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Plaintiff Abdus Shahid brought this claim against the Respondent, the Borough of Eddystone, for discrimination against him on the basis of race, national origin and religion after the Respondent deliberately engaged in a four-year-long campaign to prevent him from living in or renting out a property he owned in Eddystone because it did not want a Muslim in the area. Following the complaint, the Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court previously granted in part and denied in part, holding that while the Plaintiff was barred by the Heck v. Humphrey and Rooker-Feldman doctrines from challenging the validity of his convictions for violating Eddystone ordinances, there were also genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment on the remaining claim that Eddystone denied him a certificate of occupancy and preventing him from renting the property because of his race, religion and national origin. Following a jury trial, the Court analyzed testimony evidence about alleged statements by Eddystone officials acknowledging the existence of a discriminatory housing policy and evidence that similarly situated white property owners were treated more favorably. However, the Court determined that the Plaintiff failed his burden of proof with regards to his claim that the Respondent violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, because he produced no concrete credible evidence showing that he was treated differently than white property owners, and that the Respondent’s actions were anything other than genuine attempts to enforce the Eddystone housing code. The Court concluded that the Plaintiff failed to establish that the Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race, religion or national origin. Therefore, the Court entered judgment in favor of the Respondent.

English text of the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, Act No. XXIV of 1997, amending the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

The Plaintiff, the Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor, challenged the Pittsfield Charter Township, the Township Board, Township Supervisor Mandy Grewal, and six Township Board of Trustees Members for their refusal to re-zone the area surrounding the Plaintiff so that the Plaintiff could expand and build a school. Although an independent outside planner endorsed the rezoning, the Plaintiff alleged that the Respondents denied rezoning due to concerns from community members, stemming largely from an animus to the Islamic faith. By denying the rezoning proposal on this basis, the Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents discriminated against the organization in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and "state law claims" in the Michigan state constitution. The Respondents filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded the Township Board of Trustees' individual liability under Section 1983. However, the District Court dismissed the other claims alleging violations of RLUIPA, the US Constitution, and the Michigan Constitution.

The Plaintiffs, three Muslim individuals (Hamid Raza, Mohammad Elshinawy, Asad Dandia), two mosques (Masjid Al-Ansar, Masjid at-Taqwa), and a non-profit Muslim organization (Muslims Giving Back), alleged that the NYPD violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights through unlawful, "suspicionless" surveillance and sought an injunction to prevent further surveillance. The Plaintiffs sought to prove discriminatory intent in one or two of the ways identified in Brown: (1) an express classification theory—by showing that "the NYPD expressly classified Muslims by adopting a policy of singling them out for heightened policy scrutiny"; or (2) a discriminatory application theory—"to the extent that Respondents claim they had a legitimate law enforcement interest in  Plaintiffs, . . . by showing that [Plaintiffs] were subject to NYPD investigations of unequal and unwarranted scope, duration, and invasiveness as a result of their religious beliefs and activities." Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 1999). The Respondent, the City of New York, filed for bifurcated discovery, and the Plaintiffs responded with a move for a preliminary injunction and for expedited discovery. The Respondent argued that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the necessary standard for justifying expedited discovery. The District Court granted the expedited motion in part, but set up a two-stage schedule for discovery.

Plaintiff Larry William Cortinas brought this action against the California prison system, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Plaintiff alleged that medical staff at the prison refused him treatment and medication for his rheumatoid arthritis and hepatitis C because he was Muslim. The Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to demonstrate that he would be entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Coleman filed an action against the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) alleging violations of his constitutional rights under the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA. The Plaintiff claimed that these rights had been violated in over 12 policies, including the policy that limited his purchase of prayer oil to once a week, a grooming policy that prevented him from growing a beard, and a CD policy limiting inmates’ purchase of spoken religious word CDs to a single vendor. The District Court dismissed all claims against the Respondent except for claims related to the CD policy, which the District Court determined was not related to any legitimate penological interest.

The Plaintiff Amir Shabazz challenged the Pleasant Valley State Prison for their policy of denying Muslim inmates ḥalāl meals for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. The Plaintiff contended that Muslim inmates were denied ḥalāl meat, instead forcing them to eat vegetarian meal options. The Plaintiff argued that this constituted religious discrimination under RLUIPA and the Fourteenth Amendment, since Jewish inmates were provided with kosher options and therefore were not forced to similarly eat the vegetarian meal options. The Plaintiff claimed that this treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court found that the facts put forth by the plaintiff were "vague and inconsistent," and therefore that the Plaintiff failed to state any cognizable claim against the Respondent. 

In divorce proceedings, a wife appealed the decision of the Oakland Circuit Court Family Division, granting her husband’s motion to dismiss her claims and recognize their previous divorce, which occurred when the couple was in India. Specifically, she contested the validity of the “triple ṭalāq” divorce (a version of final, irrevocable divorce under Indian and Islamic law, performed unilaterally by the husband) that her husband performed in India, and filed for divorce in Michigan. The trial court concluded that the certificate of divorce that the defendant husband produced from their earlier divorce was sufficient evidence to dismiss the case under Michigan Compiled Laws 2.116(C)(7) (which bars claims based on prior judgment). The Court of Appeals reversed and found in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the Indian divorce violated due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution art. 1, § 2, as it gave the wife no chance to plead her case concerning the divorce before a court. The Court also concluded that allowing the divorce to stand would be contrary to state public policy, as it privileged the Muslim personal law of India (which placed women in a weaker position regarding property division in the event of a divorce than would Michigan state law) over Michigan state law and the rights and protections extended to persons living in the state.

During trial court proceedings in which a Muslim couple was dividing their marital property, the husband, Mr. Irfan Aleem, attempted to perform a “triple ṭalāq” divorce—a form of final, irrevocable dissolution of marriage under Pakistani law, initiated unilaterally by the husband. The Court refused to honor this type of divorce, concluding that it violated due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by not giving Mrs. Farah Aleem any role or voice in the divorce proceedings. The Court also concluded that allowing the ṭalāq divorce to replace court proceedings was contrary to the public policy interest of the people of Maryland, as it would allow Pakistani version of Islamic law, which grants all property to the husband as the default in divorce cases, to regulate distribution of property in the state of Maryland. The Court thus upheld the ruling of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, granting the wife’s petition for divorce, and applied the Maryland default rule that, in the absence of prior written agreement, marital property is to be divided fairly and equitably.

The plaintiff, Dominic Ali, a Muslim inmate at the Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility, sued several prison officials for allegedly violating his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the state's constitution. The plaintiff alleged that the prison failed to provide jumu'a (Friday prayer) services for Muslim inmates, failed to ensure that he was provided with healthy food during Ramadan (the Islamic month of fasting), and denied him the ability to observe Ramadan by removing his name from the prison's internal Ramadan fasting list. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit. The Court agreed: it found that the plaintiff had not brought his grievances to the attention of the prison's commissioner, and therefore granted the defendants' motion.

The petitioners, Elwood "Atheem" Small and Parlie DuBose, Jr., alleged that their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when they were strip-searched in the presence of women and when their participation in religious holiday events was, according to prison policy, conditioned upon their signing a document that allegedly placed restrictions on their religious practice. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the claim. The petitioners appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The Appellate Court held that the Ramadan policy was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The Appellate Court also determined that the practice of strip-searching the petitioners in a group of inmates in the presence of female staff members did not violate the petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights, because exigent circumstances existed that necessitated the search.

The plaintiffs, a group of inmates held at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in Concord, filed suit against Massachusetts prison officials for alleged violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The plaintiffs alleged that the prison officials violated these rights by refusing to provide separate accommodations for adherents of the Nation of Islam, whose practices (according to one of the plaintiffs) are "distinctly different" from those of Sunnī Islam. The magistrate judge recommended that the defendants' motion to dismiss be allowed because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted their administrative remedies within the prison system.

Plaintiff Tabari Strong, a Muslim prisoner in Beeville, Texas, filed a lawsuit alleging that the prison's grooming policy requiring all inmates to be clean-shaven violated his statutory rights under RLUIPA. He also claimed that the policy violated his right to exercise his religion under the First Amendment, and that enforcement of the policy violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that he is entitled to a declaratory judgment. The District Court refused to grant the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief as an "extraordinary remedy," but maintained that it would be contrary to justice not to grant the relief requested by the plaintiff to have a quarter-inch beard.

Plaintiff Marlo Thomas, incarcerated at the Ely State Prison (ESP), brought this action against former ESP Warden E.K. McDaniel, former ESP Associate Warden Renee Baker, and former ESP Associate Warden Debra Brooks, for an alleged violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Plaintiff claimed that he was placed in administrative segregation by the Respondents because they had a personal grudge against him because he was a Muslim inmate. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court found that the Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence to support several elements of his First Amendment free exercise claim and his Fourteenth Amendment claim. The District Court found that the Plaintiff produced no evidence that he sincerely believed he must engage in group worship to satisfy the tenants of his Islamic faith. Furthermore, the District Court found that the Plaintiff produced no evidence that Respondents' decision to confine him in administrative segregation was not reasonably related to the prison's legitimate penological interests, and instead found that the Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation for safety and security reasons unrelated to religious discrimination.

Plaintiff Shawn Sharp, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), brought this civil rights action pursuant to the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA, claiming that two prison facilities unlawfully denied his request to accommodate his particular religious group. The plaintiff claimed that the Sunni Muslim services offered at the DOC did not allow him free exercise of his religion, since he is a member of the so-called Habashi sect of Islam, which has ideological differences from the prison’s recognized Sunni group. The prison’s Muslim chaplain disagreed, stating that if Sharp was a Sunni Muslim, as he claimed to be, then there was no reason why Sharp could not attend the already-provided services of Sunni Muslims. The Court decided in favor of the Defendants, determining that the DOC successfully presented a qualified immunity defense, and that the plaintiff’s request had no rational connection to any legitimate penological interest.

William Knuckles and several other inmates, all adherents of the Nation of Islam, filed a §1983 claim against prison officials, alleging a violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, they alleged that they were not allowed to correspond with their religious leaders, receive books and periodicals, "wear Muslim medals," or have a special dietary plan. In finding that the inmates were entitled to be visited by qualified ministers, the Court cautioned that all meetings should remain of a religious nature and could be supervised by prison officials.

This case was brought on appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, prison officials (Warden Jack Lee, Assistant Warden Gene Shinault, and Correctional Officer K. Lester). Petitioner Leroy Lovelace was removed from a “pass list” (which gives inmates access to Ramadan prayer services and special meals) after prison officials claimed that he broke his fast by eating during the day. Lovelace argued that his removal was due to his complaints about expired food, and was thus in violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and the requirements of Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) (protecting prisoners from having their religious practices substantially burdened, without a compelling government interest). Section 3 of RLIUPA states that “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person--is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C.A. §2000cc-1(a). The Court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Lester, the prison official who reported the alleged fast breaking, as well as against Warden Lee, who was in charge of overseeing the prison, concluding that both officials played direct roles in the incident. The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the plaintiff had made out a valid due process claim, and the Court affirmed the remainder of the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.