SHARIAsource

The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) in Lucknow, India responded to the Karnataka High Court’s decision that ḥijāb is not "essential" in Islam, and that state colleges are authorized to bar Muslim women from wearing it. The Board states that the High Court’s verdict contradicted Article 15 of the Indian Constitution, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, gender, caste, class, or place of birth, and guarantees individual liberty to all citizens, as well as the right to identity. They thus conclude that this decision is an injustice against the constitutional freedoms of Indian citizens. The Board also expresses concern with secular state courts making decisions on what is or is not essential religious practice, stating that “it is not in the jurisdiction of the courts to decide this but that of the ulemas [sic] and scholars.” They further note that the Indian Constitution accords every individual the right to determine what is essential in their religion. On a related matter, they add that the establishment of a common Uniform Civil Code—as has been further proposed—in a multi-religious country will interfere in the fundamental rights of religious freedom, and further negatively impact the religious and individual rights and freedoms of Muslim citizens in Indian. 

The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) in Delhi, India responded to the Karnataka High Court’s decision that ḥijāb, or wearing a headscarf,  is not "essential" in Islam, and that state colleges were authorized to ban Muslim women from wearing it on their campuses.  The General Secretary of the AIMPLB, Hazrat Maulana Khalid Saifullah Rahmani Sahab, responded that hijāb is in fact an essential and agreed-upon part of Islamic law and practice (sharīʿa) and that some form of it is obligatory, or wājib, for every Muslim woman.

At a meeting in Lucknow on February 5, 2023, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) passed a resolution opposing the Indian government’s proposed Uniform Civil Code. The Board noted that the proposed UCC was “neither relevant nor beneficial for a multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-lingual country like India.” The Board further expressed concerns that the UCC would divide India along religious and cultural lines, and that it would erode safeguards around religious freedom and equality.

On February 8, 2023, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) filed an affidavit with the Supreme Court of India asserting that it is permissible for women to pray in mosques, provided that there is segregation of men and women within the mosque. The Board also included a note to the Muslim community at large that, when mosques are being constructed, separate women’s prayer spaces should be included in the construction plans.

As part of their sharīʿa implementation programs, a number of sharīʿa states established new official Councils of Ulama or Sharia Commissions, sometimes with advisory and sometimes with administrative or regulatory functions. Other states established Ministries of Religious Affairs or Offices of Special Advisors to the Governors on Religious Matters, with similar functions. These new bodies were added to older ones, such as the Religious Preaching Boards established in many states in the 1970s and 1980s to regulate Islamic religious preaching in particular. The materials gathered here document all these bodies and their work, including the older Preaching Boards. The materials include all relevant statutes, plus official reports where available, and reports of interviews conducted during fieldwork over a number of years.

These materials are a part of The Nigeria Papers – a SHARIAsource Special Collection, compiled and edited by Independent Scholar Philip Ostien and others. 

The Khoja Case, also known as the Aga Khan Case, is one of the rare cases profiling the Shia Imami Nizari Ismaili community (henceforth “Ismailis”). Decided in the High Court of Bombay in 1866 by the Honourable Sir Joseph Arnould, this case was brought by a series of Ismaili plaintiffs who argued that the Ismaili Community was a Sunni community, and therefore did not owe allegiance to the Aga Khan as its leader. The Court held that the Ismaili Community was in fact a Shi’a community, that the Aga Khan was the authoritative head of the community, and therefore, that he had the right to exercise his traditional modes of authority.

In Danial Latifi & Anr v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India (the “Court”) considers whether the Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Divorce Act, 1986 (“the Act”) abrogates its ruling in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Others (“Shah Bano”).[1] In Shah Bano, the Court held that divorced Muslim women unable to support themselves have a right to lifetime maintenance under Section 127 of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, which does not conflict with Muslim Personal Law[2] ostensibly limiting rights to mahr[3] and maintenance during the period of iddat.[4] [5] In Danial Latifi, the Court holds that the Act did not overturn Shah Bano, but instead that divorced Muslim women who are unable to maintain themselves are entitled to receive a one-time lump sum payment during the period of iddat sufficient for lifetime maintenance. The Court chiefly justifies this ruling by arguing that abrogating Shah Bano, would violate various constitutional rights of Muslim women. The Court also makes prudential arguments concerning the impact of abrogating Shah Bano on divorced Muslim women’s economic circumstances, and moreover holds that abrogation would be contrary to Islamic law.

[1] Danial Latifi & Anr v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740 (India).

[2] India has a uniform criminal code, but different personal codes addressing family law for various religious communities. This dual system is very controversial in India.

[3] A sum agreed upon prior to marriage to be given to a wife in two parts (one deferred and one immediate).

[4] The roughly three-month period where re-marriage is forbidden to divorced women.

[5] Shah Bano produced political backlash resulting in the passage of the Act referenced above, with the intention of overturning the ruling. See supra note 1.

In Javed & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.,[1] the Supreme Court of India (the “Court”) considers whether a non-retroactive state law barring elected members of various local governments from having more than two children is violative of various articles of the Indian Constitution (the “Constitution”). The law was challenged by disqualified candidates who argued that the law was discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable, that it violated fundamental rights per Article 21, and interfered with religious freedom guarantees in Article 25.[2] The Court holds that the law is reasonable and not arbitrary or discriminatory given India’s overpopulation problem and the perception of a clear nexus between reducing population and encouraging local leaders to be role models.[3] The Court also holds that contesting and holding elected office are not fundamental rights, and even if they were, the public health limitation would mean that the law does not encroach on such rights.[4] But the focus of this paper is on the Court’s analysis with respect to religious freedom, where the Court in effect holds that the public health and welfare limitation must govern and that regardless, polygamy, and having more than two children is not an “integral part” of Islam and there is no conflict with the Muslim personal law.[5]

[1] Javed & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 369 (India).

[2] Supra note 2 (Article 25 of the Indian Constitution is analogous to the American 1^st amendment’s religious freedom protections, but with an explicit public health limitation).

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] See id. (India has separate personal codes addressing matters such as marriage for different religious communities..

Xinjiang, officially the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is a region in Central Asia and home to several ethnic groups, including the Uyghur, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, in addition to a large Han Chinese population. In recent years, the conflict between Uyghurs and the Beijing government has intensified due to the government’s policies of mass surveillance, increased arrests, and a system of “re-education camps,” which reportedly held more than a million Muslim ethnic groups. The 2017 Regulation was introduced as providing legal justifications for the government’s mass detention policies on anti-terrorism grounds. It was enacted on March 29, 2017 by the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the region’s legislature. Article 14 of the 2017 Regulation authorized the government to effectuate “education and transformation” through “individual and collective” education programs. Article 48 further authorized criminal penalties for violation.

This Supreme Court regulation provides clarification and a set of guidelines regarding the provision of legal aid to parties unable to afford in-court legal services.

In 1986, the Aga Khan IV promulgated a global Ismaili Constitution, which brought the social governance of the Ismaili community under one umbrella. It was envisioned as a document which could harness the best in individual creativity while creating an ethos of group responsibility. The global Constitution, amended in 1998, covers a range of topics including authority over the community, family and personal law, dispute resolution mechanisms, and the formation of institutions relevant to the community. 

This fatwa regulates the slaughter of sacrificial animals during the Hajj al-Tamattu. Said slaughter is to be carried out on haram land, and if a person cannot afford to purchase such an animal (generally, a goat), they may instead fast for 10 days: three days on haram land, seven days upon their return home.

This section of al-Jarīda al-Rasmiyya officially promulgates the first two books of the Moroccan Personal Status Code, the Mudawwana. The first book presents the stipulations concerning marriage, including issues such as the contract, dowry, and inhibitors (like number of wives). The second book deals with the dissolution of marriage, thus addressing conditions of repudiation, women’s repudiation, and the ʿidda (the woman’s waiting period until she may remarry).

In response to the decision that the Federal (civil) High Court holds jurisdiction over syariah courts on the matter of legal custody in Indira Gandhi Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & ORS (2013), Pathmanathan Krishnan successfully appealed his case in 2015 to the Civil Court of Appeals in Pathmanathan Krishnan v. Indira Gandhi Mutho & Other Appeals (2015). The Court of Appeals held that first, the Judicial Commissioner had no jurisdiction to determine the issue of the children’s conversion to Islam as the validity of the conversion of any person to the religion of Islam and status of whether a person is a Muslim or not was “a matter falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shariah Court under section 50 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (Perak) Enactment 2004.” Secondly, the court held that the learned Judicial Commissioner had “committed a grave error when he approached the jurisdiction issue” by venturing into the constitutional construct of the fundamental liberties.

To fund construction for a new building without violating Islamic law's prohibition against interest, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN) entered into an ijāra agreement with Devon Bank; the bank created a subsidiary for the purpose of the ijāraagreement. Under the agreement, Devon Bank had legal ownership of the building's title until ICN could fully purchase the building. After ICN paid the amount for the building's construction, ownership was transferred to ICN from Devon Bank. ICN applied for a property tax exemption, including for the time period in which Devon Bank held the title for the building. The state of Tennessee denied ICN the exemption for the period in which Devon owned the building, but granted it for the time after. ICN appealed that decision. 

In November 2021, the UAE government issued a new personal status law from Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahayan, president of the UAE federation of seven emirates, titled Law No. 14 of 2021 Concerning the Personal Status of Non-Foreigners Muslims in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The law covers civil marriage, divorce, alimony, joint child custody, proof of paternity, and inheritance. Most notably, this new law allows for civil marriage, not just marriage under Islamic law. It allows expats, tourists, and non-residents to marry in Abu Dhabi and allows foreigners to follow their home countries’ laws on matters of inheritance and divorce.

The plaintiff , an American citizen whose wife was killed in a suicide bombing in Israel, sued Iran under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (allowing suit against sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism), for intentional infliction of emotional distress and economic loss due to wrongful death of his wife in a suicide bomber’s attack in Israel. The plaintiff argued that Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security should be held financially liable, as there were financial ties between the group that claimed responsibility for the attack, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Iran. Iran failed to make an appearance or file an answer. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $10,380,568 for emotional and economic loss.

Additional commentary. The FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §1605(a) is the terrorism exception to FSIA and what plaintiffs depend on to get jurisdiction over Iran. §1605(a)(1) stays that “A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case not otherwise covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” While there is no direct connection to Islamic law, there is a dispute that centers around whether Iran -- an Islamic constitutional state -- sponsors military operations conceived of as jihad under the guise of Islamic law.

Plaintiff Hilton Karriem Mincy, a Muslim prisoner at the Lycoming County Prison, brought this suit against the Respondents – the county prison, the prison warden and other prison officials – alleging that the prison’s inadequate food service during Ramadan, which included no hot meals at the end of the day and evening meals of insufficient caloric content to compensate for the absence of a daytime meal, constituted a failure to accommodate his religious beliefs and a violation of the RLUIPA. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, and the Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiff identified no official policy promulgated by the prison administration which violated his constitutional rights, and there was no evidence to suggest that any named Respondent played a direct role or had any personal involvement in the preparation or storage of food.

This regional regulation makes provision for the handling of beggars, vagrants, and displaced and promiscuous persons. It states that the sexually promiscuous are those who have sexual relations out of wedlock for financial or material gain, contrary to social, religious, and moral norms. Within the definition the regulation includes pimps, male prostitutes, and transsexual/transvestite prostitutes (art 1(11)).

Holding: A Mormon minister is entitled to tax exemptions under § 513 of the 1859 Hawaii Civil Code, which exempts “all clergymen of any Christian denomination regularly engaged in their vocation” from the obligation of paying personal taxes.

Procedural posture: Tax collector filed for assumpsit (a common law action brought to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract) to recover defendant’s personal taxes in the District Court of Koolauloa, HI. The Court, sitting without a jury, found for defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Islamic law is not relevant, except that the defendant testified he is not “a Mohammedan” and does not “accept the Koran,” and that the Court noted that “Mohammedanism” is one of the four “grand systems” of the religious world.

Judgment: Judgment for the defendant, in an opinion authored by Judge McCully.

Facts: Defendant Henry Richards was a minister of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormon Church) who was sent as a missionary to Hawaii. At trial, to determine whether he qualified as a “Christian clergyman” exempt from personal taxes under § 513 of the 1859 Hawaii Civil Code, Richards testified as to his religious beliefs. They included belief in, inter alia, baptism, the Gospels, revelation, polygamy, the atonement of Christ, the Holy Ghost, and the Book of Mormon. The Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Hawaii found that, because the defendant believed in Christ and accepted the Old and New Testament, he was a Christian clergyman for tax purposes. The Court addressed the concern that Mormons have more scriptures than the Bible by stating that the Roman Catholic Church has accepted revelation and papal infallibility, but is still considered Christian. Furthermore, the Court concluded that because Richards did not himself practice or preach polygamy in Hawaii, his belief was not grounds for excluding him from being a Christian minister. Therefore, the Court concluded that, as a Mormon minister, Richards qualified for the personal tax exemption given to Christian ministers.