SHARIAsource

The parties were married on 5 May 2013 and had their only child on 7 September 2013. The plaintiff, however, submitted that the parties had quarrelled regularly since they were married because:

1. the defendant only ever provided the plaintiff with IDR 100,000 per month, and since July 2014, no financial support at all, resulting in the plaintiff having to work, as well as request financial assistance from her parents to meet their domestic needs;
2. the defendant rarely worked, but instead prioritised spending time with his friends rather than the plaintiff and their child;
3. the defendant's parents would meddle in the parties' domestic affairs, and encourage the defendant to leave the plaintiff; and
4. the defendant had not been a good father figure for the parties' child, and had not been responsible for his family, failing to provide them with any love and affection.

Problems escalated in July 2014 when the plaintiff could no longer tolerate the defendant's behaviour. Following an argument, the defendant left the parties' rental property and returned to his parents' home. The parties had remained separate for four months, during which time the defendant had failed to provide the plaintiff and their child with any financial support. The plaintiff claimed that she had worked hard to resolve the parties' disputes, even seeking the assistance of the Marriage Preservation, Fostering and Counselling Body (Badan Penasehatan, Pembinaan dan Pelestarian Perkawinan), but problems remained the same.

Initial court-sanctioned mediation failed to make the parties reconcile, but when the defendant provided his verbal response to the plaintiff's allegations in court, the plaintiff agreed to withdraw her application for divorce.

The parties were married on 5 July 2012, and had their only child on 14 March 2014. The plaintiff submitted, however, that towards the end of 2013, she and the defendant had begun to quarrel regularly. This was a result of the defendant providing the plaintiff with insufficient spending money to cover household items, the defendant's apathy towards finding work, and the defendant's spending time with his friends and coming home in the middle of the night without any legitimate excuse.

Problems escalated in mid-January 2014 when the defendant texted the plaintiff from Pekanbaru telling her he was going to Dhamasraya to meet someone. When the plaintiff inquired as to why the defendant did not want to return home, he said he was searching for employment there and that, once their child had grown up, he would come and find them. Upon hearing this, the plaintiff decided to seek a divorce from the defendant. For the next year the parties remained separated and not once did the defendant provide the plaintiff with any financial support. The plaintiff felt that reuniting with the defendant would only lead to further quarrelling.

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shugra) on the grounds that ongoing conflict between the parties was a legitimate reason for divorce.

The parties were married on 9 December 2004 and had lived with the plaintiff's parents. The plaintiff submitted that, since 2008, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome because the defendant's unwillingness to gain employment meant they could not meet their domestic needs. The defendant then left the plaintiff to live with his own parents, and for the seven years they were separated, they were never physically intimate with one another. The plaintiff submitted that the defendant's attitude and behaviour had caused her extended suffering, that she had endeavoured to rectify the situation with the defendant, but that she now felt divorce to be the only feasible option available.

The court conceded that the purpose of marriage, as envisaged in Surat Ar-Rum verse 21, art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, being a peaceful, hopeful and loving (sakinah, mawaddah dan rahmah) household, was no longer feasible. Accordingly, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and Kitab Fiqih Sunnah Juz II, the court granted the applicant an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court also cited Kitab Al-Anwar Juz II in support of its granting a divorce in the absence of the defendant, who had failed to attend court, despite having been formally summonsed.

The parties were married on 31 October 2012 and had lived with the plaintiff's parents. The plaintiff submitted that the marriage had always been quarrelsome because the defendant had never been willing to seek employment, meaning the parties could not meet their domestic needs. Two months prior to the proceeding, the defendant left the plaintiff without notice or a farewell to live with his own parents, and for the two months they were separated they had not shared any physical intimacy. The plaintiff submitted that the defendant's attitude and behaviour had caused her extended suffering, that she had endeavoured to rectify the situation with the defendant, but that she now felt divorce to be the only feasible option available.

The court conceded that the purpose of marriage, as envisaged in Surat Ar-Rum verse 21, art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, being a peaceful, hopeful and loving (sakinah, mawaddah dan rahmah) household, was no longer feasible. Accordingly, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and Kitab Fiqih Sunnah Juz II, the court granted the applicant an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court also cited Kitab Al-Anwar Juz II in support of its granting a divorce in the absence of the defendant, who had failed to attend court, despite having been formally summonsed.

The parties were married on 9 December 1996 and had five children. They had lived with the plaintiff's parents for one month, before moving around Bukittinggi and Riau for approximately eight years, finally settling in Agam. The plaintiff submitted that, by the beginning of 2004, the marriage had become quarrelsome because the defendant:

1. rather than providing for his family, would frequently preach with Jamaah Tabligh, incurring many debts along the way, forcing the plaintiff to have to work as a street vendor to make ends meet; and
2. had failed to care for and protect the plaintiff as his wife, showing little interest in any concerns she might have.

Problems escalated in August 2015 when the defendant fell from his motorcycle. When the plaintiff inquired with the defendant as to the cause of his fall, the defendant responded that he had been having negative thoughts about the plaintiff, which had caused him to fall. The plaintiff responded by saying that she could no longer live like this. The defendant's refusal to apologise left the plaintiff feeling offended. When the defendant then prepared a document stating that he divorced the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed for divorce with the court.

The court acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court also acknowledged that the parties' marriage no longer represented a joyful and everlasting union, as envisaged by art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or a peaceful, hopeful and loving (sakinah, mawaddah dan rahmah) family, as envisaged art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The parties were married on 16 August 2012 and had one child. The plaintiff submitted, however, that the marriage had only been harmonious for six months until March 2013, after which time the defendant had:

1. failed to provide for his family, causing the plaintiff to have to work in order to meet their daily domestic needs;
2. failed to show appropriate care and consideration for the plaintiff and their child;
3. had an extra-marital affair, which the plaintiff had learned about from reading a text message sent to the defendant's mobile phone; and
4. been dishonest regarding his finances, crying poor when the plaintiff requested money to purchase groceries, but always having enough money to drink at roadside stalls (warung).

Problems escalated at the end of April 2015 when the defendant refused to provide the plaintiff with extra shopping money. When the plaintiff inquired as to where the defendant stored his money, and the defendant refused to answer, the plaintiff told the defendant to leave the matrimonial home. The parties had remained separated since.

The court acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court also acknowledged that the parties' marriage no longer represented a joyful and everlasting union, as envisaged by art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or a peaceful, hopeful and loving (sakinah, mawaddah dan rahmah) family, as envisaged art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, as well as Surah ar-Rum, verse 21 from the Qur'an.

The parties were married on 8 January 2006 and had two children. After their marriage, they lived in a rental property in Medan for a year. They then moved to the defendant's parents' home for a year, before living in another rental property. The plaintiff submitted that the parties had quarrelled since the beginning of 2007 because the defendant had not worked to meet the parties' domestic financial needs.

In July 2013, problems escalated after the defendant had an extra-marital affair with another woman. This caused the plaintiff to return to her parents' home. The defendant followed suit and returned to his own parents' home as well. The parties had remained separate for the past two years and seven months. Around January 2015, the defendant and his parents attended the plaintiff's parents' home in order for the defendant to orally divorce the plaintiff and draft a statement of divorce.

In acceding to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra), the court noted that the parties had breached the mandate contained in arts 33 and 34 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and verse 21 of Al-Rum (The Byzantines) of the Qur'an. Moreover, the plaintiff had proven that the parties' marriage was irreparable, making divorce the only feasible course. The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The Plaintiff, Muslim prisoner Davis Totten, brought this civil rights claim against employees of Ryan Correctional Facilities alleging religious discrimination. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom because they 1) threatened the Plaintiff with disciplinary action if he attended the Friday (jumuʿa) prayer service, the Islamic study class (taʿlīm) or any Islamic seminar while on a work or school assignment; 2) tried to control how Muslims appoint their spiritual leader for the Friday prayer services; and 3) failed to make preparations for the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service, among other alleged offenses. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, on the claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Respondents’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. On the first issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, because the Plaintiff did not meet his burden of convincing the Court that it was clearly established law that an official’s failure to allow prisoners to attend the Friday prayer service, the Islamic study class, or any Islamic seminar violate the First Amendment right to practice religion. The Magistrate Judge found the Respondents entitled to summary judgment on the second issue, because the Magistrate Judge found that the plaintiff did not indicate that any prison officials actually appointed an inadequate spiritual leader who interfered with his right to practice his religion. On the third issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on this claim, because the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his ability to attend the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service—which is mandated by his religion and is a “sincerely held” practice—had been infringed upon, and was not related to a legitimate penological interest.

The parties were married on 22 October 2012 and had one child. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome after just one month because the defendant:

1. had failed to provide sufficient financial support to meet the parties' daily domestic needs;
2. had failed to obtain stable employment;
3. had failed to show his appreciation for the plaintiff as his wife, even physically assaulting her on a regular basis; and
4. had a temperamental nature and would often become angry with the plaintiff, often over insignificant matters.

The parties had subsequently been separated since 6 May 2016, after the plaintiff returned to her parents' home no longer able to cope with the defendant's treatment of her. The plaintiff submitted that she had concluded she had no other option but to irrevocably divorce the defendant (talak satu ba'in sughra). The plaintiff also requested that the parties' child remain in her care for the sake of the child's own welfare.

Despite the defendant's absence, the court, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court, pursuant to arts 105(a) and 156(a) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, also granted the plaintiff custody of the parties' children on the grounds that one of the children was still below the age of 12 (belum mumayyiz), and that it was in the best interests of the other children to remain in the plaintiff's care.

The parties were married on 2 February 1994 and had two children. They had lived harmoniously as husband and wife for 21 years, however, in 2000, the respondent fell ill. This had compromised her ability to be physically intimate with the applicant for approximately the past four years. Concerned that he would commit adultery (zina), in December 2014, the applicant requested the respondent's permission to marry again. The respondent granted him permission. The woman the applicant proposed to marry was fit and proper in that she did not breach any shari'a or civil legislative requirements: she was not a blood relative of the applicant or respondent, nor had they shared a wet nurse; she was a divorcee and not engaged to another man; and her marriage guardian was prepared to marry them. The applicant also told the court that he believed he was capable of having more than one wife as his monthly salary was IDR 5 million, he had promised to be fair to both wives as well as his children, and the respondent had prepared a written statement in support of the applicant. The applicant also told the court that he and the respondent were prepared to separate their joint assets if the applicant were granted judicial permission to marry again.

The court counselled the applicant on the consequences and risks of polygamy, advising him not to go ahead with the second marriage. Its advice, however, went unheeded. With this in mind, the court cited verse 3 of Surat Annisa from the Qur'an, which does not prohibit polygamy but places the onus on the man to prove he will treat both wives fairly, as enunciated in art 55(2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court was of the opinion that the applicant would treat his wives and children fairly, and, as required by art 5(1.b) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 58(1.b) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, could financially afford to care for them. After the applicant signed a statement attesting to do so, meeting the requirements of art 5(1)(a), (b) and (c) of Law No. 1 of 1974, as well as art 41(b) and (c) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975. The court acceded to the applicant's request and stipulated the items acquired by the parties as a married couple as their joint assets.

The parties were married on 26 May 2000 and had three children. The applicant submitted that the parties' marriage had been harmonious until June 2012, after which time it had become quarrelsome because the respondent had had an extra-marital affair. The applicant learned of the affair after noticing the respondent telephoning the other man from various places such as the parties' bedroom, the bathroom, and kitchen, sometimes in the middle of the night. The applicant also submitted that the respondent would wait until the applicant was asleep before calling the other man, and would even take their son Iqbal with her when she would meet him.

Problems escalated in August 2012 when the respondent forbade the respondent from seeing or telephoning this other man. The respondent maintained that he was merely a friend and became angry with the applicant. The applicant then left the matrimonial home and moved to his parents' home. The parties had remained separated for the three years leading up to the proceeding. Familial intervention had failed to make the parties reconcile, and the applicant sought the court's permission to divorce the respondent (talak satu raj'i).

The respondent's counterclaim included requests for:

1. IDR 25 million to cover her expenses for the four-year period the parties were separated;
2. IDR 3 million for iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted);
3. a prayer (sholat) instrument as mut'ah (divorce compensation); and
4. IDR 3 million per month for child maintenance.

The applicant, in response, offered:

1. two motorcycles for the four-year period the parties were separated, as these were acquired during the parties' marriage;
2. IDR 1.5 million for iddah;
3. a prayer instrument as mut'ah, as requested; and
4. IDR 2.4 million per month for child maintenance.

The court acceded to the applicant's request, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, on the grounds of ongoing conflict. With regards to the respondent's counterclaim, the court, noting that the applicant's average monthly wage was IDR 5 million, ordered the applicant to pay to the respondent the following:

1. IDR 15 million for the four-year period;
2. IDR 3 million for iddah;
3. a prayer instrument; and
4. IDR 3 million per month in child maintenance.

The parties were married on 12 January 2001 and had one child. The applicant submitted that, by the beginning of 2014, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome because the respondent had:

1. undervalued the applicant as her husband by, for example, not being at home when the applicant would return home for lunch, without first requesting the applicant's permission, and becoming angry when the applicant would confront the respondent about this; and
2. undervalued the applicant's family, frequently refusing to meet members of the applicant's family when they would visit.

Problems escalated at the end of 2014 when the respondent, for no apparent reason, refused to lend the applicant money to assist with his sale of daily items, despite the fact that the applicant had helped the respondent purchase bananas to be taken to market for sale. After the ensuing argument, the applicant left the respondent for his parents' home, where he had remained for the eight months leading up to the proceeding. The applicant had, however, continued to provide financial support for the parties' child. The applicant, accordingly, sought the court's permission to divorce (talak satu raj'i) the respondent.

Other than refuting many of the applicant's submissions, the respondent also counterclaimed for the following:

1. IDR 4.5 million for iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted);
2. a prayer (shalat) instrument as mut'ah (divorce compensation); and
3. IDR 1.5 million per month in child maintenance.

The applicant, in response, claimed he could only afford the following:

1. IDR 500,000 for iddah;
2. a prayer instrument as mut'ah; and
3. IDR 1.5 million in child maintenance.

The court acceded to the applicant's request, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, on the grounds of ongoing conflict. With regards to the respondent's counterclaim, the court ordered the applicant to pay to the respondent the following:

1. IDR 2 million for iddah;
2. a prayer instrument as mut'ah; and
3. IDR 1.5 million per month in child maintenance.

The parties agreed that, on 5 January 2016, the first party (as the plaintiff) had filed an application with the Wonosari Religious Court against the second party for defaulting on a musyarakah financing agreement, dated 30 September 2014. On 2 May 2016, the parties underwent mediation and agreed to resolve the case peacefully. The terms of settlement between the parties acknowledged:

1. the musyarakah agreement, dated 30 September 2014;
2. that the quantified material and immaterial damages sought by the first party in its application to the Court were IDR 29,522,400, but based on mediation, it was agreed that the second party would pay to the first party IDR 22,876,235, to cover its arrears;
3. that in the musyarakah agreement the second party had guaranteed to the first party the deed of title to a property in Semin, Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta;
4. that the second party was able to pay its arrears, per figure 2, in 16 instalments of IDR 500,000 payable on the 15th of each month, from May 2016 to August 2017, with a 17th and final instalment of IDR 14,876,235 payable on 15 September 2017;
5. that if the second party failed to meet its repayment obligations, the first party was entitled to seize and sell the Semin property;
6. that if the second party met its repayment obligations, the first party would return to the second party the deed of title to the Semin property;
7. that the terms of the deed of settlement would be registered in a judicial decision, and that the parties would, in good faith, implement the contents thereof; and
8. that the parties agreed that the terms of the deed of settlement would be affirmed in a court decision.

The court ordered that the parties adhere to the contents of the deed of settlement, dated 2 May 2016, and that they share costs.

The plaintiff submitted a claim for child maintenance from the defendant (her biological father), who was previously married to her biological mother from 1995-2001. Since September 2000, four months before her parents divorced, until the time of the proceeding, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had not provided her with any financial support, either via her biological mother or directly. The plaintiff submitted that, from the age of 4-19 years, the defendant had neglected his financial obligations to the plaintiff, which the plaintiff quantified at IDR 1.5 million per month, or IDR 264 million in total for the past 14 years and eight months. The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant was obligated to provide her with IDR 2 million per month in financial support until she reached 21 years of age, and that as a university lecturer with a PhD, he earned sufficient income to afford these payments.

The defendant submitted an objection to the plaintiff's case on the grounds that the plaintiff's biological mother had unilaterally changed the plaintiff's name and altered her birth certificate, the new certificate having been issued on 11 January 2007. Meanwhile, the birth certificate the defendant had in his possession was a copy of the original (dated 8 February 1996). The defendant submitted that the effect of this alteration was that it was no longer clear who the plaintiff's actual biological father was.

As part of the defendant's primary defence, he submitted that, following his divorce from the plaintiff's mother, he had finalised all financial issues through deliberatons with the plaintiff's great-aunt (now deceased), as well as the matter of the custody of the plaintiff. At the time, the defendant had abided by the plaintiff's mother's wishes and allowed the plaintiff to remain in her mother's care until she was of an age where she could knowingly choose which parent she wished to follow.

The defendant also suggested to the court that it was more likely that the plaintiff's mother had instigated the claim, given that there had been no tension in the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, as well as the fact that the parties had only recently reunited in September 2014 after more than 13 years apart. Moreover, the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff's mother had been fractured at best, meaning that the defendant had not known of the plaintiff's specific whereabouts, other than that she had been living with her mother and grandmother in Makassar. In short, the lack of communication between the defendant and the plaintiff's mother made providing the plaintiff with financial assistance logistically unfeasible. Indeed, when the plaintiff visited the defendant with her aunt at his residence for the first time in 13 years, the defendant happily provided the plaintiff with IDR 1 million, while the defendant's father (the plaintiff's grandfather) gave her IDR 500,000. The defendant informed the court that the plaintiff later requested IDR 8 million from the defendant to cover certain educational costs. As the defendant had only recently returned from completing postgraduate study in Yogyakarta at the time of the request, however, the defendant and his wife could only afford to provide the plaintiff with IDR 4 million, which the plaintiff had refused.

The court dismissed the defendant's objection on the grounds that the plaintiff's original birth certificate had never been declared null and void by the authorised agency, and, therefore, its legal authority remained intact.

In regards to the plaintiff's claim, the court noted the conflicting laws as to the legal age of an adult: while art 47(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, as well as art 47(1) of Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary, define an adult as someone who is 18 years of age, art 98 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws defines an adult as a person of 21 years of age. Meanwhile, customary law (hukum adat) stipulates 15 as the relevant age. In choosing to follow that legislation that defined the legal age as 18, the court thereby found that the plaintiff was already an adult as she was 19 years of age. In reaching its decision, the court considered that the plaintiff and defendant had been separated for 13 years, that the defendant and defendant's father had offered the plaintiff IDR 1.5 million collectively on their first meeting in 13 years, and that the plaintiff had refused to accept IDR 4 million from the defendant to cover educational costs. The court also cited Indonesian Supreme Court Decision No. 608 K/AG/203 (23 March 2005), where the Supreme Court declared that the obligations of a father to provide financially for his child were Lil Intifa rather than Lil Tamlik, that is, the obligation to meet a child's needs is shared by the child's parents, and therefore, does not rest solely on the father (art 77(3) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws; art 45(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage). Accordingly, back payments were not necessary as the child's past needs were assumed to have already been met. Pursuant to the defendant's concession that he was happy to provide the plaintiff with financial assistance, provided it was within his own means, as well as surat Al Baqarah verse 233, the court ordered the defendant to pay to the defendant IDR 2 million per month until she reaches 21 years of age.

The applicant married the first respondent on 21 May 2006, and the parties had their first and only child on 30 January 2009. Throughout their marriage the parties had never quarrelled and had executed their spousal duties appropriately. On 29 August 2014, however, the applicant married the second respondent, without having the marriage recorded officially (a siri (clandestine) marriage). The marriage was officiated by the second respondent's father, and witnessed by the second respondent's neighbour and the applicant's neighbour. The applicant claimed his relationship with the second respondent prior to marrying her was not in contravention of shari'a, that being that the two respondents were not related, nor was he related to the second respondent; and the second respondent was a divorcee and not engaged to another man. The applicant and second respondent were also expecting their first child, the second respondent being seven months pregnant. The applicant also maintained that he could meet his wives' daily needs, as well as those of their children, given his salary (IDR 2.5 million per month). Furthermore, the applicant maintained that he had been fair to both his wives, the relationship between the two respondents had not been problematic, the applicant had been able to demarcate what constituted the joint assets of he and the first respondent, and the first respondent's parents did not object to his marrying the second respondent.

As all parties had failed to attend court, however, the court dismissed the application, commenting that the parties were not treating the matter with any seriousness.

This regional regulation states that Diniyah Takmiliyah education is based on the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution (art 2). It defines Diniyah Takmiliyah education as non-formal Islamic religious education (art 3), that operates to meet the Islamic religious educational needs of primary school students (art 4), intended to provide religious competency to students in order that they develop into knowledgable, God-believing, God-mindful, practising and noble Muslims (art 5). The duration of Diniyah Takmiliyah is four years (art 6), and the curriculum comprises:

1. Qur'anic-Hadith literacy;
2. creed-morals (aqidah-akhlak);
3. legal understanding-worship (fiqih-ibadah);
4. Islamic cultural history;
5. Arabic; and
6. practical worship (praktek ibadah) (art 13).

Petitioner Kofi Easterling, an inmate at Green Bay Correctional Institution (GBCI), filed suit against the Respondents, various prison officials, alleging that they ignored the Petitioner's instructions as to when Ramadan began. The Petitioner claimed that the Respondents’ Ramadan date violated his religious beliefs under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. In the District Court, the Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, to which the Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in response. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Respondents, finding that the Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim failed because he had produced no evidence of a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Because the Plaintiff failed to meet his burden under RLUIPA, he similarly failed to establish that the Respondents burdened a “central religious belief or practice” in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, the Respondents were entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment and RLUIPA claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

This regional regulation obliges Muslim school children to attend Madrasah Diniyah Awaliyah, which is a non-formal educational stream that makes provision for Islamic religious education for a term of four years at primary level (art 5). The regulation states that this requirement is based on the Pancasila ('five principles' - Indonesian state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution (art 2), and that it will meet societal needs by supplementing the Islamic education of students who attend public schools (art 3).

This is a reference to an alleged meeting that took place between Abū Ḥanīfa (the eponym of the Ḥanafī school) and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq in the presence of the Abbasid caliph Manṣūr (r. 136-58) where Abū Ḥanīfa acknowledges Jaʿfar as being the most knowledgable person in religious law. Hossein Modarressi employs this reference to show how other Muslim scholars recognized Jaʿfar's mastery of Islamic law.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to an alleged meeting that took place between Abū Ḥanīfa (the eponym of the Ḥanafī school) and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq in the presence of the Abbasid caliph Manṣūr (r. 136-58) where Abū Ḥanīfa acknowledges Jaʿfar as being the most knowledgable person in religious law. Hossein Modarressi employs this reference to show how other Muslim scholars recognized Jaʿfar's mastery of Islamic law.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).