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The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 10 May 1984 by the village imam. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a one-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had five children, the first of whom had passed away. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage, and in order that they could obtain a birth certificate for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 25 August 1976 by the village imam. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a prayer instrument paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had six children, the first of whom had passed away. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 9 May 2002 by the village imam. The second applicant's uncle had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a one-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had two children. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage, and in order that they could obtain a birth certificate for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 3 October 1989 by the village imam. The second applicant's older sibling had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a two-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, although the first applicant's first wife had passed away prior to this marriage. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 8 September 1983 by the village imam. The second applicant's older sibling had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a two-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had three children. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage, and in order that they could obtain a birth certificate for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 12 September 1994 by the village imam. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a two-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had a child. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The parties were married on 4 April 2004 and had two children, who were now in the care of the respondent. They had lived with the applicant's parents for two years, before moving to the respondent's parents' home, where they had lived for six years and five months. The applicant submitted that the marriage had been harmonious until mid-2008, when the respondent had begun to flout the applicant's wishes, and the respondent's family had begun to meddle in the parties' domestic affairs. In June 2010, the applicant quarrelled with the respondent's family yet again, resulting in the applicant being asked to leave the respondent's parents' home, before the local imam was able to bring them to reconcile. In September 2012, following yet another argument, the applicant returned to his own parents' home.

The parties had remained separated for the seven months leading up to the proceeding, which had caused the applicant to suffer emotionally. Resigned to the fact that the marriage could not be salvaged, the applicant requested the court's permission to divorce (talak satu raj'i) the respondent.

Despite the respondent's absence from court, the court, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the applicant's request on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 22 April 2007 by the village imam. The respondent's father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah), and the dowry (mas kawin) had been a prayer instrument purchased with cash. After the parties were married, they had lived together in Kendari for two weeks with the applicant's family before returning home to Ambon. The parties also had one child, who was currently in the respondent's care.

The applicant submitted that the parties' marriage had been harmonious until the beginning of 2009, after which time it had become quarrelsome. The applicant submitted that this was because the applicant's first wife and her family would often threaten the respondent, telling her that the applicant intended to divorce her. This would, in turn, leave the respondent feeling threatened and demanding that the applicant divorce her. The applicant submitted that the parties had separated in December 2010, both parties having neglected their spousal obligations to one another. Accordingly, the applicant requested the Court's permission to divorce the respondent (talak satu raj'i).

The court acceded to the applicant's request, but also ordered the applicant to pay to the respondent IDR 2.7 million for iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and IDR 3.5 million as mut'ah (divorce compensation).

This fatwa affirms a raft of preceding fatwa that declare the teachings of Darul Arqam to be divergent from Islamic beliefs (Aqidah Islamiyah). It supports in full the decision of the Attorney-General of the Republic of Indonesia to prohibit the distribution of the book Aurad Muhammadiyah pegangan Darul Arqam, by Ustaz Azhari Muhammad, published by Penergan Al-Arqam. It also supports the Attorney-General's decision to maintain efforts to protect the prohibition on the distribution of the book Presiden Soeharto Ikut Jadwal Allah by Abuya Syech Imam Azhari Muhammad, edited by Ustazah Chadijah Aam, published by Penerbitan al-Arqam Indonesia.

The fatwa recommends that the Attorney-General of the Republic of Indonesia issue a prohibition on Darul Arqam and the dissemination of its ideas and teachings for the sake of protecting the purity of Islamic teachings and national unity. The fatwa also calls on Muslims not to be influenced by the teachings of Darul Arqam.

The parties were married on 4 Feburary 2016. The plaintiff's father had served as the marriage guardian (wali nikah), the parties were married by the local imam, two witnesses had been present, and the dowry (mas kawin) had been a two-gram ring purchased with cash. The parties did not, however, have a marriage book (buku nikah), which the plaintiff required for administrative purposes in order to divorce the defendant.

The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had only been harmonious until the end of February 2016, when it had become increasingly quarrelsome. The plaintiff, therefore, requested that the court declare the parties' marriage lawful, and grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

On the day of the proceeding, however, the defendant failed to attend because, despite having been summonsed by the court bailiff, he had never received the summons as no one in the defendant's community, including authorities, knew him. Moreover, the court had counselled the plaintiff to first locate the defendant and then seek to reconcile with him. The plaintiff, acting on the court's advice, opted to withdraw her application.

Muslim inmate Imam Abd’Allah Halim Abdul Akbar (aka Phillip M. Hudson) sued several prison officials under §1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment free exercise rights. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the prison denied his attempts to start a Muslim inmate group. The prison officials argued that the denial resulted from the plaintiff’s failure to follow the proper procedures for creating such a group. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the prison did not deprive the plaintiff of his ability to practice his religion and that the regulations governing creation of inmate groups were consistent with legitimate penological objectives of preventing gang activity and maintaining order in the prison population. 

Plaintiff James McRoy claimed that prison officials violated his First Amendment free exercise rights by cancelling some of the scheduled Muslim prayer services without notice, limiting the number of services that Muslim inmates could attend each week, limiting the number of Muslim inmates who could attend each service at any given time, subjecting Muslim inmates to strip searches before they could leave their cells to attend services, prohibiting imams from bringing religious publications onto the prison’s premises, and prohibiting Muslim inmates from exclusively living together in one of the prison’s living units. The prison officials, however, claimed that their actions resulted from a lack of volunteers to organize services and the need to curtail inmate movement on some days because of heightened security concerns. The Court held that McRoy did not sufficiently demonstrate that a jury could conclude that he had been subjected to a violation of his rights. It thus entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

This fatwa was issued in response to the following questions from the Attorney-General of the Republic of Indonesia:

1. Jamaah Muslimin Hizbullah is of the opinion that pledging an allegiance (berbai'at) to the Imam of Jamaah Muslimin Hizbullah is obligatory (wajib). What is the opinion of the Council?
2. Can the Council provide to the Attorney-General Qur'anic verses or Hadith regarding Islamic government/Caliphate (Jama'at Imamah/Khalifah) and swearing an oath (Bai'at) apart from that produced by Jemaat Muslimin Hizbullah?
3. What is the Council's opinion on the formation of Jamaat Muslimin Hizbullah under the leadership of Syeh Wall Al Fatah in 1953 which, until now, has continued under the leadersihp of Imam Haji Muhyiddin Hamdi?
4. Can the Council provide any further information in relation to Jamaah Muslimin Hizbullah?

In the fatwa, the Council provided, among other information, the following in response:

1. Jama'ah means more than two people, which, in this case, means at least two people who pray five times a day. Regular prayers are encouraged but are not obligatory (sunat mu' akkad), however, Friday prayers (shalat Juma'at) are considered a pillar of a Muslim's Friday (rukun Jum'at). There are even those who believe that congregating to pray fives times a day is obligatory for some Muslims (fardhu kifayah); that praying together reaps twice the rewards of praying on one's own, and is advocated by Islam. The Council also states that jama'ah in a societal context means working together for good against evil (amar ma'ruf nahi munkar), helping one another socially, and avoiding disunity.
2. Khalifah means representative (wakil), meaning the person elected by the jama'ah to become their leader. Historically, khalifah referred to the head of Islamic government at the time of the companions of the Prophet (sahabat).
3. Bai'at literally implies a handshake as a sign of an agreement. More specifically, however, it is an acknowledgment by the people of their leader's authority.
4. Jama'ah Muslimin Hizbullah is an Islamic people's organisation with its own interpretation of Islam. The Council acknowledges that there exist groups among Indonesia's Muslim population with differing views and beliefs on Islam, some of which diverge from the Qur'an and Hadith. Usually such divergent followings are limited in numbers and, over time, struggle to acquire more followers. That said, proselytisation (da'wah) efforts are indeed necessary to correct these incorrect interpretations of Islam.

This fatwa states that there are two conflicting opinions regarding divorce (pronouncement of talak). The first is that the pronouncement of talak three times at once is akin to the third talak. This opinion was held by the Companions of the Prophet (Sahaba), the Tabi'in (the next generation), and imams of all four schools (mazhab) of Sunni Islamic thought. The counter opinion is that pronouncement of talak three times at once is only akin to the first of three pronouncements of talak. This opinion was held by Thawus, the Imamiyah school (mazhab) of Shi'a Islamic thought, Ibnu Taimiyah, and Ahlu az-Zahir. The fatwa states that the Committee finds the former opinion to be more sound. It also notes that marriage and divorce is regulated for Muslims in ss 10 and 31 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and ss 14-18 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975.

The fatwa states that efforts must be made to prevent three pronouncements of talak at once occurring again. Moreover, that if state marriage laws are implemented correctly, there will be no more incidents of three pronouncements of talak at once in Indonesia. The fatwa also acknowledges the significance of the role of the religious courts (pengadilan agama) in preventing such incidents occurring in the future.

The parties were married on 7 March 2002 in Wasponda, Soroako, Central Sulawesi (Sulawesi Tengah), by the local imam. The second applicant's father had acted as the marriage guardian (wali), two witnesses were present, and the dowry (mahar) was a one-gram gold ring. The first applicant was a widower and the second applicant a virgin, and there were no other bars to their marriage, such as being blood relatives or having shared the same wet nurse. After the parties were married, they had lived together and had one child, born on 4 February 2003. Their marriage, however, had not been registered with the local Office of Religious Affairs. In order to obtain a marriage book (buku nikah), the parties requested that their marriage be registered.

The court, pursuant to art 12(4) of Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2015, ruled that the case could be adjudicated by a sole judge. Furthermore, the judge, pursuant to art 7(2) and (3)(d) and (e) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, was of the opinion that the applicants' request could be considered by the court. The judge, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974, stated that a marriage is lawful if conducted according to the respective religion and beliefs of the parties, which in this case was Islam. Applying art 14 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the judge stated that the pillars of marriage require that there be:

1. a prospective husband;
2. a prospective wife;
3. a marriage guardian;
4. two witnesses; and
5. an oral declaration.

Finding that these criteria had been met, and that there were no other bars to their marriage, the judge, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, declared the marriage lawful (sah).

The parties were married on 25 December 1986 in Patue, Ajangale, Bone, by the local imam. The second applicant's father had acted as the marriage guardian (wali), two witnesses were present, and the dowry (mahar) was a one-gram gold ring. Both applicants were virginal, and there were no other bars to their marriage, such as being blood relatives or having shared the same wet nurse. After the parties were married, they had lived together and had four children aged 29, 25, 24 and 21. Their marriage, however, had not been registered with the local Office of Religious Affairs. In order to obtain a marriage book (buku nikah), the parties requested that their marriage be registered.

The court, pursuant to art 12(4) of Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2015, ruled that the case could be adjudicated by a sole judge. Furthermore, the judge, pursuant to art 7(2) and (3)(d) and (e) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, was of the opinion that the applicants' request could be considered by the court. The judge, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974, stated that a marriage is lawful if conducted according the respective religion and beliefs of the parties, which in this case was Islam. Applying art 14 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the judge set out the pillars of marriage, which require that there be:

1. a prospective husband;
2. a prospective wife;
3. a marriage guardian;
4. two witnesses; and
5. an oral declaration.

Finding that these criteria had been met, and that there were no other bars to their marriage, the judge, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, declared the marriage lawful (sah).

Plaintiff Charles Glenn, an inmate at the New Hampshire Department of Corrections (DOC) filed suit against the Respondents, various DOC prison officials, for alleged violations of his rights to free exercise [of his ability to exercise Islamic ritual law] under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. Specifically, the Plaintiff – a practicing Muslim – argued that there had been no Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services at the New Hampshire State Prison for the past three years and that he had no access to an Imam (a Muslim prayer leader), a Qur’an, or other Islamic literature, which placed constraints on his ability to practice Islam [specifically, it's ritual law aspects]. In conducting a Preliminary Review, the Court applied the four-part test for examining the constitutionality of a regulation that restricts an inmate’s First Amendment free exercise of religion found in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). The Court assessed the four Turner factors -- (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether alternative means to exercise the right exist; (3) what impact accommodating the right will have on prison resources; and (4) whether there was an absence of alternatives to the prison regulation. The Court found that the prison’s policy of denying Friday Prayer (jumuʿa) services, which are a central and essential element of religious practice, impinged on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to exercise his religion.

Ibn Ḥārith al-Khushanī recorded the following case as a ḥikāya, an anonymous report: A Christian appeared before the judge Aslam b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, petitioning to be executed. The anecdote offers insight into the historical role of judges during a period of religious dissent in the Umayyad Caliphate, while the author's narrative voice demonstrates past judicial approaches to rationality, humor, and violent penalization. 

This text is part of Maribel Fierro, The Judges of al-Andalus, forthcoming.

On March 6, 2017, President Donald J. Trump, issued a revised Executive Order which barred, with certain exceptions, entry to the United States of nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries, suspended the entry of refugees for 120 days, and reduced the number of refugees who can be admitted to the United States by more than half. The Plaintiffs (the State of Hawai’i and Dr. Ismail Elshikh, an American citizen of Egyptian descent who serves as the Imam of the Muslim Association of Hawai’i) filed a motion for a nationwide temporary restraining order.

The Plaintiffs argued that the revised Executive Order subjected them to discrimination in violation of the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (INA), because the Executive Order results in “their having to live in a country and in a State where there is the perception that the Government has established a disfavored religion.” The Plaintiffs pointed to public statements by the President and his advisors regarding the implementation of a “Muslim Ban,” which the Plaintiffs contended was the tacit and illegitimate motivation underlying the revised Executive Order. For example, the Plaintiffs pointed to a statement by President Trump that he was “establishing a new vetting measure to keep radical Islamic terrorists out of the United States of America,” and that “We don’t want them here,” and to an interview with President Trump in which he claimed: “Do you know if you were a Christian in Syria it was impossible, at least very tough to get into the United States? If you were a Muslim you could come in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost impossible and the reason that was so unfair, everybody was persecuted in all fairness, but they were chopping off the heads of everybody but more so the Christians. And I thought it was very, very unfair. So we are going to help them.”

The Court found that the State of Hawai’i and Dr. Elshikh both had standing to assert their claims. The Court found that Hawai’i had standing due to the harms to the state’s proprietary interests as operator of public universities and due to preliminary data that indicated the revised Executive Order had suppressed international travel and injured tourism as Hawai’i’s main economic driver. As for Dr. Elshikh’s standing, the Court observed that the injury-in-fact prerequisite can be “particularly elusive” in Establishment Clause cases because plaintiffs do not typically allege an invasion of a physical or economic interest. “Despite that, a plaintiff may nonetheless show an injury that is sufficiently concrete, particularized, and actual to confer standing.” See Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1048-49; Vasquez v. L.A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 2007). Dr. Elshikh had standing because the revised Executive Order left him and his family, including a wife of Syrian descent and young children who are American citizens, with the knowledge that the United States—their own country—would discriminate against individuals who are the same ethnicity as them, and who hold the same religious beliefs. The Court found that, because the revised Executive Order targeted Muslim citizens due to their religious views and national origin, which may result in these citizens being unable to associate freely with those of other faiths, the injuries are sufficiently personal, concrete, particularized and actual to confer standing in the Establishment Clause context.

As for the Establishment Clause claim, the Court declined the Defendants’ urging to rely on the Executive Order’s religiously neutral text, and instead evaluated the text in conjunction with the historical background of the revised Executive Order. The Court found this historical record “includes significant and unrebutted evidence of religious animus driving the promulgation of the Executive Order and its related predecessor.” The Court included statements made by President Trump including: “I think Islam hates us” and “People were so upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim. Remember this. And I’m okay with that, because I’m talking territory instead of Muslim.”

Because the Court found that the Plaintiffs have shown a “strong likelihood” of succeeding on their claim that the Executive Order violates First Amendment rights under the Constitution, and “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights,” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012), the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO). In effect, the TRO now blocks the second version of the ban.

Editors’ Note: Many of the statements about Islam, including references to Islam generally and to jihād, tend to refer to false conceptions of Islamic law or sharīʿa as inherently violent.