SHARIAsource

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of Turkmenistan, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Turkmenistan's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of South Africa, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under South Africa's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Burundi (Republique du Burundi/Republika y'u Burundi), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Burundi's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Djibouti (Republique de Djibouti/Jumhuriyat Jibuti), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Djibouti's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Azarbaycan Respublikasi), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Azerbaijan's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under Guyana's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Maldives (Dhivehi Raajjeyge Jumhooriyyaa), based on research produced by the Library of Congress. Under the Maldives' Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) is the principal source of legislation. 

The parties were married on 12 September 1984 and had two children (born 15 June 1985 and 9 April 1992). Initially, the marriage had been harmonious, however, by June 2006 it had become quarrelsome. The cassation respondent had submitted that the cassation applicant:

1. in July 2006, had begun hitting her and demanding a divorce;
2. married another woman without the cassation respondent's permission; and
3. would often leave the home without any reason or warning.

Problems escalated and, on 26 October 2009, the cassation applicant left the cassation respondent. The cassation respondent, in the first instance, requested that the local religious court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba’in sughra), as well as IDR 3 million per month in child maintenance.

The defendant submitted a counterclaim against the plaintiff for:

1. divorce compensation (iwad) (IDR 2 billion); and
2. permission to divorce the plaintiff before the Court (ikrar talak).

In the first instance, the Sidoarjo Religious Court (2881/Pdt.G/2012/PA.Sda) found in favour of the cassation respondent, granting her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba’in sughra), and ordering the cassation applicant to pay to the cassation respondent IDR 3 million per month in child maintenance, plus IDR 650,000 in court costs. The court dismissed the cassation applicant's counterclaim.

The cassation applicant then lodged an appeal with the Surabaya High Religious Court. The Surabaya High Religious Court upheld the judgment of the lower court, and ordered the cassation applicant to pay court costs.

On 11 December 2013, the cassation applicant submitted a request for cassation to the Indonesian Supreme Court based on the following grounds:

1. the two lower courts had not considered his counterclaim for divorce compensation (khuluk) in the amount of IDR 2 billion; and
2. the cassation applicant’s counterclaim was for land that he had previously purchased for the cassation respondent.

Pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the court upheld the decision of the Surabaya High Religious Court, dismissing the cassation applicant’s reasons for cassation, and ordering him to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).

The parties were married on 19 June 1992 and had three children (aged 21, 18 and 10). The plaintiff submitted that the defendant had:

1. frequently physically abused her;
2. did not take care of the plaintiff; and
3. had married another woman without the plaintiff’s approval or knowledge.

In September 2013, the defendant left the plaintiff moving the plaintiff to file for an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba’in sughra). While the defendant attended the first hearing, he failed to attend the subsequent hearing, despite being officially summonsed. The parties, pursuant to art 130 of Herziene Inlandsch Reglement, in conjunction with art 82 of Law No. 7 of 1989, as amended by Law No. 3 of 2006 and Law No. 50 of 2009 on Religious Courts, attended court-sanctioned mediation but failed to reconcile their differences. The defendant then agreed to the divorce but objected to the plaintiff's claim that he had physically abused the plaintiff.

The court found that the parties' marriage no longer fulfilled the purpose of marriage, as stipulated in art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974, in conjunction with art 3 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Accordingly, the court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict. The court ordered the plaintiff to pay court costs (IDR 341,000).

Plaintiff Sturgeon Stewart, an inmate at the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) brought suit against Respondents Vernestene Dulin, head of prison food services, and various other prison officials for alleged violations of his rights to religious free exercise on the claim that the prison served Muslim inmates the same ḥalāl food menu for all meals of the day, and that these meals excluded meat. Ḥalāl food is meat prepared in accordance with Islamic ritual law, and free of pork and alcohol. The Plaintiff contended that this repetition was not a nutritional religious-accommodating alternative to regular prison meals. The Court found for the Respondents, determining that Muslim prisoners do not have a right under the First Amendment or the RLUIPA to be provided ḥalāl meat entrees. Rather, a correctional facility need only provide Muslim prisoners with food that is not ḥarām (prohibited under Islamic law). The Court found that, as long as the Plaintiff was given an alternative to eating non-ḥalāl meat, he did not suffer a substantial burden to his religious beliefs. The Court determined that the Plaintiff had been provided with alternatives to non-ḥalāl meat, but that the Plaintiff was “simply not happy with the substitutions offered.” Therefore, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s factual allegations, construed as true, failed to establish a violation of the Plaintiff’s federal rights.

This order implements the decision from the District Court of Colorado in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez, who adopted the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang that government officials not receive immunity but that the court dismiss Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions. This order implements that recommendation and decision adopted by the district court.

In this decision, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez adopts the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review of the record, Judge Martinez agreed with Judge Wang’s recommendation that the government officials were not entitled to immunity, as petitioner Ray Anthony Smith had made sufficient allegations to make out a prima facie claim. Also following Judge Wang’s recommendations, Judge Martinez dismissed Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Bahrain (Mamlakat al Bahrayn), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Bahrain’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status, and is the principal source of legislation.

The first respondent, the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syari'ah Nasional – Basyarnas), had made a decision on 16 September 2009 between the second respondent (PT. Atriumasta Sakti) and the applicant (PT. Bank Syariah Mandiri), ordering the applicant to return to the second respondent IDR 878,791,366. This figure comprised a banking provision cost payment of IDR 350 million, or one per cent of the value of the financing facility worth IDR 35 billion, because the Murabahah agreement between the two parties had been declared invalid by the first respondent; IDR 45,027,000 in project insurance monies; IDR 5,962,700 in upfront employee social security payments; IDR 298,135,000 to the DKI Jakarta Government Construction Structuring and Supervision Services; and instalment repayments of IDR 179,666,666. The applicant was also ordered to return to the respondent any other costs associated, provided those costs could be verified by the Public Accountants' Office. Basyarnas also decided that if the applicant failed to abide by its decision, the respondent could lodge an application with Bank Indonesia (the Indonesian central bank) to hand the applicant an administrative sanction, and reduce the applicant's credit rating.

The court noted that, pursuant to art 70 of Law No. 30 of 1999, as well as the Elucidation of Chapter VII of Law 30, in conjunction with Law No. 7 of 1989 as amended by Law No. 3 of 2006, and Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2008, a party to such a dispute may request that a religious court declare a Basyarnas decision null and void. Article 70, however, only applies if: a. the decision was based on the submission of a false document; b. a relevant document was concealed by the opposing party; or c. the decision was based on misleading information. In this instance, the applicant claimed that the first respondent had failed to consider material legal facts to its case, therefore invoking art 70(c). Based on a submission made by the second respondent that the applicant had failed to carry out the second and subsequent stages of liquidation deriving from the Murabahah financing facility, the first respondent had determined that the applicant had defaulted on its agreement with the second respondent. The applicant claimed that the first respondent had ignored the fact that it was actually the second respondent who had defaulted by:

1. failing to produce the original building permit and then failing to the applicant with a copy, pursuant to art 3(1) of the Murabahah agreement;
2. failing to pay the notary, pursuant to art 3(4) of the agreement; and
3. failing to transfer its own self-financing monies, pursuant to art 3(23) of the agreement.

While the second respondent had already shown the applicant a building permit management services contract between it and H. Jayadi Kusumah, as well as proof of payment of a quote for 1 March 2005 for IDR 3,212,500,000 to H. Jayadi Kusumah as a buliding permit enactment management fee, as well as permission for other construction for the Ruko Soho Carbella Square project, the applicant claimed that the first respondent had ignored the fact that the reliability of this quote had not been established. Moreover, the applicant had even requested to see the quote via the Basyarnas secretary, pursuant to trial procedures, but had been denied. This, the applicant claimed, precluded it from carrying out its end of the bargain. In short, the applicant claimed the second respondent had failed to hand over to the applicant its building permit, whereas the second respondent had claimed it had paid IDR 3,212,500,000 to H. Jayadi Kusumah to arrange the building permit and other necessary construction permits.

The applicant also claimed that there was a material disparity between the final draft of the Basyarnas decision and the decision provided to the Central Jakarta Religious Court insofar as the Religious Court had been told that Basyarnas would not accede to claims for damages until their reliability had been verified by the Public Accountant. While the Religious Court declared the Basyarnas decision null and void, the Supreme Court found that the Religious Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, thereby reinstating the Basyarnas decision.

Pursuant to art 67(c) of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, in conjunction with Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the applicant requested the court reconsider (peninjauan kembali) its decision on the grounds that the court had granted more than that sought by the respondents. It alleged that:

1. the court had unnecessarily found that the Central Jakarta Religious Court did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case;
2. that the Basyarnas decision ordered it to return to the applicant other costs not related to the transaction in question; and
3. it had unnecessarily authorised the second respondent to ask Bank Indonesia to sanction the applicant if it failed to comply with its decision.

The applicant also claimed that Basyarnas had made a legal error by directing the secretary to register an official copy of the decision with the Central Jakarta Religious Court registrar, when Law No. 30 of 1999 requires that such decisions be registered with the State Court (Pengadilan Negeri). The applicant also claimed that the Supreme Court, in the first instance, had cited art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari'a Banking, stating that as the dispute was a shari'a banking dispute, the religious courts had jurisdiction, only to then declare the religious courts did not have jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the applicant's review (peninjauan kembali) appeal, ordering it to pay costs of IDR 2.5 million. In doing so, it held that no legal error had been made by the court in the first instance. Rather, that the parties to the dispute had already clearly stated that the dispute would be resolved via arbitration, thereby invoking art 2 of Law No. 30 of 1999, and precluding the state courts and religious courts from having jurisdiction (art 3 of Law No. 30 of 1999). The court also noted that Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2008 conflicted with art 59(3) of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Authority, and had accordingly already been rendered null and void by Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2010. Moreover, while the applicant had sought to invoke art 70(c) of Law No. 30 of 1999, it had failed to prove upon what misleading information its opponents' case had rested.

The parties were married on 21 January 1994 and had four children (aged 19, 17, 12 and 7). Initially, their marriage was harmonious; however, by December 2010, it had become quarrelsome. The cassation respondent had claimed that:

1. the parties could not reconcile their differences;
2. the cassation applicant could not commit to Islam (despite having converted to Islam from Christianity to marry the cassation respondent, he then, in 2006, reverted to Christianity, only to convert to Islam again in 2011);
3. the cassation applicant had not provided her with financial support for the last three years.

Problems escalated and, in April 2011, the parties separated. The cassation applicant, in the first instance, requested the local religious court grant her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba’in Shughro). In Decision 1048/Pdt.G/2013/PA.Kab.Kdr (18 September 2013), the lower court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted her an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba’in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, and ordered her to pay IDR 691,000 in court costs.

The cassation applicant then lodged an appeal with the Surabaya High Religious Court (3427/Pdt.G/2013/PT.Sby), which upheld the judgment of the Kediri Religious Court.

On 11 February 2014, the cassation applicant submitted a request for cassation to the Supreme Court based on the following grounds:

1. that the Surabaya High Religious Court had applied the law incorrectly, granting a divorce despite the cassation respondent's claim for divorce not being established with any legitimate evidence;
2. that the aforementioned evidence was inadequate because the marriage was actually stable and harmonious; and
3. that the cassation respondent's true motive for divorce was to be with her boyfriend, while the interests of the parties' children were not adequately considered by the court.

Pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the court upheld the decision of the Surabaya High Religious Court, dismissing the defendant’s reasons for cassation, and ordering him to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).

The prosecution submitted that the accused had raped the 13-year old victim, his own biological daughter, contrary to arts 49, and 1(30) and (25) of Aceh Qanun No. 6 of 2014 on Criminal Law, on a day in October 2015 at around 4.00pm, and then again on 5 November 2015 at around 4.30pm. The prosecution submitted that upon learning that his daughter had been physically intimate with her own step-father, the accused visited her at his sibling's home, where she was living, and raped her on at least two occasions. On the first occasion, the accused allegedly told the victim that he was raping her because she was no longer virginal ('udah hancur'), that she therefore had ruined her future, and that he would take her to Medan where she could become a prostitute ('lonte'). On the second occasion, on 5 November 2015, the accused again allegedly raped the victim while threatening her that he would either kill her or send her to Medan to become a prostitute.

A medical report submited by the prosecution revealed that the victim had been raped on several occasions. The prosecution submitted that, pursuant to arts 49, and 1(30) and (25) of Aceh Qanun No. 6 of 2014 on Criminal Law, the prescribed punishment for incestuous rape is either between 150 and 200 strokes of the cane, a fine of between 1500 and 2000 grams of pure gold, or a prison sentence of between 150 and 200 months. The prosecution requested, therefore, that the accused be imprisoned for 16 years.

The court acknolwedged that the charge was one of rape, rather than zina (sexual relations out of wedlock), meaning that the evidentiary burden contained in Aceh Qanun No. 7 of 2013 on Criminal Procedure applied, rather than that of four witnesses, as in cases of zina. Moreover, as Aceh Qanun No. 6 of 2014 prescribed a ta'zir punishment for rape, the court was of the opinion that a prison sentence would reduce the chances of the accused reoffending. In sentencing the accused to 15 years' jail, less time already served on remand, the court also acknowledged the seriousness of the offence and the need to protect children from such abuse, citing Law No. 35 of 2014 on Amendments to Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection.

The parties were married on 18 November 2005 and had two children (born 2006 and 2007). The cassation respondent had submitted that the parties were not suitable from the beginning and that they had quarrelled regularly because:

1. the cassation applicant would often return home very late without reason, even during her pregnancy with the parties’ first child, a time when the cassation respondent most needed support from the cassation applicant;
2. the cassation applicant seldom provided financial support, and what he did provide was insignificant considering his salary as a member of council (anggota dewan);
3. when living with the cassation applicant in the cassation applicant’s parents’ home, the cassation respondent felt unsafe because she was often left alone with the cassation applicant’s brothers;
4. when the cassation respondent raised the issue of financially supporting the marriage, the cassation applicant would hit and verbally abuse her;
5. when the cassation respondent finally left the cassation applicant and lived with her parents, when she tried to return to live with the cassation applicant, the fighting would reoccur, with the cassation applicant often intoxicated;
6. the cassation applicant often slandered the cassation respondent’s family.

The physical abuse continued and, on 29 November 2008, the cassation applicant attended the cassation respondent's place of work, where he hit and kicked the cassation respondent, resulting in her being hospitalised with an injury and bruising to her leg. The level of abuse peaked on 24 October 2009, when the cassation applicant struck the cassation respondent in the head several times. Fearing for her welfare and that of the children, the cassation respondent locked herself and the parties' children in a bedroom and escaped out a window, fleeing for her parents’ home. The cassation respondent then attempted to file a report with the local police, but subsequently withdrew it because, as a member of council (anggota dewan), he was a public figure. On 4 November 2009, the cassation respondent eventually attempted to file for divorce in the Semarang Religious Court. During the process, however, the cassation applicant made amends and declared his love for the cassation respondent. The cassation respondent subsequently withdrew her application and the parties attempted to reconcile. On 23 April 2011, the parties had an argument and the cassation applicant declared that he wanted to divorce the cassation respondent and focus on his career in public office. The cassation respondent returned to the cassation respondent’s parents’ home but the divorce was not properly concluded. On 24 November 2011, the cassation applicant was arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) and reported in the mass media. The cassation respondent alleged that the cassation applicant's conduct had caused her and their children psychological damage and distress, and that the marriage was no longer tenable.

The cassation respondent, in the first instance, had requested that the local religious court terminate the marriage and grant her custody of the children, as well as to order the cassation applicant to pay court costs. The lower court (830/Pdt.G/2012/PA.Smg), pursuant to art 39(f) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, in conjunction with art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, granted the cassation respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba’in sughra) on the grounds of ongoing conflict, and custody over the children with visiting rights to the cassation applicant. The lower court, however, ordered the cassation respondent to pay court costs (IDR 491,000).

The cassation applicant lodged an appeal with the Semarang High Religious Court. The Semarang High Religious Court (091/Pdt.G/2013/PTA.Smg) upheld the lower court's judgment and ordered the cassation applicant to pay court costs (IDR 150,000).

On 2 January 2014, the cassation applicant submitted a request for cassation to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the Semarang High Religious Court had not applied the law properly, that there were inadequacies and contradictions in the witness statements, that the cassation respondent was having an extra-marital affair with another man, that the children needed a father figure, and that it was his responsibility to be head of the household. The cassation applicant also submitted to the court that he was concerned the cassation respondent was not fit to have custody of the children.

Pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the court upheld the decision of the Semarang High Religious Court, dismissed the cassation applicant’s reasons for cassation, and ordered him to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).

The parties were married on 20 October 1990 and had two children. The cassation respondent had submitted that during the marriage the parties had accumulated joint assets (harta bersama), comprising:

1. property title no. 1218, in the name of the cassation applicant to the value of IDR 4.5 billion, also in the cassation applicant’s possession;
2. property title no. 171, in the name of the cassation applicant to the value of IDR 500 million, also in the cassation applicant’s possession;
3. a pharmacy, in the name of the cassation applicant to the value of IDR 35 million, also in the cassation applicant’s possession; and
4. one vehicle to the value of IDR 300 million, in the name of the cassation applicant, and in the cassation applicant’s possession. 

These joint assets became the object of dispute between the parties. The cassation respondent had brought a claim in the Semarang Religious Court for his share of the assets. He submitted that the cassation applicant was uncooperative in transferring his lawful share of the assets. The cassation respondent submitted that he had repeatedly tried to claim his share of the assets but that the cassation applicant continually refused to cooperate. The cassation respondent alleged that the cassation applicant’s refusal to transfer the listed items, or equal value of the assets, 50-50 between the parties, contravened the principle of the division of matrimonial assets, as contained in the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

In the first instance, the Semarang Religious Court (No. 1607/Pdt.G/2012/PA.Smg) on 22 July 2013, found in favour of the cassation respondent, ordering a 50-50 division of the assets in dispute, and ordered both parties to pay court costs (cassation respondent: IDR 1,871,000; cassation applicant: IDR 775,000).

The cassation applicant lodged an appeal with the Semarang High Religious Court (No. 233/Pdt.G/2013/PTA.Smg), which amended the decision of the Semarang Religious Court, ruling in favour of the cassation respondent and ordering the cassation applicant to pay court costs (IDR 150,000).

The cassation applicant lodged a request for cassation on 6 March 2014. The cassation applicant submitted that the Semarang High Religious Court did not follow the regulations and misapplied the law because it did not take into account the obligations of each party to third parties when apportioning the division of the assets. The cassation applicant submitted that:

1. the properties subject to dispute were purchased with her own money;
2. during the construction of the house the cassation respondent had never provided financially for the family, despite having a sizeable income; and
3. the cassation respondent had not provided a financial contribution towards the education of the children.

The cassation applicant also submitted that the cassation respondent had omitted several joint assets from his initial claim:

1. property in the name of the cassation applicant valued at IDR 1.3 billion;
2. a vehicle valued at IDR 80 million;
3. proceeds of the sale of various items to the value of IDR 260 million;
4. another vehicle valued at IDR 80,000,000;
5. debts owed to several banks and persons; and
6. medical and education expenses for the parties' two children.

The Supreme Court did not accept the cassation applicant’s reasons for cassation, and, pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, dismissed the appeal. The cassation applicant was ordered to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).

The Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 establishes the fatwā legalization process in the state of Selangor, Malaysia. It also establishes and outlines the role of the mufti as the chairman of Selangor’s state fatwā committee. It is the main piece of legislation governing Selangor's syariah courts, Islamic finance guidelines, individual conversion to Islam, as well as other Islamic regulations the state has determined to regulate. 

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.