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Plaintiff Peter McDaniels sued various prison officials, alleging that they intentionally failed to provide him with pre-sunrise meals during Ramadan and with an Eid al-Fitr meal at the conclusion of Ramadan, in violation of his First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The Plaintiff also contended that the lack of provision of ḥalāl meat and deprivation of an Arabic Qurʾān for nine months were discriminatory violations of his rights. The Respondents moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Respondents' request for summary judgment on the Ramadan meals issue, stating that the Plaintiff failed to show that such failures to provide a meal on isolated incidents imposed a significant restriction on his religious practice. However, the District Court decided that the Respondents did not meet their burden of demonstrating that the religious diet policy furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim that the Respondents deprived the Plaintiff of his rights by not allowing him access to a Qurʾān, finding that the Respondents were not required to provide the Plaintiff with an Arabic Qurʾān or dates to be used in his devotional practice, given the absence of any showing that Respondents prevented him from obtaining such items. The Plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief, but the Court found that the individual Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, so they could not be held liable for personal damages under RLUIPA.

Ethiopian law allows personal and family law matters to be adjudicated in sharīʿa courts as long as all parties voluntarily submit to the courts’ jurisdiction. This Proclamation spells out three levels of sharīʿa courts: (1) the Federal First-Instance Court of Sharia, (2) the Federal High Court of Sharia (which hears appeals and cases above a certain monetary threshold), and (3) the Federal Supreme Court of Sharia. The courts apply Islamic law but follow civil rules of procedure. The Federal Courts of Sharia are the country’s only official courts that apply religious law.

J bin T passed away on 24 January 2008, stipulating as his beneficiaries: C binti S (wife and first appellant); J binti J (daughter); A (mother); P binti T (sister); R binti T (brother); T bin T (brothers); and N binti T (sister and fifth respondent).

The Meulaboh Shari'a Court (lower court) declared as joint property of the deceased and first appellant two shophouses, two parcels of land, accumulated social security monies totalling IDR 770 million, the remaining proceeds from the sale of a truck (IDR 70 million), and insurance monies totalling IDR 100,000. As the estate of the deceased alone, the lower court stipulated four separate parcels of land.

The lower court distributed to the first appellant half of what was determined to be the joint property of the first appellant and deceased, while the other half, along with the deceased's personal estate, was distributed among the stipulated beneficiaries.

The Court amended the decision of the lower court, applying the Supreme Court-endorsed principle that, if the deceased had a child/children, his estate was only to be devised/bequeathed to his parents, spouse and children, to the exclusion of all other beneficiaries. Accordingly, as the deceased was survived by his daughter (second appellant), his estate was to be distributed among both appellants and the deceased's mother.

The Court also disagreed with the lower court's finding that the social security monies (IDR 770 million) and the insurance monies (IDR 100,000) were the joint property of the deceased and first appellant, because art 22(1) and (2) of Government Regulation No. 14 of 1993 requires that life insurance be paid to the surviving spouse or child/children, and in the event there is no surviving spouse or child/children, to the closest living blood relative(s). Accordingly, the monies were to be paid to the appellants. As for the insurance policy monies, art 1(1) of Law No. 2 of 1992 on Insurance Companies required that those monies be paid to the parties specified in the deceased's policy.

H binti T (deceased) had placed in trust a parcel of land upon which was located a two-storey shop building. Matters were complicated as the building was still subject to a rent agreement involving a third party and, prior to the conclusion of the agreement, the deceased had passed away. This did not preclude the land and building from becoming subject of the deceased's will, however.

The land and building had been devised to the first respondent via the appellant as an intermediary. The Court found that, even though the land and building had been devised by the deceased to the first respondent, before the will had become valid, the deceased had already devised the land and building to another party, thereby rendering the endowment to the first respondent invalid, pursuant to arts 194(2) and 217(3) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. That the first respondent had also been collecting rent monies pursuant to the pre-existing rent agreement from July 2002-July 2007 meant that he was ordered by the Court to transfer those monies to the trustee body.

The Court also found the appellant's claim lacked clarity and cause and, therefore, dismissed it. It also found, however, that the respondents' claim that the appellant lacked the standing to lodge a claim was incorrect. This was because it was immaterial morally and customarily that at the time of executing the trust there was not yet an official notice of appointment or power of attorney from the trustee (nazir). Indeed, it was custom in the area that a trusted person would manage religious property, meaning that the appellant had the capacity to look after property subject of the endowment to ensure it did not go missing, as well as the capacity to lodge a claim.

The Court also disagreed with the lower court, which found that the notice of endowment (dated 12 September 1998) was the same as a will, which, based on this line of reasoning, meant there were two different wills. The Court found this inherently incorrect, both in terms of the purpose of the notice, as well as in terms of the notice's applicability.

The Court deemed the first respondent lacked the standing to manage the land subject of the trust and ordered him to transfer the land to the trustee body.

The parties were married on 20 March 1993 at the Office of Religious Affairs in Plupuh, Sragen. After marrying they lived in Sukaramai, Banda Aceh, and had three children. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had been harmonious until 18 December 2010, after which the defendant had left the plaintiff and their children for no apparent reason. Despite searching for, as well as inquiring as to the whereabouts of, the defendant, the plaintiff had not been able to locate him. Therefore, the plaintiff sought a judicial divorce from the defendant, as well as custody of the parties' one remaining child still under the age of consent. Owing to her own impecuniosity, the plaintiff also sought dispensation from any court costs.

In the defendant's absence, the court acceded to the plaintiff's application for an irrevocable divorce (talak ba'in shughra), acknowledging that the purpose of marriage, as envisaged in art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, was no longer feasible. Moreover, that the defendant having left the plaintiff for more than two consecutive years was sufficient reason to grant a divorce, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(b) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(b) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

In regards to their child, the court found that while the child remained the joint responsibility of the parties, the plaintiff would be better placed to rear and educate him given his being underage (belum mumayyiz). This also accorded with the requirement contained in art 105(a) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court emphasised its belief that a mother would be more patient and meticulous in raising the children, and that to separate them from the plaintiff would be incredibly problematic given their age. The court also cited art 59(2) of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, which acknowledges the rights and needs of children to maintain a personal relationship with their father. Accordingly, it granted the defendant visitation rights, as well as the right to be consulted regarding his children's education and development, as contained in art 26(1) of Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection. The court also acceded to the plaintiff's request that the State bear the costs associated with the proceeding.

The fatwa is a unanimous decision by forty Muslim muftis, affiliated with the Sunni Ittehad Council in Pakistan, declaring honor killing of women as “un-Islamic” or heresy (kuffur) and an “unpardonable sin” (gunah-e-qabir). The decree explicitly states that burning a woman alive, in the name of honor, for marrying a person of their choosing, is heresy and against the commands of Islam. The fatwa quotes a Quranic verse, verse number 232 of Surat al-Baqarah: [translated from the Urdu translation of the verse – as used in the fatwa – into English] “Oh woman’s family, do not say no to women for wanting to marry the husband [of their choice] if the two of them have consented to the marriage.” The fatwa states that Islam is the true guardian of rights of women and that it is imperative upon the leaders of an Islamic nation/government (hukumat) to ensure protection of women’s rights. For that purpose, the government should pass and implement laws that make burning and killing of women an unpardonable crime. The oppression and torture unleashed upon women has no relation to Islam. The fatwa then refers to an example (sunna) of the Prophet Muhammad, as narrated in Sahih-Bukhari: The Prophet (s.a.w.) terminated the marriage contract (nikkah) of a woman who complained to him (s.a.w.) that she did not like the man her father had married her off to. The fatwa condemns the act of burning alive or killing one’s child for marrying someone of their choice and then “appeals” to the parents to focus on the ethical education and upbringing of their children in line with the teachings of Islam; and that the upcoming month of Ramadan will be devoted to raise awareness about women’s rights. Finally, the fatwa states that those who burn women and girls alive should be hanged to death.

The particular newspaper reporting (in Roznama Dunya) on this fatwa includes the names of twenty four clerics who signed the fatwa (the total number of clerics who joined in issuing the fatwa were forty but the newspaper article explicitly mentions just twenty four names).

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Singapore, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Singapore's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status.  

This fatwa declares that intellectual property rights are recognised and protected under Islamic law. Moreover, that they can be the object of a contract (commercial or non-commercial), can be transferred into an endowment, as well as bequeathed to beneficiaries. The fatwa also declares that unauthorised dealings with the intellectual property rights of another person, without their permission, is haram (forbidden).

This is a reference to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq's outstanding generosity. Hossein Modarressi cites this reference in his discussion of some of the features of al-Ṣādiq's personal life.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq's cautioning against participation in the often antagonistic theological and sectarian debates of the time. Hossein Modarressi cites this reference in his discussion of some of the features of al-Ṣādiq's personal life.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to the text of a document of manumission written by Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq. Hossein Modarressi cites this reference in his discussion of some of the features of al-Ṣādiq's personal life.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq's advice to a questioner to burn his astrological books. Hossein Modarressi cites this reference in his discussion of some of the features of al-Ṣādiq's personal life.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to Rajab or Shaʿbān as two possible months for Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq's death. Hossein Modarressi cites this reference in his discussion of some of the features of al-Ṣādiq's personal life.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq's praise of the cleanliness of Christian churches that he visited in Iraq. Hossein Modarressi cites this reference in his discussion of some of the features of al-Ṣādiq's personal life.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This regional regulation states that Muslim dress is to show that a person or society is devoted to Allah Subhanahu wa ta'ala by practising Islamic teachings (art 2). The purpose of Muslim dress is to:

1. engender the attitude of a good and noble Muslim;
2. familiarise Muslim dress with everyday life, and for the sake of Islamic symbolism;
3. create a society that loves Islamic and Minangkabau culture; and
4. preserve customary values and Minangkabau culture in accordance with the adage 'Syarak Mangato Adat Memakai' (art 3).

The regulation also states that Muslim dress operates to guarantee respect and the identity of the Islamic ummah, as well as Minangkabau customary culture (art 4). It makes Muslim dress obligatory for workers, university students, as well as public and Islamic school students (art 5). Muslim dress, for men, is long trousers and a short- or long-sleeve shirt (art 8(1)(a)), while for women it is a long-sleeve shirt that covers the hips and reaches the knees, a skirt that reaches the ankles, and a headscarf (kerudung) that covers the hair, ears, neck, nape, and chest (art 8(1)(b)).

In its preambular statement, this regional regulation states that in order to create a safe and orderly Jembrana regency, efforts are necessary to prevent and eradicate lewd behaviour and prostitution, which constitutes amoral conduct. In its elucidation, the regulation states that prostitution, and the facilitation thereof, is contrary to religious laws, state laws, morality, and the morals of the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology). Accordingly, pursuant to art 3, all persons and bodies/organisations, are not permitted to conduct themselves in a lewd manner or to solicit prostitution. Contravention of this prohibition carries a maximum penalty of three months' impriosnment or a fine of IDR 50 million (art 6).

The broader significance of this regional regulation is that, while it states that prostitution is contrary to religious laws, rather than Islamic laws, Jembrana is a predominantly Hindu regency, with a minority Muslim population of 79,857 people from a total population of 311,995, according to official figures (http://www.jembranakab.go.id/?module=kependudukan). Therefore, this is a regulation that, arguably, seeks to Islamise public life, but also invokes state laws and the Pancasila, thereby legitimising it for a Hindu majority (224,618 people).

In preambular statement (c), this regional regulation states that begging constitutes a mental illness or laziness not in accordance with religious teachings, while sexual promiscuity constitutes conduct that is contrary to social and religious norms, that endangers young lives, and increases the spread of HIV/AIDS. The regulation states that the handling of vagrancy and begging, as well as sexual promiscuity, is based on the values of the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology), and principles of human rights (art 2). The regulation prohibits vagrancy and begging (art 4(1), and prohibits such behaviour en masse or alone, with the intent to engender pity in others (art 4(2)). Moreover, it prohibits the equipping of other persons, including babies and infants, to beg (art 4(3)). It also prohibits prostitution and sexual promiscuity (arts 7 and 8).

Violation of art 4(1) and (2) carries a maximum penalty of three months' imprisonment or IDR 1 million (art 20(1)), while contravention of art 4(3) and (4) carries a maximum penalty of 15 days' imprisonment and/or a fine of between IDR 5-50 million (art 20(2)), and contravention of arts 7 and 8 carries maximum penalties of three months' imprisonment and/or IDR 50 million (art 20(5)-(7)).

The parties were married on 20 October 1990 and had two children. The cassation respondent had submitted that during the marriage the parties had accumulated joint assets (harta bersama), comprising:

1. property title no. 1218, in the name of the cassation applicant to the value of IDR 4.5 billion, also in the cassation applicant’s possession;
2. property title no. 171, in the name of the cassation applicant to the value of IDR 500 million, also in the cassation applicant’s possession;
3. a pharmacy, in the name of the cassation applicant to the value of IDR 35 million, also in the cassation applicant’s possession; and
4. one vehicle to the value of IDR 300 million, in the name of the cassation applicant, and in the cassation applicant’s possession. 

These joint assets became the object of dispute between the parties. The cassation respondent had brought a claim in the Semarang Religious Court for his share of the assets. He submitted that the cassation applicant was uncooperative in transferring his lawful share of the assets. The cassation respondent submitted that he had repeatedly tried to claim his share of the assets but that the cassation applicant continually refused to cooperate. The cassation respondent alleged that the cassation applicant’s refusal to transfer the listed items, or equal value of the assets, 50-50 between the parties, contravened the principle of the division of matrimonial assets, as contained in the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

In the first instance, the Semarang Religious Court (No. 1607/Pdt.G/2012/PA.Smg) on 22 July 2013, found in favour of the cassation respondent, ordering a 50-50 division of the assets in dispute, and ordered both parties to pay court costs (cassation respondent: IDR 1,871,000; cassation applicant: IDR 775,000).

The cassation applicant lodged an appeal with the Semarang High Religious Court (No. 233/Pdt.G/2013/PTA.Smg), which amended the decision of the Semarang Religious Court, ruling in favour of the cassation respondent and ordering the cassation applicant to pay court costs (IDR 150,000).

The cassation applicant lodged a request for cassation on 6 March 2014. The cassation applicant submitted that the Semarang High Religious Court did not follow the regulations and misapplied the law because it did not take into account the obligations of each party to third parties when apportioning the division of the assets. The cassation applicant submitted that:

1. the properties subject to dispute were purchased with her own money;
2. during the construction of the house the cassation respondent had never provided financially for the family, despite having a sizeable income; and
3. the cassation respondent had not provided a financial contribution towards the education of the children.

The cassation applicant also submitted that the cassation respondent had omitted several joint assets from his initial claim:

1. property in the name of the cassation applicant valued at IDR 1.3 billion;
2. a vehicle valued at IDR 80 million;
3. proceeds of the sale of various items to the value of IDR 260 million;
4. another vehicle valued at IDR 80,000,000;
5. debts owed to several banks and persons; and
6. medical and education expenses for the parties' two children.

The Supreme Court did not accept the cassation applicant’s reasons for cassation, and, pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, dismissed the appeal. The cassation applicant was ordered to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).

This is a reference to an alleged meeting that took place between Abū Ḥanīfa (the eponym of the Ḥanafī school) and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq in the presence of the Abbasid caliph Manṣūr (r. 136-58) where Abū Ḥanīfa acknowledges Jaʿfar as being the most knowledgable person in religious law. Hossein Modarressi employs this reference to show how other Muslim scholars recognized Jaʿfar's mastery of Islamic law.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to an alleged meeting that took place between Abū Ḥanīfa (the eponym of the Ḥanafī school) and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq in the presence of the Abbasid caliph Manṣūr (r. 136-58) where Abū Ḥanīfa acknowledges Jaʿfar as being the most knowledgable person in religious law. Hossein Modarressi employs this reference to show how other Muslim scholars recognized Jaʿfar's mastery of Islamic law.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).