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This brief, submitted by fifteen religious and civil rights organizations, addresses the notion that numerous conflicts often arise between job duties and religious convictions in areas of ritual law, including Sabbaths and other holy days, dietary restrictions, and dress for many Jews, Muslims, Christians and members of other faiths. These organizations point out that the headscarf (ḥijāb) is a particularly visible manifestation of a religious practice (more so than taking off holy days), and under the laws of the United States, it is entitled to no less a standard of reasonable accommodations, particularly in an era where online applications set the qualifications and in-person interviews may offer cause for discrimination if not for application of Title VII broadly. They further argue that “the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning gives the employer a perverse incentive to deny to religiously observant applicants any opportunity to discuss religion-based limitations on their appearance or scheduling. Under that reasoning, the employer’s ignorance automatically defeats a prima facie case, and thus effectively eliminates Title VII’s accommodation protections for those applicants. Under the Tenth Circuit’s position, then, observers of Sabbaths and other holy days will find themselves effectively excluded from a large and growing sector of the workforce that is hired through online applications (p. 10).” For reviews and commentary on the U.S. law implications of this case, see the SCOTUSblog Case Page.

The Plaintiff Kajauna Kenyatta Irvin named James A. Yates (warden), R. Fisher Jr. (associate warden), P.D. Brazelton (associate warden), K.R. Nash (correctional captain), M.C. Davis (associate warden), Dana B. Allen (correctional captain), A. Walker (correctional captain), Wendy K. Myers (community partnership manager), James D. Bennett (correctional lieutenant), S. Lantz (correctional lieutenant), E. McBride (correctional sergeant), D. McGee (protestant chaplain), E. Guthery (correctional officer), and Does 1-30 (PVSP correctional staff members) as the Respondents in this lawsuit, alleging that these individuals 1) forced Muslim prisoners to conduct their religious services outside; 2) failed to provide dietary accommodations for religious celebrations; 3) suspended purchase orders for religious oils; and 4) failed to hire a replacement Muslim chaplain. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff's complaint stated cognizable claims against Respondents McBride, Davis, Yates, Myers, Bennett, Allen, Nash, Walker, Brazelton, Guthery, McGee, and Does 1-30 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of the Plaintiff's rights under the First Amendment and under RLUIPA. The District Court provided the Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the District Court in regard to the remaining Respondents.

The Plaintiff Nathaniel Hallman, a federal prisoner at the Lexington County Detention Center and an observing Muslim, brought this suit against the Respondents, Trinity Food Group, the Sheriff of Lexington County and several sheriff employees, for allegedly refusing to provide adequate and appropriate meals during Ramadan. The Respondents filed for summary judgment, asserting that the Ramadan meals provided to Muslim inmates were adequate. The Magistrate judge found that the prisoner requested to participate in Ramadan, during which members of the Islamic faith fasted during daylight hours. The detention center inmates observing Ramadan were not served a meal during the lunch period, but are provided a breakfast meal before sunrise and a dinner meal after sunset. The Magistrate judge recommended that the motions for summary judgment should be granted because the menu served to the inmates observing Ramadan was approved by a licensed dietician to ensure that the menu met those inmates' caloric and nutritional needs.

Plaintiff Sturgeon Stewart, an inmate at the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) brought suit against Respondents Vernestene Dulin, head of prison food services, and various other prison officials for alleged violations of his rights to religious free exercise on the claim that the prison served Muslim inmates the same ḥalāl food menu for all meals of the day, and that these meals excluded meat. Ḥalāl food is meat prepared in accordance with Islamic ritual law, and free of pork and alcohol. The Plaintiff contended that this repetition was not a nutritional religious-accommodating alternative to regular prison meals. The Court found for the Respondents, determining that Muslim prisoners do not have a right under the First Amendment or the RLUIPA to be provided ḥalāl meat entrees. Rather, a correctional facility need only provide Muslim prisoners with food that is not ḥarām (prohibited under Islamic law). The Court found that, as long as the Plaintiff was given an alternative to eating non-ḥalāl meat, he did not suffer a substantial burden to his religious beliefs. The Court determined that the Plaintiff had been provided with alternatives to non-ḥalāl meat, but that the Plaintiff was “simply not happy with the substitutions offered.” Therefore, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s factual allegations, construed as true, failed to establish a violation of the Plaintiff’s federal rights.

The Court affirmed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Jerry Charles, who alleged a violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) to practice his religion. Specifically, the plaintiff requested accommodations that would allow him to have prayer oil, which he contended was a necessary part of his religious practice. The Department of Corrections challenged RLUIPA as unconstitutional, but the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.

Plaintiff Daniel O’Neil Ruffin, the only practicing Muslim in the Downeast Correctional Facility in Machiasport, Maine, brought this suit against the Respondents, facility program manager Carol Geel, facility director Scott Jones, and former commissioner of the Maine Department of Corrections Martin Magnusson for allegedly violating his First Amendment rights by denying his request to be allowed to conduct religious services in the common area. The Respondents claimed that they denied the request because it would have been impracticable to assign an officer to supervise a single prisoner, and that they tried to accommodate the Plaintiff’s religious beliefs by allowing him to conduct services in his room. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court referred to a Magistrate judge for a recommended decision. The Magistrate judge recommended that the Respondents be entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer would not have known that the challenged conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights.

Plaintiff Tarick Ali sued his former employer under Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act, claiming he was discriminated against on the basis of his religion. As an EMT and firefighter for the District of Columbia, Ali alleged that the District subjected him to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment after he filed a complaint about his supervisor’s lack of accommodation of his prayer schedule. He alleged that, on several occasions, his direct supervisor told him that he must choose between his religion and job, publicly mocked him when he returned from prayer, and ridiculed him for filing an internal complaint regarding the alleged discrimination. The Court denied the defendant government’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the evidence presented could allow a jury to find that the plaintiff was treated adversely because of his religion and was subjected to a hostile work environment on that basis.

A Muslim female teacher sued her former employer, the Board of Education for the School District of Philadelphia, as well as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. The defendant school board argued that it suspended and ultimately fired the plaintiff under the Pennsylvania Garb Statue (Public Law No. 282) when she refused to remove her headscarf while teaching. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found in favor of the defendant Commonwealth, but against the School Board. The Third Circuit affirmed the decision against the Commonwealth but reversed the decision against the School Board, holding that, while the statute may present conflicts with the First Amendment, to bring a claim under Title VII, as the plaintiff did, requires proving that the accommodation would not be an undue burden for the employer. The Court further held that allowing teachers to wear religious garb would be an example of an undue burden, as it threatens the religious neutrality of the public school system. The Court upheld the conclusion of the District Court that “the Commonwealth was not [plaintiff’s] employer within the meaning of Title VII."

Plaintiff Mitchell Theophilus Garraway filed an action against the Respondent, a Lewisburg penitentiary, for a claimed violation of RLIUPA. The Plaintiff alleged that various Federal Bureau of Prisons rules and policies severely and unnecessarily burden his right to private religious exercise of his Islamic faith. The Plaintiff cited, among other reasons, that the prison did not make the chapel available to all Muslims to congregate for Friday prayer, and also placed other restrictions on Muslims’ ability to perform all their prayers together as one group. The District Court decided that the penitentiary had a legitimate governmental interest—the need to maintain order and security—that was rationally connected to the policy regarding congregation for prayer. 

The Plaintiff Amir Shabazz challenged the Pleasant Valley State Prison for their policy of denying Muslim inmates ḥalāl meals for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. The Plaintiff contended that Muslim inmates were denied ḥalāl meat, instead forcing them to eat vegetarian meal options. The Plaintiff argued that this constituted religious discrimination under RLUIPA and the Fourteenth Amendment, since Jewish inmates were provided with kosher options and therefore were not forced to similarly eat the vegetarian meal options. The Plaintiff claimed that this treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court found that the facts put forth by the plaintiff were "vague and inconsistent," and therefore that the Plaintiff failed to state any cognizable claim against the Respondent. 

The Plaintiff, Marcus Leeotis Watts, sued the Respondents, various prison officials at the Perry Correctional Institution in South Carolina, for allegedly violating his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment when the prison failed to provide Muslim prisoners with ḥalāl meat. The Respondents contended that the vegetarian meal option that complied with Islamic law was adequate, and sought summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Respondents, citing earlier case law providing that the failure to provide a ḥalāl diet containing meat did not substantially burden prisoners' exercise of religion because a Muslim prisoner is not religiously-obligated to eat meat.

Muslim inmate Imam Abd’Allah Halim Abdul Akbar (aka Phillip M. Hudson) sued several prison officials under §1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment free exercise rights. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the prison denied his attempts to start a Muslim inmate group. The prison officials argued that the denial resulted from the plaintiff’s failure to follow the proper procedures for creating such a group. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the prison did not deprive the plaintiff of his ability to practice his religion and that the regulations governing creation of inmate groups were consistent with legitimate penological objectives of preventing gang activity and maintaining order in the prison population. 

Plaintiff John Walker Lindh, a convicted "American Taliban," challenged prison policies that allowed for individual prayer in cells, but banned group congregation for prayer due to "security concerns." The Plaintiff sued the warden of the Federal Correctional Institution of Terre Haute, Indiana, alleging violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The District Court found that the Plaintiff did have sincerely held religious beliefs, and therefore turned its inquiry to whether the ban on group prayer furthers the compelling interest of security and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. The District Court ultimately determined that the warden-Respondent failed to establish that the total ban on daily congregational prayer by the Plaintiff was the least restrictive means of meeting the warden's security concerns.

The Plaintiff, Christopher B. Scott, brought suit against Dekalb County prison officials. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment constitutional rights by 1) not providing a Muslim chaplain; 2) not allowing Muslim prisoners to wear a kufi; 3) failing to provide a secure and private place to pray five times a day; and 4) not providing a special meal at the end of Ramadan. The Respondents sought summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion, claiming that the plaintiff had not exhausted the administrative remedies necessary to bring suit. The Magistrate Court recommended that the Respondents' motion for summary judgment be granted on the Plaintiff's claims concerning the wearing of a kufi and concerning the celebration of an end-of-Ramadan meal. Summary judgment for all other claims was denied.

The Plaintiff Akeem Muhammad, an inmate in the Florida penal system, filed suit against the Respondents (prison officials Marvin Davis, Alex Taylor, and R. Graham; the Food Service Administrator of the Fla. Dept. of Corrections; and the Assistant Warden and Warden of Florida State Prison) for their refusal to provide him with a daily pre-fasting meal. The District Court determined that the plaintiff could not sue individual Respondents for monetary damages under RLUIPA. The District Court also determined that the Respondents failed to demonstrate that the policy of refusing to provide Muslim prisoners with a pre-twilight meal during Ramadan is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. Therefore, the District Court denied the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment on the RLUIPA claim.

Plaintiff Jim Davis challenged a prison policy that imposed a temporary, total ban on the purchase and receipt of prayer oil as a violation of both his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights. The Respondents, the prison administration and various officers individually named in the complaint, counterclaimed that a ban on prayer oils furthered a legitimate government interest, as prayer oils posed a fire, health, and safety hazard. The Plaintiff alleged in a second claim against the Respondents that they retaliated against him for filing a grievance regarding this prison policy by restricting the purchase of religious items to the quarterly packages he could receive while incarcerated. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff stated a cognizable First Amendment and RLUIPA violation with respect to the prayer oil ban, because the Plaintiff sufficiently showed that the prayer oils were not flammable and therefore did not pose a risk. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss with regard to the second claim because the District Court determined that restricting religious items to the quarterly packages did not sufficiently burden his practice of religion, as he was not denied all access to prayer oil and was still allowed to order oil in quarterly packages.

Plaintiff William C. McKinnedy, a South Carolina inmate, brought this suit against the Respondents, over 30 South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) staff members and state government officials, alleging that the Respondents violated his religious beliefs by 1) refusing to provide a food tray prior to sun-up during Ramadan; and 2) not allowing the Plaintiff to attend the Eid feast at the conclusion of Ramadan. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that on multiple occasions the Plaintiff informed the Chaplain that he did not consider himself part of the Muslim community. The Magistrate Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants, determining that the Defendants’ refusal to allow the Plaintiff to participate in Ramadan was related to a legitimate penological interest, such as security concerns.

The plaintiff, Tracey Taylor, a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Department of Corrections (Illinois), brought an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the respondents Cook County and Sheriff Thomas Dart for alleged violations of his civil rights in denying him access to Islamic prayer services and by failing to serve ḥalāl meat (prepared in accordance with Islamic law). The respondents moved for summary judgment after alleging that Taylor failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they violated his constitutional rights. The Court granted summary judgment for the respondents, determining that the denial of Islamic prayer services was related to a legitimate penological interest, and that the prison had adequately provided the plaintiff with sufficiently nutritious Islamic meals, even though they were vegetarian/vegan.

The plaintiffs, two Muslim prisoners, sued state and prison officials for failing to provide Muslim inmates with ḥalāl meat options while incarcerated. The defendants claimed that inmates in the custody of the state are not entitled, under either the First Amendment or RLUIPA, to a diet that includes ritually-slaughtered meat. The defendants also requested summary judgment because they claimed that Wells-Bey did not have an allergy to eggs that inhibited his ability to eat a lacto-ovo diet as a substitute for meat. The Court determined that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff claimed he had an egg allergy and therefore could not subsist off the vegetarian meal plan; however, the Court allowed the defendants to refile their motion if they were able to obtain more information about the plaintiff's "alleged allergy."

Plaintiff Jeffrey Coleman filed an action against the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) alleging violations of his constitutional rights under the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA. The Plaintiff claimed that these rights had been violated in over 12 policies, including the policy that limited his purchase of prayer oil to once a week, a grooming policy that prevented him from growing a beard, and a CD policy limiting inmates’ purchase of spoken religious word CDs to a single vendor. The District Court dismissed all claims against the Respondent except for claims related to the CD policy, which the District Court determined was not related to any legitimate penological interest.