendants not auction the second plaintiff's property;
2. declare the Sleman State Court's decision to be legally binding;
3. declare the Mudharabah agreement between the first and second defendants contrary to shari'a law principles and, therefore, null and void;
4. declare the addendum null and void;
5. the defendants pay damages, pursuant to the decision of the Sleman State Court; and
6. declare the first defendant's conduct vis-a-vis the deed of title of the second plaintiff's property unlawful.

The court declined to pass judgment, however, acceding to the first defendant's objection that the parties to the dispute had agreed to resolve all disputes before the National Shari'a Arbitration Body.

The plaintiff’s legal counsel asserted that, on 24 August 2011, the plaintiff (deceased) and defendant (Bank BRI Syari’ah Cabang Surabaya) entered into a financing agreement (Al Qardh) to enable the plaintiff to purchase precious metals. Articles 1 and 2 of the agreement stated that the defendant would lend to the plaintiff IDR 95.4 million to be used to purchase 200 grams of gold from the precious metals company Antam. The gold was valued at IDR 106 million, and required a down payment of IDR 10.6 million. Pursuant to art 3 of the agreement, the plaintiff was required to repay the defendant in instalments of IDR 1,590,000, over a period of 60 months (until 24 August 2016). Upon repayment of two instalments, the plaintiff was then entitled to a cash back incentive, notably after repaying the first three instalments, as well as the twelfth instalment. Article 5(1) of the agreement also specified that to guarantee the return of the monies loaned, the plaintiff was to use the 200 grams of gold as collateral. To ensure the gold was cared for and stored for the period of the loan, the plaintiff paid to the defendant a monthly fee of IDR 1,033,500, making his total monthly repayments IDR 2,623,500.

The plaintiff successfully made these repayments for 29 months (until January 2014), while the defendant upheld its end of the bargain by paying to the plaintiff the cash back incentives up until November 2013, after which it defaulted. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to act in good faith, providing a variety of reasons to postpone the payment of the cash back incentives. The plaintiff paid to the defendant the remainder of his debt owing (IDR 49,290,000 as of 7 February 2014), hoping that the defendant would then repay to the plaintiff all its cash back incentives. The defendant, however, continued to provide the plaintiff with reasons as to why it could not uphold its end of the bargain. Finally, on 23 May 2014, the defendant paid to the plaintiff the cash back for January 2014 (IDR 912,925) and March 2014 (IDR 981,825) totalling IDR 1,894,750.  The plaintiff told the court he had instigated proceedings to recoup the unpaid cash back incentives totalling IDR 21,893,175. The plaintiff also objected to the defendant unlawfully debiting the plaintiff’s bank account for IDR 3,100,500 when the principal debt had been repaid. The defendant claimed that this debit was to cover the plaintiff’s ijarah (fee) for February 2014, in addition to a fine equal to two months’ ijarah, resulting from the plaintiff repaying the entire principal. The plaintiff, however, claimed that the debit was clearly unlawful and in contravention of arts 2(3) and 4(1)(c) of the ijarah agreement, which stated that the ijarah period concluded when the gold/items being stored and cared for by the defendant no longer constituted a surety and had been returned to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought actual damages to the value of IDR 52,044,637, as well as compensatory damages to the value of IDR 1 billion for pain and suffering. For every day the defendant failed to pay after the seven day deadline he sought the court to enforce, the plaintiff requested that the defendant pay a one per cent fine. Moreover, if the defendant was unable to pay the damages sought by the plaintiff, the plaintiff recommended that the court order it to sell a property it owned and pay the damages from the proceeds of the sale. The plaintiff also recommended the court hand down judgment, the implementation of which could not be delayed if the defendant sought to appeal the decision.

The defendant lodged an exception to the plaintiff’s case, stating that the court was not authorised to adjudicate the case. The defendant argued that art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking permits parties to specify in an agreement their preferred mode of dispute resolution, which does not have to be a religious court, that being a state court or arbitration body. It argued that the parties’ express desire, as stated in art 12 of the agreement, was to resolve any disputes relating to the agreement before the National Shari’a Arbitration Board (Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional – Basyarnas), if initial discussions and deliberation (musyawarah) were unsuccessful. Moreover, that any decision made by Basyarnas was first and final. The defendant also cited art 59 of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Authority, which acknowledges arbitration as a final and binding form of civil dispute resolution, based on a written agreement by the parties to the dispute. In the event one of the parties to a dispute does not abide by the ruling of the arbiter, art 59(3) enables the other party to lodge an application with the Chief Justice of the state court (Pengadilan Negeri) to compel the non-abiding party to do so. The defendant also noted that the elucidation of art 59(1) defines 'arbitration' as including shari’a arbitration.

In regards to the plaintiff’s principal claim, the defendant retorted that the plaintiff’s calculations in regards to the cash back payments were excessive. It also argued that the monthly instalments owed by the plaintiff were IDR 2,623,500 (this figure comprised IDR 1,590,000 based on the Al-Qard agreement, and IDR 1,033,500 per the ijarah agreement). The defendant asserted that the cash back arrangement derived from the Al-Qard agreement, because it would otherwise have been a violation of the current law and the agreement itself, meaning that it must be calculated based on the ijarah agreement, on the condition the plaintiff paid all repayments for the entire 60 months, without defaulting. For the plaintiff to repay the entire contract price, and then to expect to receive all cash back payments at once, was not what the parties had agreed to in the ijarah agreement. The defendant acknowledged that the plaintiff had overpaid the defendant by IDR 2,067,100 when paying out the contract price, and was happy to return the excess monies. In regards to the actual damages sought by the plaintiff, the defendant struggled to understand the plaintiff’s reasoning and calculations. More fascinating, however, was its summation of the IDR 1 billion sought in compensatory damages, which it described as a "fantastic number that fell from the sky" (nilai yang fantastis yang jatuh dari langit) that had no basis.

The court acknowledged that the parties had, in art 12 of the agreement, agreed to resolve any disputes via arbitration. It cited Surat Al-Maidah, verse 1, which encourages Muslims to uphold the agreements they make, as well as art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), which requires parties to an agreement to treat that agreement as law, and art 4(1) and (2) of Law No. 30 of 1999 on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution, which permits parties to agree to arbitration as their preferred mode of dispute resolution. In regards to the Constitutional Court’s (No. 93/PUU-X/2012) decision regarding the elucidation of art 55(2) of Law No. 21 of 2008, and vesting in the religious judiciary absolute jurisdiction over shari’a banking cases, the court said it needed to consider the opinion of Prof Dr Laica Marzuki, former Supreme Court and Constitutional Court Justice, that Constitutional Court judgments have no retroactive application, but are prospectively binding. As the parties had reached their agreement on 21 August 2011, the court found that the Constitutional Court’s judgment was inapplicable and, therefore, the parties were bound by the contents of the agreement.

The first respondent, the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syari'ah Nasional – Basyarnas), had made a decision on 16 September 2009 between the second respondent (PT. Atriumasta Sakti) and the applicant (PT. Bank Syariah Mandiri), ordering the applicant to return to the second respondent IDR 878,791,366. This figure comprised a banking provision cost payment of IDR 350 million, or one per cent of the value of the financing facility worth IDR 35 billion, because the Murabahah agreement between the two parties had been declared invalid by the first respondent; IDR 45,027,000 in project insurance monies; IDR 5,962,700 in upfront employee social security payments; IDR 298,135,000 to the DKI Jakarta Government Construction Structuring and Supervision Services; and instalment repayments of IDR 179,666,666. The applicant was also ordered to return to the respondent any other costs associated, provided those costs could be verified by the Public Accountants' Office. Basyarnas also decided that if the applicant failed to abide by its decision, the respondent could lodge an application with Bank Indonesia (the Indonesian central bank) to hand the applicant an administrative sanction, and reduce the applicant's credit rating.

The court noted that, pursuant to art 70 of Law No. 30 of 1999, as well as the Elucidation of Chapter VII of Law 30, in conjunction with Law No. 7 of 1989 as amended by Law No. 3 of 2006, and Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2008, a party to such a dispute may request that a religious court declare a Basyarnas decision null and void. Article 70, however, only applies if: a. the decision was based on the submission of a false document; b. a relevant document was concealed by the opposing party; or c. the decision was based on misleading information. In this instance, the applicant claimed that the first respondent had failed to consider material legal facts to its case, therefore invoking art 70(c). Based on a submission made by the second respondent that the applicant had failed to carry out the second and subsequent stages of liquidation deriving from the Murabahah financing facility, the first respondent had determined that the applicant had defaulted on its agreement with the second respondent. The applicant claimed that the first respondent had ignored the fact that it was actually the second respondent who had defaulted by:

1. failing to produce the original building permit and then failing to the applicant with a copy, pursuant to art 3(1) of the Murabahah agreement;
2. failing to pay the notary, pursuant to art 3(4) of the agreement; and
3. failing to transfer its own self-financing monies, pursuant to art 3(23) of the agreement.

While the second respondent had already shown the applicant a building permit management services contract between it and H. Jayadi Kusumah, as well as proof of payment of a quote for 1 March 2005 for IDR 3,212,500,000 to H. Jayadi Kusumah as a buliding permit enactment management fee, as well as permission for other construction for the Ruko Soho Carbella Square project, the applicant claimed that the first respondent had ignored the fact that the reliability of this quote had not been established. Moreover, the applicant had even requested to see the quote via the Basyarnas secretary, pursuant to trial procedures, but had been denied. This, the applicant claimed, precluded it from carrying out its end of the bargain. In short, the applicant claimed the second respondent had failed to hand over to the applicant its building permit, whereas the second respondent had claimed it had paid IDR 3,212,500,000 to H. Jayadi Kusumah to arrange the building permit and other necessary construction permits.

The applicant also claimed that there was a material disparity between the final draft of the Basyarnas decision and the decision provided to the Central Jakarta Religious Court insofar as the Religious Court had been told that Basyarnas would not accede to claims for damages until their reliability had been verified by the Public Accountant. While the Religious Court declared the Basyarnas decision null and void, the Supreme Court found that the Religious Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, thereby reinstating the Basyarnas decision.

Pursuant to art 67(c) of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, in conjunction with Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the applicant requested the court reconsider (peninjauan kembali) its decision on the grounds that the court had granted more than that sought by the respondents. It alleged that:

1. the court had unnecessarily found that the Central Jakarta Religious Court did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case;
2. that the Basyarnas decision ordered it to return to the applicant other costs not related to the transaction in question; and
3. it had unnecessarily authorised the second respondent to ask Bank Indonesia to sanction the applicant if it failed to comply with its decision.

The applicant also claimed that Basyarnas had made a legal error by directing the secretary to register an official copy of the decision with the Central Jakarta Religious Court registrar, when Law No. 30 of 1999 requires that such decisions be registered with the State Court (Pengadilan Negeri). The applicant also claimed that the Supreme Court, in the first instance, had cited art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari'a Banking, stating that as the dispute was a shari'a banking dispute, the religious courts had jurisdiction, only to then declare the religious courts did not have jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the applicant's review (peninjauan kembali) appeal, ordering it to pay costs of IDR 2.5 million. In doing so, it held that no legal error had been made by the court in the first instance. Rather, that the parties to the dispute had already clearly stated that the dispute would be resolved via arbitration, thereby invoking art 2 of Law No. 30 of 1999, and precluding the state courts and religious courts from having jurisdiction (art 3 of Law No. 30 of 1999). The court also noted that Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2008 conflicted with art 59(3) of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Authority, and had accordingly already been rendered null and void by Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2010. Moreover, while the applicant had sought to invoke art 70(c) of Law No. 30 of 1999, it had failed to prove upon what misleading information its opponents' case had rested.

This fatwa (in its attachment) states that the provision of alms (zakat) for educational purposes, especially in the form of scholarships, is rightful (sah) because it constitutes a benevolent act of charity (ashnaf fi sabilillah). More specifically, that scholarships are a form of assistance derived from alms based on the Qur'an, surah At-Taubah, verse 60, based on the understanding that charity according to a group of legal scholars (fiqh ulama) from several schools of thought (mazhab), as well as exegisis scholars (ulama tafsir), is a general utterance (lafaznya umum).

The fatwa also states that Muslim students, as recipients of alms-derived scholarships:

1. should strive for academic achievement;
2. be prioritised based on their level of impecuniosity; and
3. study that which will benefit the Indonesian nation.

In this opinion, addressed to the Official Gazette, the Secretary of the Guardian Council invalidated Article 26 –Note 1 of the Law on the Formation, Duties, and Election of National Islamic Councils 1996. He argued that because Guardian Council does not have any supervisory authority over the decisions of the City Councils (unlike legislative acts), religious minorities could not represent Muslims where majority of residents are Muslims.

The plaintiffs submitted that they had entered into a shari'a credit loan agreement with the first defendant for IDR 2 billion, leveraging six properties in their names as a shari'a credit guarantee. The plaintiffs maintained that they had met their financial repayment obligations to the first defendant, and had always acted in good faith towards the first defendant. The plaintiffs referred to this good faith because they sought to novate the terms of the shari'a credit loan agreement through the Magelang Religious Court, and were concerned that the first defendant would auction the properties, or several thereof, in response, without first going through the court. Indeed, the plaintiffs submitted, the first defendant, through the second defendant, had unilaterally auctioned the plaintiffs' properties, contrary to law, justice and humanity, especially in terms of the shari'a economy. Moreover, that in order for the conduct of the first and second defendant to be legal, they first needed to obtain the recommendation of the interested co-defendant. The plaintiffs submitted that as the first and second defendant had failed to do so, they should be ordered to pay to the plaintiffs IDR 7 million per day for every day they failed to carry out the orders of the Mageland Religious Court. The novation of terms of a contract, the plaintiffs submitted, was regulated in art 180 of the Herziene Inlandsch/Indonesisch Reglement (HIR).

The defendants submitted that a clause in the original agreement stated that any dispute arising would be settled before the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional), pursuant to art 59(1) of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Authority, and arts 2 and (4)(1) and (2) of Law No. 30 of 1999 on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution. The court noted that, pursuant to art 49(i) of Law No. 3 of 2006 on the Religious Judiciary, and art 55(1) and (2) of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari'a Banking, the religious courts have the absolute competence to resolve shari'a banking disputes, provided the agreement in dispute does not specify otherwise. As the parties had specified otherwise, the court found that art 1338(1) of the Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), which states that all contractual agreements are to be treated as statutes for the parties that make them, applied. In shari'a law, the court stated, this concept in muamalah (commercial and civil law) is known as asas al-sufiah, al-muamalah al-ibahah. Accordingly, the court found that it was precluded from adjudicating the dispute.

This statute repeals Law No. 38 of 1999 on Zakat Management. It provides the Islamic rationale behind zakat (alms), and stipulates the implementation and regulation of the National Zakat Management Body (BAZNAS - Badan Amil Zakat Nasional), as well as its branches at province and regency/municipality levels. BAZNAS is responsible for the collection, distribution, utilisation and reporting, of zakat, as well as infaq, sadaqah, and other Islamic social funding. The statute also prescribes as punitive measures a variety of fines and terms of imprisonment for breaches of provisions therein.

The purpose of this ministerial decree is to streamline Islamic religious studies and Arabic language education in madrasah nationally for 2013-2015 to ensure quality of the curriculum.

This statute regulates consumer protection in Indonesia. Specifically, it legislates with regard to the rights and obligations of consumers and traders, prohibited conduct, standard clauses, responsibilities of traders, development and monitoring, the National Consumer Protection Body (Badan Perlindungan Konsumen Nasional), people's consumer protection bodies, and dispute resolution and related bodies.

A Muslim-naturalized American citizen of Egyptian national origin sued Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff, along with officials at the Transportation Security Administration, under Title VII, as well as under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), the Fifth Amendment, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Privacy Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff was suspended from work with the Federal Aviation Administration after he failed to obtain a security clearance renewal following 9/11, and the plaintiff alleged that his security clearance was not renewed because he was Egyptian and Muslim. The defendant claimed that the Administration did not control who receives a security clearance, and that their action suspending him was merely a result of his failure to maintain his previous level of clearance. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of religious or national-origin discrimination [with no allegation of barring practices of Islamic ritual law, for example] as articulated by McDonnell Douglas, and that without the security clearance, he was no longer qualified for his job. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

An Arab Muslim truck driver for Swift Transportation Company sued his former employer under Title VII, Tennessee state law, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion, as well as intentional economic harm under state law and the FMLA. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that non-Arabs and non-Muslims received better work assignments and that fellow drivers made “hateful” comments regarding his religion and national origin. However, he did not provide any specifics regarding these claims. The defendant claimed that it terminated the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not report an accident within the timeframe mandated by the company. The Court granted the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating employment, and because the plaintiff did not exhaust all administrative measures before pursuing a case in court. The plaintiff madeno explicit connection to Islamic law, except that to complain of perceived bias on the basis of his religion, which may have included religious practice.

A Pakistani Muslim hospital employee sued his employer under Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law (after receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)), alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff argued that he received negative performance evaluations because he was absent from work on several Fridays and other days in observance of Islamic religious prayer services and holidays, in compliance with Islamic ritual law. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie discrimination claim, as he never articulated any adverse employment action suffered. The Court, however, allowed Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim to move forward as it raised a material question of fact that should be decided by a jury. 

An Afghani Muslim security guard at a company that contracted with his former employer for his security guard services sued under Title VII and §1983, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin as well as a hostile work environment. The plaintiff claimed that, while working for the company, he was harassed by the property manager who asked him if he was from Afghanistan and if he was Muslim. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim, concluding that the plaintiff and defendant company did not have an employee-employer relationship, that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and that the alleged actions were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment finding. The plaintiff made no explicit claim about Islamic law except to complain of perceived bias on the basis of his religion, which may have included ritual practices based on Islamic law.

Representing an Arab-American Muslim former employee of the Omni Hotels, the EEOC sued the hotel chain under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiff claimed that the company fired the employee from his position because he was vocal in his community regarding American-Islamic relations following the events of 9/11. The company argued that his termination resulted from the employee’s lackluster sales at the hotel he was managing, and that the plaintiff resigned for his own personal reasons. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that, while the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, it failed to provide evidence showing that the defendant’s defense was a pretext for discriminatory intent.

A Lebanese Muslim physician sued his former employer, represented by Secretary of Veteran Affairs Jim Nicholson, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination under Title VII. The plaintiff claimed that the VA Medical Center, his place of employment, subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his identity as both Lebanese and Muslim [presumably related to his observance of Islamic ritual law] and that his supervisors retaliated against him for filing a claim with the EEOC. He further argued that the employer's discrimination ultimately led to his termination. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative options before initiating a lawsuit in court, and that he had not demonstrated that his termination was retaliatory.  

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Trinidad and Tobago's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

The plaintiff, who won a judgment in the lower court, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine’s refusal to retry an employment discrimination case in which the jury refused to award damages despite finding the defendants guilty. In the underlying case, the plaintiff had sued his employer under §1981 and Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination as well as harassment based on his race and religion in the form of a wide range of offensive actions and statements aimed at the plaintiff, including likening the plaintiff to Osama bin Laden, telling him to go back to his own country, and attempts to shove pork in his mouth (Islamic law prohibits the consumption of pork). The plaintiff argued that on a guilty finding, the jury was obliged to award damages as a matter of law. The appellate court, however, pointed to precedent rejecting this argument, and thus affirmed the lower court’s decision not to retry the case.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Peru (República del Perú), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Peru's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.