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This statute prohibits human trafficking activities, as well as activities related to human trafficking, and sets in place severe monetary penalties and prison sentences for offenders.

Plaintiff Jim Davis challenged a prison policy that imposed a temporary, total ban on the purchase and receipt of prayer oil as a violation of both his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights. The Respondents, the prison administration and various officers individually named in the complaint, counterclaimed that a ban on prayer oils furthered a legitimate government interest, as prayer oils posed a fire, health, and safety hazard. The Plaintiff alleged in a second claim against the Respondents that they retaliated against him for filing a grievance regarding this prison policy by restricting the purchase of religious items to the quarterly packages he could receive while incarcerated. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff stated a cognizable First Amendment and RLUIPA violation with respect to the prayer oil ban, because the Plaintiff sufficiently showed that the prayer oils were not flammable and therefore did not pose a risk. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss with regard to the second claim because the District Court determined that restricting religious items to the quarterly packages did not sufficiently burden his practice of religion, as he was not denied all access to prayer oil and was still allowed to order oil in quarterly packages.

Plaintiff Jerry Lemons, a Muslim prisoner confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, brought this complaint against the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, for a violation of his freedom to exercise his religion when the Respondents did not provide a special menu for an Islamic holy day in December 2008. The judge determined that the fact that a single meal service was disrupted or missed did not create a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s ability to practice religion, and recommended that the Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim be dismissed.

This order implements the decision from the District Court of Colorado in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez, who adopted the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang that government officials not receive immunity but that the court dismiss Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions. This order implements that recommendation and decision adopted by the district court.

In this decision, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez adopts the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review of the record, Judge Martinez agreed with Judge Wang’s recommendation that the government officials were not entitled to immunity, as petitioner Ray Anthony Smith had made sufficient allegations to make out a prima facie claim. Also following Judge Wang’s recommendations, Judge Martinez dismissed Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to aḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of hisḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon reviewing the record, in Smith v. Crockett, U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang determined that the petitioner alleged actions that sufficed to make out a basic claim and recommended that government officials should not receive immunity. The Judge recommended, however, dismissal of Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

Muslim plaintiff Iqbal Sulehria sued his employer, the New York City Department of Correction, and related officials under Title VII, §1983, and New York State and City anti-discrimination laws, alleging religious and national origin discrimination as well as retaliation for filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and through the prison administration. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that his co-workers and managers harassed him for being Muslim after the events of 9/11. The harassment consisted of verbal taunts, intrusive searches, withholding promotions, denying him use of the bathroom, forcing him to work in substandard conditions, and having his face imposed on the body of Osama bin Laden in photos left on the plaintiff’s desk. The Court upheld a magistrate judge’s report granting the City partial summary judgment, dismissing the retaliation and failure-to-promote claims, because the Court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case; however, the Court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment as to the hostile work environment claim, concluding that a jury could see the events as alleged to be severe and pervasive enough to allow the claim to go forward.

This regional regulation makes provision for the eradication of immoral practices, which, it states, damage the pillars of society and are contrary to religious norms, morality, customs and tradition, and current legal norms in Musi Banyuasin regency (arts 1(7) and 2(1)). The regulation includes the following in the definition of immoral practices (perbuatan maksiat):

1. prostitution;
2. sexual relations out of wedlock (zina);
3. homosexual reations;
4. lebianism;
5. sodomy;
6. rape;
7. sexual abuse;
8. pornoaction;
9. pornography;
10. gambling;
11. alcohol; and
12. illicit substance abuse (art 2(2)).

A person found to be in contravention of the regulation can face a maximum fine of IDR 50 million or a maximum prison sentence of six months (art 9(2)).

This regional regulation makes provision for the eradication of immoral practices, which, it states, damage the pillars of society and are contrary to religious norms, morality, customs and tradition, and current legal norms (art 2(1)). The regulation includes the following in the definition of immoral practices (perbuatan maksiat):

1. prostitution;
2. sexual relations out of wedlock (zina);
3. homosexual relations;
4. lebianism;
5. sodomy;
6. rape;
7. sexual abuse;
8. pornoaction;
9. pornography;
10. gambling;
11. alcohol; and
12. illicit substance abuse (art 2(2)).

A person found to be in contravention of the regulation can face a maximum fine of IDR 5 million or a maximum prison sentence of 180 days (art 10(2)).

Plaintiff Daniel O’Neil Ruffin, the only practicing Muslim in the Downeast Correctional Facility in Machiasport, Maine, brought this suit against the Respondents, facility program manager Carol Geel, facility director Scott Jones, and former commissioner of the Maine Department of Corrections Martin Magnusson for allegedly violating his First Amendment rights by denying his request to be allowed to conduct religious services in the common area. The Respondents claimed that they denied the request because it would have been impracticable to assign an officer to supervise a single prisoner, and that they tried to accommodate the Plaintiff’s religious beliefs by allowing him to conduct services in his room. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court referred to a Magistrate judge for a recommended decision. The Magistrate judge recommended that the Respondents be entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer would not have known that the challenged conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights.

A Toledan man named Ibn Ḥātim was accused of being a heretic by sixty witnesses on the initiative of a fellow Toledan called Ibn Labīd al-Murābiṭ. The judge consulted with the local jurists, and following their legal opinions, he sentenced the accused to death. However, he granted the accused the right to challenge the witnesses (iʿdhār). Ibn Ḥātim escaped from Toledo and found refuge in the neighboring kingdom of Badajoz. Ibn Labīd went after him, carrying a copy of the judge’s sentence (tasjīl) along with the legal opinions of a number of non-Toledan jurists. In Badajoz, the ruler withdrew his support from Ibn Ḥātim, who fled again, this time to Cordoba. While in Cordoba, the “moral” police arrested Ibn Ḥātim, and the judge imprisoned him, giving him two months to prove his innocence. Unable to do so, Ibn Ḥātim was crucified alive. A number of legal issues arise in the course of this case: should the process of iʽdhār—the right to challenge witnesses—be granted to those accused of heresy (zandaqa)? Should refuge be granted to them? What happens with the estate or inheritance of an executed zindīq? Can a judge reverse a sentence given by another judge? The source is a collection of court cases by Andalusi scholar Ibn Sahl (d. 486/1093), and it is based on information directly available to the compiler, who was also a witness of most of the events described.

On January 17, 2023, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed a bill expanding the country’s laws on blasphemy. Previously, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws subjected those who insulted the Prophet Muhammad to the death penalty. The amended blasphemy laws carry a minimum ten-year prison sentence for those deemed to have insulted any of the Prophet’s Companions or Family members, and it renders blasphemy a non-bailable offense.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Uzbekistan (O'zbekiston Respublikasi), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Uzbekistan's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

This document is a beyānnāme, or declaration, sent by the Ottoman reʾīsül-kuttāb (chief scribe) to Britain's ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, justifying the Ottoman declaration of war on Russia by explaining Russia's violation of treaty obligations. The document gives insight into eighteenth-century Ottoman attitudes to international law and its relationship with Islamic law. Its use of the phrase naḳż-ı ʿahd (breaking the treaty), which has its origins in a specifically Qurʾānic context illustrates one way in which war was legitimized within the Ottoman Empire. Other phrases used in the beyānnāme demonstrate how Ottoman legal plurality functioned within a martial context.