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The first applicant submitted that she had married a man by the name of Drs. Moerdiono on 20 December 1993, pursuant to Islamic norms. According to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, a marriage is lawful if performed in accordance with the respective religion and beliefs of the persons wishing to marry. The first applicant's marriage, however, had not been recorded with the Office of Religious Affairs, as required by art 2(2) of the Law No. 1 of 1974. As a result, the legal status of the first applicant's child (the second applicant) was that the second applicant had been born out of wedlock, per art 43(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974, and therefore only had a civil relationship with his mother and his mother's family. According to Islam, however, the first applicant's child was legitimate (sah) because the applicant was married to the second applicant's father when the second applicant was born meaning the second applicant's lineage with his father must be acknowledged.

The applicant submitted that her constitutional rights and those of the second applicant, as guaranteed by arts 28B(1) and (2), and 28D(1) of the 1945 Constitution, had been repudiated by virtue of art 43(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974.

The court acceded to the applicant's submission regarding art 43(1) stating that the article was to be read down as meaning that a child's civil relationship with its father and its father's family depended on scientific proof that the child was a blood relation of the father.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Holy See/Vatican City-State (La Santa Sede/Stato della Citta del Vaticano), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under the Vatican City-State's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

The fatwa states that:

1. Islam acknowledges that legitimate offspring is a child born from parents in wedlock;
2. adopting a child with the understanding that s/he then becomes divorced from his/her biological parents is contrary to Islam;
3. child adoption is permissible under Islam for the purposes of raising, caring for, and educating a child, but does not change the child's biological or religious status; and
4. adoption of an Indonesian child by a non-Indonesian citizen is contrary to art 34 of the 1945 Constitution, and diminishes national pride.

The Plaintiff, the Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor, challenged the Pittsfield Charter Township, the Township Board, Township Supervisor Mandy Grewal, and six Township Board of Trustees Members for their refusal to re-zone the area surrounding the Plaintiff so that the Plaintiff could expand and build a school. Although an independent outside planner endorsed the rezoning, the Plaintiff alleged that the Respondents denied rezoning due to concerns from community members, stemming largely from an animus to the Islamic faith. By denying the rezoning proposal on this basis, the Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents discriminated against the organization in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and "state law claims" in the Michigan state constitution. The Respondents filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded the Township Board of Trustees' individual liability under Section 1983. However, the District Court dismissed the other claims alleging violations of RLUIPA, the US Constitution, and the Michigan Constitution.

The applicants submitted that they were married in accordance with Islamic law on 18 December 2005 by a qadhi before two witnesses. The second applicant's younger brother had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been four mayam worth of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a widower and the second applicant a widow. The parties had never divorced nor had they left Islam (murtad). There were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had two children. They had registered their marriage with the local village (gampong) but not yet with the Office of Religious Affairs and required a court determination for administrative and other purposes.

The court cited Kitab l'anatu al-Thalibin, juz IV, page 254, and Kitab Tuhfah, volume 4, page 132, as examples of Islamic norms that allow the ratification of a marriage based on facts such as those established by the parties. In acceding to the parties' request, the court found that, pursuant to arts 2(1) and 6 of Law No. 1 of 1974, and art 7(2) and (3)(b) of the Compilation Islamic law, the parties' marriage constituted an Islamic marriage agreement (aqad nikah).

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Lhoksukon Shari'a Court, which, among other things, granted the respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra).

The Court dismissed the appeal, concurring with the lower court that the ongoing conflict between the parties constituted a sufficient reason for divorce, pursuant to arts 39(1) and (2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

In Ayub Masih v. State (23 Aug 2022), Justice Qazi Faez Isa and Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah granted bail on an interim petition, pending trial, to the plaintiff Salamat Mansha Masih, who was arrested for “preaching and making blasphemous remarks” in April 2021. Masih was denied bail by the Sessions Judge and the Judge of the High Court, who relied on the First Information Report (FIR), which alleges that the petitioner was a preacher, and the statements of the four witnesses. Upon review, the Supreme Court declared that an “examination of the charge reveals material deficiencies ... [and] does not contain a number of prescribed requirements with regard to the framing of the charge,” casting doubt on the reliablity of the FIR and testimony from the four witnesses. Namely, the Court pointed to the misidentification of the petitioner as a preacher, and the lack of corroborating evidence for the witness testimony. Remanding the case without deciding on the merits, the Court charged the lower courts with observing the constitutional requirements for fair trials in blasphemy and other criminal law cases. Constitutional requirements of applying shari'a, alongside its fundamental rights and fair trial provisions, include consideration of the Islamic law doubt canon instructing judges to ”avoid criminal punishments in cases of doubt”), and thereby requiring heightened procedures, a beyond a reasonable doubt standard for criminal convictions. For further studies of the doubt canon, together with the heightened procedures, standards of proof, and interpretive norms requiring lenity in Islamic criminal law, see Intisar Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2015).

This fatwa acknowledges the scourge of terrorism that has recently affected many countries, including Indonesia. It also acknowledges the perceptions held by some that terrorism reflects Islamic techings, that Muslims should be approached with caution, and that acts of terror constitute jihad.

The fatwa considers that terrorism, according to Islamic fiqh, constitutes piracy/unlawful warfare (hirabah). It determines that terrorism is a crime against humanity and civilisation that constitutes a serious threat towards state sovereignty and security, to world peace, as well as to societal welfare. It is transnational organised crime that can be categorised as an extraordinary and indiscriminate crime.

The fatwa distinguishes between terrorism and jihad, stating that terrorism is:

1. designed to cause damage (ifsad) and anarchy/chaos (faudha);
2. intended to create fear and destroy others; and
3. conducted without regulation and limits.

Meanwhile, it states that jihad:

1. brings about improvements (ishlah), albeit via warfare;
2. intends to enforce the religion of Allah and/or defend the rights of the oppressed; and
3. is conducted pursuant to regulations specified by shari'a with a clear enemy in mind.

Legally, the fatwa states that acts of terror are forbidden (haram), while acts of jihad are obligatory (wajib). Persons that commit suicide do so for personal reasons and are pessimists, while martyrs do so as a victim for their religion and the Muslim people, with the intent of obtaining the mercy and pleasure of Allah Subhanahu wa Ta'ala. Suicide bombing is, therefore, forbidden (haram), regardless of whether it is committed in a peaceful area or in a warzone. Martyrdom, however, is permitted.

This regional regulation states that Diniyah Takmiliyah is a non-formal Islamic religious education that combines religious values and Islamic morals as complementary Islamic education for primary and middle school students. Moreover, that it is implemented pursuant to the Pancasila ('Five Principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution (art 2). The aim of Diniyah Takmiliyah is to provide school children with knowledge and competency in practising Islam in order that they become believing, pious, noble, healthy, knowledgable, competent Muslims (art 4). Diniyah Takmiliyah curriculum comprises: Qur'anic and hadith studies, creed (aqidah), morals (akhlak), legal understanding (fiqih), Islamic cultural history, Arabic, and practical worship (art 12(1)). The regulation obliges Muslim primary school students (art 13(3)) to undertake Diniyah Takmiliyah education.

The applicants submitted that they were married in accordance with Islamic law on 20 April 2000 before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as the second applicant's marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been 10 mayam of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. There were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had three children and no third party had ever sought to impugn the sanctity of their marriage. They had received a marriage certificate, issued by the Office of Religious Affairs, but it had been lost in the 26 December 2004 tsunami. The parties, therefore, requested that the court ratify their marriage for civil administration purposes.

In acceding to the parties' request, the court found that, pursuant to arts 2(1) and 6 of Law No. 1 of 1974, and art 7(2) and (3)(b) of the Compilation Islamic law, the parties' marriage constituted an Islamic marriage agreement (aqad nikah).

The applicants submitted that they were married in accordance with Islamic law on 15 June 2006 before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as the second applicant's marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been three mayam worth of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. The parties had never divorced nor had they left Islam (murtad). There were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had no children. They had not yet registered their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs because, at the time of their marriage, the Office of Religious Affairs was inactive due to post-tsunami reconstruction. The parties, therefore, requested that the court ratify their marriage for hajj administration purposes and other administrative requirements.

The court cited Kitab l'anatu al-Thalibin, juz IV, page 254, Bughyatul mustarsyidin, page 298, and kitab Tuhfah, volume 4, page 132, as examples of Islamic norms that allow the ratification of a marriage based on facts such as those established by the parties. In acceding to the parties' request, the court found that, pursuant to arts 2(1) and 6 of Law No. 1 of 1974, and art 7(2) and (3)(b) of the Compilation Islamic law, the parties' marriage constituted an Islamic marriage agreement (aqad nikah).

This regional regulation obliges Muslim school children to attend Madrasah Diniyah Awaliyah, which is a non-formal educational stream that makes provision for Islamic religious education for a term of four years at primary level (art 5). The regulation states that this requirement is based on the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution (art 2), and that it will meet societal needs by supplementing the Islamic education of students who attend public schools (art 3).

The parties were married on 21 February 2005 in Makassar and had two children. The plaintiff submitted that, since 2009, she and the defendant had quarrelled regularly because the defendant:

1. had been physically violent towards the plaintiff; and
2. would drink excessively and verbally abuse the plaintiff.

The plaintiff had returned to her parents' home in June 2010, where she had stayed for the three months leading up to the proceeding. After formal mediation failed to reconcile the parties, the court acknowledged that the parties' ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, constituted a sufficient reason to grant the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak ba'in shughra).

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Meulaboh Shari'a Court, which, among other things, granted the respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain shughra) and specified child maintenance payments to be made by the appellant.

The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court to grant the the respondent an irrevocable divorce, concurring with the lower court that the ongoing conflict between the parties constituted a sufficient reason for divorce, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1075, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. In regards to child maintenance payments, however, the Court overturned the decision of the lower court on the grounds that the respondent had not made any request for such payments in the first instance.

This fatwa states that Islam shariatises medical treatment as it constitutes a part of disease prevention. Medical treatment may not contravene shari'a, while medicine used for the purposes of medical treatment must use holy and halal ingredients. The fatwa requests that the government ensure such halal medicine is readily available, and implores business operators to have regard for halal components in medicine and not to assume that using medicine implies the patient's condition is an emergency. It also requests that authorities not certify as halal medicine containing forbidden (haram) or unclean (najis) ingredients, and implores people to always use holy and halal medicine.

In its unanimous decision, the 10th Chamber of the Council of State, the highest administrative law court of the country, annulled the Cabinet Decision of 1934 converting the Hagia Sophia from a mosque into a museum. The Court reasoned as follows: the companion law to Turkey's secular Civil Code had provided that the old (Islamic) law would apply to waqfs (endowments) established before the new Civil Code came into force. The Hagia Sophia was a mosque, the Court found, that constituted part of Fatih Sultan Mehmed's (aka Mehmed the Conqueror) waqf, and under the applicable law at the time, it was forbidden to alter the status of waqf property via administrative decisions. The Court therefore ruled that the Cabinet Decision of 1934 had unlawfully changed the status of waqf property. The Court struck down the Cabinet Decision of 1934, thus paving the way for restoring Hagia Sophia's status as a mosque for worship.

This regional regulation prohibits the production, distribution, sale, stockpiling, storage, and consumption of alcholic beverages in Indramayu regency. Moreover, it categorically prohibits any person or entity from bringing alcholic beverages into Indramayu regency. Contravention of this regulation can result in up to six months' imprisonment or a fine of up to IDR 50 million. While the regulation arguably seeks to Islamise the region, it justifies its blanket prohibition on alcohol, not on the grounds of religious (Islamic) norms, but on the grounds that alcohol constitutes a hazard to people's health, a threat to the future of the next generation and the nation, and disrupts societal security and order.

This fatwa states that, in Islam, a child is born in a holy state, free from sin, even if born of adultery. The fatwa acknowledges Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision No. 46 of 2010 that granted children born out of wedlock the same status as that of children born of parents in wedlock.

The fatwa states, however, that a child born of adultery does not have a relationship with its father or father's family, but does with its mother and mother's family. The child does not bear the sin of its parents, who are to be punished (hadd) by the authorised parties. The government is authorised to hand down a ta'zir punishment to compel the male adulterer to cover the child's needs and provide the child with some form of inheritance in his will (wasiat wajibah). This ta'zir punishment is designed to afford the child some protection; not to legitimise the relationship between the father and child.

The fatwa also recommends that the People's Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) and government legislate to ensure severe punishments for adultery as a deterrent, as well as to ensure that children born of adultery are afforded the necessary protections a father should provide his child. The fatwa requests that the government facilitate with ease the provision of birth certificates to children born of adultery, but not to legitimise the relationship between the father and child. The fatwa also obliges the government to educate society so as children born of adultery are not discriminated against, but are treated like any other child.

This regional regulation obliges Muslim school children to attend Diniyah Takmiliyah, which is a non-formal educational stream that makes provision for Islamic religious education for a term of four years at primary level, two years at middle school level, and two years at high school level (arts 3 and 6). The regulation states that this requirement is based on the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution (art 2), and that it will supplement the Islamic education of students who attend public schools (art 4). The curriculum comprises the study of the Qur'an and Hadith, creed and morals (aqidah - ahlak), legal understanding and worship (fiqih - ibadah), Islamic cultural history, Arabic language, and practical worship (art 13(1)). 

This regional regulation states that compulsory attendance at a Madrasah Diniyah Takmiliyah Awaliyah (MDTA) is based on the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution. The regulation states that MDTA is a non-formal educational stream that administers a type of Islamic religious education for three years (art 5), designed for students in grades 3-5 (art 6(2)). The curriculum comprises the study of:

1. the Qur'an;
2. Hadith;
3. creed (aqidah);
4. morals (akhlak);
5. Islamic legal understanding (fiqih);
6. Islamic cultural history;
7. Arabic; and
8. practical worship (praktek ibadah) (art 13(a)).