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In Civil Petition No.1289 of 2020, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a wife has a right to be maintained by her husband and that this right is absolute under Islamic law “so long as she remains faithful to him and discharges, or is willing to discharge, her own matrimonial obligations” and that a Muslim husband is bound to maintaining his wife even if she can maintain herself out of her own resources. They ordered that the petitioner, Haseen Ullah, has been “evading his legal as well as moral obligation“ to pay the agreed upon dower and maintenance to his wife, Naheed Begum, and their five minor children. For these reasons, the Supreme Court found the petition to be baseless and dismissed it with costs throughout. 

On September 23, 2022, the Texas Supreme Court remanded a divorce case to the trial court in which it had originally been heard, deciding that the lower court had erred in its initial judgment. The case involved two agreements that had been signed in 2008 when the couple was first married; one was an Islamic “Marriage Contract,” and the other was an “Islamic Prenuptial Agreement.” The wife sued for divorce, claiming that she had not known at the time exactly what she was signing and had assumed that the prenuptial agreement was just a copy of the marriage contract. The prenuptial agreement stated that any conflicts arising from the marriage were to be “resolved according to the Qur’an, Sunnah, and Islamic Law in a Muslim court, or in [its] absence by a Fiqh Panel,” whose decision was to be “binding and final.” The Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in determining the enforceability and validity of the prenuptial agreement, and that the conflicts arising from the marriage should be determined by a court according to U.S. law, rather  than by a so-called fiqh panel of Islamic law experts. The Court’s per curiam opinion came in response to an appeal from the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals, whose ruling can be viewed here. 

The parties were married on 18 August 2006 and had one child. After they married they lived in Ketapang, West Kalimantan. The applicant submitted that, since 2007, he and the respondent had quarrelled regularly because the respondent was often jealous for no apparent reason. Moreover, at the beginning of 2008, the respondent left the matrimonial home unbeknownst to the applicant, and had remained apart from the applicant for three years and six months, never returning. The applicant maintained that the parties had not communicated since, and that their differences were now irreconcilable.

Despite being summonsed formally, the respondent failed to attend the proceeding. The court concluded that the parties no longer loved each other as husband and wife, as envisaged in art 77(2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Due to ongoing conflict between the parties, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court granted the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i).

""Khan v. Hasan, the New York intermediate appellate court held that a mahr agreement under which the husband agreed to pay a sum of money to the wife in the event of divorce was unenforceable under New York state law because the verbal agreement did not conform to New York's laws on matrimonial agreements, which require such agreements to be in writing. The Court further held with regard to the question of applying Islamic law to interpret the alleged agreement: 'It is without question that when courts must touch upon questions of religious concerns, they may not consider religious doctrine.'"

The Kerala High Court ruled: "The Quranic verse relating to khula found in Chapter 2, verse 229, in unequivocal terms, declares that a Muslim wife has the right to terminate her marriage."

In its judgment dated October 10, 2023, the Constitutional Court of South Africa (the "Court") interpreted section 7(3) of South Africa's Divorce Act. The relevant provision allowed redistribution orders from one spouse to another in marriages that took place "out of the community of property," where marital assets are kept separate between the spouses at all times. Instead, the section introduced an "accrual system" for out-of-community property marriages, allowing spouses, in the event of the marriage's dissolution, to claim from the other spouse some of the assets accruing during the marriage as equitable relief. While the section has been lauded for protecting financially vulnerable spouses, especially those whose domestic and reproductive labor went unnoticed, the Court still invalidated the section to the extent that it excluded two groups from its coverage: (1) spouses who married out of the community of property without accrual after November 1, 1984 (the section's cut-off date) and whose marriage ended through divorce; and (2) spouses who married out of the community of property without accrual before or after November 1, 1984, and whose marriages ended through death.

The Court's judgment has been interpreted as extending the accrual system protections to these two groups. One commentator, Waheeda Amien (University of Cape Town), noted in her contribution to The Conversation: "The Court's judgment will provide much-needed financial relief to spouses whose marriages out of the community of property without accrual end, regardless of when the parties were married or how the marriage ended."  The same piece also noted the impact of the judgment on Muslim marriages in South Africa: now, spouses in Muslim marriages that are out of community of property without accrual, too, will be able to ask courts to order the redistribution of marital assets in the event the marriage ends. 

The Indian Supreme Court here held that polygamy was not an ‘integral’ part of the Muslim religion and could therefore be regulated by the state.

In Narasu Appa Mali in 1952, the Bombay High Court limited its own ability to address the constitutionality of Muslim personal law in India, holding that personal laws are not “laws in force” within the purview of Article 13 of the Constitution, and thus need not satisfy the fundamental rights test.

The parties were previously married and had sought a ruling from the Lhokseumawe Shari'a Court in regards to what constituted joint assets as acquired during the time of their marriage.

The Lhoksemawe Shari'a Court had determined which assets were joint assets, and these included two vehicles (one for which money was still owed), several plots of land, a house, and credit card debt owed to Bank Rakyat Indonesia.

Despite restipulating many of the same joint assets as the lower court, the Court rendered the ruling of the lower court null and void and adjudicated on its own. It found that some evidence provided did not constitute a sworn statement, rendering an allegation that the respondent had a debt of IDR 15 million to be inadmissible. The Court also found that the lower court had erred in not declaring a home a joint asset, despite the appellant stating as much.

The Meulaboh Shari'a Court (lower court) had created an inventory of the parties' joint assets, which included several parcels of land, two houses, household applicances, a vehicle, and Honda motorcycle.

The Court upheld the lower court's decision, choosing only to make slight amendments to the way in which it worded its decision.

The deceased passed away in 1999, stipulating his wife (second appellant) and son (first respondent) as his beneficiaries. He bequeathed them a house attached to some land, as well as seven other separate parcels of land. The Jantho Shari'a Court (lower court) granted the beneficiaries their inheritance, subject to a bequest of the deceased to gift one-third of his estate to his step-son (first appellant). Accordingly, the lower court granted the first appellant 1890m-squared of land, the second appellant one-quarter of the land (945m²), and the first respondent 2835m², but also declared the bequest executed by the deceased to be unlawful.

The Court overturned the lower court's declaration regarding the bequest, declaring it lawful and noting that anything the appellant received in excess of that one-third was to be returned to the beneficiaries. The Court also determined that the second respondent was also a legitimate beneficiary (as the deceased's other biological son) and entitled to one-third of the aforementioned parcels of land.

The Bireuen Shari'a Court (lower court) had stipulated the joint assets of the parties in its decision, including a parcel of land, a vehicle, and a range of household applicances. The lower court had ordered the appellant to transfer half of those assets to the respondent, and to sell those assets that could not be transferred, instead transferring half the proceeds from those sales to the respondent.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the lower court, specifically in regards to the parcel of land. The Court held that, while the appellant had purchased the parcel of land when he was married, he did so only having just married the respondent, but more importantly, using money he had saved from having worked for his parents prior to marrying the respondent, before he had his own business and source of income.

The Court also commented that the philosophy behind art 35 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage was that marriage adds value to assets acquired collectively as husband and wife, whereas in this case, the parcel of land was not acquired under such circumstances and could therefore be distinguished from true joint assets. It found in favour of the appellant in this regard.

In regards to the parties' three children, the Court granted joint custody, but required the appellant to pay IDR 1 million per child, per month in child maintenance, until the children were independent.

M passed away in 1992. The appellants and respondents were beneficiaries under M's will, pursuant to which they were bequeathed different percentages of eight separate parcels of land.

The Court found that, on appeal, there were several irregularities in the respondents' initial claim, viz. the beneficiaries of the deceased were not properly included (children are automatically represented by their mother); and a section of their petition did not accord with their demand that the second appellant be declared a beneficiary, when in actual fact she was not. The Court, therefore, felt compelled to render the lower court's decision null and void and adjudicate on its own. It found in favour of the appellants.

The Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court) had stipulated the parties' joint assets as two parcels of land, the proceeds from the sale of a vehicle (IDR 50 million), and two motorcyles. It ordered the parties to ensure these assets were split 50/50.

The appellant, however, claimed that the lower court was incorrect to dismiss his claim that a debt owed by both parties to Bank BPD Aceh of IDR 50 million was also a joint debt. The lower court had reasoned that because the appellant had repaid that debt on 12 September 2006 by taking out another loan of IDR 60 million, that the loan had been repaid. The Court disagreed, stating that additional loan did not release the respondent from her joint-obligation with the appellant to repay the debt.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court, which had:

1. granted the respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra);
2. granted the respondent custody of the parties' two children;
3. ordered the appellant to pay child maintenance monthly until the children are independent; and
4. stipulated the parties' joint assets were to be split 50/50, after a joint-debt of IDR 5 million had been repaid.

For all intents and purposes, the Court concurred with the decision of the lower court. It did, however, decide to prepare its own decision, amending the lower court's reference to the parties' joint-debt.

The Jantho Shari'a Court (lower court) had granted the appellant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i) from the respondent, but had also ordered the appellant to pay IDR 5.5 million in financial support to the respondent for iddah (100-day period after divorce has been granted), mut'ah (divorce compensation) and maskan (accommodation). In regards to the respondent's counterclaim, the lower court had stipulated the parties' joint assets and ordered that they be split on a 50/50 basis. It also granted the respondent custody of the parties' child.

For all intents and purposes, the Court concurred with the decision of the lower court. It did, however, decide to hand down its own judgment, amending some of the formulaic errors it noted in the decision of the lower court.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Kutacane Shari'a Court (lower court), which had determined the parties' marriage to be lawful, and granted the respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra). The lower court had also deemed several parcels of land to be joint assets of the parties and ordered that they be split on a 50/50 basis.

The Court found no fault with the lower court's reasoning or decision, but opted to improve the formulation of its decision.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Langsa Shari'a Court (lower court), which had granted the respondent a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i). The lower court had also granted the appellant's counterclaim in part, ordering the respondent to pay to the appellant IDR 10 million for iddah (100-day period after divorce has been granted), IDR 7.5 million for mut'ah (divorce compensation), IDR 10 million for maskan (accommodation), IDR 5 million for kiswah (clothing), as well as granting the appellant custody of the parties' three children, and ordering the respondent to pay child maintenance until all three children had become of age. The lower court also stipulated as joint assets of the parties 15 parcels of land, four vehicles and one motorcycle, as well as several debts owed to several banks.

The Court disagreed with the amount the lower court had ordered the respondent to pay to the appellant as compensation, amending the order to IDR 7.5 million for iddah, IDR 7.5 million for mut'ah, IDR 5 million for kiswah, while it overturned the order to pay IDR 10 million for maskan. It specified that the respondent pay IDR 2.5 million in child maintenance, however. It also had qualms with the lower court stipualting two particular objects as joint assets, given a third party's claim over them.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Kualasimpang Shari'a Court (lower court), which had stipulated as joint assets of the parties a two-storey shophouse, household appliances and furniture, and a debt of IDR 27 million. The lower court also granted the respondent custody of the parties' child, and ordered the appellant to pay to the respondent child maintenance for two children until they became of age.

The Court concurred with the majority of the lower court's judgment, however, it clarified that the joint debt of IDR 27 million should have been categorised as a counterclaim on the part of the appellant.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Lhoksukon Shari'a Court (lower court), which had granted the appellant and respondent a divorce, but had also stipulated the parties' joint assets as follows: five parcels of land, one house, one motorcycle, and one tonne of wood for building a house (value: IDR 3.2 million).

The Court disagreed with the decision of the lower court insofar as two of the parcels of land, which had been retracted from the respondent's claim, were still included in the lower court's judgment as joint assets. The Court also found that the lower court need not have included price estimates of the parcels of land as prices can change depending on circumstances and time.