SHARIAsource

Petitioner Kofi Easterling, an inmate at Green Bay Correctional Institution (GBCI), filed suit against the Respondents, various prison officials, alleging that they ignored the Petitioner's instructions as to when Ramadan began. The Petitioner claimed that the Respondents’ Ramadan date violated his religious beliefs under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. In the District Court, the Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, to which the Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in response. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Respondents, finding that the Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim failed because he had produced no evidence of a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Because the Plaintiff failed to meet his burden under RLUIPA, he similarly failed to establish that the Respondents burdened a “central religious belief or practice” in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, the Respondents were entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment and RLUIPA claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

In its judgment dated December 15, 2023, a majority of the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld various provisions of the Supreme Court Act of 2023 as constitutional. The majority rejected arguments that the Act sought to interfere with the Court's independence and exclusive jurisdiction over its own affairs and internal organization. Certain provisions of the Act constrain the power of the Chief Justice and provide certain guarantees that some cases need to be heard by a committee of justices as opposed to a single justice or only a few of them. Most importantly, the Court, in upholding the Act, rejected the Chief Justice's power as the so-called "Master of the Roster." Previously, under that power, the Chief Justice had the ability to constitute benches, that is, appoint individual justices of his choosing, who then heard specific cases. Rejecting that power, the Court ruled that the "Master of the Roster" power was alien to the Constitution of Pakistan. Further, the Court noted that the word "master" was offensive and un-Islamic, writing that "Islam establishes the principle of equality . . . ."

This statute is the second amendment to Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Administration, and reflects changes to the statute following a Constitutional Court decision on individual candidates. It also legislates with regard to appointing a replacement deputy regional head following a death, resignation or inability on the encumbent's part to execute their responsibilities.

The four applicants wished to nominate themselves for the then-upcoming elections of regent and deputy-regent of Pidie, Bireun, Aceh Timur, and Simeulue respectively in 2011. Article 256 of Law No. 11 of 2006 on the Governance of Aceh, however, required that individual/independent candidates in regional head elections be nominated by a political party or coalition. In other words, art 256 precluded the nomination of independent candidacy. Therefore, pursuant to art 50 of Law No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court, the applicants sought to challenge the constitutional validity of art 256 of Law No. 11 of 2006 on the grounds that it contravened arts 18(4), 27(1), 28D(1) and (3), and 28I(2) of the Indonesian Constitution. The applicants also claimed that art 256 contravened art 43 of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, which reiterated and elaborated upon art 28D(3) of the Constitution, in regards to every Indonesian citizen being entitled to be elected to a position of political office.

The court acceded to the application, finding art 256 of Law No. 11 of 2006 in contravention of the aforementioned constitutional guarantees and, therefore, rendered it null and void.

The Sharia Court, Mariga, Nigeria convicted the Appellant for the offense of house trespass and theft under the Penal Code of Nigeria. The Appellant brought this appeal before the High Court of Niger State, challenging his conviction on the basis that the Sharia Court’s jurisdiction was limited to Islamic law and did not extend to the Penal Code, which is based on Common Law. The High Court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.

These materials include (i) a compendium of the Sharia Courts Laws enacted by the sharīʿa states, in the form of the Zamfara State Sharia Courts Law annotated section by section to show variations between it and all the rest; (ii) tables correlating the sections of the Zamfara State Sharia Courts Law with the Area Courts laws of 1967-68, from which the Zamfara law was derived; (iii) other statutory materials; (iv) materials on civil procedure in the Sharia Courts; (v) selected decisions by state High Courts and the federal Court of Appeal on matters related to the Sharia Courts, including their jurisdiction and the law applicable in them; (vi) information on the judges of the Sharia Courts, including their numbers, qualifications, and remuneration; (vii) data on caseloads of courts in the sharīʿa states, including the High Courts and Sharia Courts of Appeal, 2011-2015; and (viii) data on numbers of judgments of amputation and stoning to death imposed by Sharia Courts, 2011-2015, and numbers of appeals from such judgments going to High Courts and Sharia Courts of Appeal.

These materials are a part of The Nigeria Papers – a SHARIAsource Special Collection, compiled and edited by Independent Scholar Philip Ostien and others. 

This report acknowledges the decision of the Indonesian Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) to invalidate art 256 of Law No. 11 of 2006 on the Administration of Aceh. The article sought to allow indepedent candidates to run for government office, but only in the first election after the enactment of the Law.

On March 6, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued a revised Executive Order which barred, with certain exceptions, entry to the United States of nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries, suspended the entry of refugees for 120 days, and reduced the number of refugees who can be admitted to the United States by more than half. The Plaintiffs (political activist Linda Sarsour, as well as 26 additional Muslim individuals) filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. While other litigation opposing the revised Executive Order were filed to enjoin only Sections 2 and 6 of the revised Executive Order, in this case the Plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin the enforcement of the revised Executive Order in its entirety. In order for the Plaintiffs to succeed, they had to prove that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their case; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of the equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008).

The plaintiff brought a case before the General Court of Roudehen seeking the Court’s authorization for remarriage. The Court rejected his claimed and stated that Article 16 of the Family Protection Law 1974 was unconstitutional.

On March 6, 2017, President Donald J. Trump, issued a second Executive Order which barred, with certain exceptions, entry to the United States of nationals from predominantly Muslim countries. This order barred nationals from six Muslim-majority countries (the original seven except for Iraq), suspended the entry of refugees for 120 days, and reduced the number of refugees who can be admitted to the United States by more than half. The Plaintiffs (the International Refugee Assistance Project; HIAS, Inc., the Middle East Studies Association; Muhammed Meteab; Paul Harrison; Ibrahim Ahmed Mohomed; John Does Nos. 1 & 3; and Jane Doe No. 2) filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Preliminary Injunction. In an opinion by U.S. District Judge Theodore D. Chuang, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland found that the revised Executive Order should be halted because the Plaintiffs are likely to establish that Section 2(c) of the revised Executive Order, which issued the travel ban against citizens of the six designated Muslim-majority countries, violates the Constitution and federal law, specifically the Establishment Clause and Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2012).

The Plaintiffs argued that they had standing to assert the claim that the revised Executive Order violated the Establishment Clause because the “anti-Muslim views” underlying the Executive Order caused them stress and anxiety. The Court acknowledged that for “purposes of an Establishment Clause claim, non-economic, intangible harms to “spiritual, value-laden beliefs” can constitute a particularized injury sufficient to support standing. Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997). Because the harm suffered by the individual Plaintiffs is “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct” in that the revised Executive Order will result in the disfavoring of Islam, the Court found that the Plaintiffs had standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim.

The Court further determined that in order to withstand an Establishment Clause challenge under the Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971) test, (1) an act must have a secular purpose, (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) it must not “foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Id. at 612-613 (citations omitted). The Court found that the Plaintiffs presented a convincing case that the revised Executive Order fails the Lemon test because there is substantial, direct evidence that the travel ban was motivated by a desire to ban Muslims as a group from entering the United States. The Plaintiffs primarily relied on statements made by President Trump and his advisors, including a “Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration” on his campaign website “calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our representatives can figure out what is going on,” an interview with CNN in which Trump professed that he believed “Islam hates us” and that the United States had “allowed this propaganda to spread all through the country that [Islam] is a religion of peace,” and a written statement about the December Berlin attack in which he lamented that people “prepared to celebrate the Christmas holiday” were killed by “ISIS and other Islamic terrorists [who] continually slaughter Christians in their communities and places of worship as part of their global jihad.” Many of the statements about Islam, including references to Islam generally and to jihād, tend to refer to false conceptions of Islamic law or sharīʿa as inherently violent.

Rejecting the argument about neutrality on its face, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs’ motion. The Court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Section 2(c) of the Executive Order.

Editors’ Note: Many of the statements about Islam, including references to Islam generally and to jihād, tend to refer to false conceptions of Islamic law or sharīʿa as inherently violent.

On March 6, 2017, President Donald J. Trump, issued a revised Executive Order which barred, with certain exceptions, entry to the United States of nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries, suspended the entry of refugees for 120 days, and reduced the number of refugees who can be admitted to the United States by more than half. The Plaintiffs (the State of Hawai’i and Dr. Ismail Elshikh, an American citizen of Egyptian descent who serves as the Imam of the Muslim Association of Hawai’i) filed a motion for a nationwide temporary restraining order.

The Plaintiffs argued that the revised Executive Order subjected them to discrimination in violation of the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (INA), because the Executive Order results in “their having to live in a country and in a State where there is the perception that the Government has established a disfavored religion.” The Plaintiffs pointed to public statements by the President and his advisors regarding the implementation of a “Muslim Ban,” which the Plaintiffs contended was the tacit and illegitimate motivation underlying the revised Executive Order. For example, the Plaintiffs pointed to a statement by President Trump that he was “establishing a new vetting measure to keep radical Islamic terrorists out of the United States of America,” and that “We don’t want them here,” and to an interview with President Trump in which he claimed: “Do you know if you were a Christian in Syria it was impossible, at least very tough to get into the United States? If you were a Muslim you could come in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost impossible and the reason that was so unfair, everybody was persecuted in all fairness, but they were chopping off the heads of everybody but more so the Christians. And I thought it was very, very unfair. So we are going to help them.”

The Court found that the State of Hawai’i and Dr. Elshikh both had standing to assert their claims. The Court found that Hawai’i had standing due to the harms to the state’s proprietary interests as operator of public universities and due to preliminary data that indicated the revised Executive Order had suppressed international travel and injured tourism as Hawai’i’s main economic driver. As for Dr. Elshikh’s standing, the Court observed that the injury-in-fact prerequisite can be “particularly elusive” in Establishment Clause cases because plaintiffs do not typically allege an invasion of a physical or economic interest. “Despite that, a plaintiff may nonetheless show an injury that is sufficiently concrete, particularized, and actual to confer standing.” See Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1048-49; Vasquez v. L.A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 2007). Dr. Elshikh had standing because the revised Executive Order left him and his family, including a wife of Syrian descent and young children who are American citizens, with the knowledge that the United States—their own country—would discriminate against individuals who are the same ethnicity as them, and who hold the same religious beliefs. The Court found that, because the revised Executive Order targeted Muslim citizens due to their religious views and national origin, which may result in these citizens being unable to associate freely with those of other faiths, the injuries are sufficiently personal, concrete, particularized and actual to confer standing in the Establishment Clause context.

As for the Establishment Clause claim, the Court declined the Defendants’ urging to rely on the Executive Order’s religiously neutral text, and instead evaluated the text in conjunction with the historical background of the revised Executive Order. The Court found this historical record “includes significant and unrebutted evidence of religious animus driving the promulgation of the Executive Order and its related predecessor.” The Court included statements made by President Trump including: “I think Islam hates us” and “People were so upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim. Remember this. And I’m okay with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.”

Because the Court found that the Plaintiffs have shown a “strong likelihood” of succeeding on their claim that the Executive Order violates First Amendment rights under the Constitution, and “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights,” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012), the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO). In effect, the TRO now blocks the second version of the ban.

Editors’ Note: Many of the statements about Islam, including references to Islam generally and to jihād, tend to refer to false conceptions of Islamic law or sharīʿa as inherently violent.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Guinea (Republique de Guinee), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Guinea's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Thailand (Ratcha Anachak Thai), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Thailand's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Indonesia's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. However, one province—Aceh Province—has established Islamic law formally within its jurisdiction.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Nigeria's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Iran's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is the principal source of legislation. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Mali (Republique de Mali), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Mali's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Jamhuryat Islami Pakistan), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Pakistan’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is a principal source of legislation.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Turkey (Turkiye Cumhuriyeti), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Turkey's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Benin (Republique du Benin), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Benin's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.