SHARIAsource

During trial court proceedings in which a Muslim couple was dividing their marital property, the husband, Mr. Irfan Aleem, attempted to perform a “triple ṭalāq” divorce—a form of final, irrevocable dissolution of marriage under Pakistani law, initiated unilaterally by the husband. The Court refused to honor this type of divorce, concluding that it violated due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by not giving Mrs. Farah Aleem any role or voice in the divorce proceedings. The Court also concluded that allowing the ṭalāq divorce to replace court proceedings was contrary to the public policy interest of the people of Maryland, as it would allow Pakistani version of Islamic law, which grants all property to the husband as the default in divorce cases, to regulate distribution of property in the state of Maryland. The Court thus upheld the ruling of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, granting the wife’s petition for divorce, and applied the Maryland default rule that, in the absence of prior written agreement, marital property is to be divided fairly and equitably.

The Plaintiff, Muslim prisoner Davis Totten, brought this civil rights claim against employees of Ryan Correctional Facilities alleging religious discrimination. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom because they 1) threatened the Plaintiff with disciplinary action if he attended the Friday (jumuʿa) prayer service, the Islamic study class (taʿlīm) or any Islamic seminar while on a work or school assignment; 2) tried to control how Muslims appoint their spiritual leader for the Friday prayer services; and 3) failed to make preparations for the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service, among other alleged offenses. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, on the claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Respondents’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. On the first issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, because the Plaintiff did not meet his burden of convincing the Court that it was clearly established law that an official’s failure to allow prisoners to attend the Friday prayer service, the Islamic study class, or any Islamic seminar violate the First Amendment right to practice religion. The Magistrate Judge found the Respondents entitled to summary judgment on the second issue, because the Magistrate Judge found that the plaintiff did not indicate that any prison officials actually appointed an inadequate spiritual leader who interfered with his right to practice his religion. On the third issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on this claim, because the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his ability to attend the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service—which is mandated by his religion and is a “sincerely held” practice—had been infringed upon, and was not related to a legitimate penological interest.

A Maryland court ruled that Sharīʿa Court lacked jurisdiction in a custody case since the couple never resided in the jurisdiction of the Sharīʿa Court. 

The plaintiff, Dennis Balk, a former professor at the New York Institute of Technology (NYIT) in Bahrain, brought this suit against the New York Institute of Technology after he was fired. Balk alleged that he was fired from his position after a daily Bahrain newspaper, Al-Ayam, published an article stating that he had posted to his class website a controversial cartoon depicting the Prophet Muhammad in rags. Balk brought this claim, which alleged discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin in violation of Title VII. The plaintiff also brought a motion to compel the deposition of Dr. Mohammed Hussein, the Executive Director of the Middle East for NYIT. The District Court determined that Dr. Hussein's deposition was necessary in the "interest of justice" within the meaning of the Walsh Act because of his alleged involvement in the plaintiff's firing. The District Court additionally found that given Dr. Hussein's periodic travel to the US, it was not unreasonable to compel Dr. Hussein to appear.

On March 6, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued a revised Executive Order which barred, with certain exceptions, entry to the United States of nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries, suspended the entry of refugees for 120 days, and reduced the number of refugees who can be admitted to the United States by more than half. The Plaintiffs (political activist Linda Sarsour, as well as 26 additional Muslim individuals) filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. While other litigation opposing the revised Executive Order were filed to enjoin only Sections 2 and 6 of the revised Executive Order, in this case the Plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin the enforcement of the revised Executive Order in its entirety. In order for the Plaintiffs to succeed, they had to prove that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their case; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of the equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008).

A foreign Pakistani custody decree was entitled to comity because the Pakistani custody decree was based on the best interests of the children.

This fatwa states that the provision of alms (zakat) to the poor and downtrodden is a productive use thereof. Moreover, that alms given in God's name may be spent in the public interest (maslahah'ammah).

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that the primary consideration with regards to child maintenance is the welfare and interests of the child. Moreover, a child under the age of seven years, whose mother travels overseas frequently, and who is happy and content with his father, should be placed in the care of his/her father.

This ministerial regulation facilitates the implementation of art 42 of Government Regulation No. 79 of 2005, which states that the ministerial regulation will provide further provisions regarding supervisory procedures for regional regulations and regional head regulations, as well as the evaluation of draft regional regulations and draft regional head regulations.

More specifically, the regulation sets out the review (invalidation) process for all regional regulations, including the formation of a team to conduct the review (tim klarifikasi). Notably, for a clarification team to invalidate a regional head regulation, art 6(2) requires that that regulation conflict with 'the public interest, regional regulation and higher-level laws'. For a regional regulation to be invalidated, however, art 6(4) states that it only need conflict with 'the public interest and/or higher-level laws' (emphasis added).

This fatwa states that capital market, as well as all mechanisms and activities associated therein, accord with shari'a if they meet shari'a principles. Moreover, a security is deemed to meet shari'a principles if it obtains a Shari'a Compatibility Declaration. It specifies that transactions must not be speculative or manipulative, nor may they contain components that are excessively risky, interest-bearing, immoral or the like.

The court ordered the parties to adhere to the deed of reconciliation (akte perdamaian) to which they had agreed. The terms of the deed of reconciliation stated that the parties agreed to resolve the dispute via familial deliberation (musyawarah kekeluargaan); that the parties acknowledged debts owing between them, per the musyarakah financing agreement; that the second party acknowledged the quantum and totality of its obligations pursuant to the agreement; and that the second party was prepared to repay its debts and arrears on an interest-free basis by, at the latest, 31 January 2015.

This statute regulates the role, authority, structure, and personnel, of the Indonesian Attorney-General's Department. It replaces the now defunct Law No. 5 of 1991 on the Attorney-General of the Republic of Indonesia. Pursuant to art 30(3)(d) and (e), in the interests of public order, the Attorney-General, through the Coordinating Body for Monitoring Societal Beliefs (Badan Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat), may monitor sects (aliran kepercayaan) that can endanger society and the state, and prevent abuse and/or defamation of religion.

This fatwa states that interest-bearing interbank investment certificates are contrary to shari'a. Investment certificates based on a Mudharabah agreement (Sertifikat Investasi Mudharabah Antarbank - Interbank Mudharabah Investment Certificate), however, are not. An Interbank Mudharabah Investment Certificate may only change hands once after it has been purchased. Interbank Mudharabah Investment Certificate transactors may be:

1. shari'a banks as lenders and borrowers; and
2. conventional banks as lenders.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that a wife filing for divorce from her husband should not always be declared nusyuz (disobedient). A divorce application submitted by a wife is not evidence of a wife's disobedience, therefore a husband can be ordered by the court to provide his wife with financial support for the first three months following the parties' divorce (nafkah iddah). This is to ensure that the wife can carry out iddah, for the purpose of, among other things, cleansing her womb of her husband's seed (istibra'). This is also in the interests of the husband.

This fatwa acknowledges that a bond (a long-term debt-based security issued by a public company to a bond-holder that obliges the company to pay periodic-interest and repay the principal to the bond-holder) is a conventional capital market investment instrument. It distinguishes a shari'a bond as a long-term security issued by a public company to a shari'a bond-holder that obliges the issuer to pay as income to the shari'a bond-holder a share of the profit, margin or fee, and to repay the bond by a certain maturity date.

The fatwa states that shari'a bonds may be issued pursuant to the following types of agreement:

1. Mudharabah/Qiradh;
2. Musyarakah;
3. Murabahah;
4. Salam;
5. Istishna; and
6. Ijarah.

This fatwa states that income derived from services is taxable for the purposes of alms (zakat) if it meets the annual threshold. There are only eight groups eligible to receive alms, as contained in the Qur'an, surah at-Taubah, verse 60. If one of those groups is not present, those alms may be distributed to groups that are present. In the interests and welfare of Muslims, funds collected that are not alms can be requested as infaq or shadaqah. The provision of infaq and shadaqah, the collection of which is regulated by Ulil Amri (coordinating body), is incumbent on Muslims according to their own financial capacity.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Swiss Confederation (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft (German); Confederation Suisse (French); Confederazione Svizzera (Italian); Confederaziun Svizra (Romansh)), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Switzerland's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

The applicants submitted an application for child adoption to the court stating that:

1. they were married on 3 January 2001;
2. they wished to adopt their neighbour's child, Muhammad Hashif Hasbullah;
3. they had already cared for the child since 10 January 2016;
4. their primary motivation for wanting to adopt the child was that the child was still their neighbour, and that they also wanted the child to maintain a connection with his mother;
5. the child's biological parents had already transferred temporary custody of the child to the applicants; and
6. their other motivation being that the child was their nephew.

The court cited art 39 of Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection, stating that:

1. child adoption can only be carried out if it serves the child's best interests, and meets local customs and norms and current legislative regulations;
2. child adoption does not sever the child's blood connection with its biological parents; and
3. the prospective adoptive parents must be of the same religion as the child.

The court also acknowledged that these legislative requirements accorded with the Qur'an, Surat An-Nisa', verse 144, and a fatwa issued by the Indonesian Council of Ulama (U-335/MUI/VI/1982).

The court acceded to the applicants' request, finding that the applicants had met the legislative requirements to adopt the child in question.