SHARIAsource

The applicant submitted that on 8 June 1960 she had married her husband in accordance with Islamic law. Her father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) before two witnesses, and with a dowry (mahar) of three grams of gold. No legitimate reasons impugned their marriage. The applicant's husband had passed away on 6 November 2015, his death certificate being issued on 10 November 2015. He left behind only his pension, which the applicant could not access because she and her husband had never been issued with a marriage certificate. Accordingly, the applicant requested that the court ratify her marriage in accordance with current legislative provisions.

The court, noting its exclusive jurisdiction over the ratification of Islamic marriages as guaranteed by art 49(a) of Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary, as well as the fact that the concrete facts submitted by the applicant accorded with art 7(2) and (3)(d) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the application.

The applicants submitted that they were married in accordance with Islamic shari'a on 10 August 1998 before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mas kawin) had been IDR 100,000. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a widower (aged 31 years) and the second applicant a divorcee (aged 27 years). The parties were not blood relatives nor had they shared a wet-nurse. There were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had four children and no third party had ever sought to impugn the sanctity of their marriage. They had never, however, received a marriage certificate issued by the Office of Religious Affairs. The parties, therefore, requested that the court ratify their marriage for civil administration purposes.

The sole judge requested that the parties withdraw their application on the grounds that they had failed to submit relevant evidence and produce witnesses.

In this case, the defendant, a Muslim male to whom a 13-year old child was "married," shortly after the marriage, had engaged in non-consensual intercourse with the minor. While pleading guilty to the charge of first degree sexual assault on a child, the defendant nevertheless argued that his Islamic upbringing and background prevented him from fully appreciating the nature of the criminal conduct and he asked that this be considered a mitigating factor. The Court of Appeals of Nebraska rejected the claim, ruling that the defendant's culture and upbringing could not be taken into consideration as factors mitigating his culpability.

In December 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) considered the question whether Muslim citizens who lived in the Greek province of Thrace could be required to submit to the jurisdiction of Islamic law, as detailed by local experts called muftīs. In Greek law, Islamic law usually governed matters of family law—such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance—in cases involving the Muslims in Thrace. This arrangement was a legacy of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. When the ECHR considered whether this arrangement should persist, it considered a case in which a Muslim man had died, leaving everything to his wife in his will. His sisters contested the will, arguing that it improperly circumvented the authority of the muftīs. Greece’s highest court agreed with the sisters. With the will invalidated, the muftī distributed one-fourth of the estate to the widow, and the rest to the sisters, in accord with Islamic inheritance law. The widow appealed to the ECHR. This Court determined that the Greek government had misinterpreted the treaties, which did not require a separate legal framework for Muslims. It further noted that Greek case law was inconsistent about “whether the application of Sharia law [sic] is compatible with the principle of equal treatment and with international human rights standards.” In addition, the Court emphasized a right to "free self-identification”: people should be free to opt out of differential treatment from the government on the basis of belonging to a minority group, and the government should not force minorities into a special legal category in the name of protecting them. The Court held that Greece, by compelling the Muslim minority of Thrace to follow Islamic law, had violated Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Singapore, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Singapore's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status.  

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Shri Lanka Prajatantrika Samajavadi Janarajaya/Ilankai Jananayaka Choshalichak Kutiyarachu), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Sri Lanka's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Kenya (Jamhuri ya Kenya), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Kenya's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the State of Eritrea (Hagere Ertra), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Eritrea's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

The wife argued that the couple had a marriage ceremony in Damascus, and, should that Islamic ceremony not be legally recognized, that a valid marriage should be presumed because of the couple’s long cohabitation and public reputation as husband and wife. The husband argued that the couple was not present in Damascus at the time of the alleged marriage, and that they instead had an Islamic marriage ceremony at a flat in London. Accordingly, while the ceremony was religiously recognized as a marriage, it was not valid under English law. In its judgment, the Court ruled that where, as here, the only known or proven ceremony was one which might not have constituted a marriage under English law, then a marriage could not be presumed.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the State of Israel (Medinat Yisra'el), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Israel's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal (Sanghiya Loktantrik Ganatantra Nepal), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Nepal's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Mauritius, based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under Mauritius' Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

This ministerial regulation permits Islamic marriages to be solemnised by a non-related marriage guardian (wali nikah) in the event no male family member (wali nasab) is available to marry the prospective bride and bridegroom.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Madagascar (Republique de Madagascar/Repoblikan'i Madagasikara), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Madagascar's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

The parties were married on 7 July 2002 in accordance with Islamic shari'a. Having never complied with marriage administrative requirements, the parties did not hold a marriage certificate. The parties also had two children. They had been married happily for 12 years but, by the end of 2014, the parties' marriage had become disharmonious after the respondent carried on an extra-marital affair with another man. In March 2015, the parties separated. The applicant requested that the court ratify the parties' marriage and grant him a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i). After the applicant failed to attend the proceeding, however, the court dismissed the application.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of India (Republic of India/Bharatiya Ganarajya), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under India's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

The parties were married on 28 April 2005 at the second applicant's parents' home. The second applicant's father had acted as the marriage guardian (wali), the parties' oral declaration (ijab) had been witnessed by a celebrant (penghulu nikah), two other witnesses were present, and the dowry (mas kawin) had been a IDR 20,000. At the time of the marriage the first applicant was 25 years of age, and the second applicant was 19 years. There were no bars to their marriage under Islam, and the parties already had two children. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified so that they could obtain a marriage certificate from the local Office of Religious Affairs, as well as birth certificates for their children. As the applicants had failed to attend court, however, the sole judge ruled a miscarriage.

The parties were married on 6 August 2013. The applicant submitted that after one month living with the respondent's parents, the parties were still yet to consummate their marriage. The applicant submitted that the marriage had been arranged and that the parties did not love one another. Consequently, in September 2013, the applicant had left the respondent, returning to his parents' home. He had remained with his parents for the past two years and four months.

Acknowledging that the parties' marriage was irreparable, for the purposes of art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the applicant's request. It granted him a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i) pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and arts 116(f) and 118 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The parties were married on 22 May 2011. They lived together in the plaintiff’s parents’ house and had one child (aged 3). Initially, the marriage had been harmonious. After two years, however, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome. The plaintiff submitted that the defendant as a husband had not provided the plaintiff and their child with sufficient financial support, forcing the plaintiff herself to work to provide for the family. Problems escalated when the defendant left the plaintiff without notice. The plaintiff submitted that these circumstances had caused the marriage to deteriorate irreparably, and requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce.

The court found that the marriage could no longer fulfil the purposes of marriage as envisaged in art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Despite the defendant's absence from court, the court was satisfied that the plaintiff had met the evidentiary burden contained in art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974, and, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu Ba’in Sughro) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 7 March 2011 and lived with the plaintiff's parents. From August 2011, however, the parties had begun to quarrel regularly. The plaintiff submitted that this was the result of:

1. the defendant never providing the plaintiff with any financial support from the time of their marriage because the defendant believed the plaintiff had her own salary;
2. the parties having only ever been physically intimate once since they were married; and
3. the defendant prioritising his work meaning he rarely ever came home.

In August 2011, problems escalated and the defendant left the plaintiff. In her claim, the plaintiff submitted that the dire state of the parties' marriage meant that the purpose of marriage, as envisaged by Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, was no longer feasible. The court held that art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, as well as art 19 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, required there to be a legitimate reason for it to grant the plaintiff a divorce. The court found that ongoing conflict between the parties satisfied this requirement, per art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, in conjunction with art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughro).