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A Toledan man named Ibn Ḥātim was accused of being a heretic by sixty witnesses on the initiative of a fellow Toledan called Ibn Labīd al-Murābiṭ. The judge consulted with the local jurists, and following their legal opinions, he sentenced the accused to death. However, he granted the accused the right to challenge the witnesses (iʿdhār). Ibn Ḥātim escaped from Toledo and found refuge in the neighboring kingdom of Badajoz. Ibn Labīd went after him, carrying a copy of the judge’s sentence (tasjīl) along with the legal opinions of a number of non-Toledan jurists. In Badajoz, the ruler withdrew his support from Ibn Ḥātim, who fled again, this time to Cordoba. While in Cordoba, the “moral” police arrested Ibn Ḥātim, and the judge imprisoned him, giving him two months to prove his innocence. Unable to do so, Ibn Ḥātim was crucified alive. A number of legal issues arise in the course of this case: should the process of iʽdhār—the right to challenge witnesses—be granted to those accused of heresy (zandaqa)? Should refuge be granted to them? What happens with the estate or inheritance of an executed zindīq? Can a judge reverse a sentence given by another judge? The source is a collection of court cases by Andalusi scholar Ibn Sahl (d. 486/1093), and it is based on information directly available to the compiler, who was also a witness of most of the events described.

In December 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) considered the question whether Muslim citizens who lived in the Greek province of Thrace could be required to submit to the jurisdiction of Islamic law, as detailed by local experts called muftīs. In Greek law, Islamic law usually governed matters of family law—such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance—in cases involving the Muslims in Thrace. This arrangement was a legacy of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. When the ECHR considered whether this arrangement should persist, it considered a case in which a Muslim man had died, leaving everything to his wife in his will. His sisters contested the will, arguing that it improperly circumvented the authority of the muftīs. Greece’s highest court agreed with the sisters. With the will invalidated, the muftī distributed one-fourth of the estate to the widow, and the rest to the sisters, in accord with Islamic inheritance law. The widow appealed to the ECHR. This Court determined that the Greek government had misinterpreted the treaties, which did not require a separate legal framework for Muslims. It further noted that Greek case law was inconsistent about “whether the application of Sharia law [sic] is compatible with the principle of equal treatment and with international human rights standards.” In addition, the Court emphasized a right to "free self-identification”: people should be free to opt out of differential treatment from the government on the basis of belonging to a minority group, and the government should not force minorities into a special legal category in the name of protecting them. The Court held that Greece, by compelling the Muslim minority of Thrace to follow Islamic law, had violated Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.

The court accepted the plaintiff's claim in part, distributed the estate (four properties, five vehicles) of the deceased as it saw fit, and ordered the parties to share costs.

The court found that the respondents had principally sought from the lower court a distribution of the estate of D.G, who had passed away in 1945. Citing Supreme Court Jurisdiction No. 181.K/AG/1994, the court noted that the rights of a deceased's children, parents and spouse take precedence over those of any other concerned parties. This decision, the court found, was all the more authoritative as it was based on the opinion of Ibnu Abbas, an interpreter and commentator from Muhammad's inner-circle, who interpreted the word 'walad' in verse 176 of Surah An-Nisa' to include both boys and girls.

Accordingly, the court found that A binti D.G (sibling of the deceased H.G) could not be stipulated as a beneficiary of H.G because H.G had a daughter, Z binti H.G. That said, Z binti H.G could similarly not be stipulated as a beneficiary of A binti D.G's estate, despite having been stipulated as a replacement beneficiary, because A binti D.G was survived by her daughter M binti D.

The lower court's distribution of D.G's estate did not reflect this, causing the court to pass its own, far more detailed judgment. The distinguishing inclusion was a lineage of beneficiaries relevant to the distribution of the estate.

Nizar Bin Syaf'i passed away due to illness on 17 September 2013. He was survived by his wife (second applicant), mother (first applicant), and siblings (third-seventh applicants), all of whom were beneficiaries under his will.

The applicants successfully sought a stipulation from the court that the deceased, Nizar Bin Syafi'i, had indeed passed away, that the applicants were legitimate beneficiaries under the deceased's will, and that the fourth applicant had power of attorney to transfer the deed of title to the land of the deceased to the National Land Body (Badan Pertanahan Nasional) of Lhokseumawe. The court ordered the applicants to pay court costs (IDR 141,000).

The four applicants filed an application with the court on 26 June 2015, stating that their father (the deceased) had passed away on 6 May 1994, and that their mother had passed away on 23 November 2014. The applicants' grandparents had also all passed away. The applicants requested from the court a stipulation that they were the beneficiaries (ahli waris) of the deceased, in order that they could withdraw from Bank Syariah Mandiri the deceased's hajj savings, and deal with a deed of title filed with the National Land Body (Badan Pertanahan Nasional) in the name of the deceased.

The court acceded to the applicants' request based on the grounds that they met the requirements to be considered beneficiaries, per art 171(c) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The deceased passed away on 20 August 2014 from illness. His wife had passed away on 14 October 2010, and his parents were both deceased. The applicants (the deceased's five children) sought from the court a stipulation that they were the lawful beneficiaries under the deceased's will, in order that they could withdraw his pension from Bank BRI.

The court acceded to the applicants' request based on the grounds that they met the requirements to be considered beneficiaries, per art 171(c) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and ordered them to pay costs (IDR 466,000).

The deceased passed away on 31 May 2015. He was survived by his wife and three children (the applicants), who sought from the court a declaration stipulating that the deceased had passed away on 31 May 2015 at Harapan Bunda Kota Banda Aceh hospital, that the applicants were the lawful beneficiaries of the deceased's will, and that they needed to access the deceased's bank savings and pension.

The court acceded to the applicants' request based on the grounds that they met the requirements to be considered beneficiaries, per arts 171(c) and 174 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and ordered them to pay costs (IDR 391,000).

The deceased passed away on 2 February 2015. He was survived by his wife and three children (the applicants), who sought from the court a declaration stipulating that he had passed away, that the applicants were the lawful beneficiaries of the deceased's will, and that they needed to access the deceased's bank savings, and to transfer his pension.

The court acceded to the applicants' request based on the grounds that they met the requirements to be considered beneficiaries, per arts 171(c) and 174 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and ordered them to pay costs (IDR 466,000).

On 18 May 2006, the applicant's husband passed away. He was survived by the applicant and their four children. The deceased had a plot of land in Gampong Gampa, which the applicant and one of the applicant's children wished to use to leverage a bank loan. The notary they had engaged required a stipulation from a shari'a court that the applicant and her children (the children were underage) were indeed beneficiaries under the will of the deceased.

As the applicant had met all the formulaic requirements of the application, and information provided by witnesses had corroborated with that of the applicant, the court acceded to the applicant's request.

Holding: When multiple family members die in the same event, such as a natural disaster, the named beneficiary of an insurance policy is prima facie presumed the recipient of the payout unless another claimant can show that the beneficiary died in the event before the policy holder. Here, both the policy holder and his wife, who was his beneficiary, died in a flood, and without evidence showing that his wife predeceased him, the policy holder’s sister could not claim the insurance payout.

Procedural Posture: An insurance company filed interpleader in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City against the claimants of a life insurance payout. The Court found that the payout should go to the administrator of the deceased’s children. The deceased’s sister and the administrator of the deceased’s wife’s estate each appealed. Islamic law is not directly relevant, except that the court compares the American system to “the Mahometan law of India,” which it understands to presume in inheritance cases that relatives who died in the same event, such as a natural disaster, died at the same moment.

Judgment: Affirmed in part and reversed in part in an opinion authored by Justice McSherry.

Facts: Walter Hoopes, his wife Maria Hoopes, and their two children died in a flood in May 1889. Walter Hoopes had life insurance and named his wife as his beneficiary. According to the insurance regulations, should his wife pre-decease him, the payout was to go to his children; if they did not survive him, the payout was to go to his mother, then to his father, and finally to his siblings. After their deaths, Walter Hoopes’ sister, the administrator of Maria Hoopes, and the administrator of the children claimed rights to the insurance payout. The Court of Appeals of Maryland noted first that other legal systems, including Roman law, the Napoleonic Code, “the Mahometan law of India,” and ancient Danish law employed various presumptions based on age, gender, and time to help courts determine the survivorship order when multiple family members died at the same time or in the same event. However, it concluded that the American common law system has no such presumptions, and survivorship “must be proved by the party asserting it.” In this case, there was no evidence or way to know who predeceased whom in the flood. Because the wife, as the named beneficiary, had prima facie title to the insurance payout, her estate’s title could only be extinguished by a satisfactory showing by Walter Hoopes’ sister that the wife died before Walter. There is nothing in the record to indicate this was the case, so, the Court concluded, the payout belongs to the wife’s estate.

1st Edition

2nd Edition

The deceased, who passed away on 10 December 2009, had seven children. (The deceased's wife had passed away on 5 August 1985.) The deceased left behind 567m² of land, 105m² of which he had already bequested to another party. The plaintiffs did not object to this gift but objected to the defendant's occupation of the remaining 462m² of land, as well as the semi-permanent home on the land. The plaintiffs sought from the court an equal distribution of the land between the parties, whereas the defendant claimed ownership of the land and property in dispute, submitting that they were gifted to her by the deceased prior to his passing.

Familial and local government efforts to resolve the dispute (the defendant was one of the deceased's children) proved to be in vain.

The court found that information provided by three of the witnesses had affirmed the claims of the defendant that the land and property had been gifted to her by the deceased before his passing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim to inheritance and ordered them to pay costs.

The cassation applicant had married the deceased in 1997. She had one daughter from her previous marriage (her first husband had passed away), and the deceased had four children (first-fourth cassation respondents) from his first wife (fifth cassation respondent). The cassation applicant and the deceased never had any children. After the deceased passed away on 27 December 2011, ownership of their property came into question. The cassation applicant and the deceased obtained the property in 2003, five years into their marriage, and the cassation applicant sought: 50 per cent in her favour, the other 50 per cent split between the five cassation respondents. At the time of trial, the first cassation respondent was in possession of the property, valued to be worth IDR 500 million. The cassation applicant claimed the cassation respondents had not transferred to her half of the property, and based her cassation appeal on the following:

1. As the wife of the deceased, she should enjoy certain inheritance rights;

2 and 3. That while she incorrectly brought a joint asset action, rather than an inheritance claim, prior to the deceased's death, her inheritance claim should still stand;

4. That such an inheritance claim still details the division of joint assets;

5. That the appellate court had shown no interest in examining the case file and her reasons for appeal;

6.1 That the appellate court had applied the law incorrectly insofar as it had failed to properly assess the cassation applicant's additional documentary evidence, most notably that the property had been purchased prior to the cassation respondents selling the joint land of the deceased and the fifth cassation respondent (first wife of the deceased); and

6.2 That the cassation applicant would lodge an inheritance claim if her appeal in this instance were dismissed.

The Supreme Court acceded to the cassation appeal concurring that, while the cassation applicant had incorrectly filed a claim based on joint assets, rather than inheritance, the cassation respondents had also made formulaic errors in their submissions, including incorrectly making the fifth cassation respondent a party to the proceeding. Also, the court agreed that the lower court had failed to consider crucial evidence produced by the cassation applicant regarding ownership of the property.

The appellants sought to challenge Giri Menang Religious Court Decision No. 207 of 2013, which had ordered them to transfer to the respondents the respondents' share of the estate of Amaq and Inaq Sidin (deceased). The appellants based their appeal on several grounds:

1. that the respondents' initial claim had failed to include certain relevant parties in their claim, as was revealed by the evidence provided by certain witnesses, and that those relevant parties were then inserted into the claim by the lower court;
2. that the lower court's decision lacked a legal foundation, and that its decision had exceeded the parameters of the plaintiffs' claim;
3. that the lower court had erred in stipulating certain information relating to the dimensions of the land in dispute;
4. that the lower court had ignored documents submitted by the appellants regarding a certain portion of the land in dispute; and
5. that the lower court had included the incorrect boundaries of the land in dispute, in terms of a local inspection.

In dismissing the appeal, the court found that ground 1 was insufficient as the parties the appellants claimed had not been included were not beneficiaries (ahli waris) for the purposes of art 171(c) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and moreover, those parties had not been joined as parties to the claim by the lower court. The court found that the appellants had failed to establish ground 2, but conceded the appellants were correct in regards to ground 3. The court held, however, that it could simply amend the clerical errors raised in ground 3. Finally, the court dismissed ground 4, stating it had been acknowledged in the lower court's decision.

Amaq Soekalam din Daiman passed away circa-1970. His mother and father (Daiman and Sekrasip) had pre-deceased him, and his wife, Rakisah, passed away circa-1975. Amaq Soekalam and Rakisah had five children:

1. Nurisam bin Soekalam (passed away circa-1971);
2. Nuriasip bin Soekalam (first defendant);
3. Nuriadim bin Soekalam (first plaintiff);
4. Sukardip bin Soekalam (second plaintiff);
5. Nuriadip bin Soekalam (passed away circa-2003), married to Inaq Nuriadip, had five children:
6. Sadli bin Nuriadip (third plaintiff);
7. Lux bin Nuriadip (fourth plaintiff);
8. Heli bin Nuriadip (fifth plaintiff);
9. Herul bin Nuriadip (sixth plaintiff);
10. Purni bin Nuriadip (seventh plaintiff).

Amaq Soekalam left behind a plot of land (500m²) upon which was situated a semi-permanent structure (2 x 7m²), as well as a plantation (21,000m²). In 1965, he gave the plantation to Amaq Juni to develop, pursuant to an agreement that they would share the spoils. In 1982, however, a request was made that the plantation be registered by Badan Pertanahan Nasional - Lombok Barat (National Land Body - West Lombok) via the government asset legalisation process PRONA (Proyek Operasi Nasional Agraria - National Agrarian Operations Project), in order that a deed of title for the plantation could be issued. That deed of title was incorrectly issued in Amaq Juni's name, rather than Amaq Soekalam's, leading the plaintiffs to argue that it had no legal effect.

Circa-2006, Amaq Juni passed away and the land came into the possession of his wife (Inaq Uni) and children (second-sixth defendants). The plaintiffs claimed that, while Amaq Soekalam was alive, he both worked on the plantation and maintained possession of it. After he passed away, however, Amaq Juni came into possession of the plantation and had a deed of title issued in his name. After Amaq Juni's passing, the plantation came into the possession of the second-sixth defendants. The plaintiffs sought from the court an order that the plantation be divided between Amaq Soekalam's worthy beneficiaries, and that a caveat be placed on the plantation to preclude the defendants from dealing with the plantation in a manner adverse to the plaintiffs' interests. In addition, they requested that the other property be divided in accordance with Islamic inheritance laws (hukum faraid).

The court acceded to the plaintiffs' request insofar as it ordered the second-sixth defendants to transfer to the plaintiffs the plantation. The court ordered that it be divided between the plaintiffs pursuant to hukum faraid, specifically stipulating the share to which each beneficiary was entitled.

This Supreme Court pronouncement states that while a non-Muslim wife who survives her Muslim husband cannot be considered a beneficiary (ahli waris), she remains entitled to inherit her portion of his estate as his wife, pursuant to a wasiat wajibah (obligatory will).

In this case, the cassation applicant had challenged the decision of the Makassar High Religious Court (59/Pdt.G/2009/PTA). As the lawful wife of the deceased, who had passed away on 22 May 2008 (they were married on 1 November 1990), the Court stated that as the deceased and cassation applicant had been married for 18 years, and as the defendant had devoted herself to the deceased while he was alive, it was immaterial that she was a non-Muslim. Moreover, that she was entitled to receive a portion of the estate of the deceased, as well as a portion of their joint assets as husband and wife.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Makassar Religious Court (lower court), which had granted her one-half of the assets she had owned jointly with the deceased. The appellant had married the deceased on 1 November 1990, and they had remained married until the deceased passed away on 22 May 2008. The lower court had stipulated as the deceased's beneficiaries his mother and four siblings (the respondents), and two properties and IDR 50 million in life insurance as the joint assets of the appellant and deceased.

The lower court had ordered the appellant to transfer to the beneficiaries the other half of those joint assets, which constituted the estate of the deceased. In dismissing the appeal, the court cited arts 96 and 97 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws as a legal basis for the division of the assets, as well as the fact that, as the deceased was Muslim, his assets were to be distributed pursuant to Islamic law, despite one of the parties to the dispute being a Christian/non-Muslim. The appellant was ordered to pay court costs (IDR 86,000).