SHARIAsource

In response to a question on the abortion, or ijhāḍ, of a six month fetus with deformities in the thigh bones, Grand Muftī Shawky Ibrahim Allam of Egypt's Dār al-Iftā' states that scholars unanimously agree that if the age of the fetus reaches 120 days, the period when the soul is breathed into it, then it is impermissible to abort the fetus and absolutely prohibited in this case. However, he adds that if the mother’s physician decides that the survival of the fetus poses a danger to her life or health, then it is permissible to abort the fetus, prioritizing the stability of the mother’s life and health over that of the fetus.

In December 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) considered the question whether Muslim citizens who lived in the Greek province of Thrace could be required to submit to the jurisdiction of Islamic law, as detailed by local experts called muftīs. In Greek law, Islamic law usually governed matters of family law—such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance—in cases involving the Muslims in Thrace. This arrangement was a legacy of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. When the ECHR considered whether this arrangement should persist, it considered a case in which a Muslim man had died, leaving everything to his wife in his will. His sisters contested the will, arguing that it improperly circumvented the authority of the muftīs. Greece’s highest court agreed with the sisters. With the will invalidated, the muftī distributed one-fourth of the estate to the widow, and the rest to the sisters, in accord with Islamic inheritance law. The widow appealed to the ECHR. This Court determined that the Greek government had misinterpreted the treaties, which did not require a separate legal framework for Muslims. It further noted that Greek case law was inconsistent about “whether the application of Sharia law [sic] is compatible with the principle of equal treatment and with international human rights standards.” In addition, the Court emphasized a right to "free self-identification”: people should be free to opt out of differential treatment from the government on the basis of belonging to a minority group, and the government should not force minorities into a special legal category in the name of protecting them. The Court held that Greece, by compelling the Muslim minority of Thrace to follow Islamic law, had violated Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.

Fatwa concerning the legality, from an Islamic law point, of a certain inheritance distribution, with heirs and beneficiaries and their shares named.  The answer provided by the Mufti of Gumulcine, dated 11 April 1946, is that the specified distribution is lawful under Islamic law.

This is a power of attorney prepared by the Mufti of Gumulcine (Greece), dated 22 November 1961. It authorizes by the local governance board of Uysalli Village in Gumulcine the right to nominate someone who is a reputable Muslim. The document appoints Huseyin the son of Haci Hasan. The power of attorney concerns the movable and immovable property and especially the land owned by a certain person [name not legible]. The power of attorney gives the person to be nominated the authority to sell and collect rent form the property, as well as to sue or protect the property through all legal means.

Translated, this fatwā reads as follows:

Number: 35

According to Islamic law, which of the spouses, who are separated because of incompatibility and by divorce, has the right to protect, educate and restrain their child?

Answer: According to Islam, the right to protect, educate and restrain these children belongs to the mother until the boy reaches the age of 7, and the girl 9.

See also in Kitab-ı Fıkhiyye.

23 November 1992 

Mufti of Komotini

(Seal and signature)

This fatwā concerns whether a Muslim can transfer movable and immovable property to one or some of his heirs through a will. The answer provided by the muftī is that the permission and acquiescence of all other heirs is required.

In this paper, Muftī Faraz Adam considers whether Bitcoin can be considered currency in Islamic law by interpreting relevant classical legal texts with the aim of identifying the principles defining money in Islamic law. He identifies three necessary elements for currency to be money: that it constitute māl (wealth), taqawwum (legal value) and thamaniyya (monetary usage in exchange markets). He determines that Bitcoin constitutes wealth (māl) and has legal value (taqawwum), However, he determines that it cannot be considered to possess valid or stable monetary usage (thamaniyya) due to its volatility and associated risks. Muftī Adam further determines that this form of cryptocurrency does not pass the principle of preservation of wealth (hifẓ al-māl) that form part of the fundamental objectives of Islamic law (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) and its associated values of justice or equity (‘adl).

In this paper, Muftī Muhammad Abu Bakar determines that cryptocurrency is permissible under Islamic law in principle as it is treated as a good with value, as evidenced by its high market price on global exchanges and its acceptance as a form of payment at a wide variety of global merchants. He further notes that the permissibility of cryptocurrency is determined by its classification as currency in a governing legal and regulatory environment. Where jurisdictions prohibit dealing with cryptocurrency, its usage is prohibited in Islamic law as well. Muftī Abu Bakar adds that, before trading with cryptocurrency, users must consider its volatility and associated risks, given that preservation of wealth is one of the fundamental objectives (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) of Islamic law. He concludes that, overall, it is not advisable to buy cryptocurrency for investment purposes, but to utilize it as a system of payment instead. 

Translated, this short fatwā reads as follows: 

Number: 42

Can either Muslim Refi’i or his wife give away their child to a Christian for adoption, regardless of whether the marriage is dissolved or not?

Answer: No, it is not allowed.

17 September 1987

Deputy Mufti of Komotini

 (Seal and signature)

Translated, this fatwā reads:

Number: 11

Muhammed’s wife Hediye is deceased and would it be vaild to give 2 shares of the estate of the deceased to her son Sadık and one share to her daughter Ferişte in accordance with the science of farā'id?

Answer: It would be valid.

Would it be valid under the law to give one share of the land of the deceased Hediye to her daughter Ferişte and one share to her son Sadık?

Answer: It would be valid.

4 February 1980

(Seal and signature)

When asked about the permissibility of cryptocurrency, Muftī Muḥammad Taqi Usmani responded that, although he is not satisfied with it due to its speculative purposes which seem impermissible in principle,  he will have to defer his decision until a later date in the case that its use may expand into real trade. He mentions that its mass use is not likely due to the possibility of weakening economies at the hands of an elite few, so he does not encourage its usage. 

Grand Muftī Shawky Ibrahim Allam of Egypt's Dār al-Iftā' states that all uses of cryptocurrencies, including trading, buying, selling, leasing, are religiously prohibited (ḥarām) because of their negative effects on the economy, disruption of the market equilibrium and the concept of work, and the lack of required legal protections and financial oversight for traders. The Grand Muftī also concludes that cryptocurrencies infringe on the rights of those in authority, dispossessing them of their special prerogatives in this domain, and may give rise to damages from uncertainty, ignorance, and fraud in novel banking processes, standards, and values. For him, this conclusion finds support in the general statement of the Prophet Muḥammad that "He who deceives us is not of us.” Given the high risks that cryptocurrencies pose to individuals and to government, he thus concludes that there is further support for their prohibition with reference to the Islamic legal canon of “no harm”; “lā ḍarar wa-lā ḍirār.” He came to his decision by reference to economists and other related experts.

In this excerpt from his manual on judicial practice, Khaṣṣāf (d. 260–1/874–5) discusses the qualifications that ought to be present in a qāḍīand the procedures that he must follow to issue a valid judgment. “After listing the Quran, the Sunna of the Prophet, consensus, the precedent of the Prophet’s Companions and their followers (tābiʿūn), and personal discernment as valid bases for the qāḍī’s judgments, Khaṣṣāf adds that if jurisconsults are present in the city, the qāḍī might also consult them. If his opinion accords with theirs, he can issue a judgement accordingly; alternatively, he might use his own reasoning if their views do not converge. If his own view disagrees with all of theirs, he may write to other jurisconsultsin other cities and judge accordingly. In her chapter in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Nahed Samour uses this passage to point to the presence of other professional figures in court, such as jurisconsults (muftīs), who, by virtue of their juridical knowledge, compete and cooperate with the qāḍīin judicial consultations.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

A Toledan man named Ibn Ḥātim was accused of being a heretic by sixty witnesses on the initiative of a fellow Toledan called Ibn Labīd al-Murābiṭ. The judge consulted with the local jurists, and following their legal opinions, he sentenced the accused to death. However, he granted the accused the right to challenge the witnesses (iʿdhār). Ibn Ḥātim escaped from Toledo and found refuge in the neighboring kingdom of Badajoz. Ibn Labīd went after him, carrying a copy of the judge’s sentence (tasjīl) along with the legal opinions of a number of non-Toledan jurists. In Badajoz, the ruler withdrew his support from Ibn Ḥātim, who fled again, this time to Cordoba. While in Cordoba, the “moral” police arrested Ibn Ḥātim, and the judge imprisoned him, giving him two months to prove his innocence. Unable to do so, Ibn Ḥātim was crucified alive. A number of legal issues arise in the course of this case: should the process of iʽdhār—the right to challenge witnesses—be granted to those accused of heresy (zandaqa)? Should refuge be granted to them? What happens with the estate or inheritance of an executed zindīq? Can a judge reverse a sentence given by another judge? The source is a collection of court cases by Andalusi scholar Ibn Sahl (d. 486/1093), and it is based on information directly available to the compiler, who was also a witness of most of the events described.