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The plaintiffs, Sehatno Samiadoen and Tutik Ani Rahmawati, represented, Moses Antonius (complainant), who had filed a complaint with the Kalimantan Consumer Protection Group (Yayasan Lembaga Perlindungan Konsumen Kalimantan) on 30 May 2013, against the defendant's (PT Bank BNI Syariah) Banjarmasin branch. The complainant had entered into a shari’a-style home loan (Murabahah) with the defendant’s Banjarmasin branch for the purchase of a 150m² property on 18 September 2012. The term of the loan was 120 months (10 years), with monthly repayments of IDR 8,638,583, and an initial down-payment of IDR 147.5 million. The complainant also provided the defendant with payment for the first two months (IDR 17,277,166) in a show of good faith. The complainant and defendant also entered into a power of attorney agreement on 28 May 2012, pursuant to which the complainant vested in the defendant the authority to sell, transfer and release all rights over the property to any person, including to the defendant itself.

The complainant then experienced financial hardship and went into arrears. The defendant sent to the complainant three separate written warnings in regards to his default. The plaintiffs, however, told the court that the agreement contravened shari’a principles, as contained in Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking, as well as standard clausal requirements, as regulated in Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection. Moreover, that as the complainant had only recently become a Muslim (muallaf), he did not properly understand Islamic shari’a, nor did he properly understand the content of the agreement, or the fact that he could not novate its terms. Consequently, the complainant felt aggrieved by the inclusion of standard clauses, which he believed contravened art 18(1) of Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection. Pursuant to art 18(3) of Law No. 8 of 1999, the plaintiffs argued for the agreement to be rendered null and void, and sought to invoke art 62 of Law No. 8 of 1999, which prescribes a penalty of up to five years imprisonment or a fine of up to IDR 2 billion. The plaintiffs also sought to rely on the principle of presumption of liability, thereby compelling the defendant to prove its innocence, as it claimed was supported by art 23 of Law No. 8 of 1999.

The plaintiffs requested that the court grant an interlocutory order precluding the defendant from dealing adversely with the complainant’s property. They also requested that the court declare the defendant’s conduct illegal by rendering the three agreements the complainant had with the defendant null and void.

The defendant lodged an objection in regards to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum, citing art 45(1) of Law No. 8 of 1999, which requires an aggrieved party to lodge an application with either an institution assigned to resolve consumer-related disputes, or a civil court. The defendant also cited art 25(2) of Law No. 48 of 2009, which states that civil courts are authorised to adjudicate civil matters, as further proof that a civil court was the appropriate forum to hear the matter. The defendant further argued that the plaintiffs had erred in submitting their application to the court because, per arts 18 and 19 of their Murabahah agreement, the complainant and defendant had agreed to resolve any disputes in the Registrar’s office of the Banjarmasin Religious Court. The defendant also submitted that the special power of attorney, pursuant to which the plaintiffs were acting on the complainant’s behalf, was invalid due to formulaic irregularities.

In addition, the defendant sought to impugn the fact that the plaintiffs’ statement of claim referred to the complainant as if he were the plaintiff. Moreover, it argued that the plaintiffs’ assertion that the Murabahah agreement contravened shari’a principles, as contained in Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking, as well as clausal standards, per Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection, was illogical and lacked legal basis. The defendant also criticised the plaintiffs for seeking to bring a civil action, pursuant to a civil statute (Law No. 8 of 1999), to a religious court.

The court found that, pursuant to Constitutional Court Decision No. 93 of 2012, the elucidation of art 55(2), which prescribed a civil forum as a suitable venue for shari’a banking dispute resolution, was invalid. Moreover, that a 'civil judicature' (Peradilan Umum), per art 45(1) of Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection, was to be read and interpreted as a religious court (Pengadilan Agama). Accordingly, the court found that religious courts had absolute jurisdiction over this matter. Crucially, however, the court found that the parties had clearly specified the Banjarmasin Religious Court as the appropriate resolution forum, precluding it from handing down a judgment.

The plaintiff submitted that he had obtained a working capital borrowing facility from the first defendant, but that he had never received a copy of the agreement, despite making repeated requests to the first defendant. The conduct of the first defendant was therefore, the plaintiff submitted, in contravention of art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), and constituted a default on the parties' agreement. As a result, the plaintiff did not know when the agreement concluded nor the details of the repayments he was required to make in favour of the first defendant. Accordingly, the plaintiff submitted that he could not be held solely responsible if he failed to make a repayment pursuant to the agreement because the defendant had deliberately concealed the agreement from the plaintiff, contrary to art 1320 of the Civil Code.

When the plaintiff fell into arrears, the first defendant sought to auction the security property leveraged by the plaintiff to secure the loan. The plaintiff submitted, however, that the first defendant had failed to issue him with a warning before auctioning the property.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's application due to several formulaic errors contained therein. First, the plaintiff had failed to identify a legal or legislative basis to establish a legal relationship between the parties. Secondly, the plaintiff's provisional prayer for relief (petitum provisi), prayer for relief (petitum), and outline of claim (posita) differed insofar as the outline of claim defined the defendant's conduct as a default, while the provisional prayer for relief sought the suspension of the auction of the property, and the prayer for relief declared the property lawful and of value. More importantly, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to include in its claim the Office of State Assets and Auction Services (Kantor Pelayanan Kekayaan Negara dan Lelang) as a co-defendant.

The plaintiff submitted that, on 24 June 2011, he and the defendant had entered into a murabahah financing agreement for a 2011 Daihatsu vehicle. Pursuant to the agreement, the plaintiff was to pay to the defendant IDR 198,060,000. This figure comprised the price of the vehicle, insurance, as well as other incidental costs. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would pay this sum in 52 monthly payments of IDR 3,301,000, which, for the first seven months, the plaintiff did. On the eighth month, however, a person borrowing the vehicle from the plaintiff did not return it, causing the plaintiff to report the vehicle stolen to the police. The plaintiff requested that the defendant grant him a grace period vis-à-vis repayments while the police conducted its investigation into the vehicle’s whereabouts. The defendant, however, reported the plaintiff to the police for dealing with the vehicle inappropriately by transferring it to a third party. (The defendant had perceived the vehicle to be a fiduciary security guarantee.) The plaintiff cited art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari’a Banking, claiming that the defendant should have instead sought to resolve the issue pursuant to shari’a principles, via deliberation (musyawarah), banking mediation, through the National Shari’a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional – BASYARNAS), or, if necessary, the religious courts. Moreover, that the grounds invoked by the defendant in his police report repudiated the fiduciary principles of the agreement, and were contradictory to the principles of shari’a. In principle, the plaintiff argued, a murabahah agreement is a financing facility designed to benefit both parties. It is instigated by a capital holder (shahib al-mal) with another party in need via a sale-purchase transaction, clear that the sale price includes a profit for the capital holder and is to be repaid in cash or instalments (art 20(6) of Supreme Court Regulation No. 2 of 2008 on the Compilation of Shari’a Economy Laws). By repudiating the plaintiff’s request for a grace period, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had, in fact, turned the agreement into a fiduciary security guarantee agreement. For pain and suffering, the plaintiff sought IDR 300 million.

Citing art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), as well as the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda (agreements must be kept), the defendant lodged an objection to the perceived absolute authority of the court to adjudicate the case. The defendant stated that both he and the plaintiff had agreed (in art 8(2) of their agreement) to resolve any disputes arising from the agreement before the Yogyakarta State Court (Pengadilan Negeri Yogyakarta), if initial deliberation proved unsuccessful. In other words, the parties had agreed to preclude the court from having jurisdiction over the case. To strengthen his claim regarding a civil court adjudicating a shari’a banking dispute, the defendant cited art 55(2) of Law No. 21 of 2008, including the Elucidation of art 55(2).

The defendant lodged three other objections:

1. that while the plaintiff had incorrectly filed his complaint against a Maman Suryanto, rather than the defendant, he still should have filed his complaint against the company represented by the defendant, rather than the defendant personally;
2. that the damages for pain and suffering sought by the plaintiff were not supported by sufficiently clear particulars and authentic evidence; and
3. that the plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant had transformed the agreement into a fiduciary guarantee agreement was premature in that it was contingent upon the police investigation into whether or not the plaintiff’s conduct constituted a criminal transfer of a fiduciary security guarantee (the vehicle), contrary to art 372 of the Indonesian Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana) and art 36 of Law No. 42 of 1999 on Fiduciary Guarantees.

As part of his counterclaim, the defendant sought to have the court find that the plaintiff had defaulted on his repayments. The defendant claimed he had reminded the plaintiff several times, verbally and in writing, to make the eighth repayment, but the plaintiff had still defaulted. The defendant sought IDR 674,953,000 in material and immaterial loss, requested that the court guarantee this sum against the plaintiff’s current and future assets, as well as the Daihatsu vehicle, and sought an additional IDR 1 million for every day the plaintiff was late in making repayments.

First, the court noted that the defendant’s claim regarding the court’s judicial authority (or lack thereof) had been dismissed in an interlocutory decision on 17 June 2014. It assented to the defendant’s first objection, however, dismissing the case on the grounds that the defendant lacked the necessary legal standing, and that, therefore, the plaintiff should have submitted its claim against the company of the defendant, rather than against the defendant himself.

The applicants claimed that, since 2003, the first applicant had been a customer of the first respondent, via its shari'a Bukittinggi branch (PT. Bank Bukopin Cabang Syari'ah Bukittinggi). Prior to becoming a customer of the first respondent, the first applicant had been a debtor of PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) Cabang Bukittinggi, to which it owed IDR 483,2333,530 as at June 2003. At that time, the first applicant's business was experiencing financial difficulties, leading the first applicant to apply to the first respondent for a financial loan for financial support, as well as to pay his debts with PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi. After examining the relevant securities documents, the first respondent agreed to enter into an Al-Murabahah (sale-purchase) agreement with the first applicant. Once the relevant documentation was executed, the first respondent provided to the first applicant IDR 500 million, with which it paid its debt to PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi. The first respondent then took from PT. BRI Cabang Bukittinggi the deed of title of a property in the name of the second applicant (the second applicant was already an authorised guarantor pursuant to the agreement between the first applicant and first respondent).

In the Al-Murabahah agreement document the first respondent had agreed to make available items for the first applicant to the value of IDR 500 million, and the first respondent was to sell those items to the first applicant for IDR 794,816,460. (In an Al-Murabahah agreement there is an absolute requirement that there be items for sale subject of the agreement.) As there were no items purchased by the first applicant from the first respondent, the agreement had no legal authority. The agreement was further prohibited, according to the applicants, because it allowed the first applicant to borrow from the first respondent a sum of money, secured by a stationary object (the property) for a period of five years, with an additional payment for the first respondent which, according to Islam, constituted riba (usur or interest).

The Supreme Court, in the first instance, declared that the relationship between the first applicant and first respondent was one based on borrowing a sum of money, secured against a stationary object. Furthermore, that profit instalments provided by the first applicant to the first respondent were to be treated as payment instalments against the debt it owed to the first repsondent, because providing additional payments outside the scope of the principal to the lender would be contrary to shari'a. The other relevant documents, including the debt notice, the applicants claimed, were also null and void.

In addition, another Al-Murabahah agreement had been made by, and before, the first co-respondent, tying the first applicant and first respondent to the sale and purchase of items valued at IDR 581,230,044, with a sale price of IDR 350 million, and a murabahah profit for the first respondent of IDR 231,230,044. This was to be paid in instalments over 60 months, tied to a debt notice and mortgage deed, both of which were prepared by, and before, the first co-respondent, secured by the same property. Similarly, however, this agreement had no object for sale or purchase.

The total of both agreements resulted in the first applicant being in IDR 850 million debt to the first respondent. After the first applicant had paid to the first respondent IDR 363,611,240, the remainder owing, it claimed, was IDR 486,388,760. However, while the first applicant had originally owed PT BRI Cabang Bukittinggi no more than IDR 500 million, it now claimed the first applicant owed IDR 1,376,046,504 (this was the principal debt combined with interest). The first applicant maintained, however, that he had paid to the first respondent IDR 363,611,240 in instalments up until March 2006.

The Bukittinggi State Court had already issued a notice stating that the property held as a security would be auctioned on 16 August 2006. The first applicant, upon becoming aware of the fact that the two Al-Murabahah agreements were null and void, sought to prevent the first respondent from auctioning the property. Despite being made aware of, and reading, the notice, the second respondent went ahead with the auction. Accordingly, the applicants claimed that the auction should have no legal authority, and pursuant to art 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006 on the Religious Judiciary, the civil courts were precluded from resolving shari'a economy-related matters anyway.

The applicants also objected to the conduct of the third respondent, the purchaser of the property and a staff member of the legal team of the first respondent. The applicants alleged that the third respondent knew the auction reserve price and therefore only had to pay a little bit over the reserve to secure the property.

The applicants sought damages for actual loss, as well as pain and suffering. They claimed that the land was worth IDR 2.5 billion, and yet the third respondent had only paid IDR 993,600,000 as the purchase price. Moreover, they sought IDR 500 million in damages for the stress and emotional strain incurred from the entire ordeal.

The Bukittinggi Religious Court (lower court) had declared the two Al-Murabahah agreements null and void, and declared the relationship between the first applicant and first respondent a financial loan (Al-Qardh). The IDR 850 million debt owed by the first applicant to the first respondent was reduced to IDR 486,388,760, taking into account the instalments paid by the first applicant totalling IDR 363,611,240. The first respondent had also been ordered to transfer to the applicants the profit from the auction, minus the remaining debt of IDR 486,388,760, leaving the respondents owing the applicants IDR 447,595,240.

On appeal to the Padang Religious High Court, the decision of the lower court was overturned. The Padang Religious High Court found that the lower court was not authorised to adjudicate the case. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the first instance, rejected the applicants' cassation appeal, upholding the decision of the Padang Religious High Court.

The applicants used their last avenue of appeal before the Supreme Court (reconsideration or peninjauan kembali) claiming that the Supreme Court's judgment, at cassation level, was erroneous. The applicants asserted that the Al-Murabahah agreements contained an arbitration clause whereby the parties had agreed to resolve any legal disputes before the Indonesian Islamic Civil and Commercial Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Muamalat Indonesia), designating the Bukittinggi State Court registrar's office as the appropriate venue. Whereas, in actual fact, the respondents had submitted their request to seize the property to the Bukittinggi State Court. Moreover, the applicants claimed that the Al-Murabahah agreements failed to meet the following shari'a requirements:

1. interest (riba)-free;
2. the sale-purchase items may not be forbidden (haram);
3. the bank is to finance some or all of the items, pursuant to the agreed-upon classification;
4. the bank is to purchase the items in its own name;
5. if the bank makes representations to the customer that it is purchasing the items, the agreement is executed once the items the bank is purchasing become the property of the bank; and
6. the bank provides all information relating to the items, including cash or credit purchases.

The Supreme Court found that the two reasons submitted by the applicants did not fall under any of the reasons for review (peninjauan kembali) contemplated by art 67 of Law No. 14 of 1985, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

To fund construction for a new building without violating Islamic law's prohibition against interest, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN) entered into an ijāra agreement with Devon Bank; the bank created a subsidiary for the purpose of the ijāraagreement. Under the agreement, Devon Bank had legal ownership of the building's title until ICN could fully purchase the building. After ICN paid the amount for the building's construction, ownership was transferred to ICN from Devon Bank. ICN applied for a property tax exemption, including for the time period in which Devon Bank held the title for the building. The state of Tennessee denied ICN the exemption for the period in which Devon owned the building, but granted it for the time after. ICN appealed that decision. 

The ACLU brought suit objecting to the use of taxpayer money to fund what it termed a religious charter school as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The defendant academy and its sponsor, Islamic Relief, submitted a motion to dismiss, arguing that they were not a state actor. The Court found that the evidence regarding Islamic Relief’s role as a state actor was not clear, and thus denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in 2011. As of August 2011, the case was still ongoing.

The Plaintiff, Muslim prisoner Davis Totten, brought this civil rights claim against employees of Ryan Correctional Facilities alleging religious discrimination. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom because they 1) threatened the Plaintiff with disciplinary action if he attended the Friday (jumuʿa) prayer service, the Islamic study class (taʿlīm) or any Islamic seminar while on a work or school assignment; 2) tried to control how Muslims appoint their spiritual leader for the Friday prayer services; and 3) failed to make preparations for the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service, among other alleged offenses. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, on the claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Respondents’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. On the first issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, because the Plaintiff did not meet his burden of convincing the Court that it was clearly established law that an official’s failure to allow prisoners to attend the Friday prayer service, the Islamic study class, or any Islamic seminar violate the First Amendment right to practice religion. The Magistrate Judge found the Respondents entitled to summary judgment on the second issue, because the Magistrate Judge found that the plaintiff did not indicate that any prison officials actually appointed an inadequate spiritual leader who interfered with his right to practice his religion. On the third issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on this claim, because the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his ability to attend the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service—which is mandated by his religion and is a “sincerely held” practice—had been infringed upon, and was not related to a legitimate penological interest.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Medan Religious Court (lower court). The lower court had determined that the non-issuance of a building permit from the Medan Spatial and Building Service (Dinas Tata Ruang dan Tata Bangunan Kota Medan) constituted a force majeure. Accordingly, it found that:

1. the respondent (then plaintiff) was released from any liability under the murabahah credit facility agreement it had entered into with the appellant (the defendant) on 10 September 2013; and
2. that the appellant must return to the respondent two deeds of title to properties leveraged by the respondent in return for the murabahah credit facility.

The appellant challenged the decision of the lower court on the following grounds:

1. that the decision was erroneous and not based in law, insofar as the object of the agreement was stated as being three units, whereas it was for the purchase of building construction materials;
2. that the lower court had incorrectly labelled the credit facility an al-bai', per art 20(2) of the Compilation of Shari'a Economy Laws, rather than a murabahah credit facility, that is, a credit facility that benefits both parties, provided by a shahib al-mal (creditor), per art 20(6) of the Compilation of Shari'a Economy Laws;
3. that the lower was incorrect in defining the non-issuance of a building permit as a force majeure for the purposes of arts 1244-1245 of the Indonesian Civil Code, and also incorrect in applying the law because a force majeure only results in the parties being released from demands for damages, costs and/or profits to the party experiencing the force majeure, which causes it to default; and
4. that the force majeure submitted by the respondent had already passed because the notice of unsuccessful application for a building permit was dated 5 May 2014, while the appellant was only informed of the notice on 19 August 2014 (three months after the fact), which was contrary to the 14-day statute of limitations contained in art 17(3) of the murabahah credit facility.

The court acceded to the appeal, concurring with the appellant's submission that the respondent was required to inform the appellant of the issuance (or lack thereof) of any relevant building permit, pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, the court overturned the decision of the lower court, and ordered the respondent to pay costs.

Plaintiff Charles Glenn, an inmate at the New Hampshire Department of Corrections (DOC) filed suit against the Respondents, various DOC prison officials, for alleged violations of his rights to free exercise [of his ability to exercise Islamic ritual law] under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. Specifically, the Plaintiff – a practicing Muslim – argued that there had been no Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services at the New Hampshire State Prison for the past three years and that he had no access to an Imam (a Muslim prayer leader), a Qur’an, or other Islamic literature, which placed constraints on his ability to practice Islam [specifically, it's ritual law aspects]. In conducting a Preliminary Review, the Court applied the four-part test for examining the constitutionality of a regulation that restricts an inmate’s First Amendment free exercise of religion found in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). The Court assessed the four Turner factors -- (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether alternative means to exercise the right exist; (3) what impact accommodating the right will have on prison resources; and (4) whether there was an absence of alternatives to the prison regulation. The Court found that the prison’s policy of denying Friday Prayer (jumuʿa) services, which are a central and essential element of religious practice, impinged on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to exercise his religion.

Plaintiff Mitchell Theophilus Garraway filed an action against the Respondent, a Lewisburg penitentiary, for a claimed violation of RLIUPA. The Plaintiff alleged that various Federal Bureau of Prisons rules and policies severely and unnecessarily burden his right to private religious exercise of his Islamic faith. The Plaintiff cited, among other reasons, that the prison did not make the chapel available to all Muslims to congregate for Friday prayer, and also placed other restrictions on Muslims’ ability to perform all their prayers together as one group. The District Court decided that the penitentiary had a legitimate governmental interest—the need to maintain order and security—that was rationally connected to the policy regarding congregation for prayer. 

Plaintiff Joey Kenneth Priddy, a Virginia inmate, filed this civil rights action alleging that the Respondents, various prison officials at Bland Correctional Center, violated his constitutional rights by allowing Muslim inmates to conduct prayer groups in common areas of the prison facility. The Plaintiff sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The District Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s complaint, determining that the challenged prison practices did not deprive the Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. The District Court found that there was no violation of the Establishment Clause, because the prison officials allowed Muslim inmates to conduct informal prayer groups in common areas, but that this opportunity is equally open to any inmate of any other religious persuasion. Therefore, the accommodation of Muslim inmates’ beliefs did not constitute an improper endorsement of Islam over other religions.

Plaintiffs, Muslim prisoners, sued the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, alleging violations of state and federal law, including the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, § 1983, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Plaintiffs alleged that being patted down by female prison guards violated their First Amendment free exercise rights inasmuch as it contravened the tenets of their Islamic faith, which forbids intimate contact between unrelated members of the opposite gender. The Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment for most of the claims, but denied it with respect to the RLUIPA and the Massachusetts General Law claims, concluding that a jury would best be able to determine whether the alleged infraction violated the terms of these two statutes.

Plaintiff Tariq A. Vaughn, Sr., an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics alleging that he told prison officials that he did not want to be housed with a Muslim inmate, and after he was placed in a cell with a Muslim inmate, that the Muslim inmate stabbed him in the head and back. The magistrate judge recommended that the Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint be dismissed with prejudice because it was frivolous, and alternatively for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted. [There seemed to be no stated religious or Islamic law basis for the claim.]

Petitioner Fedwa Khalik, an Arab-American who was born in Kuwait and practiced Islam, sued her former employee, alleging discrimination because of race, religion, national origin, and ethnic heritage under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Petitioner alleged she was grabbed in the office and subjected to false investigation and discrimination. The Appellate Court held for the Respondent after determining that the Petitioner’s allegations were not plausible under the Twombly/Iqbal standard [two cases which announced a new federal pleading standard, allowing district court judges to dismiss a complaint if it does not set out a “plausible” claim: Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)] because (1) several of her allegations were not entitled to the assumption of truth because they were entirely conclusory, and (2) the remaining facts did not sufficiently allege discrimination or retaliation since her claims were based solely on the fact that she was Muslim and Arab-American.

Plaintiff Shawn Sharp, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), brought this civil rights action pursuant to the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA, claiming that two prison facilities unlawfully denied his request to accommodate his particular religious group. The plaintiff claimed that the Sunni Muslim services offered at the DOC did not allow him free exercise of his religion, since he is a member of the so-called Habashi sect of Islam, which has ideological differences from the prison’s recognized Sunni group. The prison’s Muslim chaplain disagreed, stating that if Sharp was a Sunni Muslim, as he claimed to be, then there was no reason why Sharp could not attend the already-provided services of Sunni Muslims. The Court decided in favor of the Defendants, determining that the DOC successfully presented a qualified immunity defense, and that the plaintiff’s request had no rational connection to any legitimate penological interest.

In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to aḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of hisḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon reviewing the record, in Smith v. Crockett, U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang determined that the petitioner alleged actions that sufficed to make out a basic claim and recommended that government officials should not receive immunity. The Judge recommended, however, dismissal of Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

In this decision, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez adopts the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review of the record, Judge Martinez agreed with Judge Wang’s recommendation that the government officials were not entitled to immunity, as petitioner Ray Anthony Smith had made sufficient allegations to make out a prima facie claim. Also following Judge Wang’s recommendations, Judge Martinez dismissed Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

This order implements the decision from the District Court of Colorado in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez, who adopted the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang that government officials not receive immunity but that the court dismiss Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions. This order implements that recommendation and decision adopted by the district court.

This document is a beyānnāme, or declaration, sent by the Ottoman reʾīsül-kuttāb (chief scribe) to Britain's ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, justifying the Ottoman declaration of war on Russia by explaining Russia's violation of treaty obligations. The document gives insight into eighteenth-century Ottoman attitudes to international law and its relationship with Islamic law. Its use of the phrase naḳż-ı ʿahd (breaking the treaty), which has its origins in a specifically Qurʾānic context illustrates one way in which war was legitimized within the Ottoman Empire. Other phrases used in the beyānnāme demonstrate how Ottoman legal plurality functioned within a martial context. 

The cassation applicant sought to challenge the decision of the Medan High Religious Court Decision No. 127 of 2015 on the grounds that the Medan High Religious Court had incorrectly applied the law and that its reasoning was not based on legitimate and sufficient grounds. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the non-issuance of a building permit (Izin Mendirikan Bangunan) did not constitute a force majeure that could thereby release the cassation applicant from his obligations pursuant to the agreement.