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The parties were married on 8 October 2000 and had two children. Before the Pontianak Religious Court (lower court), the cassation respondent had submitted that, since 2008, her marriage to the cassation applicant had become strained because the cassation applicant would often belittle the cassation respondent's parents, leaving the cassation respondent feeling offended. There were also issues pertaining to the ways in which the parties' families managed a relevant business, as well as allegations from the cassation respondent that the cassation applicant had been physically violent towards her, which necessitated a police report. The lower court had, accordingly, granted the cassation respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shughra), pursuant to art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The cassation applicant appealed to the Supreme Court at cassation level on the grounds that the Pontianak High Religious Court, which had affirmed the decision of the lower court, had failed to summons him in an appropriate manner. The Supreme Court found that the cassation applicant had failed to establish this and, therefore, pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, dismissed the appeal.

The parties, of Lebanese background, were married in Kuwait in 1973, though had moved to Australia in 1985 and maintained dual citizenship. In October 1998 the parties divorced Islamically through a local Islamic centre, then in November 1998 attended the Lebanese embassy and executed a power of attorney to allow their respective lawyers in Lebanon to proceed with the divorce application (and bypass the Australian legal system). These proceedings were not possible in Australia due to the maintenance of a mandatory one year separation period before divorces are granted. The divorce was subsequently granted in November 1998 in the Jaafarite Canonical Court in Lebanon, with the decree that neither party had rights or obligations towards the other. The husband subsequently remarried. 

The wife appealed subsequently applied for a divorce in the Australian courts under s 104(4) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), stating that this outcome was a denial of natural justice. 

The case stemmed on the recognition of the Lebanese divorce on the grounds that the parties had no 'property of consequence' in Australia (it was in Lebanon, where the wife had initiated court proceedings against the husband) and that the parties sought to bypass Australian law.

This case was unsuccessfully appealed by the applicant in Taffa & Taffa [2012] FamCA 181.

The deceased, who passed away on 10 December 2009, had seven children. (The deceased's wife had passed away on 5 August 1985.) The deceased left behind 567m² of land, 105m² of which he had already bequested to another party. The plaintiffs did not object to this gift but objected to the defendant's occupation of the remaining 462m² of land, as well as the semi-permanent home on the land. The plaintiffs sought from the court an equal distribution of the land between the parties, whereas the defendant claimed ownership of the land and property in dispute, submitting that they were gifted to her by the deceased prior to his passing.

Familial and local government efforts to resolve the dispute (the defendant was one of the deceased's children) proved to be in vain.

The court found that information provided by three of the witnesses had affirmed the claims of the defendant that the land and property had been gifted to her by the deceased before his passing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim to inheritance and ordered them to pay costs.

The cassation applicant appealed on the grounds that the two previous courts had granted the cassation respondent a divorce because the cassation applicant was unable to conceive a child during their six years together. The cassation applicant argued this was due to no fault of her own, but rather that Allah SWT had not blessed them with a child. In addition, that the cassation respondent and cassation applicant had never quarrelled, but rather the cassation respondent had simply left the cassation applicant for no apparent reason. The cassation applicant also claimed that the cassation respondent was required by legislation (Law No. 10 of 1983) to submit a written request from his superior at work to formalise the divorce.

Purusant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the two previous courts had applied the law correctly. The court did, however, make adjustments to maintenance costs payable by the cassation respondent.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 21 August 1985 by the village imam. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a two-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had four children. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage, and in order that they could obtain a birth certificate for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 10 February 1985 by the village imam. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a two-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had seven children. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage, and in order that they could obtain a birth certificate for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The cassation applicant sought to challenge Malang Religious Court Decision No. 915 of 2015, as well as Surabaya High Religious Court Decision No. 243 of 2015, on the grounds that the preceding courts had incorrectly applied the law or contravened the law, as provided in art 30(1)(b) of Law No. 14 of 1985, Law No. 5 of 2004, Law No. 3 of 2009 on the Indonesian Supreme Court.

In granting the cassation applicant's appeal, the Supreme Court found that the preceding courts had both erred in determining that the cassation applicant was not the adopted child of Fatchul Isya'i at law. The Supreme Court held that the acknowledgment from the cassation respondents that the cassation applicant was indeed the adopted child of Fatchul Isya'i was a relevant and conclusive consideration. Moreover, because Fatchul Isya'i had adopted the cassation applicant in 1982, prior to the enactment of the Compilation of Islamic Laws in 1991, art 171 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws was inapplicable to the facts of the case.

The parties were married on 18 January 1985. They had lived in Central Java for about 20 years before moving to a rental property in Sukajadi until they separated. They had two children and had been married for 25 years. Since 2010, however, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome because, the plaintiff submitted, the defendant:

1. would become unnecessarily angry on a regular basis;
2. was temperamental;
3. had frequently physically assaulted the plaintiff;
4. had carried on an extra-marital affair with another woman; and
5. had neglected the plaintiff and failed to provide her with financial support.

In 2015, after yet another argument, the parties decided to separate. They had remained apart for a year at the time of the proceeding. Familial attempts to make the parties reconcile had been unsuccessful and, having concluded that the parties' differences were irreconcilable, the plaintiff requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

Despite the defendant's absence from court, the court, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict between the parties.

The parties were married on 14 July 1995 and had four children. Before the Padang Religious Court (lower court), the cassation respondent had filed for divorce from the cassation applicant, having alleged that the cassation applicant, since October 2011, had been an irresponsible husband, never providing the cassation respondent with any spending money. Moreover, since 2008, the cassation applicant had not provided the cassation respondent with any emotional support, leaving her in a distressed state.

The cassation applicant had incorrectly accused the cassation respondent of having had an extra-marital affair, while often becoming angry for no apparent reason, as well as denigrating her character to members of her family, causing the cassation respondent's family to often blame her if something went wrong. According to the cassation respondent's older sibling, the cassation applicant would also often threaten their children saying he would not allow them to see the cassation respondent. When the cassation applicant left the matrimonial home, he took the parties' children with him.

The lower court had granted the cassation respondent an irrevocable divorce (thalak satu bain sughra), but granted the cassation applicant custody of the parties' children. On appeal, the Padang High Religious Court had affirmed the cassation respondent's irrevocable divorce (thalak satu bain sughra), but granted her custody of the parties' four children.

The cassation applicant appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the Padang High Religious Court had not given sufficient consideration to the facts of the case, but had simply based its decision on art 105 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Finding the decision of the Padang Religious High Court not to contain any incorrect applications of the law, the Supreme Court, pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, dismissed the appeal.

The parties were married on 3 May 1985, in accordance with Islamic tradition. They had two children, born in 1986 and 1992. The applicant claimed that, after marrying the respondent, work commitments meant that the parties had had to live separately. The respondent lived with her parents in Padang, while the applicant was always out of town in cities including Medan, Riau, and Jakarta.

The parties' marriage was harmonious for the first 15 years, but, by 2000, it had become quarrelsome. This, the applicant claimed, was due to the respondent's lack of gratitude for the spending money with which he had provided her, even though it was not always as much as the respondent had requested. Constant physical distance between the parties had also taken its toll.

Problems escalated at the beginning of 2003, and the frequency with which the parties would argue left the applicant feeling reluctant to return to the matrimonial home. As a result, the parties had lived separately for approximately the past 10 years and five months, and, in 2013, they decided to separate.

The court noted that its advice to the parties that they reconcile had been to no avail. Moreover, the respondent had no objections to the applicant's request for a divorce. Accordingly, the court, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i) on the grounds that ongoing conflict between the parties.

The parties were married on 21 July 1985 and had eight children. The marriage had been harmonious until 2010, when, the plaintiff submitted, it had begun to deteriorate because the defendant:

1. often gambled;
2. often physically assaulted the plaintiff when the parties would argue; and
3. was often dishonest, and also neglected the plaintiff and their children.

In 2014, people often saw the defendant with another woman near the parties' place of residence. Problems escalated in April 2015 when the plaintiff discovered that the defendant had had an extra-marital affair. While the parties remained under the same roof, they now slept in separate beds, as a result. The plaintiff claimed that she had attempted to reconcile with the defendant, but to no avail, and that the suffering caused by the defendant's conduct left her to believe that the only feasible option remaining was divorce, pursuant to art 19 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

Based on the information before it, including witness statements, the court acceded to the plaintiff's application, granting her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, Kitab Fiqih Sunnah Juz II, and Manhaj al-Thullab juz VI. Despite failing to attend the proceeding, the court acknowledged that the defendant had been summonsed officially, pursuant to art 26 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 138 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The parties were married on 21 January 1994 and had four children (aged 19, 17, 12 and 7). Initially, their marriage was harmonious; however, by December 2010, it had become quarrelsome. The cassation respondent had claimed that:

1. the parties could not reconcile their differences;
2. the cassation applicant could not commit to Islam (despite having converted to Islam from Christianity to marry the cassation respondent, he then, in 2006, reverted to Christianity, only to convert to Islam again in 2011);
3. the cassation applicant had not provided her with financial support for the last three years.

Problems escalated and, in April 2011, the parties separated. The cassation applicant, in the first instance, requested the local religious court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba’in Shughro). In Decision 1048/Pdt.G/2013/PA.Kab.Kdr (18 September 2013), the lower court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba’in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, and ordered her to pay IDR 691,000 in court costs.

The cassation applicant then lodged an appeal with the Surabaya High Religious Court (3427/Pdt.G/2013/PT.Sby), which upheld the judgment of the Kediri Religious Court.

On 11 February 2014, the cassation applicant submitted a request for cassation to the Supreme Court based on the following grounds:

1. that the Surabaya High Religious Court had applied the law incorrectly, granting a divorce despite the cassation respondent's claim for divorce not being established with any legitimate evidence;
2. that the aforementioned evidence was inadequate because the marriage was actually stable and harmonious; and
3. that the cassation respondent's true motive for divorce was to be with her boyfriend, while the interests of the parties' children were not adequately considered by the court.

Pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the court upheld the decision of the Surabaya High Religious Court, dismissing the defendant’s reasons for cassation, and ordering him to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).

The reconsideration (peninjauan kembali) applicant, previously the plaintiff/appellant/cassation applicant, herein referred to as the plaintiff, submitted a request for reconsideration in its claim against the reconsideration respondents and reconsideration co-respondents, previously the cassation respondents/defendants/respondents and co-cassation respondents/co-defendants/co-respondents, herein referred to as the defendants and co-defendants. The plaintiff submitted that he had purchased from a Bapak (Mr) Munasan a 250m² property on 29 August 1975, and that the village head was aware of the purchase. The property had been transferred into the plaintiff's name in 1979 for the purposes of property tax and regional building fees. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, however, on 29 July 2000, the property was bequeathed to another party, the fifth defendant, pursuant to a deed drafted by the first co-defendant. Furthermore, the fifth defendant requested that the first co-defendant have the second co-defendant issue the transfer of title in the name of the fifth defendant, with the second, third and fourth defendants serving as trustees (nadzir). On 12 May 2001, the plaintiff submitted that he was invited by the first defendant to discuss the matter of the land endowment. There he was shown a draft statement requiring his signature. Then, on 17 November 2010, the defendants, believing the statement was erroneous, drafted an invalidation of land endowment deed for the second co-defendant. On 29 July 2011 at the local office of religious affairs, the defendants prepared an invalidation report and invalidation declaration and deed of land endowment in relation to the property. The plaintiff submitted that, therefore, the defendants' conduct was evidence the plaintiff was the lawful owner of the property and that the defendants sought legal certainty over the matter in the form of a decision from the Bandung Religious Court. Moreover, that the plaintiff was entitled to IDR 500,000 per day for every day the court's decision was not implemented.

In dismissing this final appeal, the court found that the reason for reconsideration submitted by the plaintiff, that being that new evidence in the form of a relevant document had been discovered that had not been considered in the previous proceeding, failed to meet the prescribed requirement for new and admissible evidence in art 67(b) of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court.

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The plaintiffs stated that Amaq Sidin and Inaq Sidin (husband and wife) had passed away in 1983 and 1986 respectively, and were survived by their five children and beneficiaries (three sons and two daughters):

1. Sidin bin Amaq Sidin (alias Amaq Kidi), who passed away in 1980, was married to Inaq Kidi, who also passed away in 1985. They were survived by three children:

• Kidi, who passed away in 2008, and was survived by three of her own children (14th, 15th and 16th plaintiffs);
• Mendur bin Sidin (alias Amaq Kidi) (first plaintiff);
• Sriti binti Sidin (alias Amaq Kidi) (second defendant);
• Nawati binti Amaq Mundri, who passed away in 1990, and was survived by her three children (eighth-tenth plaintiffs);
• Idaniati binti Amaq mundri (11th plaintiff);
• Ayuni binti Amaq Mundri (12th plaintiff); and
• Ariantini binti Amaq Mundri (13th plaintiff).

1. Cili (alias Inaq Saidi binti Amaq Sidin), who passed away in 2003, was married to Amaq Saidi, and was survived by seven children, two of whom had passed away (third-seventh plaintiffs);
2. Amaq Rusdi bin Amaq Sidin (first defendant);
3. Amaq Mugasih bin Amaq Sidin (second defendant);
4. Marike (alias Inaq Mundri binti Amaq Sidin), who passed away in 1982, having married Amaq Mundri in 1980, who had also passed away, was survived by:

• Nawati binti Amaq Mundri, who passed away in 1990, and was survived by her three children (eighth-tenth plaintiffs);
• Idaniati binti Amaq mundri (11th plaintiff);
• Ayuni binti Amaq Mundri (12th plaintiff); and
• Ariantini binti Amaq Mundri (13th plaintiff).

Amaq Sidin and Inaq Sidin left to their beneficiaries three plantations, two rice padis, and one coil made of pure gold with an estimated worth of IDR 1 billion. The plaintiffs claimed that, following the passing of Amaq and Inaq Sidin, the land and gold coil had remained in the possesion of the defendants as the deceaseds' sons, without being distributed among the other worthy beneficiaries. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants had sold several portions of the bequeathed land to the co-defendants. Accordingly, the plaintiffs requested that the court distribute the assets of the deceased pursuant to Islamic inheritance law (hukum faraidl), that those portions of the aforementioned land already sold be included as part of the assets of the deceased, that a caveat be placed on that land not yet transferred to any third party, and that the plaintiffs' case be prioritised over any other related proceedings already on foot.

In enforcing the rights of the children of those beneficiaries who had passed away prior to Amaq and Inaq Sidin, the court cited arts 74(1) and 85(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, which permits the children of a deceased beneficiary to assume their entitlement. Moreover, the court noted that male children were entitled to twice the share of female children, per art 176 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court stipulated as beneficiaries the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to transfer to the plaintiffs their share of the assets of Amaq and Inaq Sidin, as it had outlined and quantified, and ordered the defendants to auction parts or all of the properties if such a transfer was not physically feasible. It also ordered the defendants to pay court costs (IDR 2,371,000).

Biography of Mālikī jurist Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā al-Laythī (152/769–234/848).

This source is part of the Online Companion to the print edition al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, the Royal Moroccan Edition: The Recension of Yaḥyā Ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī (Harvard Series in Islamic Law), edited and translated by Mohammad Fadel and Connell Monette (PIL/HUP, 2019).

The parties were married on 18 November 2005 and had two children (born 2006 and 2007). The cassation respondent had submitted that the parties were not suitable from the beginning and that they had quarrelled regularly because:

1. the cassation applicant would often return home very late without reason, even during her pregnancy with the parties’ first child, a time when the cassation respondent most needed support from the cassation applicant;
2. the cassation applicant seldom provided financial support, and what he did provide was insignificant considering his salary as a member of council (anggota dewan);
3. when living with the cassation applicant in the cassation applicant’s parents’ home, the cassation respondent felt unsafe because she was often left alone with the cassation applicant’s brothers;
4. when the cassation respondent raised the issue of financially supporting the marriage, the cassation applicant would hit and verbally abuse her;
5. when the cassation respondent finally left the cassation applicant and lived with her parents, when she tried to return to live with the cassation applicant, the fighting would reoccur, with the cassation applicant often intoxicated;
6. the cassation applicant often slandered the cassation respondent’s family.

The physical abuse continued and, on 29 November 2008, the cassation applicant attended the cassation respondent's place of work, where he hit and kicked the cassation respondent, resulting in her being hospitalised with an injury and bruising to her leg. The level of abuse peaked on 24 October 2009, when the cassation applicant struck the cassation respondent in the head several times. Fearing for her welfare and that of the children, the cassation respondent locked herself and the parties' children in a bedroom and escaped out a window, fleeing for her parents’ home. The cassation respondent then attempted to file a report with the local police, but subsequently withdrew it because, as a member of council (anggota dewan), he was a public figure. On 4 November 2009, the cassation respondent eventually attempted to file for divorce in the Semarang Religious Court. During the process, however, the cassation applicant made amends and declared his love for the cassation respondent. The cassation respondent subsequently withdrew her application and the parties attempted to reconcile. On 23 April 2011, the parties had an argument and the cassation applicant declared that he wanted to divorce the cassation respondent and focus on his career in public office. The cassation respondent returned to the cassation respondent’s parents’ home but the divorce was not properly concluded. On 24 November 2011, the cassation applicant was arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) and reported in the mass media. The cassation respondent alleged that the cassation applicant's conduct had caused her and their children psychological damage and distress, and that the marriage was no longer tenable.

The cassation respondent, in the first instance, had requested that the local religious court terminate the marriage and grant her custody of the children, as well as to order the cassation applicant to pay court costs. The lower court (830/Pdt.G/2012/PA.Smg), pursuant to art 39(f) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the cassation respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba’in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, and custody over the children with visiting rights to the cassation applicant. The lower court, however, ordered the cassation respondent to pay court costs (IDR 491,000).

The cassation applicant lodged an appeal with the Semarang High Religious Court. The Semarang High Religious Court (091/Pdt.G/2013/PTA.Smg) upheld the lower court's judgment and ordered the cassation applicant to pay court costs (IDR 150,000).

On 2 January 2014, the cassation applicant submitted a request for cassation to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the Semarang High Religious Court had not applied the law properly, that there were inadequacies and contradictions in the witness statements, that the cassation respondent was having an extra-marital affair with another man, that the children needed a father figure, and that it was his responsibility to be head of the household. The cassation applicant also submitted to the court that he was concerned the cassation respondent was not fit to have custody of the children.

Pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the court upheld the decision of the Semarang High Religious Court, dismissed the cassation applicant’s reasons for cassation, and ordered him to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).

The parties were married on 20 October 1990 and had two children. The cassation respondent had submitted that during the marriage the parties had accumulated joint assets (harta bersama), comprising:

1. property title no. 1218, in the name of the cassation applicant to the value of IDR 4.5 billion, also in the cassation applicant’s possession;
2. property title no. 171, in the name of the cassation applicant to the value of IDR 500 million, also in the cassation applicant’s possession;
3. a pharmacy, in the name of the cassation applicant to the value of IDR 35 million, also in the cassation applicant’s possession; and
4. one vehicle to the value of IDR 300 million, in the name of the cassation applicant, and in the cassation applicant’s possession. 

These joint assets became the object of dispute between the parties. The cassation respondent had brought a claim in the Semarang Religious Court for his share of the assets. He submitted that the cassation applicant was uncooperative in transferring his lawful share of the assets. The cassation respondent submitted that he had repeatedly tried to claim his share of the assets but that the cassation applicant continually refused to cooperate. The cassation respondent alleged that the cassation applicant’s refusal to transfer the listed items, or equal value of the assets, 50-50 between the parties, contravened the principle of the division of matrimonial assets, as contained in the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

In the first instance, the Semarang Religious Court (No. 1607/Pdt.G/2012/PA.Smg) on 22 July 2013, found in favour of the cassation respondent, ordering a 50-50 division of the assets in dispute, and ordered both parties to pay court costs (cassation respondent: IDR 1,871,000; cassation applicant: IDR 775,000).

The cassation applicant lodged an appeal with the Semarang High Religious Court (No. 233/Pdt.G/2013/PTA.Smg), which amended the decision of the Semarang Religious Court, ruling in favour of the cassation respondent and ordering the cassation applicant to pay court costs (IDR 150,000).

The cassation applicant lodged a request for cassation on 6 March 2014. The cassation applicant submitted that the Semarang High Religious Court did not follow the regulations and misapplied the law because it did not take into account the obligations of each party to third parties when apportioning the division of the assets. The cassation applicant submitted that:

1. the properties subject to dispute were purchased with her own money;
2. during the construction of the house the cassation respondent had never provided financially for the family, despite having a sizeable income; and
3. the cassation respondent had not provided a financial contribution towards the education of the children.

The cassation applicant also submitted that the cassation respondent had omitted several joint assets from his initial claim:

1. property in the name of the cassation applicant valued at IDR 1.3 billion;
2. a vehicle valued at IDR 80 million;
3. proceeds of the sale of various items to the value of IDR 260 million;
4. another vehicle valued at IDR 80,000,000;
5. debts owed to several banks and persons; and
6. medical and education expenses for the parties' two children.

The Supreme Court did not accept the cassation applicant’s reasons for cassation, and, pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, dismissed the appeal. The cassation applicant was ordered to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).