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From imam-us.org:

The Office of His Eminence, Ayatullah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani, communicated a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. António Guterres, regarding the desecration of the Holy Quran in Sweden. A translation of this letter can be found below along with a link to the original.

In the Name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful

To His Excellency Mr. António Guterres
Secretary-General of the United Nations

Greetings with respect and appreciation,

It has been reported in the media that someone in the Kingdom of Sweden desecrated a copy of the Holy Quran, intending to insult the religion of Islam. 

This disgraceful behavior has occurred more than once in different countries in recent years, but it is noticeable that this time it took place with an official permit from the Swedish police, claiming that it is a requirement of respect for freedom of expression!

However, it is certain that respect for freedom of expression does not justify permitting such a shameful act, which represents a flagrant attack on the sanctity of the beliefs of more than two billion Muslims in the world and creates an environment conducive to the spread of extremist ideas and wrong practices.

The Supreme Religious authority condemns what happened and calls on the United Nations to take effective steps to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents, compel countries to reconsider legislation that allows such occurrences, and call for establishing the values ​​of peaceful coexistence between followers of different religions and intellectual backgrounds based on caring for rights and mutual respect for all. 

The Office of Sayyid al-Sistani, Najaf
10 Dhu al-Hijjah, 1444 A.H
6/29/2023

The four applicants filed an application with the court on 26 June 2015, stating that their father (the deceased) had passed away on 6 May 1994, and that their mother had passed away on 23 November 2014. The applicants' grandparents had also all passed away. The applicants requested from the court a stipulation that they were the beneficiaries (ahli waris) of the deceased, in order that they could withdraw from Bank Syariah Mandiri the deceased's hajj savings, and deal with a deed of title filed with the National Land Body (Badan Pertanahan Nasional) in the name of the deceased.

The court acceded to the applicants' request based on the grounds that they met the requirements to be considered beneficiaries, per art 171(c) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

This fatwa states that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights accords with the aims and values of Islamic teachings, which protect the rights of every person to life and dignity. It qualifies, however, that the following articles of the Declaration are contrary to Islam:

1. art 16(1) and (2) on the freedom to marry without limitation due to nationality, race or religion;
2. art 18 on the freedom to change religion; and
3. art 23 on work.

The fatwa obliges Muslims to accept, respect and uphold universal human rights with the following conditions:

1. to value and respect differences of understanding, interpretations and implementation of human rights based on differences of culture, morality and laws in each country; and
2. an understanding and implementation of human rights must show a balance between individual rights and individual obligations, individual rights and communal rights, and freedoms and responsibilities.

The fatwa also states that, in relation to arts 16(1) and (2) and 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Muslims are to adhere to Islamic teachings as freedom of religion is a human right.

In preambular statement (a), this regional regulation states that alcoholic beverages can endanger physical and mental health, threaten the lives of the future generations of the nation, disturb security, peace and public order, and become a driving factor in the occurrence of acts of violence and criminality, as well as other undesirable conduct that is contrary to the philosophy of Gorontalo province: 'Adat bersendikan Syara, Syara bersendikan Kitabullah' ('custom found upon Islamic law, Islamic law found upon the Qur'an').

While the regulation does not place a blanket prohibition on alcohol, it does prohibit the importation, distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages with an ethanol content exceeding 55 per cent (art 12(1)), and prohibits all persons from bringing alcoholic beverages into Gorontalo province from overseas (art 13(1)). It also prohibits the sale of alcohol in a variety of places, including near places of worship, schools, residential areas, and hospitals (art 14(1)), as well as its consumption in public (art 15).

The parties were married on 5 May 2012 and had one child, who was currently in the care of the plaintiff. On 26 January 2016, the parties had divorced, after which time they had agreed that their child would remain in the care of the plaintiff. In this instance, the plaintiff, in order to alleviate certain difficulties already encountered while trying to enrol the parties' child for school, had lodged an application to amend certain documents. These included the parties' child's family card (Kartu Keluarga) and national identity number (Nomor Induk Kependudukan).

Despite the defendant's absence, the court, pursuant to art 105(a) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's application on the grounds that the parties' child was still underage.

In this passage, the Quran addresses the Islamic community as witnesses against mankind, declaring: “We have appointed you a middle nation, that ye may be witnesses against mankind, and that the messenger may be a witness against you.” Some suggest that this passage could be interpreted as having implications for legal procedure in Islamic courts. However, Ahmed El Shamsy maintains in "The Logic of Excluding Testimony in Early Islam" in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts that this passage does not have practical relevance to judicial procedure but rather relates to ethical witnessing in this world or the hereafter. 

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

The preamble of this regional regulation states that the ability to read the Qur'an for every school student constitutes a part of an Islamic education with strategic meaning to improve the intelligence of the life of the nation, especially in terms of instilling faithful and God-mindful values in the younger generations, and in society in general.

The regulation states that proficiency in reading the Qur'an will make students and prospective brides and bridegrooms good, noble, wise, disciplined and God-mindful people, well-versed in worship (ibadah) and with knowledge of Islamic principles. Accordingly, it requires schools to set aside additional time to teach Qur'anic recitation.

If any person contravenes the provisions of this regulation they face a maximum prison sentence of six months and/or a maximum fine of IDR 5 million.

This fatwa affirms a raft of preceding fatwa that declare the teachings of Darul Arqam to be divergent from Islamic beliefs (Aqidah Islamiyah). It supports in full the decision of the Attorney-General of the Republic of Indonesia to prohibit the distribution of the book Aurad Muhammadiyah pegangan Darul Arqam, by Ustaz Azhari Muhammad, published by Penergan Al-Arqam. It also supports the Attorney-General's decision to maintain efforts to protect the prohibition on the distribution of the book Presiden Soeharto Ikut Jadwal Allah by Abuya Syech Imam Azhari Muhammad, edited by Ustazah Chadijah Aam, published by Penerbitan al-Arqam Indonesia.

The fatwa recommends that the Attorney-General of the Republic of Indonesia issue a prohibition on Darul Arqam and the dissemination of its ideas and teachings for the sake of protecting the purity of Islamic teachings and national unity. The fatwa also calls on Muslims not to be influenced by the teachings of Darul Arqam.

The applicant submitted that he and the respondent were married on 19 March 2010 and had one child, who was in the care of the respondent. The first the years of the parties' marriage had been harmonious, but since then they had become quarrelsome because the respondent was not prepared to be the wife of an Indonesian National Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) soldier. In June 2013, the respondent left the parties' home and the applicant's unit without the applicant's permission as her husband, or in an official capacity through the applicant's unit. The parties had remained separated since and the applicant had received dispensation as a member of the military to divorce the respondent.

The court was satisfied that the applicant had met the evidentiary burden contained in art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974, and, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the applicant's request for a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i) on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court also permitted the respondent to retain custody of the parties' child.

This regional regulation states that compulsory study of Diniyah Takmiliayh Awaliyah (DTA) education and Taman Pendidikan Al-Qur'an (TPA - Qur'anic Primary Education) is based on the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution. The regulation states that DTA and TPA are non-formal religious education streams that come under the auspices of the Ministry of Religion (art 3), and are designed for primary school students (art 6(1)). Students are expected to undertake this non-formal form of education for four years, and for at least 18 hours per week (art 6(2)). The regulation states that the purpose of religious education is to make participants understand and practise religious values that have a broad, critical, creative, innovative, and dynamic vision for the purpose of intellectualising the life of a nation that is God-believing, God-mindful, and noble (art 4(1)). Compulsory study of DTA and TPA is intended to provide school children with the ability to understand Islamic teachings, in order that they develop into God-believing, God-mindful, and practising and noble Muslims (art 4(2)).

The curriculum comprises:

1. Qur'anic literacy;
2. study of the Hadith;
3. creed (aqidah);
4. morals (akhlak);
5. legal understanding (fiqih);
6. Islamic cultural history;
7. Arabic; and
8. practical worship (praktek ibadah) (art 14(1)).

Amaq Soekalam din Daiman passed away circa-1970. His mother and father (Daiman and Sekrasip) had pre-deceased him, and his wife, Rakisah, passed away circa-1975. Amaq Soekalam and Rakisah had five children:

1. Nurisam bin Soekalam (passed away circa-1971);
2. Nuriasip bin Soekalam (first defendant);
3. Nuriadim bin Soekalam (first plaintiff);
4. Sukardip bin Soekalam (second plaintiff);
5. Nuriadip bin Soekalam (passed away circa-2003), married to Inaq Nuriadip, had five children:
6. Sadli bin Nuriadip (third plaintiff);
7. Lux bin Nuriadip (fourth plaintiff);
8. Heli bin Nuriadip (fifth plaintiff);
9. Herul bin Nuriadip (sixth plaintiff);
10. Purni bin Nuriadip (seventh plaintiff).

Amaq Soekalam left behind a plot of land (500m²) upon which was situated a semi-permanent structure (2 x 7m²), as well as a plantation (21,000m²). In 1965, he gave the plantation to Amaq Juni to develop, pursuant to an agreement that they would share the spoils. In 1982, however, a request was made that the plantation be registered by Badan Pertanahan Nasional - Lombok Barat (National Land Body - West Lombok) via the government asset legalisation process PRONA (Proyek Operasi Nasional Agraria - National Agrarian Operations Project), in order that a deed of title for the plantation could be issued. That deed of title was incorrectly issued in Amaq Juni's name, rather than Amaq Soekalam's, leading the plaintiffs to argue that it had no legal effect.

Circa-2006, Amaq Juni passed away and the land came into the possession of his wife (Inaq Uni) and children (second-sixth defendants). The plaintiffs claimed that, while Amaq Soekalam was alive, he both worked on the plantation and maintained possession of it. After he passed away, however, Amaq Juni came into possession of the plantation and had a deed of title issued in his name. After Amaq Juni's passing, the plantation came into the possession of the second-sixth defendants. The plaintiffs sought from the court an order that the plantation be divided between Amaq Soekalam's worthy beneficiaries, and that a caveat be placed on the plantation to preclude the defendants from dealing with the plantation in a manner adverse to the plaintiffs' interests. In addition, they requested that the other property be divided in accordance with Islamic inheritance laws (hukum faraid).

The court acceded to the plaintiffs' request insofar as it ordered the second-sixth defendants to transfer to the plaintiffs the plantation. The court ordered that it be divided between the plaintiffs pursuant to hukum faraid, specifically stipulating the share to which each beneficiary was entitled.

This challenge to the validity of Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 on the Surveillance and Control of Alcoholic Beverages was submitted by Front Pembela Islam (FPI - the Islamic Defenders' Front), represented by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, the founder and chairperson of FPI, and KH. Ahmad Sabri Lubis, the secterary-general of FPI.

The applicant cited several teachings from the Qur'an and Hadith, the Holy Bible, and Buddhism that prohibit the consumption of alcohol, as well as Hinduism, which discourages excessive consumption of alcohol. As a state based on the principle of One Almighty God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa), the applicant submitted that Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 should, therefore, be invalidated for contradicting the religious values contained in Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution because not one religion in Indonesia permitted or deemed halal the consumption of any alcoholic beverage. The applicant also cited the physical effects alcohol consumption can have on people, as well as other people who may fall victim to alcohol-induced theft, battery, abuse, rape, and even murder.

The applicant also submitted that Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 was contrary to several national statutes, including arts 46 and 47 of Law No. 36 of 2009 on Health. This was because the decree only categorised alcohol rather than prohibiting it, while the detrimental effect alcohol can have on health repudiates the aim of arts 46 and 47, which is to improve the health of Indonesian citizens.

The court questioned whether the applicant believed its rights and/or authority had suffered because of Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997. It also questioned whether the applicant believed it had suffered any specific and actual loss or could potentially suffer any loss, and whether or not there was a causal relationship between that loss and the decree it was seeking to impugn. The court found in the applicant's favour in this regard, granting it the requisite legal standing. It then acceded to the application but did so on the grounds that several of the statutes that constituted the legal basis for Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 were no longer valid laws themselves.

This set of guidelines is the official handbook for the coordinators of the Qur'anic Literacy Development Institute (Lembaga Pengembangan Tilawatil Quran), from the national level to the sub-district level. It contains:

1. Joint Decree of the Minister of Religion and Minister of the Interior No. 19 of 1977 and No. 151 of 1977 on the Formation of the Qur'anic Literacy Development Institute Guidelines;
2. Joint Decree of the Minister of the Interior and Minister of Religion No. 128 of 1982 and No. 44A of 1982 on Efforts to Increase Qur'anic Literacy for the Islamic Community for the Purpose of Increasing Appreciation and Practice of the Qur'an in Daily Life;
3. Joint Decree of the Minister of Religion and Minister of the Interior No. 182A of 1988 and No. 48 of 1988 on the Organisational Development of the Qur'anic Literacy Development Institute; and
4. Indonesian Minister of Religion Decree No. 240 of 1989 on the Organisational and Administrative Arrangement of the Qur'anic Literacy Development Institute.

On 1 August 1988, the applicants were married. While they had no children of their own, they had raised and cared for a child named Muh. Ilham, now aged 21 years. Muh. Ilham's parents had given him to the applicants to care for because they had two other children for whom providing financially was already a struggle (at the time Muh. Ilham's father was unemployed, only working as a farmer). The applicants had been prepared to raise Muh. Ilham as their own and were able to bear the costs associated with caring for and educating Muh. Ilham because the first applicant had a steady salary with the Indonesian National Military's ground forces (Tenaga Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan Darat). The applicants requested that they be stipulated as Muh. Ilham's legal adoptive parents.

The court cited art 171(h) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, which states that an adopted child is a child for whom the responsibility to cover their educational costs and the like is transferred from their biological parents to their adoptive parents, pursuant to a court judgment. Moreover, pursuant to art 49(1) of Law No. 7 of 1989, for the sake of legal certainty, an adoption based on Islamic law requires a religious court determination.

The court found that, pursuant to Islamic legal provisions, child adoption is legal if the following conditions are met:

1. the child's welfare is prioritised;
2. the child's educational expenses and the like are covered, per art 171(h) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws;
3. the child's adoption does not sever the bloodline between the child and his/her parents;
4. the child's adoption does not result in the child being deemed to share bloodline, inheritance or any other legal relationship with his/her adoptive parents, except for the responsibilities mentioned above in point 2;
5. the child is to inherit one-third of their parents' estate, pursuant to art 209 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws;
6. the child's adoption requires an agreement between the adoptive parents and the representative or person/legal entity facilitating the adoption;
7. the adoption must adhere to current laws vis-a-vis the prospective adoptive parents;
8. the adoption must adhere to current laws for the sake of the child;
9. the adoption of a Muslim child is to adhere to the fatwa of the Indonesian Council of Ulama, No: U-335/MUI 182 of 10 June 1982; and
10. in the interests of legal certainty, child adoption, pursuant to Islamic law and art 171(h) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, be ratified by a religious court decision.

Acceding to the applicants' request, the court acknowledged that, even though Muh. Ilham was 21 years of age and adoption was no longer appropriate, the history and nature of the applicants' relationship with Muh. Ilham was such that he could be declared their adopted child.

The fatwa is a unanimous decision by forty Muslim muftis, affiliated with the Sunni Ittehad Council in Pakistan, declaring honor killing of women as “un-Islamic” or heresy (kuffur) and an “unpardonable sin” (gunah-e-qabir). The decree explicitly states that burning a woman alive, in the name of honor, for marrying a person of their choosing, is heresy and against the commands of Islam. The fatwa quotes a Quranic verse, verse number 232 of Surat al-Baqarah: [translated from the Urdu translation of the verse – as used in the fatwa – into English] “Oh woman’s family, do not say no to women for wanting to marry the husband [of their choice] if the two of them have consented to the marriage.” The fatwa states that Islam is the true guardian of rights of women and that it is imperative upon the leaders of an Islamic nation/government (hukumat) to ensure protection of women’s rights. For that purpose, the government should pass and implement laws that make burning and killing of women an unpardonable crime. The oppression and torture unleashed upon women has no relation to Islam. The fatwa then refers to an example (sunna) of the Prophet Muhammad, as narrated in Sahih-Bukhari: The Prophet (s.a.w.) terminated the marriage contract (nikkah) of a woman who complained to him (s.a.w.) that she did not like the man her father had married her off to. The fatwa condemns the act of burning alive or killing one’s child for marrying someone of their choice and then “appeals” to the parents to focus on the ethical education and upbringing of their children in line with the teachings of Islam; and that the upcoming month of Ramadan will be devoted to raise awareness about women’s rights. Finally, the fatwa states that those who burn women and girls alive should be hanged to death.

The particular newspaper reporting (in Roznama Dunya) on this fatwa includes the names of twenty four clerics who signed the fatwa (the total number of clerics who joined in issuing the fatwa were forty but the newspaper article explicitly mentions just twenty four names).

In its Grand Chamber decision, the European Court of Human Rights (the "Court") held that a French law dating back to 2010, which prohibits the concealment of one's face in public spaces, does not violate the European Convention of Human Rights (the "Convention").  The law was understood by many to have been aimed at women of the Islamic faith who choose to wear face-concealing attire, including the niqab (face veil) and the burqa.  The applicant in the case, a French born Muslim woman who wears the niqab and burqa, alleged that the law impermissibly infringed on her right to privacy, religious freedom, and her right to be free from government discrimination.  The Court disagreed, taking notice of its earlier jurisprudence that the public manifestation of religion -- as opposed to the right to hold a religious belief -- was not immune from government regulation.  It further noted its doctrine of "margin of appreciation," granting governments considerable leeway in their regulation of public manifestations of religion.  It then held, under its proportionality analysis, that the French government's contention that the law was justified on national security grounds was without merit.  However, the Court held that the government's contention that the law was justified via the aim of ensuring that citizens would be imbued with a sense of "living together" had merit.  The Court thus found no incompatibility between the law and the Convention.  Some of the dissenting opinions in the case took issue with the Court's privacy and "living together" analysis, reasoning that the right to privacy included one's right to willingly withdraw from public life or partake in it in ways that would minimize social interaction.

The parties were married on 17 January 2005 but had no children. After marrying in Bau-Bau, the parties had returned to Ambon and lived in a rental property from 2005-2006, before moving to their own home in December 2006. The plaintiff submitted that, since 2008, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome because the defendant had had an extra-marital affair in Ambon and Jakarta. The plaintiff had learned of the affair when she called the defendant and the other woman in question answered his phone, resulting in the plaintiff and other woman arguing over the phone.

The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant had failed to disclose to her that, after the parties had agreed to rent out their property for one year, the defendant had rented it out for two years, spending the proceeds from rent payments on the other woman. The defendant had also confessed to having a daughter with a non-Muslim woman, the child now being in the care of the defendant's older sister, as well as marrying another woman, with whom he had a four-year old daughter.

Problems escalated on 13 Feburary 2011 when the defendant extended the term of the rental agreement for their property without first consulting the plaintiff. The defendant then spent the rent proceeds on the other woman, the plaintiff submitted.

The defendant submitted that he did not live in Ambon, but rather in Central Jakarta, and therefore the Ambon Religious Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. Moreover, he rejected the plaintiff's submission that he had used proceeds from renting their home to fraternise with another woman. Rather, the defendant submitted that he had used that money to cover the plaintiff's university fees (the plaintif was attending university in Makassar and the defendant did not have sufficient finances to cover the costs). The defendant also rejected the plaintiff's submission that he had married another woman with whom he had a four-year old daughter.

The defendant also submitted that from the IDR 17 million per annum he made from renting the parties' home, he had spent IDR 4 million on plumbing, IDR 5 million on the issuance of a certificate from the National Land Body, provided the plaintiff with IDR 4 million to discharge a debt she owed to a colleague, and IDR 2 million to pay an instalment to the landowner as the land had not yet been paid-off in full.

Dismissing the defendant's claim that the court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, the court found that, based on both parties' submissions, it was evident that the parties were no longer compatible and had already been separated since February 2011. Pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the Court acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).