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An Afghani Muslim security guard at a company that contracted with his former employer for his security guard services sued under Title VII and §1983, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin as well as a hostile work environment. The plaintiff claimed that, while working for the company, he was harassed by the property manager who asked him if he was from Afghanistan and if he was Muslim. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim, concluding that the plaintiff and defendant company did not have an employee-employer relationship, that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and that the alleged actions were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment finding. The plaintiff made no explicit claim about Islamic law except to complain of perceived bias on the basis of his religion, which may have included ritual practices based on Islamic law.

This brief, submitted by fifteen religious and civil rights organizations, addresses the notion that numerous conflicts often arise between job duties and religious convictions in areas of ritual law, including Sabbaths and other holy days, dietary restrictions, and dress for many Jews, Muslims, Christians and members of other faiths. These organizations point out that the headscarf (ḥijāb) is a particularly visible manifestation of a religious practice (more so than taking off holy days), and under the laws of the United States, it is entitled to no less a standard of reasonable accommodations, particularly in an era where online applications set the qualifications and in-person interviews may offer cause for discrimination if not for application of Title VII broadly. They further argue that “the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning gives the employer a perverse incentive to deny to religiously observant applicants any opportunity to discuss religion-based limitations on their appearance or scheduling. Under that reasoning, the employer’s ignorance automatically defeats a prima facie case, and thus effectively eliminates Title VII’s accommodation protections for those applicants. Under the Tenth Circuit’s position, then, observers of Sabbaths and other holy days will find themselves effectively excluded from a large and growing sector of the workforce that is hired through online applications (p. 10).” For reviews and commentary on the U.S. law implications of this case, see the SCOTUSblog Case Page.

A Muslim-naturalized American citizen of Egyptian national origin sued Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff, along with officials at the Transportation Security Administration, under Title VII, as well as under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), the Fifth Amendment, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Privacy Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff was suspended from work with the Federal Aviation Administration after he failed to obtain a security clearance renewal following 9/11, and the plaintiff alleged that his security clearance was not renewed because he was Egyptian and Muslim. The defendant claimed that the Administration did not control who receives a security clearance, and that their action suspending him was merely a result of his failure to maintain his previous level of clearance. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of religious or national-origin discrimination [with no allegation of barring practices of Islamic ritual law, for example] as articulated by McDonnell Douglas, and that without the security clearance, he was no longer qualified for his job. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Lavotte Saunders, a Muslim African-American male, brought this claim of discrimination based on race and religion against the Respondent, the Plaintiff’s former employer Apothaker & Associates. Two days after the Plaintiff was hired, he was fired on the basis of having a criminal record, but later discovered that several other employees of the Respondent had criminal records (including felony convictions) and were not fired. Therefore, the Plaintiff brought suit on the basis that he was fired as a result of disparate treatment due to religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court found that claims of discrimination are subject to the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden shifting analysis: First, the Plaintiff had to state a prima facie case, and then the burden shifted to the Respondent to “articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s termination.” The Court found that the Plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case, because he could not prove that he was qualified for the position in the first place. Therefore, the Court granted the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment.

Holding: To prevail in a disparate-treatment claim, an applicant need show only that his need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, not that the employer had knowledge of his need. 

Judgment: Reversed and remanded, 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Scalia on June 1, 2015. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgement. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Facts: Respondent (Abercrombie) refused to hire Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, because the headscarf that she wore pursuant to her religious obligations conflicted with Abercrombie’s employee dress policy. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit on Elauf’s behalf, alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, inter alia, prohibits a prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of the applicant’s religious practice when the practice could be accommodated without undue hardship.

Procedural Posture: The EEOC prevailed in the District Court, but the Tenth Circuit reversed, awarding Abercrombie summary judgment on the ground that failure-to-accommodate liability attaches only when the applicant provides the employer with actual knowledge of his need for an accommodation.

Sources: Opinion Syllabus; SCOTUSblog Case Page (with further reviews and commentary on the U.S. law implications of this case).

The Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 establishes the fatwā legalization process in the state of Selangor, Malaysia. It also establishes and outlines the role of the mufti as the chairman of Selangor’s state fatwā committee. It is the main piece of legislation governing Selangor's syariah courts, Islamic finance guidelines, individual conversion to Islam, as well as other Islamic regulations the state has determined to regulate.