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The appellant sought to challenge the ruling of the Kutacane Shari'a Court, which, among other things:

1. declared the marriage of the parties to be lawful;
2. granted the respondent a divorce; and
3. evenly distributed the parties' assets.

The Court dismissed the appeal insofar as it did not overturn the lower court's decision to grant a divorce, but it was more specific in stipulating the assets of the parties and their distribution therein.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Lhoksukon Shari'a Court, which, among other things, granted the respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra).

The Court dismissed the appeal, concurring with the lower court that the ongoing conflict between the parties constituted a sufficient reason for divorce, pursuant to arts 39(1) and (2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Jantho Shari'a Court (lower court), which had granted the respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra).

The Court, however, dismissed the appeal, citing witness evidence that the parties' regular quarrelling had resulted in them separating for approximately eight months, thereby invoking art 39(1) and (2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The Court also referenced the lower court judge's unsuccessful attempts to counsel the parties to reconcile.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Kutacane Shari'a Court (lower court), which had determined the parties' marriage to be lawful, and granted the respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra). The lower court had also deemed several parcels of land to be joint assets of the parties and ordered that they be split on a 50/50 basis.

The Court found no fault with the lower court's reasoning or decision, but opted to improve the formulation of its decision.

The parties were married on 23 December 2007, after which they lived with the respondent's parents for approximately three years. The marriage had been harmonious for the first three months and the parties had their first and only child on 4 March 2008. Since September 2009, however, the parties had begun to quarrel regularly. The applicant submitted that this was due to the respondent:

1. never valuing the applicant as head of the household;
2. not being grateful for what the parties had, including the applicant's salary, which was not stable;
3. becoming jealous if the applicant were to return home late; and
4. when angry, often uttering obscenities that the applicant deeemed inappropriate.

As a result, the applicant left the matrimonial home on 23 September 2009, and had been living with his parents for the 11 months leading up to the proceeding. During those 11 months, the parties had not communicated, and the applicant claimed that the purpose of marriage, as envisaged by art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, in conjunction with art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, was no longer feasible. The applicant felt that his claim met the requirements of art 19 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, for grounds for divorce.

In a written response, the respondent submitted that she also no longer wished to remain married to the applicant. Moreover, that she had told the applicant to leave her parents' home, that she had been working to support their child, that she did not feel that the applicant valued her as his wife, and that the applicant's temperament meant that she did not respect him as the head of their family.

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i) on the grounds that the marriage was no longer tenable due to ongoing conflict.

The Compilation of Islamic Laws (Kompilasi Hukum Islam) is the Republic of Indonesia's own state-sanctioned compilation of Islamic laws on marriage, inheritance and charitable foundations (wakaf). Established pursuant to Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 1991, it was compiled within the two authoritative symbols of Soeharto's New Order: the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. Kompilasi Hukum Islam was intended to be treated as a set of guidelines, rather than an enforceable statute, its intended effect being to make matters of Islamic law become matters of the state.

The parties were married on 27 December 2012 and had their first and only child on 31 January 2013. Six months into their marriage, however, the parties had begun to quarrel regularly. The plaintiff submitted that the cause of the conflict was the defendant's lack of responsibility as a husband in terms of providing enough financially to meet the parties' daily needs. The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant was unmotivated in his employment and that she had to assist to make ends meet. Furthermore, the defendant did not assist the plaintiff in looking after their child while the plaintiff was busy or cooking, and when the parties would argue, the defendant would often leave the matrimonial home, sometimes for up to two weeks at a time.

Problems escalated on 20 December 2013 when the defendant failed to provide enough to meet the parties' domestic needs, and the plaintiff was hesitant to seek assistance from her parents. When the plaintiff sought to discuss this with the defendant, the parties argued and the defendant then left the matrimonial home, unbeknownst to the plaintiff. The defendant never returned, nor did he contact the plaintiff or provide her with financial assistance to help rear their child.

The plaintiff sought to pay the necessary fee ('iwadh) for the court to grant her a divorce from the defendant (talak satu khul'i). The court noted that the defendant's failure to attend court had rendered mediation futile. It also noted that the defendant's conduct specifically repudiated their marriage as he had failed to provide the plaintiff with financial support, and failed to care for the plaintiff for more than six months (conduct envisaged by figures 2 and 4 of the parties' marriage contract). Accordingly, by virtue of art 116(g) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the plaintiff was permitted to divorce the plaintiff for breach of their marriage vows by paying a fee ('iwadh) of IDR 10,000.

The parties were married on 20 March 1993 at the Office of Religious Affairs in Plupuh, Sragen. After marrying they lived in Sukaramai, Banda Aceh, and had three children. The plaintiff submitted that the parties' marriage had been harmonious until 18 December 2010, after which the defendant had left the plaintiff and their children for no apparent reason. Despite searching for, as well as inquiring as to the whereabouts of, the defendant, the plaintiff had not been able to locate him. Therefore, the plaintiff sought a judicial divorce from the defendant, as well as custody of the parties' one remaining child still under the age of consent. Owing to her own impecuniosity, the plaintiff also sought dispensation from any court costs.

In the defendant's absence, the court acceded to the plaintiff's application for an irrevocable divorce (talak ba'in shughra), acknowledging that the purpose of marriage, as envisaged in art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, was no longer feasible. Moreover, that the defendant having left the plaintiff for more than two consecutive years was sufficient reason to grant a divorce, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(b) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(b) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

In regards to their child, the court found that while the child remained the joint responsibility of the parties, the plaintiff would be better placed to rear and educate him given his being underage (belum mumayyiz). This also accorded with the requirement contained in art 105(a) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court emphasised its belief that a mother would be more patient and meticulous in raising the children, and that to separate them from the plaintiff would be incredibly problematic given their age. The court also cited art 59(2) of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, which acknowledges the rights and needs of children to maintain a personal relationship with their father. Accordingly, it granted the defendant visitation rights, as well as the right to be consulted regarding his children's education and development, as contained in art 26(1) of Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection. The court also acceded to the plaintiff's request that the State bear the costs associated with the proceeding.

The parties were married on 22 October 1997 and had three children. For the first 10 years of their marriage, the parties lived in Padang, but, at the end of 2007, the defendant moved to South Tangerang, Banten, until mid-January 2010, before returning to Padang. The parties' marriage had been harmonious until mid-2007, when it then became quarrelsome because, the plaintiff submitted, the defendant:

1. admitted to taking the parties' shop title and selling it to another company to pay off debts, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, before then absconding after the plaintiff requested that the defendant and his family come to some resolution following his dishonest conduct;
2. was unaccountable for his own actions;
3. undervalued the plaintiff's children from her first marriage;
4. was dishonest with the plaintiff; and
5. often forbade the plaintiff's daughter from being friends with other boys.

At the beginning of February 2012, the defendant accused the plaintiff's daughter of going out with a boy, leaving the home and calling the daughter telling her to return home. When the plaintiff's daughter disputed the allegations made by the defendant, the defendant became angry and used profane language with her. In mid-February 2012, the defendant left the matrimonial home without informing the plaintiff and moved to a rental property in South Tangerang. Since then the parties had remained separated, during which time the defendant had provided the plaintiff with no financial support for two years and 10 months.

The plaintiff, believing the parties marriage was irreparable, requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra). The court acceded to the request, finding sufficient reason to grant a divorce, as required by art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974, art 22(2) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 134 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court, pursuant to art 19(b) and (f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(b) and (f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the plaintiff a divorce on the grounds of the parties being apart for more than two years, and ongoing conflict.

The applicant was an only child from the deceased's first marriage. The deceased had remarried and had three other children. The deceased also left behind a property in East Jakarta, as well as a pension, having been a state high school teacher. The applicant requested that the court stipulate the passing of her father, and that she was the only beneficiary under her father's will. The applicant, however, in court, requested that the claim be withdrawn as she had neglected to include the names of the other beneficiaries under the will of the deceased. The court acceded to the applicant's request.

This qanun obliges school children and prospective brides and bridegrooms to obtain a good level of Qur'anic recitation proficiency before they can graduate or have their marriages ratified. The qanun states that the specific aims of school children and prospective brides and bridegrooms in obtaining such proficiency is so that they can apply their newly acquired love for the Qur'an in their daily lives, so that they can understand and memorise Qur'anic verses, so that they develop the attitude and behaviours of a good, noble Muslims, and so that they become familiar with reading the Qur'an on a daily basis (art 3(1)).

The court acknowledged that, based on the facts of the preceding interlocutory decision, the parties' marriage had been quarrelsome since May 2015. This was because the defendant had failed in his spousal duties to the plaintiff, resulting in the plaintiff returning to live with her parents. Accordingly, the court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence repudiates the direction of a high religious court (Pengadilan Tinggi Agama) to a religious court (Pengadilan Agama) that it initiate a proceeding in order to witness the appellant divorce the respondent. This is because the legality of such a proceeding would first depend on obtaining the permission of the appellant's superior work officer, as well as the opinions of Badan Penasehatan Pembinaan dan Pelestarian Perkawinan (the Marriage Counselling, Mentoring and Preservation Body) and the appellant's immediate family.

The parties were married on 15 November 2000 and had four children. At the time of the proceeding, the defendant was serving an eight-month prison sentence for having beaten the plaintiff on 25 October 2014. The plaintiff submitted that entering the third year of their marriage, the parties had begun to quarrel regularly. This was due to:

1. a difference of opinion over domestic matters;
2. the defendant's insistence on using profane language and physically assaulting the plaintiff when they would argue, resulting in the plaintiff having to see a psychologist; and
3. the defendant having carried on an extra-marital affair with another woman, to whom he had also provided financial assistance.

The parties had been separated, as a result, since November 2014. The plaintiff, therefore, requested that the court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra), and that it order the defendant to provide her with maintenance back-payments.

The court found that the marriage could no longer fulfil the purposes of marriage as envisaged in art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. It was, therefore, satisfied that the plaintiff had met the evidentiary burden contained in art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974, and, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The court also cited fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) from Kitab Al Muhadzdzab juz II, page 164, and Kitab l'anatut Thalibin, page 85, both of which state that a husband is to provide maintenance back-payments to his wife in the event he had neglected to provide for her and their children for a period. It distinguished this fiqh, however, on the grounds that the parties had been separated for that time. In regards to the parties' four children, the court ordered that the two children under the age of 12 (belum mumayyiz) remain in the custody of the plaintiff. Accordingly, it ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff at least IDR 800,000 per month until the children reach the age of 21.

The parties were married on 7 June 2011 and had one child. Initially, the marriage was harmonious. By 2014, however, it had become quarrelsome because, the applicant submitted, the respondent would:

1. become excessively suspicious of the applicant; and
2. frequently accuse the applicant of carrying on an extra-marital affair.

In February 2015, the parties separated and had remained that way for approximately nine months. The applicant initially requested that the court grant him a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i). After court-sanctioned mediation, however, the applicant withdrew his application for divorce.

In this case, the defendant, a Muslim male to whom a 13-year old child was "married," shortly after the marriage, had engaged in non-consensual intercourse with the minor. While pleading guilty to the charge of first degree sexual assault on a child, the defendant nevertheless argued that his Islamic upbringing and background prevented him from fully appreciating the nature of the criminal conduct and he asked that this be considered a mitigating factor. The Court of Appeals of Nebraska rejected the claim, ruling that the defendant's culture and upbringing could not be taken into consideration as factors mitigating his culpability.

This is a reference to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq's position on recognizing the validity of the rules of other religions, such as marriage among the Magians, for example. Hossein Modarressi cites this reference as an example of one of the legal presumptions of al-Ṣādiq's legal school: the rule of recognition.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

This is a reference to a collection of multiple reports in connection with mutʿa marriage. Hossein Modarressi cites this source to argue that Sunnī scholars disagreed over whether and when mutʿa was abrogated by the Prophet or, as was commonly believed, proscribed by ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

The parties were married on 8 October 2000 and had two children. Before the Pontianak Religious Court (lower court), the cassation respondent had submitted that, since 2008, her marriage to the cassation applicant had become strained because the cassation applicant would often belittle the cassation respondent's parents, leaving the cassation respondent feeling offended. There were also issues pertaining to the ways in which the parties' families managed a relevant business, as well as allegations from the cassation respondent that the cassation applicant had been physically violent towards her, which necessitated a police report. The lower court had, accordingly, granted the cassation respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shughra), pursuant to art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The cassation applicant appealed to the Supreme Court at cassation level on the grounds that the Pontianak High Religious Court, which had affirmed the decision of the lower court, had failed to summons him in an appropriate manner. The Supreme Court found that the cassation applicant had failed to establish this and, therefore, pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, dismissed the appeal.

The Act replaced the Iranian Family Protection Act 1975 and modified other family law provisions as embodied in the Civil Code and the Divorce Act 1992. It contains procedural matters (Family Courts, Family Consultation Centers) as well as substantial ones (marriage, divorce, custody, nafaqa, alimony and pensions) and the criminal sanctions. Major changes introduced generally are:

A) The Family Court now involves a female consultant judge who is to give her opinion in each case, which the sitting judge (a man as in other courts) has to consider, but not to follow, in deciding the case;

B) The jurisdiction of the Family Court is now extended to additional matters, including child adoption, embryo donation, and sex change;

C) The process for divorce by mutual consent is facilitated;

D) The value of the Mahr (or the portion of the Mahr) for collecting which the debtor imprisonment provisions can be invoked is now limited to a specified amount (equal to 110 gold coin);

E) Temporary marriage needs not be registered now save in specific situations;