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A Muslim woman, Zahra Mowafy, sued her former employer and her supervisors under Title VII and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging discrimination and job termination based on religion, race, national origin, and age. The plaintiff alleged that, during her time working for the company, it had created a hostile work environment by failing to stop her student interns from mocking her religious prayer rituals or asking insensitive questions about her religion. The Court found that, although the plaintiff narrowly made a prima facie case demonstrating religious discrimination (as no other non-Muslims were similarly fired), the defendant company had non-discriminatory reasons for firing the plaintiff, specifically poor work performance (which was not disputed by the plaintiff). Furthermore, on the hostile work environment claim, the Court concluded that the incidents detailed by the plaintiff were not severe or pervasive enough to allow a successful claim. Accordingly, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment is favor of the defendant. 

A Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FRCA), alleging religious discrimination and breach of contract. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was fired when his employer learned that he was a Muslim. The Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Title VII claim, because the plaintiff failed to establish that an employee-employer relationship existed between himself and the defendant; and that it similarly did not have jurisdiction to hear the contract claim because it was below the requisite amount for diversity jurisdiction. With respect to the FCRA claim, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence showing that the decision-makers knew he was a Muslim when they decided to terminate his employment.

The petitioners, Elwood "Atheem" Small and Parlie DuBose, Jr., alleged that their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when they were strip-searched in the presence of women and when their participation in religious holiday events was, according to prison policy, conditioned upon their signing a document that allegedly placed restrictions on their religious practice. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the claim. The petitioners appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The Appellate Court held that the Ramadan policy was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The Appellate Court also determined that the practice of strip-searching the petitioners in a group of inmates in the presence of female staff members did not violate the petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights, because exigent circumstances existed that necessitated the search.

Plaintiff Leo Pittman-Bey, a Muslim inmate, sued Texas prison officials for allegedly violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and his constitutional right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment by denying him after-sunset meals during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Previous prison regulations allowed practicing Muslim inmates to receive after-sunset meals during Ramadan, but only if they had attended jumuʿa (Friday prayer) services in the 60 days prior to Ramadan or had received a special exception from the Muslim chaplain. Pittman-Bey did not attend the services because, as an adherent of the Ḥanafī school of Sunnī Islam, he said he believed that jumuʿa services are not proper if conducted in nonpublic settings like prisons. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that denying Ramadan meals in accordance with the jumuʿa attendance policy did not violate the First Amendment.

Two Muslim women who were prohibited by their respective employers from wearing a ḥijāb sued their employers on the grounds of religious discrimination. The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) decided whether these women had been unfairly dismissed by their respective employers when taking into account the 2000 EU directive on discrimination in the workplace. The ECJ ruled that the first employer's internal directive against religious symbols was not applied in a directly discriminatory manner against the first woman. While indirect discrimination could be a possibility it "may be objectively justified by a legitimate aim." As for the second case, the ECJ decided "that the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have the services of that employer provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be considered a genuine and determining occupational requirement within the meaning of the directive."

The Plaintiffs, three Muslim individuals (Hamid Raza, Mohammad Elshinawy, Asad Dandia), two mosques (Masjid Al-Ansar, Masjid at-Taqwa), and a non-profit Muslim organization (Muslims Giving Back), alleged that the NYPD violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights through unlawful, "suspicionless" surveillance and sought an injunction to prevent further surveillance. The Plaintiffs sought to prove discriminatory intent in one or two of the ways identified in Brown: (1) an express classification theory—by showing that "the NYPD expressly classified Muslims by adopting a policy of singling them out for heightened policy scrutiny"; or (2) a discriminatory application theory—"to the extent that Respondents claim they had a legitimate law enforcement interest in  Plaintiffs, . . . by showing that [Plaintiffs] were subject to NYPD investigations of unequal and unwarranted scope, duration, and invasiveness as a result of their religious beliefs and activities." Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 1999). The Respondent, the City of New York, filed for bifurcated discovery, and the Plaintiffs responded with a move for a preliminary injunction and for expedited discovery. The Respondent argued that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the necessary standard for justifying expedited discovery. The District Court granted the expedited motion in part, but set up a two-stage schedule for discovery.

Plaintiff Hilton Karriem Mincy, a Muslim prisoner at the Lycoming County Prison, brought this suit against the Respondents – the county prison, the prison warden and other prison officials – alleging that the prison’s inadequate food service during Ramadan, which included no hot meals at the end of the day and evening meals of insufficient caloric content to compensate for the absence of a daytime meal, constituted a failure to accommodate his religious beliefs and a violation of the RLUIPA. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, and the Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiff identified no official policy promulgated by the prison administration which violated his constitutional rights, and there was no evidence to suggest that any named Respondent played a direct role or had any personal involvement in the preparation or storage of food.

Plaintiff Lavotte Saunders, a Muslim African-American male, brought this claim of discrimination based on race and religion against the Respondent, the Plaintiff’s former employer Apothaker & Associates. Two days after the Plaintiff was hired, he was fired on the basis of having a criminal record, but later discovered that several other employees of the Respondent had criminal records (including felony convictions) and were not fired. Therefore, the Plaintiff brought suit on the basis that he was fired as a result of disparate treatment due to religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court found that claims of discrimination are subject to the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden shifting analysis: First, the Plaintiff had to state a prima facie case, and then the burden shifted to the Respondent to “articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s termination.” The Court found that the Plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case, because he could not prove that he was qualified for the position in the first place. Therefore, the Court granted the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff, Regina Z. Muhammad, filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, asserting claims of religious and sexual harassment, religious-based disparate treatment, and retaliation under Title VII. The plaintiff contended that after her supervisor discovered she was Muslim, he made a number of discriminatory comments, and then certified other employees with whom the plaintiff had been co-trained, but not the plaintiff. The respondent subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court denied the respondent's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff could prove that her lack of training, which ultimately resulted in her termination, had a significant detrimental effect on her employment.

The Muslim plaintiff sued her former employer, Supervalu Holdings, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. Specifically, she argued that the company overlooked her for a position with more responsibility because of her religion. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as she neither proved that non-Muslims were treated better, nor did she allege that she suffered an adverse employment action (as the higher-level position did not offer additional compensation or benefits). Thus, this Court affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The Court denied defendant Deloitte Consulting’s summary judgment motion, contesting plaintiff Zakaria Memon’s Title VII discrimination claim against the company. The plaintiff alleged that he was given fewer assignments and ultimately fired because his religiously-mandated prayer schedule interfered with his workday and allegedly made clients uncomfortable. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was fired due to poor work performance. The Court found that the prima facie case of discrimination was strong enough to survive the motion for summary judgment, and a status and scheduling conference was set for April 2011.

A Pakistani Muslim hospital employee sued his employer under Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law (after receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)), alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff argued that he received negative performance evaluations because he was absent from work on several Fridays and other days in observance of Islamic religious prayer services and holidays, in compliance with Islamic ritual law. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie discrimination claim, as he never articulated any adverse employment action suffered. The Court, however, allowed Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim to move forward as it raised a material question of fact that should be decided by a jury. 

An African-American Muslim bus driver sued her former employer, the City of New York, under federal and state law (including Title VII; Article 1, section 3 of the New York State Constitution, and New York City Administrative Law §8-107(1)), alleging gender, religious, and racial discrimination and for allowing a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was subjected to a hostile work environment after securing accommodations for her to wear a headscarf (khimar) while on the job. She claimed that she was required to wear a baseball cap over the headscarf or to accept shifts that did not entail interaction with the public. The Court concluded that the complaints were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim before a jury; accordingly, it dismissed the Title VII and New York State Constitution claims. The Court permitted the employment discrimination claim under the NY City Administrative Law to proceed.

An Iranian Muslim worker sued his former employer, the University of Rochester, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his termination in the months following 9/11 resulted from religious discrimination. The defendant produced documentation of the plaintiff’s poor work performance, citing that as the reason for termination, and the plaintiff did not rebut that evidence. The Court found that the timing of his firing was not enough to establish a discriminatory nexus, that the plaintiff failed to otherwise produce instances of explicit discrimination, and that the University had provided evidence of a legitimate reason for the termination, which the plaintiff did not rebut. The Court thus entered a decision of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

A Bangladeshi Muslim worker sued her former employer under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was fired and not rehired by the defendant because of her religion and national origin. On appeal, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, but contended that she did not rebut or rebuff the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason the company had for not rehiring her—which it claimed was due to poor job performance in her previous job assignments. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff offered no proof that she was not rehired due to religious discrimination.

The Greek General Secretariat, Ministry of the Interior drafted a bill designed to prioritize Greek civil law over religious (namely Islamic) family law. This was due to concern about the rights of young Muslim minority women. However, the bill was never brought before the Greek Parliament.

An Arab Muslim truck driver for Swift Transportation Company sued his former employer under Title VII, Tennessee state law, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion, as well as intentional economic harm under state law and the FMLA. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that non-Arabs and non-Muslims received better work assignments and that fellow drivers made “hateful” comments regarding his religion and national origin. However, he did not provide any specifics regarding these claims. The defendant claimed that it terminated the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not report an accident within the timeframe mandated by the company. The Court granted the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating employment, and because the plaintiff did not exhaust all administrative measures before pursuing a case in court. The plaintiff madeno explicit connection to Islamic law, except that to complain of perceived bias on the basis of his religion, which may have included religious practice.

The plaintiffs, a group of inmates held at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in Concord, filed suit against Massachusetts prison officials for alleged violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The plaintiffs alleged that the prison officials violated these rights by refusing to provide separate accommodations for adherents of the Nation of Islam, whose practices (according to one of the plaintiffs) are "distinctly different" from those of Sunnī Islam. The magistrate judge recommended that the defendants' motion to dismiss be allowed because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted their administrative remedies within the prison system.

On appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, the Court upheld the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The EEOC brought a case under Title VII on behalf of Asthma Suliman, a Muslim employee of Kelly Services (a temporary employment agency), alleging religious discrimination. Suliman claimed that the company required her to remove her headscarf (khimār) to work at Nahan (one of Kelly’s work placement facilities) because of the risk that loose clothing posed to the wearer due to the heavy machinery. The defendant company argued that, even if the Court determined that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the company had “a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” An earlier precedent, Ollis v. Hearthstone Homes, Inc., recognized the operation of heavy machinery as a legitimate basis for requiring headscarf-removal and as a proper defense to a claim of discrimination in such instances. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the EEOC could not prove that the employee was discriminated against as a direct result of her religious beliefs, and that the defendant had demonstrated a safety-related reason for the lack of accommodation.

Brunei’s Second Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed this letter to the Special Procedures Branch of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on April 8, 2019, responding to an April 1, 2019 letter asking that the Syariah Penal Code Order of 2013 be repealed. The letter starts by affirming Brunei’s commitment to international human rights law. It then argues that the Code is acceptable given the local context: Brunei is a small country, Islam has been the official religion for centuries, and religious values underly the Brunein identity, and Brunei has the sovereignty to enforce laws reflecting its cultural and religious values. It also states that the Syariah criminal law system is focused more on prevention than punishment, that the Code does not criminalize any sexual orientations or same-sex relations, and that the most severe punishments require a standard that is so high that it would be extremely difficult to satisfy.

Note: Authors' name is written differently on the cover letter and on the country's official site. In the long form field, his name is written as on the official site.