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This fatwa states that the Islam Jama'ah sect commenced in Indonesia in the 1970s. As its teachings were misled and misleading, and led to disquiet among Indonesian society, its interpretation of Islam was prohibited by the government in 1971. Islam Jama'ah, however, continued to operate under different names, which continued to change until 1977-78. The philosophy of Islam Jama'ah was that there were 72 categories of Muslims who were not part of Islam Jama'ah and would, therefore, be directed to hell.

The sect believed it had to appoint a Leader of Believers (Amirul Mukminin) as its central leadership; a leader who must be obeyed. Adherents had to pledge allegiance to this Leader in order to be guaranteed passage to heaven, and the only rightful and permissible Islamic teachings came from ther Leader. Adherents of the sect also had to cut off ties with persons from these other categories, even if those people were their parents; they were not allowed to pray behind people who were not adherents of Islam Jama'ah; they were not allowed to wear clothing for prayers that had been touched by people who were not adherents unless it had been cleansed; husbands even had to endeavour to make their wives join the sect, and if their wives refused, they would have to divorce them. A legitimate marriage was one officiated by the sect's leader, and for a sermon to be legitimate it would have to be conducted in Arabic.

This fatwa states that Islam Jama'ah, Darul Hadits (or whatever other pseudonym the sect may have adopted), is contrary to the teachings of Islam, and that its dissemination is designed to destablise the state. It implores Muslims to avoid its teachings and to return to the pure teachings of Islam with the intent and desire to similarly save those who have already chosen Islam as their religion from the wrath of Allah. It also implores people to report to their local public prosecutor any evidence of activities conducted by Islam Jama'ah.

This regional regulation makes provision for the management of collection and management of zakat (alms), infaq (property donated by a person or entity, outside of zakat, for the purpose of public welfare), sadaqah (property donated by a Muslim or entity owned by a Muslim, outside of zakat, for the purpose of public welfare), and waqf (the permanent dedication by a Muslim of property, usually land, for pious, religious or charitable purposes).

This regional regulation makes provision for the management of zakat (alms), infaq (property donated by a person or entity, outside of zakat, for the purpose of public welfare), and sadaqah (property donated by a Muslim or entity owned by a Muslim, outside of zakat, for the purpose of public welfare), through the Badan Amil Zakat (Alms Administering Body) and Lembaga Amil Zakat (Alms Administering Institution).

This regional regulation makes provision for the management of zakat (alms), infaq (property donated by a person or entity, outside of zakat, for the purpose of public welfare), and sadaqah (property donated by a Muslim or entity owned by a Muslim, outside of zakat, for the purpose of public welfare), through the Badan Amil Zakat (Alms Administering Body), Palopo, South Sulawesi (Sulawesi Selatan).

The parties were married on 19 May 2012. They had no children. The applicant submitted that, since the beginning of June 2012, he and the respondent had quarrelled regularly. This was the result of:

1. the parties' frequent difference of opinion;
2. the appellant reverting to Christianity (Protestantism) from Islam; and
3. the respondent's temperamental and emotional nature, which would often result in the respondent becoming vulgar and using profane language, which left the appellant feeling that to continue domestic life with the respondent would be untenable.

Consequently, the parties had separated for approximately six months leading up to the proceeding. The applicant had also attempted to deliberate with the respondent to reach a truce, but to no avail. Accordingly, the applicant applied to the court for a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i).

The respondent disputed the applicant's three primary submissions, maintaining that it was the applicant who was temperamental, aggressive, and had threatened to divorce the respondent. More specifically, it was the applicant who had instigated the quarrelling so that he had a legal reason to divorce the respondent (ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975), because he had already reverted to Christianity, and had become involved with another woman.

In her counterclaim, the respondent sought the following monetary compensation, in accordance with the applicant's monthly salary of IDR 20 million: IDR 45 million for iddah (100-day period following divorce) and IDR 150 million for mut'ah (divorce compensation). The respondent also asserted that she had spent IDR 104,568,000 of her own money on the apartment in which the parties had lived in Central Jakarta prior to marrying the applicant, as well as IDR 69.5 million on personal effects (total: IDR 174,068,000).

While the court acceded to the applicant's claim that the parties' marriage was untenable, it could not grant the applicant himself a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i) because he had already reverted to Christianity. Instead, pursuant to the 2010 revised edition of the Guidelines on the Implementation and Administration of the Religious Judiciary (Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas dan Administrasi Peradilan Agama), it granted the applicant an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) and ordered the applicant to pay to the respondent IDR 15 million for iddah, as well as IDR 50 million for mut'ah. The court acceded to the respondent's claim that she had paid IDR 174,068,000 of her own money towards accommodation and personal effects prior to marrying the applicant, stipulating the monetary value of the parties' joint assets as IDR 53,832,000. The court ordered the applicant to transfer to the respondent IDR 26,916,000, and to auction the parties' property and divide the proceeds if necessary. The court also ordered the applicant to pay costs of IDR 416,000.

The parties were married on 18 June 2006 and had one child. They lived with the respondent's parents for one year, before moving to their own home, where they had lived for approximately five years. The applicant, however, claimed that he and the respondent had begun to quarrel regularly because the respondent:

1. had ordered the applicant to leave the house;
2. often owed other people money, unbeknownst to the applicant; and
3. frequently directed profane language at the applicant.

When problems escalated, the parties separated. The applicant's family's efforts to make the parties reconcile were also to no avail. As a result, the applicant believed that the only feasible option remaining was divorce.

The court stated that, because the case centred around a domestic dispute, art 22(2) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 76(1) of Law No. 7 of 1989, compelled it to hear information from witnesses who were family or persons close to the parties, in order to ascertain the extent of the quarrelling between the parties. Based on the information provided by the two witnesses produced by the applicant, the court was convinced that the applicant's claim was grounded in fact. Moreover, the purpose of marriage, being to create a joyful and enduring family and domestic life, per art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, was no longer feasible. Accordingly, the court acceded to the applicant's request and granted him a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i).

The parties were married on 10 December 2006 and had two children (born: 22 February 2008 and 9 November 2013). They had lived with the plaintiff's parents in Padang for approximately five years, before moving to the defendant's parents' home until they separated. Initially, the parties' marriage had been harmonious. After five years, however, it had become quarrelsome. The plaintiff submitted that this was because the defendant had:

1. frequently brought other women home;
2. failed to show sufficient care for the plaintiff and their children; and
3. been an irresponsible husband, failing to provide enough for his family financially.

The plaintiff also submitted that whenever the parties would quarrel, the defendant would resort using profane language, which would upset the plaintiff. Familial mediation had also proven to be in vain. Problems escalated on 2 December 2014 when the plaintiff caught the defendant telephoning someone she did not know. Then the defendant became angry when the plaintiff suggested the parties collect their children from the plaintiff's parents' home, appearing to be more interested in talking to the person on his phone. This resulted in the defendant orally divorcing the plaintiff, after which the plaintiff left the plaintiff's parents' home for her own parents' home. Since then the parties had remained separated.

The plaintiff requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra). The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 3 September 2004 and had two children. The plaintiff submitted that, on 28 March 2014, the defendant accompanied the plaintiff to Medan for medical treatment. The next day the defendant returned home, leaving the plaintiff at her elder sibling's home. Initially, the parties had remained in contact. After two months, however, the plaintiff telephoned the defendant asking why he had not inquired as to how she was, and why he had not sent her any money. When the plaintiff pushed the issue, it became apparent that the defendant had intended to divorce the plaintiff.

On 4 September 2014, the defendant telephoned the plaintiff, asking her to take him to his parents' home. The plaintiff was unsure, however, for how long the defendant had been living with his parents. When the plaintiff and her parents attended the defendant's parents' home to bring him back to the parties' home, the defendant orally divorced (talak) the plaintiff. Since then the parties' communication had ceased. Moreover, the parties had lived separately since 28 March 2014, and the defendant had failed to provide the plaintiff with any financial support. Therefore, the plaintiff submitted, the defendant had contravened his marriage vows (sighat taklik talak), per the parties' marriage book (buku nikah), entitling her to divorce the defendant for a fee (iwadh).

Seeking to be exempted from any court fees, the plaintiff also submitted that she was an impecunious person, financially responsible for two children, receiving government-funded health benefits, and the holder of a social security card.

Pursuant to art 116(g) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court granted the plaintiff a divorce for a fee (talak satu khul'i), as well as exempting her from all court fees.

The first applicant submitted that she had married a man by the name of Drs. Moerdiono on 20 December 1993, pursuant to Islamic norms. According to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, a marriage is lawful if performed in accordance with the respective religion and beliefs of the persons wishing to marry. The first applicant's marriage, however, had not been recorded with the Office of Religious Affairs, as required by art 2(2) of the Law No. 1 of 1974. As a result, the legal status of the first applicant's child (the second applicant) was that the second applicant had been born out of wedlock, per art 43(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974, and therefore only had a civil relationship with his mother and his mother's family. According to Islam, however, the first applicant's child was legitimate (sah) because the applicant was married to the second applicant's father when the second applicant was born meaning the second applicant's lineage with his father must be acknowledged.

The applicant submitted that her constitutional rights and those of the second applicant, as guaranteed by arts 28B(1) and (2), and 28D(1) of the 1945 Constitution, had been repudiated by virtue of art 43(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974.

The court acceded to the applicant's submission regarding art 43(1) stating that the article was to be read down as meaning that a child's civil relationship with its father and its father's family depended on scientific proof that the child was a blood relation of the father.

The prosecution submitted that, on Saturday 6 December 2014 at approximately 11.00pm, the accused was found in close proximity with a person of the opposite sex out lawful matrimony (khalwat). The prosecution maintained that the accused and witness had engaged in sexual relations with each other, despite the fact that both parties were married to other people. This conduct contravened arts 4, 5 and 22(2) of Aceh Qanun No. 14 of 2003 on Close Proximity. After engaging in sexual relations, both parties were brought by several other witnesses to the local Simeule Timur police station.

The court found that, on the evidence before it, the accused was guilty of khalwat, as prescribed in arts 4, 5 and 22(2) of Aceh Qanun No. 14 of 2003. In sentencing the accused to nine strokes of the cane, it cited Surah Al-Isra' verse 32, which discourages sexual relations out of lawful matrimony (zina). In determining the severity of the sentence, the court noted that the accused:

1. had conducted herself in a manner not consistent with the applicability of Islamic shari'a in Aceh;
2. was already married; and
3. had been carrying on an extra-marital affair with the witness for two years; but
4. had acknowledged her misconduct;
5. regretted her misconduct and vowed not to re-offend;
6. had been cooperative throughout the proceeding and conducted herself appropriately; and
7. was a first-time offender.

The prosecution submitted that, on Saturday 6 December 2014 at approximately 11.00pm, the accused was found in close proximity with a person of the opposite sex out lawful matrimony (khalwat). The prosecution maintained that the accused and witness had engaged in sexual relations with each other, despite the fact that both parties were married to other people. This conduct contravened arts 4, 5 and 22(2) of Aceh Qanun No. 14 of 2003 on Close Proximity. After engaging in sexual relations, both parties were brought by several other witnesses to the local Simeule Timur police station.

The court found that, on the evidence before it, the accused was guilty of khalwat, as prescribed in arts 4, 5 and 22(2) of Aceh Qanun No. 14 of 2003. In sentencing the accused to nine strokes of the cane, it cited Surah Al-Isra' verse 32, which discourages sexual relations out of lawful matrimony (zina). In determining the severity of the sentence, the court noted that the accused:

1. had conducted himself in a manner not consistent with the applicability of Islamic shari'a in Aceh;
2. was already married; and
3. had been carrying on an extra-marital affair with the witness for two years; but
4. had acknowledged his misconduct;
5. regretted his misconduct and vowed not to re-offend;
6. had been cooperative throughout the proceeding and conducted herself appropriately; and
7. was a first-time offender.

Two Uzbek “independent Muslim” men, Bekhzod Bakhtiyarovich Yusupov and Ismoil Samadov, applied for asylum and withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(A). Both men had entered the country on student visas and subsequently remained in the United States illegally. The Board of Immigration Appeals found that, while the men would be eligible for asylum under CAT, the national security exception to withholding removal, 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), applicable according to the Attorney General when “there is evidence that would permit a reasonable person to believe that the alien may pose a danger to national security,” barred the Board from allowing the men to stay in the country. The Court reversed and remanded the case, as the congressional intent indicated that the proper requirement for the national security exception is “is a danger” and not the “may pose a danger” argued by the Attorney General.

Additional information. This case would be heard by the 3rd Circuit again in Yusopov v. Att’y Gen., Nos. 09-3074, 2011 WL 2410741 (3rd Cir. 2011).  8 U.S.C. §1231 (b)(3)(A) provides that “…the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”.  8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) says that withholding of removal detailed in (b)(3)(A) would not apply if “here are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.”

In this decision, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez adopts the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review of the record, Judge Martinez agreed with Judge Wang’s recommendation that the government officials were not entitled to immunity, as petitioner Ray Anthony Smith had made sufficient allegations to make out a prima facie claim. Also following Judge Wang’s recommendations, Judge Martinez dismissed Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

This order implements the decision from the District Court of Colorado in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez, who adopted the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang that government officials not receive immunity but that the court dismiss Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions. This order implements that recommendation and decision adopted by the district court.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Maldives (Dhivehi Raajjeyge Jumhooriyyaa), based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under the Maldives' Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is the principal source of legislation. 

This fatwa declares that homosexual intercourse is forbidden (haram) and constitutes a crime (jarimah). It recalls that Allah SWT created human beings and living creatures to procreate and to regulate their sexual inclination based thereon. The fatwa defines 'homosex' (homoseks) as sexual activity between persons of the same sex, 'lesbianism' (lesbi) as sexual activity between two women, and 'gay' as sexual activity between two men. It declares that homosexuality is an abnormality that must be cured and a deviation that must be corrected. The fatwa recommends that the Indonesian People's Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) and government together enact legislation to proscribe the existence of a homosexual community and prescribe heavy penalties for homosexual intercourse.

Plaintiff, a Muslim prisoner, challenged prison policies that (1) failed to provide a Muslim chaplain and an adequate number of Islamic services; (2) prohibited religious meetings without a volunteer present; (3) failed to provide ḥalāl meals and a location where he may perform five daily ṣalāt (prayers); and (4) prohibited him from wearing a kufi (prayer cap) or an Islamic medallion outside of his clothing. The Court found that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the prison's policies substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion, as required for a finding of a violation of the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and that where plaintiff had demonstrated a substantial burden, the prison had demonstrated that its policies were the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling government interest in safety and security.

Amiruddin bin Mahmud had perished in the tsunami of 26 December 2004 in the village of Paya Tieng. He was survived by his four beneficiaries, Arba'iyah binti Amiruddin (daughter and first appellant), Husniati binti Amiruddin (daughter second appellant), Nurhayati binti Mahmud (sister and first respondent), and Jauhari binti Mahmud (sister and second respondent). The Jantho Shari'a Court (lower court) stipulated that to his beneficiaries the deceased had devised two properties and four parcels of land, with the appellants each receiving a two-sixths share, and the respondents one-sixth each.

The appellants, in their response and appeal, noted that the deceased's wife, Mardhiah, had also perished in the 2004 tsunami, and that she had been survived by beneficiaries such as her sister and niece. The respondents, however, had failed to include those beneficiaries in their initial claim, rendering their application null and void. Moreover, they had failed to specify whether or not the objects of their claim were the personal assets of the deceased, or the joint assets of the deceased and his wife. Pursuant to Supreme Court Jurisprudence No. 621/K/Sip/1975, the Court overturned the decision of the lower court, finding the respondents' initial claim to be null and void.

The primary purpose of this presidential determination is captured in art 1, which prohibits all persons from intentionally and publicly conveying, endorsing, or soliciting public support for an interpretation of a religion followed in Indonesia, or conducting religious activities that resemble the religious activities of that religion, where such interpretation and activities deviate from the fundamental tenets of that religion. Article 4 also amends the Indonesian Criminal Code to include art 156a, thereby criminalising such behaviour.

The elucidation lists the six religions to which the vast majority of Indonesians adhere: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The elucidation clarifies, however, that this list is not exhaustive, and that other religions such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, and Taoism are not prohibited. That said, the list of religions to which the vast majority of Indonesians adhere would subsequently become the base definition for the term 'religion' in Indonesia.

This presidential determination was later exalted to the status of a statute (undang-undang) after the enactment of Law No. 5 of 1969 on the Declaration of Various Presidential Determinations and Presidential Regulations as Laws.

This regional regulation makes provision for the control and surveillance of alcoholic beverages in Central Lampung (Lampung Tengah), Lampung. It states, in its preambular statement, that misuse of alcohol is, among other things, contrary to religious and moral norms. The regulation prohibits the production, distribution, sale, stockpiling, carrying, making available, and serving of alcoholic beverages (art 3(1) and (2)). It also prohibits the consumption of alcohol, and being intoxicated, in a public place (art 3(3)). The regulation makes exceptions, however, for:

1. a person or legal entity with a permit;
2. herbal medicine traders;
3. 3-, 4-, and 5-star hotels, certified restaurants, bars, pubs, nightclubs and discotheques, and alcohol consumed at its point of sale; and
4. those using alcohol for the purposes of religious ceremonies (art 4).

Contravention of art 3 can result in a maximum prison sentence of six months, or a maximum monetary penalty of IDR 50 million. Contravention of art 4 can result in a maximum prison sentence of three months, or a maximum monetary penalty of IDR 50 million.