SHARIAsource

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Tunisia (Al Jumhuriyah at Tunisiyah), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Tunisia's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (Republika Demokratika Timor Lorosa'e (Tetum); Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste (Portuguese)), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Timor-Leste's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under the Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Principality of Andorra (Principat d'Andorra), based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under Andorra's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Finland (Suomen tasavalta/Republiken Finland), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Finland's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under Guyana's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Sweden (Konungariket Sverige), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Sweden's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This fatwa (in its attachment) states that the provision of alms (zakat) for educational purposes, especially in the form of scholarships, is rightful (sah) because it constitutes a benevolent act of charity (ashnaf fi sabilillah). More specifically, that scholarships are a form of assistance derived from alms based on the Qur'an, surah At-Taubah, verse 60, based on the understanding that charity according to a group of legal scholars (fiqh ulama) from several schools of thought (mazhab), as well as exegisis scholars (ulama tafsir), is a general utterance (lafaznya umum).

The fatwa also states that Muslim students, as recipients of alms-derived scholarships:

1. should strive for academic achievement;
2. be prioritised based on their level of impecuniosity; and
3. study that which will benefit the Indonesian nation.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of Brunei Darussalam (Negara Brunei Darussalam), based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under Brunei's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is the principal source of legislation. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the United Arab Emirates (Al Imarat al Arabiyah al Muttahidah), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under the UAE's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has primary legal status. 

A nine-member panel at the Federal Court of Malaysia led by Chief Justice Tengku Maimun ruled in a unanimous decision that Section 66A of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment of 2003 was unconstitutional and void as the power of judicial review that it conferred was not a power that the Selangor state legislative assembly was authorized to give. The petition arose out of the High Court consideration of an application for judicial review wherein an organizational petitioner, the SIS Forum (of Malaysia), sought to challenge the validity of a fatwā [advisory Islamic law opinion].The Court stated that it is not concerned with the procedural or substantive validity of the fatwā, and was not asked to determine the courts are authorized to undertake such evaluations in the first place under clause (1A) of Article 121 of Malaysia’s Federal Constitution. The petition concerns only the question whether the Selangor State Legislative Assembly (SSLA) was authorized to enact section 66A of the ARIE 2003, conferring powers of judicial review on syariah (Islamic law) courts. The Court concluded that Selangor, a Malaysian state, cannot grant syariah courts the power to review the rulings of Islamic authorities, which is a power retained exclusively by civil courts. For further context on Islamic law in Malaysia, consult Tamir Moustafa's Constituting Religion: Islam, Liberal Rights, and the Malaysian State (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

This document is the first draft of Criminal Procedure Bill prepared and adopted by the parliament and sent to the Guardian Council for review.

This fatwa acknowledges the scourge of terrorism that has recently affected many countries, including Indonesia. It also acknowledges the perceptions held by some that terrorism reflects Islamic techings, that Muslims should be approached with caution, and that acts of terror constitute jihad.

The fatwa considers that terrorism, according to Islamic fiqh, constitutes piracy/unlawful warfare (hirabah). It determines that terrorism is a crime against humanity and civilisation that constitutes a serious threat towards state sovereignty and security, to world peace, as well as to societal welfare. It is transnational organised crime that can be categorised as an extraordinary and indiscriminate crime.

The fatwa distinguishes between terrorism and jihad, stating that terrorism is:

1. designed to cause damage (ifsad) and anarchy/chaos (faudha);
2. intended to create fear and destroy others; and
3. conducted without regulation and limits.

Meanwhile, it states that jihad:

1. brings about improvements (ishlah), albeit via warfare;
2. intends to enforce the religion of Allah and/or defend the rights of the oppressed; and
3. is conducted pursuant to regulations specified by shari'a with a clear enemy in mind.

Legally, the fatwa states that acts of terror are forbidden (haram), while acts of jihad are obligatory (wajib). Persons that commit suicide do so for personal reasons and are pessimists, while martyrs do so as a victim for their religion and the Muslim people, with the intent of obtaining the mercy and pleasure of Allah Subhanahu wa Ta'ala. Suicide bombing is, therefore, forbidden (haram), regardless of whether it is committed in a peaceful area or in a warzone. Martyrdom, however, is permitted.

This challenge to the validity of Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 on the Surveillance and Control of Alcoholic Beverages was submitted by Front Pembela Islam (FPI - the Islamic Defenders' Front), represented by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, the founder and chairperson of FPI, and KH. Ahmad Sabri Lubis, the secterary-general of FPI.

The applicant cited several teachings from the Qur'an and Hadith, the Holy Bible, and Buddhism that prohibit the consumption of alcohol, as well as Hinduism, which discourages excessive consumption of alcohol. As a state based on the principle of One Almighty God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa), the applicant submitted that Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 should, therefore, be invalidated for contradicting the religious values contained in Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution because not one religion in Indonesia permitted or deemed halal the consumption of any alcoholic beverage. The applicant also cited the physical effects alcohol consumption can have on people, as well as other people who may fall victim to alcohol-induced theft, battery, abuse, rape, and even murder.

The applicant also submitted that Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 was contrary to several national statutes, including arts 46 and 47 of Law No. 36 of 2009 on Health. This was because the decree only categorised alcohol rather than prohibiting it, while the detrimental effect alcohol can have on health repudiates the aim of arts 46 and 47, which is to improve the health of Indonesian citizens.

The court questioned whether the applicant believed its rights and/or authority had suffered because of Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997. It also questioned whether the applicant believed it had suffered any specific and actual loss or could potentially suffer any loss, and whether or not there was a causal relationship between that loss and the decree it was seeking to impugn. The court found in the applicant's favour in this regard, granting it the requisite legal standing. It then acceded to the application but did so on the grounds that several of the statutes that constituted the legal basis for Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 were no longer valid laws themselves.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

The plaintiffs, Sehatno Samiadoen and Tutik Ani Rahmawati, represented, Moses Antonius (complainant), who had filed a complaint with the Kalimantan Consumer Protection Group (Yayasan Lembaga Perlindungan Konsumen Kalimantan) on 30 May 2013, against the defendant's (PT Bank BNI Syariah) Banjarmasin branch. The complainant had entered into a shari’a-style home loan (Murabahah) with the defendant’s Banjarmasin branch for the purchase of a 150m² property on 18 September 2012. The term of the loan was 120 months (10 years), with monthly repayments of IDR 8,638,583, and an initial down-payment of IDR 147.5 million. The complainant also provided the defendant with payment for the first two months (IDR 17,277,166) in a show of good faith. The complainant and defendant also entered into a power of attorney agreement on 28 May 2012, pursuant to which the complainant vested in the defendant the authority to sell, transfer and release all rights over the property to any person, including to the defendant itself.

The complainant then experienced financial hardship and went into arrears. The defendant sent to the complainant three separate written warnings in regards to his default. The plaintiffs, however, told the court that the agreement contravened shari’a principles, as contained in Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking, as well as standard clausal requirements, as regulated in Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection. Moreover, that as the complainant had only recently become a Muslim (muallaf), he did not properly understand Islamic shari’a, nor did he properly understand the content of the agreement, or the fact that he could not novate its terms. Consequently, the complainant felt aggrieved by the inclusion of standard clauses, which he believed contravened art 18(1) of Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection. Pursuant to art 18(3) of Law No. 8 of 1999, the plaintiffs argued for the agreement to be rendered null and void, and sought to invoke art 62 of Law No. 8 of 1999, which prescribes a penalty of up to five years imprisonment or a fine of up to IDR 2 billion. The plaintiffs also sought to rely on the principle of presumption of liability, thereby compelling the defendant to prove its innocence, as it claimed was supported by art 23 of Law No. 8 of 1999.

The plaintiffs requested that the court grant an interlocutory order precluding the defendant from dealing adversely with the complainant’s property. They also requested that the court declare the defendant’s conduct illegal by rendering the three agreements the complainant had with the defendant null and void.

The defendant lodged an objection in regards to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum, citing art 45(1) of Law No. 8 of 1999, which requires an aggrieved party to lodge an application with either an institution assigned to resolve consumer-related disputes, or a civil court. The defendant also cited art 25(2) of Law No. 48 of 2009, which states that civil courts are authorised to adjudicate civil matters, as further proof that a civil court was the appropriate forum to hear the matter. The defendant further argued that the plaintiffs had erred in submitting their application to the court because, per arts 18 and 19 of their Murabahah agreement, the complainant and defendant had agreed to resolve any disputes in the Registrar’s office of the Banjarmasin Religious Court. The defendant also submitted that the special power of attorney, pursuant to which the plaintiffs were acting on the complainant’s behalf, was invalid due to formulaic irregularities.

In addition, the defendant sought to impugn the fact that the plaintiffs’ statement of claim referred to the complainant as if he were the plaintiff. Moreover, it argued that the plaintiffs’ assertion that the Murabahah agreement contravened shari’a principles, as contained in Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking, as well as clausal standards, per Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection, was illogical and lacked legal basis. The defendant also criticised the plaintiffs for seeking to bring a civil action, pursuant to a civil statute (Law No. 8 of 1999), to a religious court.

The court found that, pursuant to Constitutional Court Decision No. 93 of 2012, the elucidation of art 55(2), which prescribed a civil forum as a suitable venue for shari’a banking dispute resolution, was invalid. Moreover, that a 'civil judicature' (Peradilan Umum), per art 45(1) of Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection, was to be read and interpreted as a religious court (Pengadilan Agama). Accordingly, the court found that religious courts had absolute jurisdiction over this matter. Crucially, however, the court found that the parties had clearly specified the Banjarmasin Religious Court as the appropriate resolution forum, precluding it from handing down a judgment.