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Al-Jāmiʿ is an addendum to ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī’s Muṣannaf—a collection of Hadith that bring attention to the theme of enmity between Muslims. He relates an account in which Caliph ʿUmar I (d. 23/644) reacts negatively when the spoils of a conquered territory are brought before him because of his fear that “when such opulence besets a people, God casts enmity and hatred in their midst!” This quote reveals the Caliph’s concern about how wealth would exacerbate social tensions among the people. In Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts Ahmed El Shamsy cites this account to provide historical background to the subsequent institution of progressive limitations on the eligibility criterion for serving as a witness, which aimed to address biases that might be introduced into the judiciary from internal rivalries.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

In this historical text, Wakīʿ documents the historical feud between Qaysī and Yamanī Arabs which precluded members of each group from testifying against the other in Muslim courts due to concerns of bias. The factional tension also affected political and judicial spheres. For example, Wakīʿ relates that the governor of Basra ʿUqba b. Salm (in office 149–50/766–67) was pressured into releasing an unjustly imprisoned man by the judge Sawār b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Qudāma (in office 138–56/ 755–73). The judge complied with this order because of pressure and instability due to factional political alliances. Given the degree to which Qaysī and Yamanī rivalries influenced the political sphere, it seems understandable that their testimony against each other was not accepted in the courtroom. Ahmed El Shamsy references this source in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts as the first of many historical cases in which progressive restrictions were placed on who might be permitted to give testimony resulting from increased political rivalry.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

Ibn Wahb (d. 197/812), an Egyptian student of Mālik (d. 179/795), probes the legal implications of communal bias among Christians and Jews in the commentary. He writes that the presence of enmity between Jews and Christians results in a prohibition of the sale of slaves from one group to the other, as well as the prohibition of members of one group testifying against individuals from the other. In 8:425, Ibn Abī Zayd (d. 386/996) examines the positions of jurists on the admissibility of non-Muslim testimony in court. He relays the strict view of Mālikī jurist Ibn al-Qāsim (d. 191/806), which affirms the view of Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. 96/715), that non-Muslim testimony is wholly barred on the basis of Quranic verse 65:2. Ibn al-Qāsim indicates that the earlier Quranic verse 5:106—which allowed non-Muslims to serve as witnesses for a Muslim’s last will—has been abrogated by the verse 65:2. Ahmed El Shamsy employs this source in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts to address the broader legal implications of individual or communal biases' influence on the admissibility of courtroom testimony.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

In this excerpt from Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Kindī's (d. 350/961) book on early Muslim judges, the author reports that the Qaysī Arabs and Yamanī Arabs, two warring tribes, were prohibited from testifying against one another by the Egyptian judge Tawba b. Namir (in office 115–120/733–738). On the second page, Kindī discusses the issue of non-Muslim testimony. He writes that while many Muslim jurists barred non-Muslim testimony entirely, those authorities who permitted it were faced with the challenge of devising techniques to screen witnesses from diverse communities. In this regard, Kindī records how the Egyptian ḥadīth scholar and judge Khayr b. Nuʿaym (in office 120–27/738–45) verified the personal credentials of non-Muslim witnesses by interviewing members of their respective circles (yasʾal ʿan ʿadālatihim fī ahl dīnihim). This procedure assumed that non-Muslims might also obtain a status of righteousness, a notion which is not necessarily assumed by other jurists. In Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts Ahmed El Shamsy references this source to explore how the concern of bias due to enmity might also serve as sufficient grounds to reject testimony in an internal Muslim context due to political-factional enmity. 

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.   

Herein, Ibn Rushd I (d. 520/1126) reviews the prohibition of cross-confessional testimony. He clarifies that cross-confessional testimony is specifically forbidden between Christian and Jews, due to the historical presence of enmity between the groups, but is generally permissible in other cases such as among Zoroastrians. In Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Ahmed El Shamsy surveys Ibn Rushd as a springboard to discussing the admissibility of testimony which might be prohibited on a case-by-case basis if enmity is known to exist.   

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

In this text, Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) lays out his legal theory regarding the criterion for witness eligibility. Shāfiʿī’s introduces specific criteria, inferred from the Qurʾān, for admitting or rejecting testimony on an individual rather than group basis. He also forbids non-Muslim testimony, citing Qurʾānic precedent. [In section 6:476,] Shāfiʿī theorizes that a concern over individually held bias from enmity represents the underlying rational for denying the testimony of individual witnesses in courts. This rational extends to cases involving Muslim and non-Muslim witnesses and plaintiffs. He notes that, “We do not permit the testimony of an enemy against his enemy” (in Arabic “lā nujīz shahādat ʿaduww ʿalā ʿaduwwih”). Shāfiʿī proceeds to condemn baseless hatred due to factional rivalries and dictates that displays of such bias negate one's credibility to serve as a witness in all cases. Shāfiʿī also considers the consequences for one who might hold theologically related bias from heretical religious beliefs. This approach largely agrees with the Ḥanafī position. [In section 7:513-516,] Shāfiʿī provides two additional categories of individuals whose testimony should be rejected due to their theological beliefs, namely, (1) those who do not accept that false testimony is forbidden in Islamic law and (2) those who harbor enmity against a specific individual due to a theological dispute. Notably, Shāfiʿī qualifies that the latter case only proscribes the individual from testifying against those with whom he is in dispute (and thus potentially biased against). So, his convictions would not negate his overall credibility as a witness to testify in other cases. [In section 7:573-74,] In a further presentation of nuance, Shāfiʿī indicates that there is no blanket prohibition to disqualify the testimony of the gamer and poet. Rather, the testimony of these characters ought only to be disqualified on a case-by-case basis if it was discovered they were dishonest or derelict in their religious duties. In contrast, as Ahmad El Shamsy notes, other legal scholars indiscriminately excluded these "shady" characters. [In section 8:40,] Shāfiʿī demonstrates a more lenient approach towards including Muslim witnesses of questionable status, he represents a more stringent position regarding non-Muslim testimony which he completely prohibits. Since there is no reliable Hadith on the topic, Shāfiʿī relies on Qurʾānic verses to construct his argument. He cites 2:282 and 65:2, respectively, to select, “from those you approve as witnesses,” and the “upright witnesses from among you” to argue that non-Muslims are excluded because they are neither 'approved of' by Muslims nor considered part of the community of ‘upright witnesses.’ Shāfiʿī then anticipates and rebuts a counter-argument to his position on non-Muslim witnesses from the jurist al-Shaybānī (d. 189/804 or 805) who supports non-Muslim testimony. In his rebuttal, Shāfiʿī dissects Shaybānī's position and highlights the absurdity of preferring scripturalists over other non-Muslims for the purpose of testimony, given that they are seen to have falsified their scripture and should therefore be assumed even less trustworthy. Also Shāfiʿī hyperbolically questions why Shaybānī would show more concern for preserving the legal rights of Muslims over the rights of individuals of questionable status within the Muslim community, such as slaves or Bedouins, who are excluded from testimony because their integrity cannot be verified. Ahmad El Shamsy notes in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts that Shāfiʿī’s approach might be characterized as one which grants decisive authority to scripture. 

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.