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Plaintiff Larry William Cortinas brought this action against the California prison system, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Plaintiff alleged that medical staff at the prison refused him treatment and medication for his rheumatoid arthritis and hepatitis C because he was Muslim. The Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to demonstrate that he would be entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This fatwa states that Islam shariatises medical treatment as it constitutes a part of disease prevention. Medical treatment may not contravene shari'a, while medicine used for the purposes of medical treatment must use holy and halal ingredients. The fatwa requests that the government ensure such halal medicine is readily available, and implores business operators to have regard for halal components in medicine and not to assume that using medicine implies the patient's condition is an emergency. It also requests that authorities not certify as halal medicine containing forbidden (haram) or unclean (najis) ingredients, and implores people to always use holy and halal medicine.

This fatwa declares the usage of the following to be haram (forbidden), unless life-threatening circumstances prevail:

1. medicine containing, or derived from, human organs;
2. human urine in medical treatment; and
3. cosmetics containing, or derived from, human organs.

This fatwa states that, generally speaking, massage parlours serve a social purpose, provided they do not contravene any religious laws. It stipulates that massage parlours are a place for medical treatment. Therefore, at law they are permissible (mubah), unless they contravene shari'a provisions, in which case they are forbidden (haram).

The parties were married on 28 November 1994. In September 2012 and after 18 years of marriage, however, the defendant left the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted that, since June 2004, the marriage had been quarrelsome. This was the result of the defendant becoming angry and easily agitated by the smallest of problems, resulting in his use of profane language and threatening to divorce the plaintiff. In addition, the defendant often resorted to physical violence towards the defendant, slapping and hitting the plaintiff to the extent that the plaintiff had incurred nerve damage to her right eye for which she was still receiving medical treatment.

Since their separation in September 2012, there had been no physical intimacy between the parties, and the defendant had not provided the plaintiff with any financial support. The defendant also failed to attend court, despite having been summonsed formally. The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu Ba'in Sughro) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 2 April 2000 and had one child. The plaintiff submitted that, after 12 years of marriage, she and the defendant had begun to quarrel regularly. This was the result of:

1. the plaintiff often catching the defendant telephoning other women;
2. the defendant often directing profanities at the plaintiff; and
3. the defendant not providing the plaintiff with adequate financial support, meaning the defendant had to sell daily items to meet the parties' children's needs.

The defendant refuted the allegation that he had telephoned other women, submitting that, in actual fact, the plaintiff had been involved with another man via Facebook when the defendant went to Pekanbaru. Moreover, while he acknowledged that he had directed profanities at the plaintiff, he disputed the frequency with which he had done so as alleged by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff further alleged that problems escalated in October 2013, resulting in the plaintiff leaving the matrimonial home. The parties had remained separated since. The defendant argued that the actual reason the plaintiff left was because she had asked to return to her village to seek medical treatment.

Due to evident ongoing conflict between the parties, the court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra).

The parties were married on 3 September 2004 and had two children. The plaintiff submitted that, on 28 March 2014, the defendant accompanied the plaintiff to Medan for medical treatment. The next day the defendant returned home, leaving the plaintiff at her elder sibling's home. Initially, the parties had remained in contact. After two months, however, the plaintiff telephoned the defendant asking why he had not inquired as to how she was, and why he had not sent her any money. When the plaintiff pushed the issue, it became apparent that the defendant had intended to divorce the plaintiff.

On 4 September 2014, the defendant telephoned the plaintiff, asking her to take him to his parents' home. The plaintiff was unsure, however, for how long the defendant had been living with his parents. When the plaintiff and her parents attended the defendant's parents' home to bring him back to the parties' home, the defendant orally divorced (talak) the plaintiff. Since then the parties' communication had ceased. Moreover, the parties had lived separately since 28 March 2014, and the defendant had failed to provide the plaintiff with any financial support. Therefore, the plaintiff submitted, the defendant had contravened his marriage vows (sighat taklik talak), per the parties' marriage book (buku nikah), entitling her to divorce the defendant for a fee (iwadh).

Seeking to be exempted from any court fees, the plaintiff also submitted that she was an impecunious person, financially responsible for two children, receiving government-funded health benefits, and the holder of a social security card.

Pursuant to art 116(g) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court granted the plaintiff a divorce for a fee (talak satu khul'i), as well as exempting her from all court fees.

The parties were married on 16 July 2006. They had no children, despite having already sought both conventional medical and alternative infertility treatment. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage, however, was only harmonious for the first two years. In February 2008, the defendant, a police officer, returned to his original post in Bogor. The parties remained in contact for the first month but from then on the defendant rarely contacted the plaintiff, other than to request that she send him money. For the past three years the parties had remained separated, the defendant providing the plaintiff with no financial or emotional support throughout their time apart.

In February 2010, the plaintiff took leave from work and went to Bogor to ask the defendant why the parties had not been in more regular contact. When the plaintiff arrived in Bogor, however, she discovered that the defendant had remarried. The plaintiff asked the defendant why he had remarried only to be told that the defendant had wished to take the burden off his new wife. The plaintiff submitted that the defendant's response left her feeling bewildered. Accordingly, she requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra).

Pursuant to art 19(b) and (f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(b) and (f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the plaintiff's request on the grounds that the parties had been separated for more than two consecutive years, and ongoing conflict.

The parties were married on 18 September 2005. The plaintiff submitted, however, that only a few months after she and the defendant had married, she received a telephone call from a woman calling herself Ciah, claiming to have secretly married (nikah siri) the defendant and being five-months pregnant with the defendant's child. From thereon, this became a point of contention between the parties, despite the defendant never validating the claims made by this other woman.

The plaintiff alleged that other causes of tension between the parties included:

1. the defendant often being angry with the plaintiff for no apparent reason;
2. the defendant never contributing financially to the parties' domestic needs, thereby making the plaintiff assume he was spending his salary on his other wife;
3. the plaintiff and defendant having been separated since the end of 2013;
4. since the beginning of 2011, the defendant having not executed his spousal responsibilities vis-a-vis the plaintiff; and
5. notably, frequent quarrelling between the parties causing the plaintiff to want to move to Bireuen for work, but not being granted permission to do so by the defendant, the dispute escalating to the point that the defendant hit the plaintiff, causing her to seek medical treatment for facial bruising.

The plaintiff also claimed that, from January 2011-present, the defendant had failed to provide her with financial and emotional support. The plaintiff quantified the financial support she believed the defendant owed her at IDR 2 million per month for 41 months (IDR 82 million). The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant had failed to provide her with a true dowry (mahar) at the time of their marriage. Rather, the defendant had borrowed five grams of pure gold from the plaintiff's parents, which he had returned after they were married, vowing to the plaintiff that he would one day give to her five grams of pure gold, or the cash equivalent thereof. The defendant, the plaintiff submitted, never upheld that promise.

The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had appropriately sought and obtained a letter of permission from her superior officer to divorce the defendant, and that the defendant's objection to that letter was irrelevant insofar as the court was unauthorised to intervene in the affairs of a government agency. The court also noted that the parties had sought to reconcile their differences via mediation, but to no avail.

The court acceded to the plaintiff's application for an irrevocable divorce (talak ba'in shughra), acknowledging that the purpose of marriage, as envisaged in art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and surat Al-rum verse 21, being a peaceful, hopeful and loving (sakinah, mawaddah dan rahmah) homelife was no longer feasible. Moreover, that ongoing conflict between the parties was sufficient reason to grant a divorce, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court, however, dismissed the plaintiff's claim for back-payment maintenance costs (IDR 82 million), noting that the plaintiff, like the defendant, worked as a civil servant, who would had to have first obtained the defendant's permission to work. The court noted that if one of the plaintiff's reasons for wanting to divorce the defendant was due to a lack of financial support, to then demand money from the defendant would contradict her claim.

Fatwā concerning the legality, based on their interpretation of Islamic law, of a) the responsibility of mosque officials to prevent unwell congregants from entering a mosque’s premises and b) the temporary suspension of congregational and Friday prayers, and subsequent mosque closures. The answer provided by the Fatwa Committee, who met on 18 February 2020, is that a) mosques’ management has the religious duty to request or prohibit any unwell congregants from entering the mosque area, whether for performing prayers or other matters and the closing of a mosque and b) the suspension of congregational prayers and Friday prayers during this situation, is required.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.