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In a divorce proceeding, the Circuit Court of Fairfax County upheld a couple’s marriage contract. On appeal, defendant Ali Afghahi raised several arguments against the validity of the contract, and claimed that upholding it would be inequitable; he also made several evidentiary objections, including that the marriage contract as admitted was not the original document and should therefore be barred according to the “best evidence rule.” He further argued that as no expert was called to testify about the meaning of marriage in Islamic cultures, the judgment was unenforceable. The appellate court rejected these arguments and affirmed the judgment against him (and in favor of the validity of the marriage contract), concluding that his objections were untimely because he had not raised them in the lower court.

At issue in this case is the validity of a marriage performed in the Islamic tradition, where the husband sought an annulment of an initial “traditional” marriage and recognition of a subsequent civil marriage. The law of the Philippines does not require a couple to obtain a marriage certificate if their marriage is performed according to the Islamic tradition; accordingly the couple married under traditional Islamic law and obtained no certificate. In seeking annulment of that marriage and recognition of a subsequent marriage, appellant Rafiqul Islam argued that the first marriage was not official; he further argued that the union was not truly Islamic because his so-called wife was not Muslim, because the wedding ceremony was performed by a clerk rather than a religious official, and because neither party intended to enter into a marital relationship. On appeal, the Court upheld the trial court’s decision that the first marriage was a legitimate, state-recognized union, and thus that any subsequent marriage would be considered void.

Nurani v. Nurani was a case adjudicated by the Court of Appeal at Nairobi in 1982. The Court held it had concurrent jurisdiction with the Ismaili Council for Kenya, through its sectarian tribunal. Thus, this tribunal had the first right to issue a decision on issues arising from the couple's divorce since both the husband and wife had submitted to its jurisdiction. In this decision, the Court contextualized the role of the sectarian tribunal within the context of Kenya's pluralist legal system.

In TSJ v. SHSR, decided by the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, the Court found that the Kenya Ismaili Conciliation and Arbitration Board did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a matter of divorce despite the fact that both husband and wife had initially submitted to its jurisdiction. The Court held that either it, or the Kadhis' Courts, could have exclusive jurisdiction in this matter.  

A district court in Lahore, Pakistan, ruled against a man who had remarried without obtaining his wife’s permission. Judicial magistrate Ali Jawad Naqwi ruled that the accused, Shehzada Saqib Suhail, had illegally pursued a third marriage without first obtaining the consent of the complainant, Ayesha Khalil, who at the time was his second wife. The magistrate ruled that the accused had “solemnized third marriage during the existence of marriage with the complainant and therefore accused namely Shahzada Saqib Suhail is convicted u/s 6(5) of Muslim Family Ordinance.” In its opinion the court cited section 6 of Muslim Family Ordinance 1961 which stipulates the manner and practice of polygamy in Pakistan. 6(5) of the Ordinance disallows any man from contracting an additional marriage without the permission and consent of the Arbitration Council. Under the ordinance, an application for permission must be submitted to the Chairman of the Arbitration Council along with the necessary fees, reasons for marriage, and importantly, proof of consent of existing wife or wives. The court found that no such permission had been obtained from the second wife the complainant, Ayesha Khalil, nor from the Arbitration Council when the third marriage was established, and sentenced accused with six months of simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,00,000/.

On December 26, 2008, Mariam Ayad ("Wife") and Ayad Hashim Latif ("Husband") got married.  They executed a prenuptial agreement ("Islamic Prenuptial Agreement") on the same day, which the wife alleges she considered to be a customary marriage certificate, not a contract conferring substantive rights and limitations on the Husband and the Wife, respectively.  The couple have a son.  Their marriage started deteriorating in 2020, at which point the Wife alleges she learned for the first time about the existence of the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement and the fact that she had executed it on the day of her marriage with her Husband.  On January 25, 2021, the Wife filed for divorce.  The Husband countersued for divorce and filed a motion to have the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement enforced, which provides that all divorce-related matters, including spousal support, child support, alimony, and marital property division, shall be resolved through the ruling of a fiqh panel to be convened.  The trial court, in rejecting the Wife's arguments regarding the invalidity and unenforceability of the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement, which the Wife had argued based on her assertion that she had thought she was signing a cultural document at the time of signing and that she was not given an opportunity to read and understand the terms, ruled in favor of the Husband and held that the prenuptial arrangement be enforced. 

The Wife appealed to the appellate court seeking relief from the order of referral to arbitration of the trial court.  In her submission to the appellate court, the Wife made four separate arguments:

1. The Islamic Prenuptial Agreement is void on grounds of contravening public policy, as the agreement clearly disavows Texas law and the laws of the United States, and replaces those with Islamic Law, which, according to the Wife's submission, "limits the rights of a woman to obtain a divorce," in violation of Equal Protection, the Establishment Clause, and Due Process, given the different weights assigned by Islamic law to official testimony from women compared to men.

2. The Islamic Prenuptial Agreement is void as a matter of Texas contract law because the agreement was involuntarily executed.

3. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement stipulated to arbitration, as the agreement does not contain evidence of a meeting of the minds as regards an intent to arbitrate.  The agreement's mention of a "fiqh panel" or a "Muslim court" cannot unequivocally be read as an agreement to arbitrate.

4. Relatedly, the trial court also abused its discretion in referring the dispute to arbitration without allowing the Wife to present meaningful evidence refuting the existence of an alleged agreement to arbitrate.

The case is pending before the Texas appellate court.

In divorce proceedings, a wife appealed the decision of the Oakland Circuit Court Family Division, granting her husband’s motion to dismiss her claims and recognize their previous divorce, which occurred when the couple was in India. Specifically, she contested the validity of the “triple ṭalāq” divorce (a version of final, irrevocable divorce under Indian and Islamic law, performed unilaterally by the husband) that her husband performed in India, and filed for divorce in Michigan. The trial court concluded that the certificate of divorce that the defendant husband produced from their earlier divorce was sufficient evidence to dismiss the case under Michigan Compiled Laws 2.116(C)(7) (which bars claims based on prior judgment). The Court of Appeals reversed and found in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the Indian divorce violated due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution art. 1, § 2, as it gave the wife no chance to plead her case concerning the divorce before a court. The Court also concluded that allowing the divorce to stand would be contrary to state public policy, as it privileged the Muslim personal law of India (which placed women in a weaker position regarding property division in the event of a divorce than would Michigan state law) over Michigan state law and the rights and protections extended to persons living in the state.

The appellate court upheld the Superior Court of Orange County’s refusal to divide marital property in the context of a divorce according to Islamic law. The plaintiff introduced a marriage certificate as a “premarital contract,” which, among other things, lays out a set amount to be paid to the wife in the event of a divorce. The lower court refused to consider the certificate a “contract,” as it was not clear that both parties were expressly agreeing to the same terms, consistent with their understanding of Islamic law and custom.

This Court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County that prevented a wife from collecting her deferred dowry (sadaq), the dowry due from the husband to the wife upon marriage, a portion of which is deferred by agreement to be paid upon death or divorce. The husband argued that, under Islamic law, the wife forfeits her contractual right to the deferred dowry if, as here, she is the one to seek the divorce. This Court upheld the contract, holding that it was binding because there was a meeting of the minds, and the parties agreed that the deferred dowry would be due upon divorce.

In a divorce proceeding involving a prenuptial agreement (Islamic marriage contract) between a Muslim husband and wife, the California Court of Appeals considered the validity of a provision requiring the husband to pay 3,000 Jordanian dinars as well as 2,000 dinars of either cash or household furniture as a “deferred dowry” (known as mahr or ṣadāq) due to the wife upon death or divorce. The husband claimed that the deferred dowry is not due where, as here, the wife initiates the divorce proceeding. The court concluded that, regardless of the individual claims, requiring payment of one party to the other upon divorce was an example of prohibited “divorce profiteering” and that, “if the court had accepted the position of wife’s expert, the contract would not have been enforceable under the public policy of the state.” Accordingly, the Court upheld the lower court's decision not to enforce that provision of the agreement.

A UK family court considered whether and how UK law recognizes a marriage conducted according to Islamic law that had not been accompanied by a civil law marriage. The husband contended that the couple was never married, and the wife—petitioning for divorce—insisted that they were. The two had signed an Islamic marriage contract (nikāḥ) accompanied by a ceremony abroad, lived together and had children together, and held themselves out as married for years both abroad and in the UK. The court concluded that, on those facts and considering the UK laws on marriage—as interpreted, for the first time, through the Human Rights Act 1998 and the best interests of the child—that the marriage was “void” or “voidable.” This determination meant that the couple was not validly married under UK law but that their union was also not considered a non-marriage. Instead, as a void marriage, their union was something akin to what Islamic law would label a “defective marriage.” The court had essentially concluded that, although a marriage was not properly concluded or registered according to the law, the steps taken toward one would in some measure be recognized by the law and entitle the wife to certain legal protections upon dissolution of the union. In this case, this meant that the wife was entitled to a decree of nullity from the court, and that the wife could take advantage of certain UK civil law remedies for maintenance and child custody upon dissolution.

During trial court proceedings in which a Muslim couple was dividing their marital property, the husband, Mr. Irfan Aleem, attempted to perform a “triple ṭalāq” divorce—a form of final, irrevocable dissolution of marriage under Pakistani law, initiated unilaterally by the husband. The Court refused to honor this type of divorce, concluding that it violated due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by not giving Mrs. Farah Aleem any role or voice in the divorce proceedings. The Court also concluded that allowing the ṭalāq divorce to replace court proceedings was contrary to the public policy interest of the people of Maryland, as it would allow Pakistani version of Islamic law, which grants all property to the husband as the default in divorce cases, to regulate distribution of property in the state of Maryland. The Court thus upheld the ruling of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, granting the wife’s petition for divorce, and applied the Maryland default rule that, in the absence of prior written agreement, marital property is to be divided fairly and equitably.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed a state district court’s decision to uphold an Islamic marriage contract that awarded the wife a deferred dowry (mahr), an amount agreed upon at the time of marriage and due to the wife from the husband or his estate upon death or divorce, of $50,000. The district court had concluded that the amount was due pursuant to a marital contract made by the parties “in contemplation of a forthcoming marriage,” constituting “a valid, binding, and enforceable contract under Sections 4.001-003 of the Texas Family Code.” The appellate court reversed and remanded to the lower court, concluding that the agreement was not a valid premarital contract under the state law, defined as “an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage,” because the religious wedding ceremony occurred before the contract was signed. As the contract fell outside of the definition of premarital contract, the Court concluded that it could not be enforced like one. 

This document was enacted on August 1, 1913. It prescribes certain measures for the registration of marriages and divorces between Muslims in Brunei, and shows the basic format of marriage and divorce certificates. It names neither the Sultan nor the British Resident, and does not specify an author or enacting authority.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence pertains to divorce and reasons for divorce. It states that the contents of art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975 are met if, on the facts, a reason for divorce has been established. Therefore, there is no need to apportion blame to one of the parties to the divorce.

The parties were married on 29 January 2006 and had one child. The plaintiff submitted, however, that, since February 2010, the marriage had become quarrelsome. This was the result of the defendant having had an extra-marital affair, and subsequently having a child with the other woman.

Problems escalated in July 2014 with the plaintiff leaving the matrimonial home at the request of the defendant. Despite the plaintiff's efforts to reconcile with the defendant, even requesting the help of family, the plaintiff became convinced their differences were irreconcilable.

The defendant had been summonsed formally but failed to attend court. Due to the ongoing conflict between the parties, pursuant to art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain shughra).

The parties were married on 7 May 2011 and had two children. The plaintiff submitted, however, that since January 2012, the marriage had become quarrelsome. This was a result of:

1. differing values vis-a-vis domestic affairs, namely the defendant's dishonesty regarding financial affairs; and
2. the defendant often stealing other people's property, causing the plaintiff and her family to have to apologise to the relevant persons.

Problems escalated in March 2012 causing the plaintiff and defendant to separate, with the defendant having lived in rental accommodation for approximately the past two years and five months up until the time of the proceeding.

Despite being summonsed formally, the defendant failed to attend the proceeding. Due to the ongoing conflict between the parties, the court granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain shughra), pursuant to art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The parties were married on 8 March 2008 and had one child. The applicant submitted, however, that, since January 2013, the marriage had become quarrelsome. This was the result of:

1. the respondent often rebelling against the advice and wishes of the applicant and no longer appreciating the applicant as the head of the household; and
2. the respondent always demanding more of the applicant.

Problems escalated in August 2013 causing the parties to separate. They had been living separately for approximately a year prior to this divorce proceeding.

Despite being summonsed formally, the respondent failed to attend court. Due to the ongoing conflict between the parties, pursuant to art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court granted the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i).

The parties were married on 19 May 2013 and had no children. The applicant submitted that, since December 2013, the marriage had become quarrelsome primarily because of the parties' frequent differences of opinion. Problems escalated on 8 February 2014, resulting in the parties separating.

Due to the ongoing conflict between the parties, pursuant to art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court granted the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i).