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This amicus brief was filed before the Supreme Court concerning the case of Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It was submitted by over 50 faith based organizations, including Muslim Advocates, a Muslim American organization. It argues that abortion is permitted under certain circumstances until approximately 19-20 weeks gestation by many schools of Islamic thought. It cites various scholars of Islamic law to say that, among Muslims, "there is no universally agreed-upon moment when a fetus becomes a person,” however "the predominant view is that a fetus acquires personhood 120 days from conception.”

This document is a beyānnāme, or declaration, sent by the Ottoman reʾīsül-kuttāb (chief scribe) to Britain's ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, justifying the Ottoman declaration of war on Russia by explaining Russia's violation of treaty obligations. The document gives insight into eighteenth-century Ottoman attitudes to international law and its relationship with Islamic law. Its use of the phrase naḳż-ı ʿahd (breaking the treaty), which has its origins in a specifically Qurʾānic context illustrates one way in which war was legitimized within the Ottoman Empire. Other phrases used in the beyānnāme demonstrate how Ottoman legal plurality functioned within a martial context. 

Fatwā concerning the legality, based on their interpretation of Islamic law, of a) the responsibility of mosque officials to prevent unwell congregants from entering a mosque’s premises and b) the temporary suspension of congregational and Friday prayers, and subsequent mosque closures. The answer provided by the Fatwa Committee, who met on 18 February 2020, is that a) mosques’ management has the religious duty to request or prohibit any unwell congregants from entering the mosque area, whether for performing prayers or other matters and the closing of a mosque and b) the suspension of congregational prayers and Friday prayers during this situation, is required.

A petition sent to the Ottoman Sultan from Egypt in 1155 AH (1742-3), concerning a dispute between a Muslim and a Christian in the town of Zifta. The Muslim petitioner attempts to enforce the regulation of the Pact of 'Umar that forbids non-Muslims from having houses taller than those of Muslims. Baldwin's commentary on the petition focuses on how the petitioning process relates to the sharīʿa court system in the Ottoman Empire.

Ibn Ḥārith al-Khushanī recorded the following case as a ḥikāya, an anonymous report: A Christian appeared before the judge Aslam b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, petitioning to be executed. The anecdote offers insight into the historical role of judges during a period of religious dissent in the Umayyad Caliphate, while the author's narrative voice demonstrates past judicial approaches to rationality, humor, and violent penalization. 

This text is part of Maribel Fierro, The Judges of al-Andalus, forthcoming.

Holding: For an oath to be legally valid, the person who is sworn must be aware that his statement is a solemn appeal to a Supreme Being, believe that what he declares is true, and include some corporal act, such as an uplifted hand or a hand placed upon scripture.

Procedural posture: Defendant moved to quash the return of Magistrate Robert Carson. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except the Court notes that “a Mohammedan [is sworn] upon the Koran” when taking an oath in court.

Judgment: Motion to quash the return of the magistrate denied in an opinion authored by Judge Staake.

Facts: Magistrate Robert Carson left his own district and entered another for the purpose of holding a bail hearing for the defendant, who was charged with a violation of the act of assembly. The defendant contended that state law prohibited the magistrate from acting outside of his own district, and that he had no authority to hold a hearing there. The defendant also argued that the oath administered to the complainant, upon which the arrest warrant was based, was not properly administered because it was not sworn upon the Bible and was not repeated verbatim with an upraised hand. The Philadelphia County Court of Quarter Sessions found that the magistrate performed a “purely ministerial act” in holding a hearing simply to fix bail, and that such ministerial functions could be performed outside of his district. With regard to the oath, the Court found that an oath need not be recited verbatim for it to be valid. Rather, the witness must recognize that he is solemnly being sworn and do some corporal act in appealing to God about the truth of his testimony. It may be administered “in any mode peculiar to the belief of the person sworn, or in any form binding on his conscience.” The Court notes that Jews can be sworn upon the Pentateuch and Muslims upon the Qurʾān, and that there is even a special procedure for “the Chinaman.” Therefore, the Court concluded, because the complainant’s oath was administered solemnly with a corporal act, the oath was valid.

This brief, submitted by fifteen religious and civil rights organizations, addresses the notion that numerous conflicts often arise between job duties and religious convictions in areas of ritual law, including Sabbaths and other holy days, dietary restrictions, and dress for many Jews, Muslims, Christians and members of other faiths. These organizations point out that the headscarf (ḥijāb) is a particularly visible manifestation of a religious practice (more so than taking off holy days), and under the laws of the United States, it is entitled to no less a standard of reasonable accommodations, particularly in an era where online applications set the qualifications and in-person interviews may offer cause for discrimination if not for application of Title VII broadly. They further argue that “the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning gives the employer a perverse incentive to deny to religiously observant applicants any opportunity to discuss religion-based limitations on their appearance or scheduling. Under that reasoning, the employer’s ignorance automatically defeats a prima facie case, and thus effectively eliminates Title VII’s accommodation protections for those applicants. Under the Tenth Circuit’s position, then, observers of Sabbaths and other holy days will find themselves effectively excluded from a large and growing sector of the workforce that is hired through online applications (p. 10).” For reviews and commentary on the U.S. law implications of this case, see the SCOTUSblog Case Page.

The Court noted that the appellant had lodged his complaint as illegal misconduct (perbuatan melawan hukum), something outside the jurisdiction of the religious courts. It acknowledged, however, that the basis of the appellant's claim did indeed constitute a shari'a economy case, for the purposes of the elucidation of Law No. 3 of 2006, art 49(22)(i). This was because the basis of the appellant's claim derived from a Murabahah (sale-purchase) financial agreement, and a power of attorney, which the appellant believed to be legally invalid. Under the power of attorney, the respondent was authorised to sell, transfer and relinquish all rights over a parcel of land to any person, including itself, if the appellant had failed to pay its debt owing to the respondent. The appellant submitted, however, that as he had signed the agreement without properly understanding its content and effect, it, along with the Murabahah agreement, should be declared null and void. The Court disagreed with the appellant, upholding the ruling of the lower court.

This fatwa states that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights accords with the aims and values of Islamic teachings, which protect the rights of every person to life and dignity. It qualifies, however, that the following articles of the Declaration are contrary to Islam:

1. art 16(1) and (2) on the freedom to marry without limitation due to nationality, race or religion;
2. art 18 on the freedom to change religion; and
3. art 23 on work.

The fatwa obliges Muslims to accept, respect and uphold universal human rights with the following conditions:

1. to value and respect differences of understanding, interpretations and implementation of human rights based on differences of culture, morality and laws in each country; and
2. an understanding and implementation of human rights must show a balance between individual rights and individual obligations, individual rights and communal rights, and freedoms and responsibilities.

The fatwa also states that, in relation to arts 16(1) and (2) and 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Muslims are to adhere to Islamic teachings as freedom of religion is a human right.

Biography of Mālikī jurist and theologian Abū ʿUmar Yūsuf b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Barr (368/978–463/1071), known as Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the print edition al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, the Royal Moroccan Edition: The Recension of Yaḥyā Ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī (Harvard Series in Islamic Law), edited and translated by Mohammad Fadel and Connell Monette (PIL/HUP, 2019).

The plaintiff submitted that, on 24 June 2011, he and the defendant had entered into a murabahah financing agreement for a 2011 Daihatsu vehicle. Pursuant to the agreement, the plaintiff was to pay to the defendant IDR 198,060,000. This figure comprised the price of the vehicle, insurance, as well as other incidental costs. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would pay this sum in 52 monthly payments of IDR 3,301,000, which, for the first seven months, the plaintiff did. On the eighth month, however, a person borrowing the vehicle from the plaintiff did not return it, causing the plaintiff to report the vehicle stolen to the police. The plaintiff requested that the defendant grant him a grace period vis-à-vis repayments while the police conducted its investigation into the vehicle’s whereabouts. The defendant, however, reported the plaintiff to the police for dealing with the vehicle inappropriately by transferring it to a third party. (The defendant had perceived the vehicle to be a fiduciary security guarantee.) The plaintiff cited art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking, claiming that the defendant should have instead sought to resolve the issue pursuant to shari’a principles, via deliberation (musyawarah), banking mediation, through the National Shari’a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional – BASYARNAS), or, if necessary, the religious courts. Moreover, that the grounds invoked by the defendant in his police report repudiated the fiduciary principles of the agreement, and were contradictory to the principles of shari’a. In principle, the plaintiff argued, a murabahah agreement is a financing facility designed to benefit both parties. It is instigated by a capital holder (shahib al-mal) with another party in need via a sale-purchase transaction, clear that the sale price includes a profit for the capital holder and is to be repaid in cash or instalments (art 20(6) of Supreme Court Regulation No. 2 of 2008 on the Compilation of Shari’a Economy Laws). By repudiating the plaintiff’s request for a grace period, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had, in fact, turned the agreement into a fiduciary security guarantee agreement. For pain and suffering, the plaintiff sought IDR 300 million.

Citing art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), as well as the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda (agreements must be kept), the defendant lodged an objection to the perceived absolute authority of the court to adjudicate the case. The defendant stated that both he and the plaintiff had agreed (in art 8(2) of their agreement) to resolve any disputes arising from the agreement before the Yogyakarta State Court (Pengadilan Negeri Yogyakarta), if initial deliberation proved unsuccessful. In other words, the parties had agreed to preclude the court from having jurisdiction over the case. To strengthen his claim regarding a civil court adjudicating a shari’a banking dispute, the defendant cited art 55(2) of Law No. 21 of 2008, including the Elucidation of art 55(2).

The defendant lodged three other objections:

1. that while the plaintiff had incorrectly filed his complaint against a Maman Suryanto, rather than the defendant, he still should have filed his complaint against the company represented by the defendant, rather than the defendant personally;
2. that the damages for pain and suffering sought by the plaintiff were not supported by sufficiently clear particulars and authentic evidence; and
3. that the plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant had transformed the agreement into a fiduciary guarantee agreement was premature in that it was contingent upon the police investigation into whether or not the plaintiff’s conduct constituted a criminal transfer of a fiduciary security guarantee (the vehicle), contrary to art 372 of the Indonesian Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana) and art 36 of Law No. 42 of 1999 on Fiduciary Guarantees.

As part of his counterclaim, the defendant sought to have the court find that the plaintiff had defaulted on his repayments. The defendant claimed he had reminded the plaintiff several times, verbally and in writing, to make the eighth repayment, but the plaintiff had still defaulted. The defendant sought IDR 674,953,000 in material and immaterial loss, requested that the court guarantee this sum against the plaintiff’s current and future assets, as well as the Daihatsu vehicle, and sought an additional IDR 1 million for every day the plaintiff was late in making repayments.

First, the court noted that the defendant’s claim regarding the court’s judicial authority (or lack thereof) had been dismissed in an interlocutory decision on 17 June 2014. It assented to the defendant’s first objection, however, dismissing the case on the grounds that the defendant lacked the necessary legal standing, and that, therefore, the plaintiff should have submitted its claim against the company of the defendant, rather than against the defendant himself.

The plaintiffs, Sehatno Samiadoen and Tutik Ani Rahmawati, represented, Moses Antonius (complainant), who had filed a complaint with the Kalimantan Consumer Protection Group (Yayasan Lembaga Perlindungan Konsumen Kalimantan) on 30 May 2013, against the defendant's (PT Bank BNI Syariah) Banjarmasin branch. The complainant had entered into a shari’a-style home loan (Murabahah) with the defendant’s Banjarmasin branch for the purchase of a 150m² property on 18 September 2012. The term of the loan was 120 months (10 years), with monthly repayments of IDR 8,638,583, and an initial down-payment of IDR 147.5 million. The complainant also provided the defendant with payment for the first two months (IDR 17,277,166) in a show of good faith. The complainant and defendant also entered into a power of attorney agreement on 28 May 2012, pursuant to which the complainant vested in the defendant the authority to sell, transfer and release all rights over the property to any person, including to the defendant itself.

The complainant then experienced financial hardship and went into arrears. The defendant sent to the complainant three separate written warnings in regards to his default. The plaintiffs, however, told the court that the agreement contravened shari’a principles, as contained in Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking, as well as standard clausal requirements, as regulated in Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection. Moreover, that as the complainant had only recently become a Muslim (muallaf), he did not properly understand Islamic shari’a, nor did he properly understand the content of the agreement, or the fact that he could not novate its terms. Consequently, the complainant felt aggrieved by the inclusion of standard clauses, which he believed contravened art 18(1) of Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection. Pursuant to art 18(3) of Law No. 8 of 1999, the plaintiffs argued for the agreement to be rendered null and void, and sought to invoke art 62 of Law No. 8 of 1999, which prescribes a penalty of up to five years imprisonment or a fine of up to IDR 2 billion. The plaintiffs also sought to rely on the principle of presumption of liability, thereby compelling the defendant to prove its innocence, as it claimed was supported by art 23 of Law No. 8 of 1999.

The plaintiffs requested that the court grant an interlocutory order precluding the defendant from dealing adversely with the complainant’s property. They also requested that the court declare the defendant’s conduct illegal by rendering the three agreements the complainant had with the defendant null and void.

The defendant lodged an objection in regards to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum, citing art 45(1) of Law No. 8 of 1999, which requires an aggrieved party to lodge an application with either an institution assigned to resolve consumer-related disputes, or a civil court. The defendant also cited art 25(2) of Law No. 48 of 2009, which states that civil courts are authorised to adjudicate civil matters, as further proof that a civil court was the appropriate forum to hear the matter. The defendant further argued that the plaintiffs had erred in submitting their application to the court because, per arts 18 and 19 of their Murabahah agreement, the complainant and defendant had agreed to resolve any disputes in the Registrar’s office of the Banjarmasin Religious Court. The defendant also submitted that the special power of attorney, pursuant to which the plaintiffs were acting on the complainant’s behalf, was invalid due to formulaic irregularities.

In addition, the defendant sought to impugn the fact that the plaintiffs’ statement of claim referred to the complainant as if he were the plaintiff. Moreover, it argued that the plaintiffs’ assertion that the Murabahah agreement contravened shari’a principles, as contained in Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking, as well as clausal standards, per Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection, was illogical and lacked legal basis. The defendant also criticised the plaintiffs for seeking to bring a civil action, pursuant to a civil statute (Law No. 8 of 1999), to a religious court.

The court found that, pursuant to Constitutional Court Decision No. 93 of 2012, the elucidation of art 55(2), which prescribed a civil forum as a suitable venue for shari’a banking dispute resolution, was invalid. Moreover, that a 'civil judicature' (Peradilan Umum), per art 45(1) of Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection, was to be read and interpreted as a religious court (Pengadilan Agama). Accordingly, the court found that religious courts had absolute jurisdiction over this matter. Crucially, however, the court found that the parties had clearly specified the Banjarmasin Religious Court as the appropriate resolution forum, precluding it from handing down a judgment.

In April 2022 [1443 AH], the Dār al-ʿUlūm al-Sharʿiyya press published The Islamic Emirate and Governmental System, authored by the Chief Justice of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, ʿAbd al-Ḥākim al-Ḥaqqānī, with a foreword by the current Taliban head, Hibatullāh Akhunzāda. The book was published in Arabic, with the intention of reaching a broad Muslim audience, beyond Afghanistan. The 312-page book discusses governance, education, laws of war (jihād), political leadership, education, and the rights and roles of women. The book opens by stating that, following the withdrawal of American-allied forces from Afghanistan, the goal of the new Islamic State is the implementation of divine law in accordance with Islamic law generally and Hanafī jurisprudence specifically. This book claims to be a manifesto encompassing the political and governance policies of the Taliban, even though it definitely represents the beliefs of al-Ḥaqqānī and his allies, rather than the philosophy of the entire Taliban movement—which has some internal variation. The book's principal assertions follow.

The book begins by defining two types of government: al-jabāya and al-hidāya. Al-jabāya refers, essentially, to the levying of taxes, while al-hidāya refers to religio-moral guidance. The author maintains that an Islamic government should be one of al-hidāya, where the government serves the role of providing advice and guidance to the people, rather than al-jabāya, wherein a government exploits the poor for the personal gain of government officials. Under a government of al-hidāya, the author asserts that the legitimate form of law is divine, not man-made.

The book acknowledges several sources of sharīʿa. Those sources include but are not limited to the Qur’ān, the ḥadīth (prophetic reports), qiyās (deductive analogical reasoning), ijmā‘ (scholarly consensus), and khayr (benevolence).

The book further establishes that the justice system of the Islamic Emirate should be in accordance only with Hanafī jurisprudence, and that no credence should be given to other schools of Islamic law that are and have historically been minoritarian in Afghanistan. The author asserts that accommodations made for religious minorities will lead to the justice system falling apart, as in the Ottoman Empire.

According to the author, citizens of the Islamic Emirate may continue to adhere to local customs (in Afghanistan: Pashtunwali or the code of the Pashtun people). Such customs may be upheld so long as they do not conflict with sharīʿa and may include wearing traditional Afghan clothes.

The head of the global Islamic state, the book asserts, should be called the Amīr al-Mu’minīn and should be appointed according to the same methods used in selecting the first Four Rāshidūn Caliphs after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad: through the formation of a council of influential and prominent people, not through democracy, which the author considers un-Islamic. Obedience to the Amīr al-Mu’minīn by the entire Islamic world is mandatory, the author asserts, and disobedience is punishable by death. As to criteria for leadership, the author maintains that the Amīr must be a man, and that women are to stay home and avoid participation in politics, for fear that their participation would compromise the political state.

The book discusses the various political institutions that form the Islamic Emirate: a Council of Ministers, the Armed Forces, and a Judiciary. It also calls for the creation of an all-male legislative body known as the Islamic Council.

On education, the book maintains that the educational system should include mandatory education in madrasas, and optional non-Islamic education. The author states that a co-educational system is forbidden (ḥarām), but that education of women itself is not necessarily prohibited (ḥarām). According to the author, a woman’s education should occur within the home and should be carried out by her family members. Further, he maintains that women should pursue careers that are suitable for them, such as medicine, caretaking, home sciences, and teaching; and they are to interface only with other women and girls in those professions.

The book specifically discusses women’s roles in society. It requires women to fully cover themselves in ḥijāb and stipulates that they should not engage in any pursuit that would require them to be alone for longer than three days. Finally, the author notes that women should not travel long distances without a male guardian, and that they should not unnecessarily leave their residences.

Overall, the book’s claims are seldom backed with references, and the sources employed by the author are not listed.

A Toledan man named Ibn Ḥātim was accused of being a heretic by sixty witnesses on the initiative of a fellow Toledan called Ibn Labīd al-Murābiṭ. The judge consulted with the local jurists, and following their legal opinions, he sentenced the accused to death. However, he granted the accused the right to challenge the witnesses (iʿdhār). Ibn Ḥātim escaped from Toledo and found refuge in the neighboring kingdom of Badajoz. Ibn Labīd went after him, carrying a copy of the judge’s sentence (tasjīl) along with the legal opinions of a number of non-Toledan jurists. In Badajoz, the ruler withdrew his support from Ibn Ḥātim, who fled again, this time to Cordoba. While in Cordoba, the “moral” police arrested Ibn Ḥātim, and the judge imprisoned him, giving him two months to prove his innocence. Unable to do so, Ibn Ḥātim was crucified alive. A number of legal issues arise in the course of this case: should the process of iʽdhār—the right to challenge witnesses—be granted to those accused of heresy (zandaqa)? Should refuge be granted to them? What happens with the estate or inheritance of an executed zindīq? Can a judge reverse a sentence given by another judge? The source is a collection of court cases by Andalusi scholar Ibn Sahl (d. 486/1093), and it is based on information directly available to the compiler, who was also a witness of most of the events described.