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This regional regulation states that Diniyah Takmiliyah education is based on the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution (art 2). It defines Diniyah Takmiliyah education as non-formal Islamic religious education (art 3), that operates to meet the Islamic religious educational needs of primary school students (art 4), intended to provide religious competency to students in order that they develop into knowledgable, God-believing, God-mindful, practising and noble Muslims (art 5). The duration of Diniyah Takmiliyah is four years (art 6), and the curriculum comprises:

1. Qur'anic-Hadith literacy;
2. creed-morals (aqidah-akhlak);
3. legal understanding-worship (fiqih-ibadah);
4. Islamic cultural history;
5. Arabic; and
6. practical worship (praktek ibadah) (art 13).

The parties were married on 21 May 2010 and had one child. The applicant submitted that after two months, on 14 July 2010, the parties had quarrelled but were still living together. After the birth of the parties' child in January 2011, the parties had begun to quarrel frequently. By February 2011 the parties had begun to argue on a daily basis, prompting the applicant to leave the parties' home. Accordingly, the applicant sought the court's permission to divorce the respondent (talak satu raj'i).

The court acknolwedged that the parties' marriage was in an irreparable state and no longer constituted a joyful and everlasting domestic life, per art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or a peaceful, hopeful and loving domestic life, per art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, it acceded to the applicant's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The wife argued that the couple had a marriage ceremony in Damascus, and, should that Islamic ceremony not be legally recognized, that a valid marriage should be presumed because of the couple’s long cohabitation and public reputation as husband and wife. The husband argued that the couple was not present in Damascus at the time of the alleged marriage, and that they instead had an Islamic marriage ceremony at a flat in London. Accordingly, while the ceremony was religiously recognized as a marriage, it was not valid under English law. In its judgment, the Court ruled that where, as here, the only known or proven ceremony was one which might not have constituted a marriage under English law, then a marriage could not be presumed.

The parties were married on 15 January 1998 and had one adopted child. They had also lived with the plaintiff's parents for approximately 20 years. Not long after they were married the parties began to quarrel regularly. The plaintiff submitted that this was because of the defendant's alcoholic tendencies, as well as the fact that she had to bear all financial responsibilities, including those associated with the parties' adopted child. Problems escalated in 2008 when the defendant forced the plaintiff's adopted child out of the plaintiff's parents' home, causing the plaintiff great emotional suffering. The defendant then left the plaintiff, the parties remaining separated up until the time of the proceeding. The plaintiff had subsequently searched Bau-Bau in an attempt to ascertain the defendant's whereabouts but had been unsuccessful. In 2008, the plaintiff also moved to Ambon to live with her aunt.

The plaintiff filed for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) with the court. Despite the defendant's absence from court, the court acknowledged that the parties' marriage was in an irreparable state and no longer constituted a joyful and everlasting domestic life, per art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or a peaceful, hopeful and loving domestic life, per art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, it acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 23 December 2007 and had one child, born on 4 March 2008. They had lived with the respondent's parents for approximately three years. The applicant submitted, however, that, since September 2009, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome because the respondent:

1. had never shown her appreciation for the applicant as the head of the household;
2. was not content with what she had, including the applicant's salary, which she found inadequate;
3. would often become jealous if the applicant returned home late; and
4. when angry, would use inappropriate language with the applicant.

As a result, the applicant had left the matrimonial home and returned to his family's home on 23 September 2009, where he had remained for the 11 months leading up to the proceeding.

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acknowledged that the parties' ongoing conflict constituted a sufficient reason to grant the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i). Moreover, the court ordered the parties to abide by the terms of their post-marital agreement, which the court held to be binding at law. The agreement pertained to the matrimonial home, use of the proceeds if the home were to be sold, and child maintenance (calculated in accordance with the applicant's salary).

The parties were married on 15 March 2008 and had two children. Initially, the marriage had been harmonious. The plaintiff submitted, however, that, since January 2011, it had become quarrelsome because the defendant:

1. had a gambling addiction and would return home in the middle of the night;
2. had confessed to the plaintiff that he had had extra-marital affairs with other women; and
3. rarely provided for the plaintiff and their children.

In January 2011, the plaintiff left the matrimonial home and returned to her parents' home, remaining there for the time leading up to the proceeding. During this time the parties rarely communicated, leading the plaintiff to file for divorce.

The defendant conceded that the majority of the plaintiff's submissions were true. He qualified, however, that he had had an extra-marital affair upon becoming very emotional seeing the plaintiff being picked up by another man driving an Avanza. The plaintiff acknowledged this but stated the other man was only a friend.

The court, pursuant to s 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and s 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acknowledged that the parties' ongoing conflict constituted a sufficient reason to grant the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra) and, accordingly, acceded to the plaintiff's application.

The parties were married on 4 August 2007 and had lived with the applicant's parents for eight years and seven months. While they had had a child, the child had died at birth on 21 November 2013. The applicant submitted that the marriage had been harmonious until 8 March 2016 when the applicant learned that the respondent was having an extra-marital affair with another man. Problems escalated on 11 March 2016, resulting in the respondent leaving the matrimonial home without notice. For the next month the respondent had not returned home, nor had she contacted the applicant. The applicant submitted that the respondent's conduct constituted neglect of her responsibilities as a wife. The applicant, accordingly, requested that the court grant him a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i).

After corroborating the applicant's submissions with information provided by two of the applicant's witnesses, the court acceded to the applicant's request, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, on the grounds of ongoing conflict between the parties.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed a state district court’s decision to uphold an Islamic marriage contract that awarded the wife a deferred dowry (mahr), an amount agreed upon at the time of marriage and due to the wife from the husband or his estate upon death or divorce, of $50,000. The district court had concluded that the amount was due pursuant to a marital contract made by the parties “in contemplation of a forthcoming marriage,” constituting “a valid, binding, and enforceable contract under Sections 4.001-003 of the Texas Family Code.” The appellate court reversed and remanded to the lower court, concluding that the agreement was not a valid premarital contract under the state law, defined as “an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage,” because the religious wedding ceremony occurred before the contract was signed. As the contract fell outside of the definition of premarital contract, the Court concluded that it could not be enforced like one. 

Amina Lawal appealed the decision of the Upper Sharīʿa Court, Funtua, upholding her conviction of the capital crime of zinā (fornication) by the Sharīʿa Court of Bakori. As she had done in the appeals court, the Appellant retracted the confession made before the trial court. The Court held that a single confession is not a sufficient ground for a zinā conviction. Therefore, it determined that the Appellant's confession before the trial court was not a sufficient basis for conviction. Further, it determined that retraction of a confession for an offense that impinged on the “rights of God” [ḥuqūq Allāh] (such as zinā or alcohol consumption) is permissible and valid even after judgment, if made before the execution of a sentence. The Court also held that a child born by an unmarried woman within seven years of a former marriage is affiliated with the former husband [following the paternity canon in Islamic law], and under such circumstances, childbirth does not constitute proof of zinā. The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.

The parties were married on 29 December 2004, and had two children on 23 September 2004 and 6 November 2010. Their marriage had been harmonious until 2012, when the parties had begun to quarrel regularly. The applicant submitted that this was because the respondent:

1. did not carry out her responsibilities as a wife, such as preparing food for the applicant;
2. incorrectly suspected the applicant of having had an extra-marital affair, and would never listen to the applicant's explanations;
3. was excessively jealous of the applicant's family and objected to things such as the applicant providing his parents with money; and
4. whenever the parties would argue, would direct obscenities at the applicant, even in public.

Problems escalated in July 2013 when the respondent, for no apparent reason, ignored the applicant. The argument that ensued caused the respondent to ask the applicant for a divorce, which led the applicant to move to a rental property and the respondent to return to her parents' home. As mediation had failed to make the parties reconcile their differences, the applicant was of the opinion that the marriage was no longer tenable.

The court concurred, citing art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, in finding that the parties' ongoing conflict constituted a sufficient reason to grant the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i), as prescribed in art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage.

The court, pursuant to art 152 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, also ordered the applicant to pay to the respondent IDR 5 million, IDR 4.5 million of which was for iddah (100-day period after divorce has been granted). The court deemed the remaining IDR 500,000 sufficient for mut'ah (divorce compensation), as contained in art 149(a) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The applicant was also ordered to pay to the respondent IDR 750,000 per month in child maintenance.

The parties were married on 22 June 2012, but, for the duration of their short marriage, had never lived together as husband and wife. Work commitments meant that the defendant lived on a plantation in Riau, while the plaintiff lived at her parents' home in Padang. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had been disharmonious from the outset, the defendant showing a general lack of concern for the plaintiff as a husband should for his wife. For instance, three days after their marriage, the defendant left for Riau without taking the plaintiff because he supposedly did not yet have a house there. When the defendant returned to the plaintiff's parents' home for Eid al'Fitr (Idul Fitri) in 2012, he refused to be physically intimate with the plaintiff, and, at the end of January 2013, when the plaintiff visited the defendant, they were only physically intimate twice in one month.

After refusing to be physically intimate with the plaintiff again, the plaintiff returned home to Padang in April 2013, and since May 2013, the defendant had provided the plaintiff with no financial support. Despite the efforts of the plaintiff's parents to intervene and resolve the parties' problems, on 7 August 2013, the defendant effectively handed the plaintiff over to her parents without any legitimate reason. Since then communication between the parties had been severed and they had remained separated for approximately 10 months, leading up to the proceeding.

The court found that the parties' differences were irreconcilable, and, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, in conjunction with art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, believed ongoing conflict between the parties constituted sufficient grounds to grant the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

The deceased, who passed away on 18 January 2007, was survived by his second wife (respondent), as well as his first wife and children (first-eighth appellants). One of the primary issues of the dispute concerned the marriage status of the respondent to the deceased.

In overturning the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court), the Court found that, pursuant to art 38 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, if the deceased had wanted to repudiate his marriage to the respondent, he needed to have filed for divorce prior to his passing. Moreover, a marriage is formally repudiated by filing for repudiation with the Religious Court/Shari'a Court, pursuant to art 25 of Law No. 1 of 1974, arts 37 and 38 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 74(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The deceased had never followed such procedure to repudiate his marriage to the respondent.

Even if he had successfully repudiated his marriage to the respondent, the Court noted that the deceased's legal relationship to the respondent and their children (all three of whom were underage) would not cease, as per arts 75 and 76 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and art 28 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage.

The Court also dismissed the appellants' argument that the decision of the Banda Aceh State Court regarding the falsification of the respondent's marriage certificate was grounds for repudiation of her marriage to the deceased.

The Court found that for the first appellant, with whom the deceased had acquired property before he married the respondent, one-half of that property became the first appellant's, as well as one-third of the property the deceased had acquired while married to both the first appellant and respondent. The same could be said of what constituted the property of the deceased, viz. one-half of what the deceased had acquired while married to the first appellant, and one-third of what the deceased had acquired while married to both the first appellant and respondent.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Makassar Religious Court (lower court), which had granted her one-half of the assets she had owned jointly with the deceased. The appellant had married the deceased on 1 November 1990, and they had remained married until the deceased passed away on 22 May 2008. The lower court had stipulated as the deceased's beneficiaries his mother and four siblings (the respondents), and two properties and IDR 50 million in life insurance as the joint assets of the appellant and deceased.

The lower court had ordered the appellant to transfer to the beneficiaries the other half of those joint assets, which constituted the estate of the deceased. In dismissing the appeal, the court cited arts 96 and 97 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws as a legal basis for the division of the assets, as well as the fact that, as the deceased was Muslim, his assets were to be distributed pursuant to Islamic law, despite one of the parties to the dispute being a Christian/non-Muslim. The appellant was ordered to pay court costs (IDR 86,000).

The parties were married on 9 September 1996 and had two children. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome early on for reasons unbeknownst to the plaintiff. The defendant would often become intoxicated and physically beat the plaintiff, as well as leave the parties' home for days on end. In February 2006, the defendant finally left the plaintiff and their two children. As a result, the plaintiff requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

The defendant responded to the plaintiff's submissions, submitting that the plaintiff had already married another man in July 2010, and questioning whether or not Islamic law permitted a woman to marry another man before her husband had first divorced her. The defendant conceded that the parties quarrelled frequently but reasoned that it was common for married couples to do so. Moreover, that the reason the parties quarrelled as frequently as they did was that the plaintiff would often leave the parties' home, leaving behind their two children for days on end. The defendant also conceded that he had physically beaten the plaintiff when in an intoxicated state but justified it on the grounds that the plaintiff would frequently leave the parties' home to fraternise with other men.

In response to the plaintiff's submission that the defendant had left the plaintiff and their children in mid-February 2006, the defendant responded that he had commenced work in West Seram regency on 1 February 2000, and that every time he had returned home on a weekend the plaintiff was never there. In actual fact, the defendant submitted, it was the plaintiff who had left the parties' home from mid-2008 until 31 January 2011, evidenced by the fact the plaintiff had been renting a room in Ambon with the man she subsequently married. Moreover, the parties' children had been living with the defendant's parents. The defendant submitted that he was surprised to learn, when he returned home on 1 Feburary 2011, that the plaintiff had filed for divorce. He also submitted that it was unfeasible for the plaintiff to expect the defendant to maintain his spousal obligations to the plaintiff when she had been carrying on extra-marital affairs with other men before re-marrying.

The court acknowledged that the parties' marriage was in an irreparable state and no longer constituted a joyful and everlasting domestic life, per art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or a peaceful, hopeful and loving domestic life, per art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(b) and (f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(b) and (f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, it acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds that the parties had been separated for more than two consecutive years, and ongoing conflict.

This challenge to the validity of Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 on the Surveillance and Control of Alcoholic Beverages was submitted by Front Pembela Islam (FPI - the Islamic Defenders' Front), represented by Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab, the founder and chairperson of FPI, and KH. Ahmad Sabri Lubis, the secterary-general of FPI.

The applicant cited several teachings from the Qur'an and Hadith, the Holy Bible, and Buddhism that prohibit the consumption of alcohol, as well as Hinduism, which discourages excessive consumption of alcohol. As a state based on the principle of One Almighty God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa), the applicant submitted that Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 should, therefore, be invalidated for contradicting the religious values contained in Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution because not one religion in Indonesia permitted or deemed halal the consumption of any alcoholic beverage. The applicant also cited the physical effects alcohol consumption can have on people, as well as other people who may fall victim to alcohol-induced theft, battery, abuse, rape, and even murder.

The applicant also submitted that Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 was contrary to several national statutes, including arts 46 and 47 of Law No. 36 of 2009 on Health. This was because the decree only categorised alcohol rather than prohibiting it, while the detrimental effect alcohol can have on health repudiates the aim of arts 46 and 47, which is to improve the health of Indonesian citizens.

The court questioned whether the applicant believed its rights and/or authority had suffered because of Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997. It also questioned whether the applicant believed it had suffered any specific and actual loss or could potentially suffer any loss, and whether or not there was a causal relationship between that loss and the decree it was seeking to impugn. The court found in the applicant's favour in this regard, granting it the requisite legal standing. It then acceded to the application but did so on the grounds that several of the statutes that constituted the legal basis for Indonesian Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1997 were no longer valid laws themselves.

This regional regulation states that compulsory study of Diniyah Takmiliayh Awaliyah (DTA) education and Taman Pendidikan Al-Qur'an (TPA - Qur'anic Primary Education) is based on the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution. The regulation states that DTA and TPA are non-formal religious education streams that come under the auspices of the Ministry of Religion (art 3), and are designed for primary school students (art 6(1)). Students are expected to undertake this non-formal form of education for four years, and for at least 18 hours per week (art 6(2)). The regulation states that the purpose of religious education is to make participants understand and practise religious values that have a broad, critical, creative, innovative, and dynamic vision for the purpose of intellectualising the life of a nation that is God-believing, God-mindful, and noble (art 4(1)). Compulsory study of DTA and TPA is intended to provide school children with the ability to understand Islamic teachings, in order that they develop into God-believing, God-mindful, and practising and noble Muslims (art 4(2)).

The curriculum comprises:

1. Qur'anic literacy;
2. study of the Hadith;
3. creed (aqidah);
4. morals (akhlak);
5. legal understanding (fiqih);
6. Islamic cultural history;
7. Arabic; and
8. practical worship (praktek ibadah) (art 14(1)).

The parties were married on 15 May 1990 and had two children (aged 19 and 14), both of whom were in the care of the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had been harmonious until 1992, after which time the plaintiff learned from the defendant's sibling visiting from Tual, Southeast Maluku, that the defendant already had a wife in Tual. While the defendant had denied the allegation, he had also become visibly upset and angry. The plaintiff submitted that she had felt deceived by the defendant, who had maintained at the time the parties married that he was unmarried. The plaintiff had hoped the defendant could be open and honest with her and accountable for his conduct. In 1995, however, when the plaintiff became pregnant with the parties' second child, another woman came to the parties' home. When the plaintiff inquired with the defendant as to who this other woman was, the defendant refused to respond, instead taking all his clothes and leaving the plaintiff and the parties' home. It turned out, the plaintiff submitted, that the woman was the defendant's third wife, who the defendant had recently married, unbeknownst to the plaintiff.

A month later the defendant returned to the parties' home. At that time the parties were living in a rental property. Not long after the defendant returned, however, in 1999, another woman came to the parties' home. This time, when the plaintiff asked the defendant who the woman was, the defendant chased the plaintiff and the parties' children out of the rental property. It later turned out that the woman was the defendant's fourth wife, who he had also recently married, again, unbeknownst to the plaintiff.

Three months later the defendant summoned the plaintiff to return to the rental property. The plaintiff obliged. In 2004, however, the defendant left the home for four months. When the plaintiff telephoned the defendant to ask why he had not yet returned, he replied that he was hiring a car from someone and then planned to live with his sibling in Ambon. When the plaintiff went to the Governor's Office in Ambon to attend to some administrative matters, she met with the defendant's sibling. She asked him whether or not the defendant had been living with him, as the defendant had claimed. The defendant's sibling told the plaintiff that the defendant had never lived with him.

On 24 April 2004, the plaintiff telephoned the defendant, telling him to come home. When the defendant came home, the plaintiff asked him what he wanted. It was then that the defendant told the plaintiff he would later provide her with divorce papers, before taking all his clothes and leaving.

The plaintiff submitted that whenever one of the defendant's wives would come to the parties' home, the defendant would become verbally aggressive and use inappropriate language with the plaintiff. Having suffered emotionally for an extended period of time, the plaintiff requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

The court acknolwedged that the parties' marriage was in an irreparable state and no longer constituted a joyful and everlasting domestic life, per art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or a peaceful, hopeful and loving domestic life, per art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, it acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 29 May 1994. The plaintiff submitted, however, that, since May 2008, the parties' marriage had been disharmonious, primarily because the defendant had had an extra-martial affair. The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant deliberately had another woman collect him from their home, where the plaintiff and the parties' children were, and take him to the airport for a flight to Israel. When the defendant returned from Israel on 31 May 2008, rather than returning home, the defendant went to the other woman's home. The defendant returned to the plaintiff's home on 2 June 2008. Problems escalated on 4 June 2008 when the defendant requested the plaintiff's permission to marry the other woman, since which time he had also failed to execute his duties as a husband or head of the household. The plaintiff submitted that she did not believe the defendant's temperament would have a positive influence on their children.

The defendant refuted these submissions, claiming that the cause of disharmony originated in 2004 when the defendant discovered that the plaintiff was still in contact with her ex-boyfriend. Moreover, that the woman with whom he was accused of having an extra-marital affair was merely a colleague, and that the two had never conducted themselves in an inappropriate manner. In December 2009, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had told their children she had a new boyfriend and that she would introduce him to the children, before divorcing the defendant and taking the children to Jakarta to be with her new boyfriend. Furthermore, on 9 March 2010, the plaintiff left for Bali saying she had a business meeting there for one day. While in Bali she switched her mobile phone off and never provided the defendant or their children with any information as to her well-being or whereabouts. The defendant also claimed that on 14 March 2010, the plaintiff surreptitiously left for Bali again, where a friend of the defendant's saw her and her boyfriend in a hotel room. The plaintiff returned four days later, again having provided the defendant with no information as to her well-being or whereabouts. Since returning from Bali, the defendant claimed the plaintiff did not want her to touch him anymore, while admitting she had been involved with her boyfriend while in Bali. She had not even returned to the matrimonial home since then, leaving the defendant to take care of their children. The defendant told the court that the plaintiff had even changed her Facebook account status in March 2010 to 'not married'.

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acknowledged that the parties' ongoing conflict constituted a sufficient reason to grant the applicant an irrevocable divorce (talak ba'in sughra). It declined, however, to rule on the custody of the two children.

In its preambular statement, this regional regulation states that in order to create a safe and orderly Jembrana regency, efforts are necessary to prevent and eradicate lewd behaviour and prostitution, which constitutes amoral conduct. In its elucidation, the regulation states that prostitution, and the facilitation thereof, is contrary to religious laws, state laws, morality, and the morals of the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology). Accordingly, pursuant to art 3, all persons and bodies/organisations, are not permitted to conduct themselves in a lewd manner or to solicit prostitution. Contravention of this prohibition carries a maximum penalty of three months' impriosnment or a fine of IDR 50 million (art 6).

The broader significance of this regional regulation is that, while it states that prostitution is contrary to religious laws, rather than Islamic laws, Jembrana is a predominantly Hindu regency, with a minority Muslim population of 79,857 people from a total population of 311,995, according to official figures (http://www.jembranakab.go.id/?module=kependudukan). Therefore, this is a regulation that, arguably, seeks to Islamise public life, but also invokes state laws and the Pancasila, thereby legitimising it for a Hindu majority (224,618 people).

This qanun makes provision for the drafting of qanun. Pursuant to art 2(2), qanun may not contravene:

1. Islamic shari'a;
2. the 1945 Constitution;
3. the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding of 15 August 2005;
4. the Law on the Administration of Aceh and other legislative instruments that grant the Government of Aceh authority;
5. Acehnese custom;
6. the public interest;
7. eco-conservation; and
8. other qanun.