SHARIAsource

These materials include the results relating to gender of a perceptions survey carried out in three sharīʿa states in early 2016, which included questions on hisbah and women, zakat and gender issues, practices harmful to women, and education of girls and women. Also included is documentation of a number of public enlightenment and sensitization programs on women’s rights carried out in the sharīʿa states, and of the effect of sharīʿa implementation on the education of girls and women.

These materials are a part of The Nigeria Papers – a SHARIAsource Special Collection, compiled and edited by Independent Scholar Philip Ostien and others. 

UCLA, School of Law

This course introduces the field of Islamic law. Islamic law is one of the oldest and most significant legal systems in the contemporary age, and this course is designed to give students a firm grounding in its principles, concepts, and doctrines. We will study the history, theory, and the role of Islamic law in the contemporary age. No previous familiarity with the field is necessary, and there are no course prerequisites. All readings are in English. The course will be divided into two main parts: the first will deal with Islamic law in the classical context, while the second will examine the role of Islamic law in the contemporary age. The first half of the course is oriented towards the historical legacy and theoretical framework of the Islamic legal tradition with a special emphasis on the development of the various schools of law. In the second half, we will study the challenges of modernity and Islamic law in the contemporary age, and will examine issues related to Islamic public international law, human rights, women and gender, and violence.

The Greek General Secretariat, Ministry of the Interior drafted a bill designed to prioritize Greek civil law over religious (namely Islamic) family law. This was due to concern about the rights of young Muslim minority women. However, the bill was never brought before the Greek Parliament.

University of Kansas School of Law

Examines the history, doctrine, texts, and role of Islamic law throughout the world. The course focuses on the background and birth of the Arab-Islamic Empire, the life and times of the Prophet Muhammad, the development of Islam, the Moghul and Ottoman Empires, the Qurʾān and Sunna and other sacred texts, the principal schools of Islamic law, the status of women and religious minorities, and basic principles of some of the substantive areas of law, including criminal, family, inheritance, contract, business, and banking law.

An African-American Muslim bus driver sued her former employer, the City of New York, under federal and state law (including Title VII; Article 1, section 3 of the New York State Constitution, and New York City Administrative Law §8-107(1)), alleging gender, religious, and racial discrimination and for allowing a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was subjected to a hostile work environment after securing accommodations for her to wear a headscarf (khimar) while on the job. She claimed that she was required to wear a baseball cap over the headscarf or to accept shifts that did not entail interaction with the public. The Court concluded that the complaints were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim before a jury; accordingly, it dismissed the Title VII and New York State Constitution claims. The Court permitted the employment discrimination claim under the NY City Administrative Law to proceed.

University of Pennsylvania

University of Toronto

This fatwa obliges Muslims to understand the problem of gender in accordance with Islamic teachings. It mandates the Indonesian Council of Ulama Leadership Council to immediately formulate Islamic teachings that relate to gender problems to prevent the emergence of a biased view of the problem. It also obliges ulama to conduct assessments of gender problems pursuant to honest interpretations.

Plaintiffs, Muslim prisoners, sued the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, alleging violations of state and federal law, including the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, § 1983, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Plaintiffs alleged that being patted down by female prison guards violated their First Amendment free exercise rights inasmuch as it contravened the tenets of their Islamic faith, which forbids intimate contact between unrelated members of the opposite gender. The Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment for most of the claims, but denied it with respect to the RLUIPA and the Massachusetts General Law claims, concluding that a jury would best be able to determine whether the alleged infraction violated the terms of these two statutes.

The petitioners, Elwood "Atheem" Small and Parlie DuBose, Jr., alleged that their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when they were strip-searched in the presence of women and when their participation in religious holiday events was, according to prison policy, conditioned upon their signing a document that allegedly placed restrictions on their religious practice. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the claim. The petitioners appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The Appellate Court held that the Ramadan policy was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The Appellate Court also determined that the practice of strip-searching the petitioners in a group of inmates in the presence of female staff members did not violate the petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights, because exigent circumstances existed that necessitated the search.

A female Muslim police officer, Kimberlie Webb, sued the City of Philadelphia under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, alleging religion- and gender-based discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiff objected to the City barring her from wearing a headscarf (ḥijāb) with her police uniform, and argued that the prohibition amounted to a failure to accommodate her right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. The City argued that the bar was consistent with Philadelphia Police Directive 78 and that allowing her to wear religious garb would cause an undue burden on the City and the Police Department, in that it would compromise a look of cohesiveness and uniformity among officers. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to exhaust internal remedies regarding her claim of gender discrimination and found the bar on the headscarf to be a compelling state interest. Accordingly, the Court upheld the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, granting the City’s motion for summary judgment.

A female applicant filed a complaint against the Traffic Police for refusing to grant her a motorcycle license. The Court of Administrative Justice rejected the argument that the police department was allowed to issue such a license only for men and stated that riding a motorcycle has nothing to do with gender and is not prohibited under law.

The South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters drafted this bill in 2011 to "redress inequities and hardships arising from the non-recognition of these marriages." The bill proposes legislative measures to statutorily recognize Muslim marriages, arguing that the lack of such recognition unjustifiably discriminates against Muslim women on the basis of religion, marital status, gender, and sex.

In 2014, a Malaysian federal court invalidated an Islamic state law criminalizing the public behavior and appearance of transwomen (people identifying as women and identified as men at birth). The Court ruled that the Malaysian Constitution’s fundamental rights trumped state-legislated Islamic law. It relied heavily on the notion that the Muslims being prosecuted suffered from Gender Identity Disorder (GID), over which they had no control. Evidence of the plaintiff’s GID and information about GID was provided to the Court by two psychiatrists, a psychology, and a sociologist.

This fatwa defines a 'transvestite' as a man who deliberately behaves as though he is a woman. Therefore, a transvestite is not a hermaphrodite (khunsa) but rather a man and, therefore, cannot be viewed as having his own sex/gender. Moreover, all conduct of a transvestite that deviates from that of a man is haram (forbidden) and efforts must be made to ensure he reverts to the way nature intended.

The fatwa implores the Department of Health and the Department of Social Affairs to provide transvestites with psychological counsel to facilitate their reform. The fatwa also calls on the Department of Internal Affairs and other relavent agencies to dissolve transvestite organisations.

The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) in Lucknow, India responded to the Karnataka High Court’s decision that ḥijāb is not "essential" in Islam, and that state colleges are authorized to bar Muslim women from wearing it. The Board states that the High Court’s verdict contradicted Article 15 of the Indian Constitution, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, gender, caste, class, or place of birth, and guarantees individual liberty to all citizens, as well as the right to identity. They thus conclude that this decision is an injustice against the constitutional freedoms of Indian citizens. The Board also expresses concern with secular state courts making decisions on what is or is not essential religious practice, stating that “it is not in the jurisdiction of the courts to decide this but that of the ulemas [sic] and scholars.” They further note that the Indian Constitution accords every individual the right to determine what is essential in their religion. On a related matter, they add that the establishment of a common Uniform Civil Code—as has been further proposed—in a multi-religious country will interfere in the fundamental rights of religious freedom, and further negatively impact the religious and individual rights and freedoms of Muslim citizens in Indian. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Bahrain (Mamlakat al Bahrayn), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Bahrain’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status, and is the principal source of legislation.

Holding: When multiple family members die in the same event, such as a natural disaster, the named beneficiary of an insurance policy is prima facie presumed the recipient of the payout unless another claimant can show that the beneficiary died in the event before the policy holder. Here, both the policy holder and his wife, who was his beneficiary, died in a flood, and without evidence showing that his wife predeceased him, the policy holder’s sister could not claim the insurance payout.

Procedural Posture: An insurance company filed interpleader in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City against the claimants of a life insurance payout. The Court found that the payout should go to the administrator of the deceased’s children. The deceased’s sister and the administrator of the deceased’s wife’s estate each appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court compares the American system to “the Mahometan law of India,” which it understands to presume in inheritance cases that relatives who died in the same event, such as a natural disaster, died at the same moment.

Judgment: Affirmed in part and reversed in part in an opinion authored by Justice McSherry.

Facts: Walter Hoopes, his wife Maria Hoopes, and their two children died in a flood in May 1889. Walter Hoopes had life insurance and named his wife as his beneficiary. According to the insurance regulations, should his wife pre-decease him, the payout was to go to his children; if they did not survive him, the payout was to go to his mother, then to his father, and finally to his siblings. After their deaths, Walter Hoopes’ sister, the administrator of Maria Hoopes, and the administrator of the children claimed rights to the insurance payout. The Court of Appeals of Maryland noted first that other legal systems, including Roman law, the Napoleonic Code, “the Mahometan law of India,” and ancient Danish law employed various presumptions based on age, gender, and time to help courts determine the survivorship order when multiple family members died at the same time or in the same event. However, it concluded that the American common law system has no such presumptions, and survivorship “must be proved by the party asserting it.” In this case, there was no evidence or way to know who predeceased whom in the flood. Because the wife, as the named beneficiary, had prima facie title to the insurance payout, her estate’s title could only be extinguished by a satisfactory showing by Walter Hoopes’ sister that the wife died before Walter. There is nothing in the record to indicate this was the case, so, the Court concluded, the payout belongs to the wife’s estate.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Norway (Kongeriket Norge), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Norway’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.