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Plaintiff Marlo Thomas, incarcerated at the Ely State Prison (ESP), brought this action against former ESP Warden E.K. McDaniel, former ESP Associate Warden Renee Baker, and former ESP Associate Warden Debra Brooks, for an alleged violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Plaintiff claimed that he was placed in administrative segregation by the Respondents because they had a personal grudge against him because he was a Muslim inmate. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court found that the Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence to support several elements of his First Amendment free exercise claim and his Fourteenth Amendment claim. The District Court found that the Plaintiff produced no evidence that he sincerely believed he must engage in group worship to satisfy the tenants of his Islamic faith. Furthermore, the District Court found that the Plaintiff produced no evidence that Respondents' decision to confine him in administrative segregation was not reasonably related to the prison's legitimate penological interests, and instead found that the Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation for safety and security reasons unrelated to religious discrimination.

Plaintiff John Walker Lindh, a convicted "American Taliban," challenged prison policies that allowed for individual prayer in cells, but banned group congregation for prayer due to "security concerns." The Plaintiff sued the warden of the Federal Correctional Institution of Terre Haute, Indiana, alleging violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The District Court found that the Plaintiff did have sincerely held religious beliefs, and therefore turned its inquiry to whether the ban on group prayer furthers the compelling interest of security and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. The District Court ultimately determined that the warden-Respondent failed to establish that the total ban on daily congregational prayer by the Plaintiff was the least restrictive means of meeting the warden's security concerns.

Appellant Amina Aden appealed her contempt citations and sentences, contending that they violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  During the Appellant’s criminal trial for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota cited the Appellant for criminal contempt for repeatedly failing to stand when the court convened and recessed as required by pretrial order. This Court found that the lower court erred in evaluating the Appellant’s former contentions that standing at these times would violate her religious belief. The Court found that in the RFRA context, the district court erred by evaluating the orthodoxy and sophistication of the Appellant’s belief, instead of simply evaluating whether her practice was rooted in sincerely held religious belief.  Because the district court only applied a First Amendment analysis, it did not apply an RFRA analysis that evaluated whether the pretrial order was the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest.  Therefore, the Court vacated the contempt citations and remanded to the district court to evaluate whether the pretrial order was the least restrictive means to further that or other compelling interests.