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The first applicant submitted that she had married a man by the name of Drs. Moerdiono on 20 December 1993, pursuant to Islamic norms. According to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, a marriage is lawful if performed in accordance with the respective religion and beliefs of the persons wishing to marry. The first applicant's marriage, however, had not been recorded with the Office of Religious Affairs, as required by art 2(2) of the Law No. 1 of 1974. As a result, the legal status of the first applicant's child (the second applicant) was that the second applicant had been born out of wedlock, per art 43(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974, and therefore only had a civil relationship with his mother and his mother's family. According to Islam, however, the first applicant's child was legitimate (sah) because the applicant was married to the second applicant's father when the second applicant was born meaning the second applicant's lineage with his father must be acknowledged.

The applicant submitted that her constitutional rights and those of the second applicant, as guaranteed by arts 28B(1) and (2), and 28D(1) of the 1945 Constitution, had been repudiated by virtue of art 43(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974.

The court acceded to the applicant's submission regarding art 43(1) stating that the article was to be read down as meaning that a child's civil relationship with its father and its father's family depended on scientific proof that the child was a blood relation of the father.

The parties were married on 7 May 2005 and had two children. From December 2012 the parties' marriage had become disharmonious as a result of regular quarrelling. The plaintiff submitted that this was the result of:

1. the defendant's egotistical tendencies, never validating the plaintiff's opinion; and
2. the defendant being physically and psychologically abusive towards the plaintiff.

Problems escalated and, in August 2013, while remaining under the same roof, the parties had begun to sleep in separate beds. Regardless, the plaintiff believed the marriage was irreparable and that divorce was the only feasible option. As a civil servant, the plaintiff had also already obtained permission to divorce from her superior officer (the Mayor of Kendari).

Despite the defendant's absence from court, the court acceded to the plaintiff’s request, granting her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shugra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court also deferred to expert Islamic legal opinion in Kitab Ia'natul Thalibin Juz III, which dictates that a court is to grant a wife a divorce if she is no longer happy with her husband. The court ordered the plaintiff to pay court costs (IDR 241,000).

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Lebanon Republic (Al Jumhuriyah al Lubnaniyah), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Lebanon's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

The Act replaced the Iranian Family Protection Act 1975 and modified other family law provisions as embodied in the Civil Code and the Divorce Act 1992. It contains procedural matters (Family Courts, Family Consultation Centers) as well as substantial ones (marriage, divorce, custody, nafaqa, alimony and pensions) and the criminal sanctions. Major changes introduced generally are:

A) The Family Court now involves a female consultant judge who is to give her opinion in each case, which the sitting judge (a man as in other courts) has to consider, but not to follow, in deciding the case;

B) The jurisdiction of the Family Court is now extended to additional matters, including child adoption, embryo donation, and sex change;

C) The process for divorce by mutual consent is facilitated;

D) The value of the Mahr (or the portion of the Mahr) for collecting which the debtor imprisonment provisions can be invoked is now limited to a specified amount (equal to 110 gold coin);

E) Temporary marriage needs not be registered now save in specific situations;

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal (Sanghiya Loktantrik Ganatantra Nepal), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Nepal's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Shri Lanka Prajatantrika Samajavadi Janarajaya/Ilankai Jananayaka Choshalichak Kutiyarachu), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Sri Lanka's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Langsa Shari'a Court, which had granted the respondent a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i), but also ordered the respondent to pay to the appellant the following in maintenance: IDR 5 million (iddah - 100-day period after divorce has been granted); the monetary equivalent of two grams of gold (mut'ah); IDR 1 million (kiswah - clothing); and IDR 750,000 per month in child maintenance, until the parties' three children were of age and independent.

Overall, the Court agreed with the decision of the lower court. It did not, however, concur with the lower court's usage of the word 'menolak' (dismiss) in regards to the appellant's request that one-third of the respondent's salary be provided to the appellant as financial support, based on Government Regulation No. 10 of 1983 (amended by Government Regulation No. 45 of 1991), because those regulations relate to the discipline of civil servants, rather than marriage and divorce. Accordingly, the Court stated, such a claim should be declared 'tidak dapat diterima' (unacceptable).

The Court also increased the amount of maintenance payable by the respondent, as follows: IDR 5 million (iddah); the monetary equivalent of three grams of gold (mut'ah); IDR 2 million (kiswah); and IDR 750,000 per month in child maintenance, until the parties' three children were of age and independent.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Madagascar (Republique de Madagascar/Repoblikan'i Madagasikara), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Madagascar's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Mauritius, based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under Mauritius' Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

The parties were married on 2 February 1994 and had two children. They had lived harmoniously as husband and wife for 21 years, however, in 2000, the respondent fell ill. This had compromised her ability to be physically intimate with the applicant for approximately the past four years. Concerned that he would commit adultery (zina), in December 2014, the applicant requested the respondent's permission to marry again. The respondent granted him permission. The woman the applicant proposed to marry was fit and proper in that she did not breach any shari'a or civil legislative requirements: she was not a blood relative of the applicant or respondent, nor had they shared a wet nurse; she was a divorcee and not engaged to another man; and her marriage guardian was prepared to marry them. The applicant also told the court that he believed he was capable of having more than one wife as his monthly salary was IDR 5 million, he had promised to be fair to both wives as well as his children, and the respondent had prepared a written statement in support of the applicant. The applicant also told the court that he and the respondent were prepared to separate their joint assets if the applicant were granted judicial permission to marry again.

The court counselled the applicant on the consequences and risks of polygamy, advising him not to go ahead with the second marriage. Its advice, however, went unheeded. With this in mind, the court cited verse 3 of Surat Annisa from the Qur'an, which does not prohibit polygamy but places the onus on the man to prove he will treat both wives fairly, as enunciated in art 55(2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court was of the opinion that the applicant would treat his wives and children fairly, and, as required by art 5(1.b) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 58(1.b) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, could financially afford to care for them. After the applicant signed a statement attesting to do so, meeting the requirements of art 5(1)(a), (b) and (c) of Law No. 1 of 1974, as well as art 41(b) and (c) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975. The court acceded to the applicant's request and stipulated the items acquired by the parties as a married couple as their joint assets.

The parties were married on 14 August 1987 and had two children (born 1988 and 1990). Initially, the marriage was harmonious, but, on 2 October 1995, the cassation applicant filed for divorce in the Surabaya Religious Court (lower court) (950/Pdt. G/1995/PA. Sby). During the divorce proceedings, on 18 and 23 September 1996, the cassation respondent reported the cassation applicant to the police for domestic abuse. During the proceeding, the cassation respondent successfully requested the lower court's permission for herself and the parties' children to live separately from the cassation applicant.

On 15 October 1996, the lower court dismissed the cassation applicant's request for a divorce, citing the interests of the parties' young children as its primary reason. This decision was later upheld by the East Java High Religious Court (No. 189/Pdt.G/1996/PTA.Sby), as well as the Indonesian Supreme Court (No. 157 K/AG/1998) on 5 February 1999.

While the parties remained under one roof, pursuant to court orders, they had not communciated nor been physically intimate with one another for 17 years. After the cassation applicant refused to act as his daughter's marriage guardian, the cassation respondent asserted that the family could no longer depend on the cassation applicant as a husband or father, and requested that the Surabaya Religious Court (lower court) grant her a divorce. The lower court (No. 355/Pdt.G/2012/PA.Sby), on 5 June 2013, granted the cassation respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra) and ordered her to pay court costs (IDR 316,000).

The cassation applicant lodged an appeal in the Surabaya High Religious Court. The Surabaya High Religious Court (No. 304/Pdt.G/2013/PTA.Sby), on 29 October 2013, upheld the decision of the lower court, in favour of the cassation respondent.

On 19 December 2013, the cassation applicant submitted a cassation application to the Indoneisan Supreme Court, submitting that the decision of the lower court should be overturned because:

1. The cassation respondent had failed to fulfil the formalities required for the trial, and that the lower court should not have accepted the cassation respondent’s submissions if they did not satisfy the formal requirements;
2. The cassation respondent, as a civil servant, had failed to obtain permission from her superior officer to file for a divorce, pursuant to Indonesian Government Regulation No. 10 of 1983 on Permission to Marry and Divorce for Civil Servants, in conjunction with Indonesian Government Regulation No. 45 of 1990.

The Supreme Court held that these matters were non-justiciable at cassation level, found that the Surabaya High Religious Court had not erred at law, and dismissed the cassation applicant's reasons for cassation, ordering him to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Bahrain (Mamlakat al Bahrayn), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Bahrain’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status, and is the principal source of legislation.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the State of Eritrea (Hagere Ertra), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Eritrea's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Arab Republic of Egypt (Jumhuriyat Misr al Arabiyah), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Egypt's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is the principal source of legislation. 

The parties were married on 18 September 2005. The plaintiff submitted, however, that only a few months after she and the defendant had married, she received a telephone call from a woman calling herself Ciah, claiming to have secretly married (nikah siri) the defendant and being five-months pregnant with the defendant's child. From thereon, this became a point of contention between the parties, despite the defendant never validating the claims made by this other woman.

The plaintiff alleged that other causes of tension between the parties included:

1. the defendant often being angry with the plaintiff for no apparent reason;
2. the defendant never contributing financially to the parties' domestic needs, thereby making the plaintiff assume he was spending his salary on his other wife;
3. the plaintiff and defendant having been separated since the end of 2013;
4. since the beginning of 2011, the defendant having not executed his spousal responsibilities vis-a-vis the plaintiff; and
5. notably, frequent quarrelling between the parties causing the plaintiff to want to move to Bireuen for work, but not being granted permission to do so by the defendant, the dispute escalating to the point that the defendant hit the plaintiff, causing her to seek medical treatment for facial bruising.

The plaintiff also claimed that, from January 2011-present, the defendant had failed to provide her with financial and emotional support. The plaintiff quantified the financial support she believed the defendant owed her at IDR 2 million per month for 41 months (IDR 82 million). The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant had failed to provide her with a true dowry (mahar) at the time of their marriage. Rather, the defendant had borrowed five grams of pure gold from the plaintiff's parents, which he had returned after they were married, vowing to the plaintiff that he would one day give to her five grams of pure gold, or the cash equivalent thereof. The defendant, the plaintiff submitted, never upheld that promise.

The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had appropriately sought and obtained a letter of permission from her superior officer to divorce the defendant, and that the defendant's objection to that letter was irrelevant insofar as the court was unauthorised to intervene in the affairs of a government agency. The court also noted that the parties had sought to reconcile their differences via mediation, but to no avail.

The court acceded to the plaintiff's application for an irrevocable divorce (talak ba'in shughra), acknowledging that the purpose of marriage, as envisaged in art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and surat Al-rum verse 21, being a peaceful, hopeful and loving (sakinah, mawaddah dan rahmah) homelife was no longer feasible. Moreover, that ongoing conflict between the parties was sufficient reason to grant a divorce, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court, however, dismissed the plaintiff's claim for back-payment maintenance costs (IDR 82 million), noting that the plaintiff, like the defendant, worked as a civil servant, who would had to have first obtained the defendant's permission to work. The court noted that if one of the plaintiff's reasons for wanting to divorce the defendant was due to a lack of financial support, to then demand money from the defendant would contradict her claim.

The parties were married on 11 April 2004 and had four children. The applicant submitted that, since 2009, he and the respondent had quarrelled regularly as a result of the applicant's advice to the respondent on how best to conduct herself as a good wife. Problems escalated on 15 April 2014, resulting in the respondent leaving the applicant and their children. The applicant maintained that divorce was the only feasible option.

The respondent responded to the applicant's allegations, stating that it was not just she who had not been a good wife, but the applicant who had not been a good husband, evidenced by his having had an extra-marital affair with another woman. While the respondent had no objections to the applicant's application for divorce, she requested:

1. custody of the parties' four children;
2. that the applicant replace the respondent's jewellery that he had sold;
3. that the applicant repay debts related to the pre-marriage customary dowry; and
4. monetary compensation for iddah (three-month period following divorce having been granted).

The applicant denied having had an extra-marital affair, but rather asserted that the respondent had had an extra-marital affair of her own. The applicant also requested that the court grant custody of the parties' first and second children to the applicant, while granting custody of the parties' third and fourth children to the respondent. The applicant also asserted that, while two pieces of the respondent's jewellery had been sold to pay for instalments on a motorcyle, he was prepared to replace them, as well as to provide the respondent with monetary compensation for iddah, provided it was compatible with his own income, which was sporadic at best. In regards to repaying the dowry, the applicant could not ascertain the amount as it was a family member who had arranged it at the time of the parties' wedding.

Following deliberations, the applicant orally withdrew his application for divorce, while the respondent provided the court with verbal assent to the withdrawal. The court treated both parties' in-court communications as a binding agreement, pursuant to art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), and ordered the applicant to pay court costs (IDR 381,000).

The parties were married on 13 May 2006 and had one child. After marrying, the parties lived with the plaintiff's parents for several weeks, before returning to Bali, where the defendant was stationed for work, and where the plaintiff was completing her medical degree at Universitas Mahassaraswati in Denpasar. While in Bali, however, the parties did not live together: the defendant lived in a rental property in Jembrana, while the plaintiff lived in a boarding house (rumah kost) in Denpasar. On one occasion, when the plaintiff was late to collect the defendant from a bus terminal, the defendant struck her in the head. While she was wearing a helmet at the time, the plaintiff still decided not to reprimand the defendant. The parties maintained these living arrangements until the plaintiff completed her studies in 2007, when the plaintiff then moved into the defendant's rental property in Jembrana.

While living together, the defendant's fondness for cockfighting became a source of tension between the parties. When angry, the defendant would often throw whatever objects happened to be in front of him, and, on one occasion, threw an empty gallon container at the plaintiff while she was pregnant. The plaintiff claimed she then cried and went to her room, while the defendant allegedly shouted 'go home to your parents' ('pulang saja ke orang tuamu'). The plaintiff later moved to the defendant's parents' home in Jember, East Java, while the defendant remained in Jembrana. The parties occasionally argued on the telephone, as a result of the plaintiff frequently hearing that the defendant was fraternising with another woman.

Around the fasting period in 2008, when the plaintiff was seven-eight months pregnant, the plaintiff heard from the neighbour and landlord of the defendant's rental property that a woman had visited the defendant from 8pm-3am. Upon receiving this information, the plaintiff became convinced that the defendant was having an extra-marital affair. When the parties spoke again on the telephone, the defendant occasionally uttered profanities that left the plaintiff feeling upset and in tears.

As the plaintiff was entering her ninth month of the pregnancy, the defendant visited her at his parents' home. One evening the plaintiff inquired with the defendant as to whether or not he had had an extra-marital affair. In response, the defendant threw an ashtray, causing the plaintiff to run into her room and lock the door out of fear. The defendant chased her, and, attempting to enter the room, proceeded to cause damage to the door handle. Concerned that the neighbours might overhear the commotion, the plainitff opened the door to her room, only for the defendant to start causing damage to a cupboard door with his fists. When the plaintiff retired to bed, the defendant then jumped up on the plaintiff's bed, almost landing on the plaintiff's pregnant stomach. After the defendant's mother intervened, the defendant sat down calmly and confessed to having had an extra-marital affair. The defendant acknowledged he was prepared for the plaintiff to divorce him, but maintained that the child was his and would go with him.

The next day the defendant apologised to the plaintiff for his wrongdoing, and the plaintiff spoke with the woman with whom the defendant had had the extra-marital affair. The woman confirmed the information provided to the plaintiff by the landlord. The next day the plaintiff experienced some pregnancy-related bleeding and was brought to Bina Sehat Hospital. The hospital noted that, as the plaintiff had experienced some psychological stress, the pregnancy would be expedited.

In 2009, after the child was born, it lived in Jember with the defendant, per the defendant's wishes. While the plaintiff was working in Kendari for two years as a civil servant, the defendant equivocated as to when he would bring the child to visit the plaintiff in Kendari. As a result, the plaintiff often visited her child in Jember. During her visits to Jember, the plaintiff became aware from things the child would say that the defendant was not showing the child any affection, and that the child was being deprived of its mother's love, something, the plaintiff told the court, pivotal to any child's development. When the plaintiff was about to return to Kendari, the child would cry while hugging the plaintiff and calling 'Mama... Mama... Mama...'.

The plaintiff had also provided the defendant with significant financial support to assist him in establishing a catfish business. During one of her visits to Jember, several months after a catfish harvest, the defendant's mother informed the plaintiff that the defendant had visited a shaman (dukun) to ensure that the plaintiff was not happy in Kendari. When the plaintiff inquired with the defendant about this, in front of the defendant's mother, the defendant punched the plaintiff in the face several times, felling the plaintiff in the corner of her room.

After deliberately limiting her communication with the defendant, the plaintiff re-established contact in November 2012.The defendant, however, only used the opportunity to order the plaintiff to arrange the parties' divorce. The parties did not communicate at all in 2013, after the defendant requested that the plaintiff not disturb him. From the beginning of 2010, the defendant had not provided the plaintiff with any financial support, and the parties had not been physically intimate since August 2012. Pursuant to arts 39, 42 and 44 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, as well as art 19 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 56 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the plaintiff sought a judicial divorce and custody of the parties' child.

Despite acknowledging that court-sanctioned mediation had been unsuccessful in reconciling the parties' differences, the court dismissed the plaintiff's application. The court acknowledged that the defendant had disputed and repudiated the plaintiff's submissions, but more significantly, it stressed that it was dismissing the application on the grounds that the two witnesses produced by the plaintiff had never seen the parties quarrel, did not know the nature of the parties' domestic situation, and the information they had provided to the court was, therefore, immaterial. On the same grounds, it dismissed the plaintiff's application for custody of the parties' child.