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A Muslim worker sued the defendant, the Philadelphia Housing Authority, under Title VII and §1983, claiming that he was terminated from employment due to his Muslim religion and in retaliation for acting as a witness in other cases against his employer. The defendant argued that he was terminated due to his participation in several crimes, such as forgery and theft. The Court found no evidence of a connection between the inappropriate remarks that were made toward the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's termination more than a year later. Thus, in 2002, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

A female Muslim employee sued her former employer under Title VII and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) for discrimination based on religion. The plaintiff claimed that she was suspended and then terminated from her job for failing to remove her religiously mandated head-covering (ḥijāb). The Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff’s claim was untimely, having passed the statute of limitations for both Title VII and the DCHRA.

Petitioner Fedwa Khalik, an Arab-American who was born in Kuwait and practiced Islam, sued her former employee, alleging discrimination because of race, religion, national origin, and ethnic heritage under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Petitioner alleged she was grabbed in the office and subjected to false investigation and discrimination. The Appellate Court held for the Respondent after determining that the Petitioner’s allegations were not plausible under the Twombly/Iqbal standard [two cases which announced a new federal pleading standard, allowing district court judges to dismiss a complaint if it does not set out a “plausible” claim: Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)] because (1) several of her allegations were not entitled to the assumption of truth because they were entirely conclusory, and (2) the remaining facts did not sufficiently allege discrimination or retaliation since her claims were based solely on the fact that she was Muslim and Arab-American.

An African-American Muslim bus driver sued her former employer, the City of New York, under federal and state law (including Title VII; Article 1, section 3 of the New York State Constitution, and New York City Administrative Law §8-107(1)), alleging gender, religious, and racial discrimination and for allowing a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was subjected to a hostile work environment after securing accommodations for her to wear a headscarf (khimar) while on the job. She claimed that she was required to wear a baseball cap over the headscarf or to accept shifts that did not entail interaction with the public. The Court concluded that the complaints were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim before a jury; accordingly, it dismissed the Title VII and New York State Constitution claims. The Court permitted the employment discrimination claim under the NY City Administrative Law to proceed.

The plaintiff, Wafaa Elwakil, brought this action against her former employer, Target Media Partners, claiming a violation of her rights pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff claimed that the company subjected her to discriminatory treatment because of her race, religion, and ethnicity; created a hostile work environment; and unlawfully retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the Kenner Police Department. The company filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for Title VII discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation because the court found that the evidence indicated that the plaintiff did not engage in a "protected activity" for the purposes of her Title VII claim.

An Indian Muslim physician, who formerly worked at a Veteran Affairs Medical Center, sued the Secretary of Veteran Affairs under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin; the failure to promote; retaliation; a hostile work environment; and constructive discharge.  The defendant argued that the plaintiff did not receive a promotion due to unsatisfactory work performance. Concluding that the plaintiff did not prove he suffered an adverse employment action and therefore failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The Court denied defendant Merrill Lynch’s motion for summary judgment, adopting the opinion of the magistrate judge, which held that the employee established a prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff Abdul-Giyath Mayale-Eke sued his former employer and direct supervisor under Title VII, §1981, the Rhode Island Fair Employment Act, and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff alleged that, as a Muslim who had immigrated from Nigeria, he was treated differently and ultimately fired from his position as an investment specialist because of his race, national origin, and religion; specifically, he claimed that he was frequently asked questions about his heritage and was subject to derogatory comments. Defendant Merrill Lynch claimed that it fired plaintiff after giving him numerous warnings of his failure to meet set performance standards. The Court ultimately denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had alleged enough specific facts to make the claim not just conceivable but plausible before a jury.

Plaintiff Sultan Chowdhury sued his employer under Title VII for discrimination, retaliation, and creating a hostile work environment. In this action, the Court reviewed the defendant’s supplemental motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. (The defendant had previously filed a motion for summary judgment that was dismissed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, and the Court ordered further briefing for the hostile work environment claim.) The plaintiff also amended his previous claim, detailing the hostile work environment claims, alleging discrimination on the basis of his religion (Islam), including belittling and humiliation in front of his co-workers, exclusion from important meetings, and interference with his attempts to seek transfer. The Court held that the named instances provided sufficient evidence for jurors to find that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to allow a hostile work environment claim. It therefore denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to move forward to trial. On March 7, 2011, a jury trial delivered a partial verdict in the case, as the jury did not answer all of the questions raised but awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $1,125,000. The Court directed the parties to file a joint status report in August 2011 if they were seeking mediation on the outstanding issues.

A Muslim woman, Zahra Mowafy, sued her former employer and her supervisors under Title VII and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging discrimination and job termination based on religion, race, national origin, and age. The plaintiff alleged that, during her time working for the company, it had created a hostile work environment by failing to stop her student interns from mocking her religious prayer rituals or asking insensitive questions about her religion. The Court found that, although the plaintiff narrowly made a prima facie case demonstrating religious discrimination (as no other non-Muslims were similarly fired), the defendant company had non-discriminatory reasons for firing the plaintiff, specifically poor work performance (which was not disputed by the plaintiff). Furthermore, on the hostile work environment claim, the Court concluded that the incidents detailed by the plaintiff were not severe or pervasive enough to allow a successful claim. Accordingly, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment is favor of the defendant. 

A Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FRCA), alleging religious discrimination and breach of contract. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was fired when his employer learned that he was a Muslim. The Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Title VII claim, because the plaintiff failed to establish that an employee-employer relationship existed between himself and the defendant; and that it similarly did not have jurisdiction to hear the contract claim because it was below the requisite amount for diversity jurisdiction. With respect to the FCRA claim, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence showing that the decision-makers knew he was a Muslim when they decided to terminate his employment.

A Pakistani Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff claimed that he was terminated for discriminatory reasons, as his supervisor made comments that the plaintiff felt were derogatory. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was terminated because of inconsistencies in his re-accreditation application to qualify him for work at the healthcare organization (as plaintiff had failed to disclose that he was suspended when working for a previous employer). The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

Additional information. The Court applied the McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 782 (1973) burden-shifting test.  This test requires plaintiffs to first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  If they are successful, the burden shifts back to the defendant (usually a company or a company representative) to demonstrate they it a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.  Finally, it then becomes the burden of the plaintiff to prove that the reason articulated by the defendant was a pretext for the true discriminatory motive.

A Pakistani Muslim banker sued her former employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff alleged that her coworkers and supervisors made derogatory remarks to her about her diet, dress, and prayer schedule; and that this discriminatory animus was the real reason that she was terminated. The defendant argued that she was fired for insubordination when she left work in the middle of a shift without permission. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the Eighth Circuit upheld this decision on appeal, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the legitimate non-discriminatory reason that the defendant offered for terminating her employment.

Mr. Zafar Hasan, a Muslim of Indian heritage, sued his former employer, Foley & Lardner LLP, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion, race, national origin and color. The plaintiff claimed that his work assignments were cut and he was ultimately terminated because he was Muslim. For support, he points to the cut in his assignments that occurred immediately after 9/11, a comment made by one partner that “those people [Muslims] don’t belong here…they should kick them all out,” a warning by another partner to be careful about displaying articles the plaintiff had written on his view that Islam is a peaceful religion, and the fact that the other two Muslims in his department were either transferred or terminated in the same time period. The defendant company responds that it cut Mr. Hasan’s work and then terminated him due to poor work performance. The Circuit Court reversed and remanded the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had presented enough direct evidence of religious discrimination to allow the case to move forward.

The EEOC represented a group of Muslims suing their former employer, Norwegian Cruise Lines, under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiffs claimed that these discriminatory motives caused the company to target them for increased scrutiny, to create a hostile work environment by allowing their co-workers to verbally harass them (in part, by referring to them as terrorists), and finally, to terminate them. The plaintiffs further entered a complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress on these bases. The defendants argued that they terminated the plaintiffs for inconsistent answers given to background questions and because they were “positive matches in the FBI database.” The Court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, but concluded that the discrimination case could go forward as plaintiffs had established a prima facie discrimination case such that a jury could find that the company’s reasons given for terminating the plaintiffs were pretexts for a discriminatory reason.

The Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, represented a number of Somali Muslims working at a JBS-owned beef plant in Grand Island, Nebraska. The Plaintiff filed a Title VII discrimination claim against the Respondent-employer, alleging that the Respondent failed to provide Muslim employees with time to pray during sunset and also denied them prayer breaks during Ramadan. The District Court ultimately agreed with the Respondent-employer, deciding that the Muslim workers did not face undue discrimination because the accommodation of their prayer breaks would cause "undue hardship" to the employer because it would lead to unsafe meat curating practices and other dangers to the non-Muslim employees at the plant.

The plaintiff, who won a judgment in the lower court, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine’s refusal to retry an employment discrimination case in which the jury refused to award damages despite finding the defendants guilty. In the underlying case, the plaintiff had sued his employer under §1981 and Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination as well as harassment based on his race and religion in the form of a wide range of offensive actions and statements aimed at the plaintiff, including likening the plaintiff to Osama bin Laden, telling him to go back to his own country, and attempts to shove pork in his mouth (Islamic law prohibits the consumption of pork). The plaintiff argued that on a guilty finding, the jury was obliged to award damages as a matter of law. The appellate court, however, pointed to precedent rejecting this argument, and thus affirmed the lower court’s decision not to retry the case.

Muslim plaintiff Iqbal Sulehria sued his employer, the New York City Department of Correction, and related officials under Title VII, §1983, and New York State and City anti-discrimination laws, alleging religious and national origin discrimination as well as retaliation for filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and through the prison administration. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that his co-workers and managers harassed him for being Muslim after the events of 9/11. The harassment consisted of verbal taunts, intrusive searches, withholding promotions, denying him use of the bathroom, forcing him to work in substandard conditions, and having his face imposed on the body of Osama bin Laden in photos left on the plaintiff’s desk. The Court upheld a magistrate judge’s report granting the City partial summary judgment, dismissing the retaliation and failure-to-promote claims, because the Court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case; however, the Court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment as to the hostile work environment claim, concluding that a jury could see the events as alleged to be severe and pervasive enough to allow the claim to go forward.

A Jordanian Muslim sued his former employer, a life insurance firm, under the California Fair Housing and Employment Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff argued that he was terminated from his job because he was a Muslim and of Middle Eastern origin. The defendant claimed that he was fired for failing to meet job performance standards; the plaintiff responded that the company’s explanation was a pretext, arguing that the company applied different job performance evaluation standards to him as compared to his non-Muslim co-workers. Employing the burden-shifting test established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (where the plaintiff alleges a prima facie claim, the company responds with a reason, and the plaintiff will prevail if he can show that the reason is a pretext for actual discrimination), the Court found that the plaintiff had presented enough evidence of a discriminatory motive to establish a prima facie case and allow the suit to proceed before a jury. Accordingly, the Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

An Arab Muslim professor sued his former employer, Saint Francis College, under Title VII, §1981, §1983, §1985(3), §1986, and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, alleging that the College denied him tenure because he was an Arab Muslim. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the College’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded that decision, holding that discrimination against Arabs constitutes racial discrimination, and that the statute of limitations restrictions imposed by the lower court were incorrectly applied, as the acts in question occurred before the statute of limitations was passed into law.

An Iranian Muslim worker sued his former employer, the University of Rochester, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his termination in the months following 9/11 resulted from religious discrimination. The defendant produced documentation of the plaintiff’s poor work performance, citing that as the reason for termination, and the plaintiff did not rebut that evidence. The Court found that the timing of his firing was not enough to establish a discriminatory nexus, that the plaintiff failed to otherwise produce instances of explicit discrimination, and that the University had provided evidence of a legitimate reason for the termination, which the plaintiff did not rebut. The Court thus entered a decision of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.