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The plaintiffs were survivors, family members, and representatives of the estates of the American victims of the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. The plaintiffs sued Iran, utilizing an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) that allows the prosecution of foreign states that sponsor terrorism for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death. The plaintiffs pointed to the financial ties between Hezbollah (who allegedly orchestrated the attack) and Iran when arguing that Iran should be held liable. Iran did not file an answer to this claim. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $1 billion in punitive damages.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis, based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under Saint Kitts and Nevis' Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

The plaintiff sued his former attorneys for malpractice, on the basis that they did not seek punitive damages in the plaintiff’s successful claim against Iran for being held hostage in Beirut in 1983. The plaintiff argued that by failing to name the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security as a defendant in that case, his attorneys prevented him from collecting substantial punitive damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. He also alleged that the attorneys charged him an excessive contingency fee. The Court dismissed the first claim, as the ability to collect punitive damages at the time was limited by President Clinton’s executive waiver of the punitive damages provision. The Court further ordered the parties to settlement discussions regarding the excessive fee complaint. The plaintiff later appealed this decision, but the case was ultimately dismissed.

The widow of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, brought suit against Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for compensatory damages for wrongful death, solatium (referring to “the mental anguish, bereavement, and grief that those with a close relationship to the decedent experience as a result of the decedent’s death”), intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. She sued under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran provided financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her $18,297,000 in compensatory damages for economic and emotional loss. The Court noted, however, that it could not award punitive damages against a foreign state.

The plaintiff, Tracey Taylor, a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Department of Corrections (Illinois), brought an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the respondents Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart for alleged violations of his civil rights in denying him access to Islamic prayer services and by failing to serve ḥalāl meat (prepared in accordance with Islamic law). The respondents moved for summary judgment after alleging that Taylor failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they violated his constitutional rights. The Court granted summary judgment for the respondents, determining that the denial of Islamic prayer services was related to a legitimate penological interest, and that the prison had adequately provided the plaintiff with sufficiently nutritious Islamic meals, even though they were vegetarian/vegan.

The cassation applicant appealed on the grounds that the two previous courts had granted the cassation respondent a divorce because the cassation applicant was unable to conceive a child during their six years together. The cassation applicant argued this was due to no fault of her own, but rather that Allah SWT had not blessed them with a child. In addition, that the cassation respondent and cassation applicant had never quarrelled, but rather the cassation respondent had simply left the cassation applicant for no apparent reason. The cassation applicant also claimed that the cassation respondent was required by legislation (Law No. 10 of 1983) to submit a written request from his superior at work to formalise the divorce.

Purusant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the two previous courts had applied the law correctly. The court did, however, make adjustments to maintenance costs payable by the cassation respondent.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Langsa Shari'a Court, which had granted the respondent a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i), but also ordered the respondent to pay to the appellant the following in maintenance: IDR 5 million (iddah - 100-day period after divorce has been granted); the monetary equivalent of two grams of gold (mut'ah); IDR 1 million (kiswah - clothing); and IDR 750,000 per month in child maintenance, until the parties' three children were of age and independent.

Overall, the Court agreed with the decision of the lower court. It did not, however, concur with the lower court's usage of the word 'menolak' (dismiss) in regards to the appellant's request that one-third of the respondent's salary be provided to the appellant as financial support, based on Government Regulation No. 10 of 1983 (amended by Government Regulation No. 45 of 1991), because those regulations relate to the discipline of civil servants, rather than marriage and divorce. Accordingly, the Court stated, such a claim should be declared 'tidak dapat diterima' (unacceptable).

The Court also increased the amount of maintenance payable by the respondent, as follows: IDR 5 million (iddah); the monetary equivalent of three grams of gold (mut'ah); IDR 2 million (kiswah); and IDR 750,000 per month in child maintenance, until the parties' three children were of age and independent.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 15 July 1983 by the village imam. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a two-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had six children. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage, and in order that they could obtain a birth certificate for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 8 September 1983 by the village imam. The second applicant's older sibling had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a two-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had three children. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage, and in order that they could obtain a birth certificate for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The Plaintiff, the Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor, challenged the Pittsfield Charter Township, the Township Board, Township Supervisor Mandy Grewal, and six Township Board of Trustees Members for their refusal to re-zone the area surrounding the Plaintiff so that the Plaintiff could expand and build a school. Although an independent outside planner endorsed the rezoning, the Plaintiff alleged that the Respondents denied rezoning due to concerns from community members, stemming largely from an animus to the Islamic faith. By denying the rezoning proposal on this basis, the Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents discriminated against the organization in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and "state law claims" in the Michigan state constitution. The Respondents filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded the Township Board of Trustees' individual liability under Section 1983. However, the District Court dismissed the other claims alleging violations of RLUIPA, the US Constitution, and the Michigan Constitution.

The Plaintiff Kajauna Kenyatta Irvin named James A. Yates (warden), R. Fisher Jr. (associate warden), P.D. Brazelton (associate warden), K.R. Nash (correctional captain), M.C. Davis (associate warden), Dana B. Allen (correctional captain), A. Walker (correctional captain), Wendy K. Myers (community partnership manager), James D. Bennett (correctional lieutenant), S. Lantz (correctional lieutenant), E. McBride (correctional sergeant), D. McGee (protestant chaplain), E. Guthery (correctional officer), and Does 1-30 (PVSP correctional staff members) as the Respondents in this lawsuit, alleging that these individuals 1) forced Muslim prisoners to conduct their religious services outside; 2) failed to provide dietary accommodations for religious celebrations; 3) suspended purchase orders for religious oils; and 4) failed to hire a replacement Muslim chaplain. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff's complaint stated cognizable claims against Respondents McBride, Davis, Yates, Myers, Bennett, Allen, Nash, Walker, Brazelton, Guthery, McGee, and Does 1-30 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and under RLUIPA. The District Court provided the Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the District Court in regard to the remaining Respondents.

Plaintiff Jesse Copeland, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, brought suit after he refused to leave a Muslim religious meeting after prison officials ordered the meeting’s conclusion and was disciplined for causing a disturbance and placed on disciplinary restrictions, including a six-month ban on attending other religious meetings. The Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, challenging the ban and other prison policies impacting Muslim inmates. The District Court dismissed the complaint and granted summary judgment for the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit determined that there was no First Amendment free exercise violation under § 1983 nor a  violation of the Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA based on the Plaintiff’s six-month ban from attending religious meetings due to procedural bars to the Plaintiff’s recovery, including sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and mootness.

The applicants submitted that they were married in accordance with Islamic law on 12 August 1983 by a marriage qadi (qadhi nikah) before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been four mayam worth of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. The parties had never divorced nor had they left Islam (murtad). There were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had three children. They had registered their marriage with the local village (gampong) but not yet with the Office of Religious Affairs and required a court determination for marriage administration and other administrative purposes.

The court cited Kitab l'anatu al-Thalibin, juz IV, page 254, and Kitab Ushu al-Fiqh by Abdul Wahhab Khallaf, as examples of Islamic norms that allow the ratification of a marriage based on facts such as those established by the parties. The court then, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 4 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, ratified the parties marriage based on the evidence produced by the applicants.

The applicants submitted that they were married on 20 October 1983 in accordance with Islamic shari'a before two witnesses. The second applicant's older brother had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been 10 grams of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a widower and the second applicant a widow. They had never divorced, no one had objected to their marriage, and there were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had no children. The parties had never registered their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs but required a court determination ratifying their marriage before they could embark on the hajj.

The court, pursuant to provision (a) of the elucidation to art 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006, and art 7(4) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, noted that a marriage ratification request can be submitted by the husband or wife. The court then, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, ratified the parties marriage based on the evidence produced by the applicants.

The Karnataka High Court ruled that the ḥijāb is not "essential" in Islam and upheld a Government Order dated 05.02.2022, issued under sections 7 & 133 of the Karnataka Education Act of 1983. That order directs the College Development Committees all over the State to prescribe the ‘Student Uniform,’ presumably in terms of Rule 11 of Karnataka Educational Institutions Rules of 1995 (Classification, Regulation & Prescription of Curricula, etc.), which bans headscarves in classrooms. A full bench of Justices on the High Court sat to hear several petitions filed by Muslim students who attend government pre-university colleges in the region and who were alleged prejudice from the ban. The Court issued this order, restricting girls from wearing headscarves, or ḥijāb, deeming it as not “essential” in Islam arguing that “what is not religiously made obligatory therefore cannot be made a quintessential aspect of the religion through public agitations or by the passionate arguments in court,'' and as a use of religious symbols by students in governmental educational institutions that have established dress codes noting that Muslim women’s  ḥijāb goes against their “constitutional spirit of ‘equal opportunity’ of ‘public participation’ and ‘positive secularism’.”

The Karnataka High Court passed an interim order in the petitions challenging the ḥijāb ban in colleges in the state. The petitions call into question the Government Order dated 05.02.2022, issued under sections 7 & 133 of the Karnataka Education Act of 1983. That order directs the College Development Committees all over the State to prescribe the ‘Student Uniform,’ presumably in terms of Rule 11 of Karnataka Educational Institutions Rules of 1995 (Classification, Regulation & Prescription of Curricula, etc.). A full bench of Justices on the High Court sat to hear several petitions filed by Muslim students who attend government pre-university colleges in the region and who were alleged prejudice from the ban. The Court issued this interim order, restricting girls from wearing headscarves, or ḥijāb, deeming it a use of religious symbols by students in governmental educational institutions that have established dress codes, and it request that the government reopen the educational institutions and allow the students to return to the classes at the earliest.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Vanuatu (Ripablik blong Vanuatu), based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under Vanuatu's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of El Salvador (República de El Salvador), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under El Salvador’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under the Bahamas' Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

The plaintiff married her husband on 31 December 1945, upon which her husband gave her a 20-acre plot of land as a dowry (mahar). The plot of land had been controlled by the plaintiff's husband's younger sibling since 1983 until the present. When the plaintiff's husband passed away, her mother-in-law asked to use the land until she passed away herself. When her mother-in-law passed away, the plaintiff requested of the defendant that the land be returned to her, but the defendant refused to do so. The plaintiff had also sought to resolve this dispute in a familial manner through deliberation and by making polite requests, but the defendant had not responded in a favourable manner himself, compelling the plaintiff to instigate proceedings.

In response to the plaintiff's claim, the defendant submitted that, when the plaintiff married her husband, the defendant himself was not yet an adult and, therefore, could not have known that the land constituted the plaintiff's dowry. Moreover, that he had sold the land in order that he have some money when he married his wife. Two years later he re-purchased the land, but he did not want to return it to the plaintiff because he believed it to be his inheritance from his parents. The plaintiff asserted that, as the land the defendant believed to have previously belonged to his parents was 35 acres, and the dowry land was 20 acres, only 15 of those acres actually belonged to the defendant.

The court found that the evidence submitted by the defendant did not support his case, whereas evidence submitted by the plaintiff showed that the 20 acres in question had indeed been given by the plaintiff's husband to the plaintiff as a dowry on the day of their marriage. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendant to transfer to the plaintiff the 20 acres of land.