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The parties were married on 3 March 2012 and had their first and only child on 1 June 2014. The plaintiff submitted, however, that the parties had quarrelled regularly since December 2012 because the defendant had had an extra-marital affair. The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant would take medicinal drugs that would often make him angry. On one occasion, for instance, in mid-February 2013, the plaintiff asked the defendant not to bring his friends home with him. In response, the defendant grabbed the plaintiff by the hair and put his hands around her neck.

Unbeknownst to the plaintiff at the time, the defendant had incurred a IDR 2 million debt with the owner of a travel service after failing to pay the owner at the time the service was rendered. Problems escalated when, on 25 June 2014, the plaintiff's parents inquired with the defendant as to the debt, to which the defendant still would not admit. When the plaintiff's parents asked the parties to resolve the matter on their own time, the defendant had concluded that the plaintiff's parents were telling him to leave their home. The defendant then left the parties' home, and the parties had remained separated for approximately seven months.

At the end of September 2014 the defendant spent the night with another woman, which the plaintiff learned about from the woman in question. Then, on 20 December 2014, the defendant picked up the plaintiff, unbeknownst to her parents, and brought her to his parents' home in Pesisir Selatan, West Sumatra. When the plaintiff's parents came to pick her up, the defendant threatened them with a knife. Believing her marriage to the defendant was no longer tenable, the plaintiff sought a divorce.

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acceded to the plaintiff's request, granting her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) as envisaged by art 119(2)c of the Compilation of Islamic Laws on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The plaintiff was a customer of the first defendant at the Lubuk Buaya Shari'a Micro-Service Unit. There he had entered into a Murabahah agreement (dated 7 July 2009), pursuant to which the first defendant executed a take over loan for the plaintiff to the value of IDR 200 million. The plaintiff was to return to the first defendant the loan and reward valued at IDR 153,600,000. Accordingly, the plaintiff was obligated to pay to the first defendant IDR 353,600,000. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant's profit was IDR 153,600,000, or equivalent to 76.5 per cent of the take over loan (IDR 200 million), which the plaintiff could not afford to pay. The plaintiff submitted that this was unlawful because, according to Islamic shari'a, the plaintiff was only entitled to 10 per cent of the profit, but had to pay to the first defendant 76.5 per cent of the contract price.

The Padang High Religious Court found that, as the parties had agreed to this profit margin, it was unable to intervene. While it did not object to the reasoning of the lower court, it handed down its own judgment, amending formulaic errors in the lower court's judgment.

The court ordered the parties to adhere to the deed of reconciliation (akte perdamaian) reached during mediation, the conditions of which were:

1. that the first and second parties had executed a multi-service rental agreement, dated 31 October 2013;
2. that, pursuant to that agreement, the second party had guaranteed to the first party the deed of title of a 2,739m² property belonging to the co-defendant located in Yogyakarta;
3. that the second party would make monthly repayments of IDR 1 million on the 25th of every month, commencing in January 2016, and ceasing in December 2016;
4. that if the second party defaulted the Yogyakarta property would be seized and sold to discharge the debts of the second party to the first party;
5. that if the second party discharged all his debts to the first party then the first party would return the deed of title to the property;
6. that these terms will be included in the court's decision, and the parties are obliged, in good faith (itikad baik), to implement the aforementioned terms of reconciliation.

The court ordered the parties to adhere to the deed of reconciliation (akte perdamaian) reached during mediation, the conditions of which were:

1. that the first and second parties had executed a multi-service rental agreement, dated 31 October 2013;
2. that, pursuant to that agreement, the second party had guaranteed to the first party the deed of title to a 2,739m² property belonging to the co-defendant located in Yogyakarta;
3. that the second party would make monthly repayments of IDR 1 million on the 25th of every month, commencing in January 2016 and ceasing in December 2016;
4. that if the second party defaulted the Yogyakarta property would be seized and sold to discharge the debts of the second party to the first party;
5. that if the second party discharged all his debts to the first party then the first party would return the deed of title to the property;
6. that these terms will be included in the court's decision, and the parties are obliged, in good faith (itikad baik), to implement the aforementioned terms of reconciliation.

The court ordered the parties to adhere to the deed of reconciliation (akte perdamaian) reached during mediation, the conditions of which were:

1. that the first and second parties had executed a multi-service rental agreement, dated 25 July 2014;
2. that, pursuant to Civil Case Complaint No: 0036/Pdt.G/2016/PA.Wno, the quantum of damages payable by the second party to the first party was IDR 42,535,000, but, based on the outcome of mediation between the parties, the amount to be repaid by the second party is IDR 30,000,000;
3. that, pursuant to that agreement, the second party had guaranteed to the first party the deed of title of a 332m² Yogyakarta property belonging to the first co-defendant;
4. that the second party would make monthly repayments, the first of which would be IDR 2 million, the second to 10th of which would be IDR 3 million, to be paid on the 25th day of each month, with a final repayment of IDR 1 million payable on 25 January 2017;
5. that if the second party defaulted, the Yogyakarta property would be seized and sold to discharge the debts of the second party to the first party;
6. that if the second party discharged all his debts to the first party then the first party would return the deed of title to the property;
7. that these terms will be included in the court's decision, and the parties are obliged, in good faith (itikad baik), to implement the aforementioned terms of reconciliation;
8. that the parties agree for this deed of reconciliation to be affirmed in a court decision.

The plaintiff submitted that he had obtained a working capital borrowing facility from the first defendant, but that he had never received a copy of the agreement, despite making repeated requests to the first defendant. The conduct of the first defendant was therefore, the plaintiff submitted, in contravention of art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), and constituted a default on the parties' agreement. As a result, the plaintiff did not know when the agreement concluded nor the details of the repayments he was required to make in favour of the first defendant. Accordingly, the plaintiff submitted that he could not be held solely responsible if he failed to make a repayment pursuant to the agreement because the defendant had deliberately concealed the agreement from the plaintiff, contrary to art 1320 of the Civil Code.

When the plaintiff fell into arrears, the first defendant sought to auction the security property leveraged by the plaintiff to secure the loan. The plaintiff submitted, however, that the first defendant had failed to issue him with a warning before auctioning the property.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's application due to several formulaic errors contained therein. First, the plaintiff had failed to identify a legal or legislative basis to establish a legal relationship between the parties. Secondly, the plaintiff's provisional prayer for relief (petitum provisi), prayer for relief (petitum), and outline of claim (posita) differed insofar as the outline of claim defined the defendant's conduct as a default, while the provisional prayer for relief sought the suspension of the auction of the property, and the prayer for relief declared the property lawful and of value. More importantly, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to include in its claim the Office of State Assets and Auction Services (Kantor Pelayanan Kekayaan Negara dan Lelang) as a co-defendant.

Two Muslim women who were prohibited by their respective employers from wearing a ḥijāb sued their employers on the grounds of religious discrimination. The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) decided whether these women had been unfairly dismissed by their respective employers when taking into account the 2000 EU directive on discrimination in the workplace. The ECJ ruled that the first employer's internal directive against religious symbols was not applied in a directly discriminatory manner against the first woman. While indirect discrimination could be a possibility it "may be objectively justified by a legitimate aim." As for the second case, the ECJ decided "that the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have the services of that employer provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be considered a genuine and determining occupational requirement within the meaning of the directive."

The plaintiff's claim stated that, after the parties were married on 1 October 2010 before a marriage registry official from the local Office of Religious Affairs, work commitments had necessitated their living apart. The plaintiff worked at the Sungai Garinggiang Public Health Centre, and lived at the Health Centre's service house, while the defendant lived with his parents in Padang. Once every three days the plaintiff returned to her parents' home until the parties separated. The parties had one child.

The plaintiff submitted that, since the beginning of the marriage, she and the defendant had quarrelled continuously. This was because:

1. the defendant did not dedicate enough time to the plaintiff; and
2. the plaintiff had heard from family friends that the defendant had had an extra-marital affair, and, while the defendant had denied the allegation, the plaintiff's own investigation revealed that the defendant had indeed had an affair with his previous girlfriend.

Problems escalated in mid-October 2012, as the defendant was still in contact with his previous girlfriend. While the defendant denied these allegations again, the ensuing argument caused him to leave the plaintiff's parents' home. The parties had remained separated since then, and the defendant had not provided the plaintiff with any financial support. In August 2013, the plaintiff was informed by friends of the defendant that the defendant had married his previous girlfriend.

The court noted that its advice to the parties that they reconcile had been to no avail. Moreover, the defendant had no objections to the plaintiff's request for a divorce. Accordingly, the court, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, in conjunction with art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shugra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Medan Religious Court (lower court). The lower court had determined that the non-issuance of a building permit from the Medan Spatial and Building Service (Dinas Tata Ruang dan Tata Bangunan Kota Medan) constituted a force majeure. Accordingly, it found that:

1. the respondent (then plaintiff) was released from any liability under the murabahah credit facility agreement it had entered into with the appellant (the defendant) on 10 September 2013; and
2. that the appellant must return to the respondent two deeds of title to properties leveraged by the respondent in return for the murabahah credit facility.

The appellant challenged the decision of the lower court on the following grounds:

1. that the decision was erroneous and not based in law, insofar as the object of the agreement was stated as being three units, whereas it was for the purchase of building construction materials;
2. that the lower court had incorrectly labelled the credit facility an al-bai', per art 20(2) of the Compilation of Shari'a Economy Laws, rather than a murabahah credit facility, that is, a credit facility that benefits both parties, provided by a shahib al-mal (creditor), per art 20(6) of the Compilation of Shari'a Economy Laws;
3. that the lower was incorrect in defining the non-issuance of a building permit as a force majeure for the purposes of arts 1244-1245 of the Indonesian Civil Code, and also incorrect in applying the law because a force majeure only results in the parties being released from demands for damages, costs and/or profits to the party experiencing the force majeure, which causes it to default; and
4. that the force majeure submitted by the respondent had already passed because the notice of unsuccessful application for a building permit was dated 5 May 2014, while the appellant was only informed of the notice on 19 August 2014 (three months after the fact), which was contrary to the 14-day statute of limitations contained in art 17(3) of the murabahah credit facility.

The court acceded to the appeal, concurring with the appellant's submission that the respondent was required to inform the appellant of the issuance (or lack thereof) of any relevant building permit, pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, the court overturned the decision of the lower court, and ordered the respondent to pay costs.

This regional regulation prohibits prostitution and sexual promiscuity for money, goods or services in the regency of Way Kanan. It prohibits all persons and legal entities from carrying out prostitution, and from facilitating it through ancillary means. Its preamble states that prostitution is contrary to religious values, morality, and communal traditional customs. The regulation also places on all persons with knowledge of such practices to report them to authorised personnel. Contravention of this regulation can result in a prison sentence of, at most, six months, or a fine of as much as IDR 3 million. For recidivists (persons who have contravened the regulation again within one year), their punishment will be one-third additionally severe if the sentence is a prison term, or one-half additionally severe if the punishment handed down is a fine.

A Pakistani Muslim hospital employee sued his employer under Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law (after receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)), alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff argued that he received negative performance evaluations because he was absent from work on several Fridays and other days in observance of Islamic religious prayer services and holidays, in compliance with Islamic ritual law. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie discrimination claim, as he never articulated any adverse employment action suffered. The Court, however, allowed Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim to move forward as it raised a material question of fact that should be decided by a jury. 

The EEOC represented an African-American Muslim suing his former employer under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff claimed he had been the recipient of many offensive comments (such as being called a “towel head” and “Taliban”) and degrading actions (such as his co-workers hiding his time card while he was at prayer services). The Court reversed and remanded a decision by the District Court for the District of Maryland to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. This Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment and that his employer had notice of the ongoing conduct; it thus denied the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to proceed.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Al Mamlakah al Urduniyah al Hashimiyah), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Jordan's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is a principle source of legislation. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Iran's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is the principal source of legislation. 

The cassation applicants sought to challenge Decision: 160/ Pdt.G/2014/PTA.Smg. of the Semarang High Religious Court and Decision: 1721/Pdt.G/ 2013/PA.Pbg of the Purbalingga Religious Court, on the grounds that both courts had erred in their application of the law. More specifically, that:

1. the lower courts had failed to consider that the money obtained pursuant to the multi-service ijarah financing agreement was used for tabloid printing costs, while printing had stopped because the director of printing (Suyitno) had absconded, as stated in a report to Purbalingga Police, dated 21 October 2013;
2. the cassation applicants had provided a financial guarantee of IDR 25 million, which, while it was subsequently blocked by the cassation respondents, should have been used to reduce their arrears;
3. evidence was produced showing that the debt owed to the cassation respondents was in the name of Mulia Lastro Wibowo, not the cassation applicants, which should render the decision of the lower courts invalid; and
4. the Purbalingga Religious Court had noted in its judgment that the cassation respondents had produced witnesses, when in actual fact they had not.

The court allowed the appeal on the following different grounds:

1. that the Semarang High Religious Court was inconsistent in its findings with regard to the cassation applicants defaulting on repayments due, stating that a default had to be allowed until the agreement concluded in September 2016, while also concurring with the Purbalingga Religious Court that the cassation applicants had defaulted; and
2. that the Semarang High Religious Court decision lacked legal certainty because the cassation applicants, who were found to have defaulted, should have been ordered to pay damages rather than to simply discharge their arrears with the cassation respondents, because such an order did not remove the risk of the cassation applicants defaulting again.

A Muslim-naturalized American citizen of Egyptian national origin sued Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff, along with officials at the Transportation Security Administration, under Title VII, as well as under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), the Fifth Amendment, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Privacy Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff was suspended from work with the Federal Aviation Administration after he failed to obtain a security clearance renewal following 9/11, and the plaintiff alleged that his security clearance was not renewed because he was Egyptian and Muslim. The defendant claimed that the Administration did not control who receives a security clearance, and that their action suspending him was merely a result of his failure to maintain his previous level of clearance. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of religious or national-origin discrimination [with no allegation of barring practices of Islamic ritual law, for example] as articulated by McDonnell Douglas, and that without the security clearance, he was no longer qualified for his job. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Hilton Karriem Mincy, a Muslim prisoner at the Lycoming County Prison, brought this suit against the Respondents – the county prison, the prison warden and other prison officials – alleging that the prison’s inadequate food service during Ramadan, which included no hot meals at the end of the day and evening meals of insufficient caloric content to compensate for the absence of a daytime meal, constituted a failure to accommodate his religious beliefs and a violation of the RLUIPA. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, and the Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiff identified no official policy promulgated by the prison administration which violated his constitutional rights, and there was no evidence to suggest that any named Respondent played a direct role or had any personal involvement in the preparation or storage of food.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Maldives (Dhivehi Raajjeyge Jumhooriyyaa), based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under the Maldives' Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is the principal source of legislation. 

Mohammad Fadel (Professor of Law, University of Toronto) and Connell Monette (Vice President of Academic Affairs, American Academy Casablanca) organized a PIL Forum Roundtable on the recent publication of al-Muwaṭṭaʾ – Recension of Yahya b. Yahya al-Laythī (d. 234/848) by Mālik b. Anas, distributed through Harvard University Press. This translation is based on the recently published Royal Moroccan Edition of the Muwaṭṭaʾ (Casablanca: Maṭbaʿat al-najāḥ al-jadīda, 2013/1434), and was commissioned by the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs. A team of Moroccan translators, under the supervision of Mohammad Fadel and Connell Monette, editors, working over the course of several years, prepared the translation.

Below are the essays contributed to the Roundtable on the ISLAMICLAWblog. Leading scholars which scholars comment on various aspects of the translation; some engage substantively with particular topics or themes in the Muwaṭṭaʾ, others comment on the translation and its style, and some combine elements of both.

Part of the Online Companion for Al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, the Royal Moroccan Edition: The Recension of Yaḥyā Ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī.

The first respondent, the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syari'ah Nasional – Basyarnas), had made a decision on 16 September 2009 between the second respondent (PT. Atriumasta Sakti) and the applicant (PT. Bank Syariah Mandiri), ordering the applicant to return to the second respondent IDR 878,791,366. This figure comprised a banking provision cost payment of IDR 350 million, or one per cent of the value of the financing facility worth IDR 35 billion, because the Murabahah agreement between the two parties had been declared invalid by the first respondent; IDR 45,027,000 in project insurance monies; IDR 5,962,700 in upfront employee social security payments; IDR 298,135,000 to the DKI Jakarta Government Construction Structuring and Supervision Services; and instalment repayments of IDR 179,666,666. The applicant was also ordered to return to the respondent any other costs associated, provided those costs could be verified by the Public Accountants' Office. Basyarnas also decided that if the applicant failed to abide by its decision, the respondent could lodge an application with Bank Indonesia (the Indonesian central bank) to hand the applicant an administrative sanction, and reduce the applicant's credit rating.

The court noted that, pursuant to art 70 of Law No. 30 of 1999, as well as the Elucidation of Chapter VII of Law 30, in conjunction with Law No. 7 of 1989 as amended by Law No. 3 of 2006, and Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2008, a party to such a dispute may request that a religious court declare a Basyarnas decision null and void. Article 70, however, only applies if: a. the decision was based on the submission of a false document; b. a relevant document was concealed by the opposing party; or c. the decision was based on misleading information. In this instance, the applicant claimed that the first respondent had failed to consider material legal facts to its case, therefore invoking art 70(c). Based on a submission made by the second respondent that the applicant had failed to carry out the second and subsequent stages of liquidation deriving from the Murabahah financing facility, the first respondent had determined that the applicant had defaulted on its agreement with the second respondent. The applicant claimed that the first respondent had ignored the fact that it was actually the second respondent who had defaulted by:

1. failing to produce the original building permit and then failing to the applicant with a copy, pursuant to art 3(1) of the Murabahah agreement;
2. failing to pay the notary, pursuant to art 3(4) of the agreement; and
3. failing to transfer its own self-financing monies, pursuant to art 3(23) of the agreement.

While the second respondent had already shown the applicant a building permit management services contract between it and H. Jayadi Kusumah, as well as proof of payment of a quote for 1 March 2005 for IDR 3,212,500,000 to H. Jayadi Kusumah as a buliding permit enactment management fee, as well as permission for other construction for the Ruko Soho Carbella Square project, the applicant claimed that the first respondent had ignored the fact that the reliability of this quote had not been established. Moreover, the applicant had even requested to see the quote via the Basyarnas secretary, pursuant to trial procedures, but had been denied. This, the applicant claimed, precluded it from carrying out its end of the bargain. In short, the applicant claimed the second respondent had failed to hand over to the applicant its building permit, whereas the second respondent had claimed it had paid IDR 3,212,500,000 to H. Jayadi Kusumah to arrange the building permit and other necessary construction permits.

The applicant also claimed that there was a material disparity between the final draft of the Basyarnas decision and the decision provided to the Central Jakarta Religious Court insofar as the Religious Court had been told that Basyarnas would not accede to claims for damages until their reliability had been verified by the Public Accountant. While the Religious Court declared the Basyarnas decision null and void, the Supreme Court found that the Religious Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, thereby reinstating the Basyarnas decision.

Pursuant to art 67(c) of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, in conjunction with Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the applicant requested the court reconsider (peninjauan kembali) its decision on the grounds that the court had granted more than that sought by the respondents. It alleged that:

1. the court had unnecessarily found that the Central Jakarta Religious Court did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case;
2. that the Basyarnas decision ordered it to return to the applicant other costs not related to the transaction in question; and
3. it had unnecessarily authorised the second respondent to ask Bank Indonesia to sanction the applicant if it failed to comply with its decision.

The applicant also claimed that Basyarnas had made a legal error by directing the secretary to register an official copy of the decision with the Central Jakarta Religious Court registrar, when Law No. 30 of 1999 requires that such decisions be registered with the State Court (Pengadilan Negeri). The applicant also claimed that the Supreme Court, in the first instance, had cited art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari'a Banking, stating that as the dispute was a shari'a banking dispute, the religious courts had jurisdiction, only to then declare the religious courts did not have jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the applicant's review (peninjauan kembali) appeal, ordering it to pay costs of IDR 2.5 million. In doing so, it held that no legal error had been made by the court in the first instance. Rather, that the parties to the dispute had already clearly stated that the dispute would be resolved via arbitration, thereby invoking art 2 of Law No. 30 of 1999, and precluding the state courts and religious courts from having jurisdiction (art 3 of Law No. 30 of 1999). The court also noted that Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2008 conflicted with art 59(3) of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Authority, and had accordingly already been rendered null and void by Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2010. Moreover, while the applicant had sought to invoke art 70(c) of Law No. 30 of 1999, it had failed to prove upon what misleading information its opponents' case had rested.