SHARIAsource

Plaintiff Hilton Karriem Mincy, a Muslim prisoner at the Lycoming County Prison, brought this suit against the Respondents – the county prison, the prison warden and other prison officials – alleging that the prison’s inadequate food service during Ramadan, which included no hot meals at the end of the day and evening meals of insufficient caloric content to compensate for the absence of a daytime meal, constituted a failure to accommodate his religious beliefs and a violation of the RLUIPA. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, and the Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiff identified no official policy promulgated by the prison administration which violated his constitutional rights, and there was no evidence to suggest that any named Respondent played a direct role or had any personal involvement in the preparation or storage of food.

Holding: A Mormon minister is entitled to tax exemptions under § 513 of the 1859 Hawaii Civil Code, which exempts “all clergymen of any Christian denomination regularly engaged in their vocation” from the obligation of paying personal taxes.

Procedural posture: Tax collector filed for assumpsit (a common law action brought to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract) to recover defendant’s personal taxes in the District Court of Koolauloa, HI. The Court, sitting without a jury, found for defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Islamic law is not relevant, except that the defendant testified he is not “a Mohammedan” and does not “accept the Koran,” and that the Court noted that “Mohammedanism” is one of the four “grand systems” of the religious world.

Judgment: Judgment for the defendant, in an opinion authored by Judge McCully.

Facts: Defendant Henry Richards was a minister of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormon Church) who was sent as a missionary to Hawaii. At trial, to determine whether he qualified as a “Christian clergyman” exempt from personal taxes under § 513 of the 1859 Hawaii Civil Code, Richards testified as to his religious beliefs. They included belief in, inter alia, baptism, the Gospels, revelation, polygamy, the atonement of Christ, the Holy Ghost, and the Book of Mormon. The Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Hawaii found that, because the defendant believed in Christ and accepted the Old and New Testament, he was a Christian clergyman for tax purposes. The Court addressed the concern that Mormons have more scriptures than the Bible by stating that the Roman Catholic Church has accepted revelation and papal infallibility, but is still considered Christian. Furthermore, the Court concluded that because Richards did not himself practice or preach polygamy in Hawaii, his belief was not grounds for excluding him from being a Christian minister. Therefore, the Court concluded that, as a Mormon minister, Richards qualified for the personal tax exemption given to Christian ministers.

This regional regulation makes provision for the handling of beggars, vagrants, and displaced and promiscuous persons. It states that the sexually promiscuous are those who have sexual relations out of wedlock for financial or material gain, contrary to social, religious, and moral norms. Within the definition the regulation includes pimps, male prostitutes, and transsexual/transvestite prostitutes (art 1(11)).

Holding: Witness oaths in court must be administered according to their opinions, as it most affects their consciences. Swearing a witness by an uplifted hand, without a bible, is valid and legal.

Procedural Posture: Plaintiff sued defendant for slander in the lower court of Crawford, IL, for defendant’s claim that plaintiff swore falsely in a judicial proceeding before a justice of the peace. The lower court sustained defendant’s motion to exclude the justice of the peace’s testimony about how plaintiff was sworn in on grounds that it did not prove that a legal oath was administered. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois to determine whether plaintiff’s oath was legally cognizable. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court notes that “a Turk [is sworn] upon the Koran” when taking an oath in court.

Judgment: Reversed and remanded in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Reynolds.

Facts: Gill sued Caldwell for slander after Caldwell charged that Gill swore falsely in a certain judicial proceeding. In the lower court, the justice of the peace in that proceeding, Thomas Kennedy, testified that Gill was administered “what he conceived to be an oath,” which consisted of swearing by an uplifted hand with no Bible. The lower court excluded this testimony on the grounds that it did not prove a legal oath was administered. The Supreme Court of Illinois found that, at common law, “oaths are to be administered to all persons according to their own opinions, and as it most affects their consciences.” The legislature codified this principle in an 1807 statute. Therefore, the Court concluded that an oath by an uplifted hand, but without scripture, is valid and legal. In a footnote, the Court further noted that at common law, witnesses are sworn “according to the form which [they hold] to be the most solemn, and which is sanctified by the usage of the country or the sect to which [they belong].” This includes, for example, “[a] Jew [swearing] upon the Pentateuch, and a Turk [swearing] upon the Koran.”

Holding: Under N.C. Acts of 1871­–72, c. 193, § 25 (Rev. § 2105), a husband who lives with his wife is liable for her torts, even though he was not present when she committed them and did not know of them.

Procedural posture: Plaintiff sued defendants husband and wife to recover damages for wife’s slander against him. Jury found for plaintiff and awarded damages, which plaintiff was entitled to recover from both husband and wife. Defendants appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the concurrence notes that “even [women] living in semicivilized countries under the domination of the Koran” have had greater legal rights than American women.

Judgment: Affirmed in an opinion by Justice Allen, with a concurrence by Chief Justice Clark.

Facts: The plaintiff sued the defendants, a husband and wife pair, for the wife’s slander against him. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the judge stated that the husband was liable on the theory that husbands are liable for their wives’ torts. The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld this opinion, based on N.C. Acts of 1871­–72, c. 193, § 25 (Rev. § 2105), which states that “[e]very husband living with his wife shall be jointly liable with her for all damages accruing from any tort committed by her.” The Court found that this statute codified the previous common law rule.

In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Clark stated that theory of merger, in which a wife’s legal personality and property is “merged” into those of her husband upon marriage, is an antiquated common law proposition. He argued that this theory “is the source of all the legal degradation of women,” and that it is especially outdated now that women have the right to vote. Compared to other women in both “civilized” and “semicivilized countries under the domination of the Koran,” in his view, American women have inferior rights under the common law system. However, he agreed with the majority that the N.C. Act of 1872 codified the common law principle, and because courts have no power to modify a statutory principle, the lower court’s ruling must stand.

Holding: A witness must believe in a God in order to be sworn in court. A court may hear testimony about a witness’ belief or disbelief to determine whether the witness may be sworn. Whether a witness believes or disbelieves in a future state of rewards and punishments goes only to his credibility as a witness, not to his ability to testify.

Procedural posture: Plaintiff objected to the competency of a witness in a case before a Massachusetts court of common pleas, and the Court overruled the objection. The jury found for defendants, and plaintiff appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court notes that a “mahometan” belief suffices for swearing an oath.

Judgment: Reversed and objection sustained in an opinion authored by Justice Wilde.

Facts: The plaintiff objected to the competency of a witness on the grounds that the witness did not believe in God. The plaintiff offered testimony from other witnesses to prove this assertion. The lower court declined to hear the testimony and overruled the objection. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that the general rule of evidence does not allow a witness to disqualify himself by declarations not made under oath. However, there is an exception for cases such as this one to prove the witness’ belief or disbelief in God, as only those who believe in God may testify in court. Article 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution—which protects citizens from being “hurt, molested, or restrained, in [their] person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of [their] own conscience”—does not apply to atheists, and even if it did, rejecting a witness for being an atheist would not violate the statute. Therefore, the Court concluded, the plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce testimony showing that the witness did not believe in God and therefore could not be sworn.

This fatwa states that personal ownership rights are to be protected by the state and are to be guaranteed in full. No person, including the government, is to reduce, marginalise or limit such rights. In the event of a conflict between personal rights and the public interest, however, the public interest is to prevail.

The government is permitted to revoke personal ownership rights for the sake of the public interest under the following conditions:

1. the government and rights-holder have deliberated, the rights-holder not being coerced at all into making a decision;
2. the rights-holder has been sufficiently compensated;
3. the party responsible for the public interest is the government;
4. the stipulation of the public interest by the People's Representative Assembly (DPR) or Regional People's Representative Assembly (DPRD) takes into account Indonesian Council of Ulama fatwa and opinions; and
5. the public interest may not be transferred for other purposes, especially those commercial in nature.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

The Sultan of Brunei enacted this document on December 10, 1911, with the approval of Harvey Chevallier, British Resident of Brunei. It defines and prescribes punishments for certain offenses committed by "persons professing the Muhammadan religion." Most of these pertain to marriage law.

This enactment of August 3, 1948, "provide[s] for the solemnization and registration of church and civil marriages." It deals with all marriages except those "contracted according to the usages of the Mohammedans, Hindus, Buddhists, Dayaks and other persons governed by their own laws or customs." It names neither the Sultan nor the British Resident, and does not specify an author or enacting authority.

This statute defines a 'child' as a person under the age of 18 years, and 'child protection' as all activities that guarantee and protect children and their right to live, grow, develop and participate to their optimum, having regard to their dignity as human beings, affording them protection from violence and discrimination.

The statute regulates the responsibilities and obligations of the state, government, and parents vis-a-vis children, as well as other child-related issues such as guardianship, foster-care, society's role, as well as that of the Indonesian Child Protection Commission (Komisi Perlindungan Anak Indonesia).

This statute regulates, among other bankruptcy-related topics:

1. eligibility for declaring bankruptcy;
2. the consequences of bankruptcy;
3. administration of the assets of a person declared bankrupt;
4. creditors;
5. judicial stipulations as to bankruptcy; and
6. activity post-bankruptcy declaration.

This qanun constitutes the Aceh Islamic Criminal Code. It prohibits jarimah (conduct prohibited under Islamic law, or sharīʿa) and imposes hudud and ta'zir punitive measures ('uqubat) as deterrents for committing jarimah. Specifically, the qanun prohibits khamar (alcohol), maisir (gambling), khalwat (close proximity in private), ikhtilath (non-sexual, pre-marital intimacy), zina (adultery), sexual abuse, rape, qadzaf (false accusation), liwath (sodomy), and musahaqah (lesbian relations).

Article 4(2) of the qanun defines hudud punishment as caning, while ta'zir, according to arts 4(3) and 4(4), is caning, monetary fines, imprisonment, and restitution.

Pursuant to art 5, persons subject to the qanun are:

1. all Muslim offenders in Aceh;
2. all non-Muslim offenders who commit an offence togther with another Muslim and voluntarily submit to the qanun;
3. all non-Muslims who commit an offence not covered in the Indonesian Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana) or that is outside the Indonesian Criminal Code, but regulated in the qanun; and
4. legal entities carrying out operations in Aceh.

This Constitutional Court review of Law No. 1 of 1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and/or Defamation of Religion concluded that while a person’s religious beliefs are part of their inner freedom of religion (forum internum), for the sake of peace and social order, when stated publicly, those interpretations must accord with the basic tenets of that religion, and the scriptures of that religion. It is in these cases that restrictions on religious interpretation may be enforced.

In divorce proceedings, a wife appealed the decision of the Oakland Circuit Court Family Division, granting her husband’s motion to dismiss her claims and recognize their previous divorce, which occurred when the couple was in India. Specifically, she contested the validity of the “triple ṭalāq” divorce (a version of final, irrevocable divorce under Indian and Islamic law, performed unilaterally by the husband) that her husband performed in India, and filed for divorce in Michigan. The trial court concluded that the certificate of divorce that the defendant husband produced from their earlier divorce was sufficient evidence to dismiss the case under Michigan Compiled Laws 2.116(C)(7) (which bars claims based on prior judgment). The Court of Appeals reversed and found in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the Indian divorce violated due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution art. 1, § 2, as it gave the wife no chance to plead her case concerning the divorce before a court. The Court also concluded that allowing the divorce to stand would be contrary to state public policy, as it privileged the Muslim personal law of India (which placed women in a weaker position regarding property division in the event of a divorce than would Michigan state law) over Michigan state law and the rights and protections extended to persons living in the state.

In this case, deciding on the issue of whether a note was subject to garnishment which entailed deciding on the issue of whether the note was personal or communal property, the Court of Appeals of Arizona first looked into Moroccan Law (which the Court called "Islamic law"), which directed the Court to look at Syrian law applicable to its Christian minority, ruling that the note was separate and personal property and thus subject to garnishment. The application of non-US law (ultimately, Syrian law and not Islamic law) was not objected to by either party.

In Narasu Appa Mali in 1952, the Bombay High Court limited its own ability to address the constitutionality of Muslim personal law in India, holding that personal laws are not “laws in force” within the purview of Article 13 of the Constitution, and thus need not satisfy the fundamental rights test.

This fatwa states that hajj pilgrims must spend several (two or three) nights in Muzdalifah, except for persons who have a valid excuse (udzur).

This fatwa declares that if there is no preferable option, the removal of a heart valve from a deceased person for the purposes of keeping another person alive can be reconciled with Islamic law, provided the relevant party/parties have given their consent.